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ABSTRACT 
This research focus on the use of information in complex public decisions in multiactor, 
multiobjective, no unique solution processes. It specifically uses the decision process on the 
location of the new crossing over the Tagus estuary as a case study. Most people saw the 
governmental choice as "merely political", considering that information was not used for 
making the decision. This may be true, but there was plenty of information around and people 
used it, particularly after the controversy generated by the decision. 
An unexpected solution, that came to be supported by planners and environmentalists 
concerned with sustainability, emerged out of an interactive process. The initial innocuous 
straightforward decision between two agreed alternatives became a controversial choice when 
the third one appeared. The debate shifted from the crossing location to the desired model of 
development for the metropolitan area. 
Information was widely used and transformed. New information was generated in forums. 
Despite the absence of horizontal coordination, a shared model of development and a strong 
networking provided an integration, making this process unique. Information acquired 
powerful meaning and was translated into simple statements loaded with complex illuminated 
imagery. 
Information use triggered action. New interest associations emerged and existing ones 
revised their strategies and operation modes. They learned to work together sharing resources, 
to formally deal with higher instances, and to work within wider settings. Besides, there 
appeared the need for restructuring existing institutions and for new ones to improve the public 
decision processes. 
vii 
Este trabalho foca-se no uso da informagiio em processos de decisiio pdblica em contextos 
multi-actores, multi-objectivos, e sem resposta dnica. Recorre a um caso de estudo sobre o 
processo de decisiio da localizaqiio da nova travessia do Tejo. Muitos viram a escolha 
governamental como sendo "meramente politics", considerando que a informaqb niio foi usada 
na decisiio. Talvez seja verdade, mas houve informagiio substancial e as pessoas usaram-na, 
em especial depois da controvkrsia gerada pela decisiio. 
Uma soluggo inesperada, que veio a ganhar o apoio de planeadores e ambientalistas 
preocupados com sustentabilidade, emergiu de um processo interactivo. A pacifica solugiio 
inicial entre duas alternativas tornou-se uma decis%o controversa com o aparecimento da terceira 
opqgo. E entiio que o debate se desloca da localizagiio da travessia para o modelo de 
desenvolvimento desejado para a Area metropolitana. 
A informaq20 foi amplamente usada e transformada no processo, e informagiio nova foi 
gerada em forums. Apesar da falta de coordenagFio horizontal, o modelo de desenvolvimento 
desejado para a Brea metropolitana e a forte rede de relagaes (networking) desempenharam um 
papel integrador. A informaqiio assumiu um papel importante, sendo traduzida em imagens de 
grande significado. 
0 uso da infornaggo conduz B ac~iio. Associag6es de interesse emergiram e as existentes 
modificaram estratkgias e modos de actuaqiio. Aprenderam a trabalhar em conjunto partilhando 
recursos, a lidar formalmente com instdncias mais elevadas, e a funcionar em contextos 
alargados. Foi identificada a necessidade de criar novas instituiqaes e de reestruturar as j i  
existentes para urn melhor funcionamento dos processos de decisiio pdblica. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The decision was made - a new crossing over the Tagus river 
in Lisbon will connect Sacave'm to Montijol. This seems to 
bring to an end in a remarkably short time one of the most 
controversial public decision processes in the Portuguese 
history. 
"Never has a public work of such a dimension generated 
so much debate nor led to such a controversial solution'". 
It was even called by an environmentalist the 
"error o f  the c e n t u ~ " ~ .  
There is a widespread problem today of making complex technical decisions in 
multiobjective contexts with many players, interests and agencies involved, and under an 
increasing public scrutiny. The problem is how to make technically competent decisions while 
also satisfying the interests and creating feasible solutions in this shared power complex 
context. These situations are increasingly common and we have very little guidance from the 
literature on how to handle them. The standard practices of using top down centralized 
planning and decision making, and relying on separate functional agencies are increasingly 
inadequate to handle these complex tasks (e.g., decisions on the National Road Infrastructure 
made exclusively by the National Road Authority (JAE)). Moreover, the simplistic models that 
we have of decision making and the role of analysis are not sufficiently helpful. This is a 
problem across all developed nations, and Portugal is particularly becoming confronted with it 
Council of Ministers, 92.07.30. 
.M Fernandes - Pu'blico (94.04.03). 
J J  Me10 - Pu'blico (94.04.03). 
today due to its entrance in the EECIEU, a growing awareness among the public and an 
increasing organization of interest groups. 
Moreover, there is a frustrating feeling among professionals that very often important 
technical information produced is not used in major decisions, or is only partially used. In 
particular, environmental practitioners complain that decisions are exclusively political and 
based on economic factors. Even in cases where there was plenty of information around, some 
is used, some is not, some we do not know. One of the most important complaints of the 
researchers is that information, even when produced, is not used in the decision process. 
Twenty years have passed since the political change towards democracy4. European and 
national law now requires a greater involvement of the citizens in several public policy 
contexts, namely plan development and environmental impact assessment. Growing citizen 
awareness about public issues and the environment generated a growing will of wider 
constituencies to intervene in public life. This intervention is restrained by the essentially 
regulatory existing institutions and bureaucratic decision processes. The institutions are not 
adequate to respond to the growing demand for a more direct involvement of the citizen. 
Operating as safety valves, the existing institutionss are better classified as courts6 or even 
arenas7 (Bryson et al, 1992), but they are far from being the forums8 so urgently sought by 
citizens. 
"To effectively maneuver through the cycle of policy change in a shared-power world, public leaders 
must be skilled in the design and use of forums, arenas and courts, the principle shared powered 
settings in which the policy process occurs." 
The almost total lack of adequate participative institutions has contributed to a rising of 
frustration. In fact, the new interest groups are increasingly challenging authority when they 
have not been included in the process. 
Lacking tradition in public interest involvement and relying in an inherited pyramidal 
hierarchy, our public system can no longer operate in this format. Recent changes at the 
societal level are forcing change to happen. Readaptation to the new needs is imperative. 
Institutions in Portugal are in transition. The country faces now the challenge Zo integrate inputs 
from the participative institutions in a bureaucratic public administration. The public is 
demanding greater legitimacy and improved justification of decisions, and a growing 
involvement in the decision process. It is obvious that a gap of communication exists between 
A military coup in April 25, 1974 overthrew a 48 year old authoritarian regime whose strong man was: most 
of the time the prime minister - Salazar. 
The basic settings within which public leadership is exercised and policy change occurs are according to 
Bryson the forum, arenas and courts. 
courts - institution of judging, which distribute and redistribute access to legitimacy. 
arenas - institution of decision, which distribute and redistribute access to the exercise of power. 
forums institution for debate, which distribute and redistribute access to the communication of meaning. 
Le~lclership,for a Cornnzon Good, tackling public problems in a shared power world, by John M Bryson and 
Barbara Crosby, Jossey Bass Publishers, 1992, pp.81. 
our public bureaucratic institutions and a wider constituency claiming a more participative role 
in the decision process. The need to integrate participative mechanisms in an highly 
bureaucratic administration is generating a lot of tension. This is even more difficult due to the 
distinct rules and procedures under which each one of these groups (the bureaucratic public 
administration and the participative groups) operates making it rather difficult to render 
compatible their working together. 
A clear example of this is the decision process on the location of the new bridge over the 
Tagus river in the Lisbon region. The civil disobedience in June 1994 on the bridge is an 
indicator of the changed political climate and the reformulated set of expectations. Portugal will 
have to deal with this and develop a decision making process that anticipates and resolves such 
issues before they surface in this way. Defenders of a wider public involvement, namely 
environmentalists, are saying that what is needed is more consensus building, involving people 
with different knowledge and stakes in face to face discussions. This can help solve conflict, 
create relationships, networks, and social and intellectual capital. 
Dialogue may be one of the ways to improve the present situation. Identification of the 
problems and debates may provide the possibility to link to representative democracy the 
advantages of the participative democracy (Roseta, 1994). This approach can be innovative and 
good for problem solving by generating a greater diversity of solutions, allowing for different 
approaches, and taking into account a greater variety of interests and issues. It can also come 
out with a more adequate solution. Further, advantages can be drawn from this, such as greater 
diversity of solutions, strong legitimization of decisions and even gains in power (e.g., Seattle 
and ~ v o r a ;  in both these cases an interactive planning process assured the political support of 
wider constituencies who reelected the Mayor despite declining votes in their own parties). 
What sometimes seems as a take over of power can be a way to strengthen that same power. 
Literature on consensus building (e.g., Innes, 1990) claims that the crucial point lies in getting 
the right people, the adequate data and an efficient process. Though this is a key aspect, it is 
important also to establish the right multiway processes. 
There is often plenty of information around, some is used, some is not, and some we do 
not know. One of the most important complaints of the researchers is that information, even 
when produced, is not used in the decision process. Facts are interpreted within the existing 
social and cultural context. Information is not value free, but acquires meaning as it is exposed, 
debated and used. This "socially constructed" information is important (e.g., Innes,1990) but 
not enough to assure that technical advice is considered in the political settings. This explains 
how the office created by the government "to develop the studies needed to present a proposal 
for the location of the crossing", the GATTELlO, reached agreement and came up with a new 
l0 "develop, coordinate and control the activities needed for the promotion of construction and exploration of a 
second road crossing of the Tagus in the Lisbon region" @L 14-A/91) . 
proposal, but not why the government did not agree or follow the recommendation. It also 
does not explain why there was no overall consensual commitment from the municipalities, 
parties and some other public sectors. 
Though the technical community complained that information was not used, I disagree. A 
substantial amount of opinions and pieces of information circulated once positions of members 
of government, mayors, environmentalists and other actors began to be known. Information 
was not used in the restricted way of making the decision in accordance to the technical 
suggestion, but it was used in debates and argumentation to defend positions, to express 
opinions and to support interests. It influenced the way people saw the issue, and in some 
cases it generated change. 
This study examines these issues through a detailed in depth case story of the analysis 
phase of the proposal for location of a new bridge over the Tagus river. Initially I conducted 
the research in this dissertation to assess what information was used by the players, why and 
how it was used. Along my inquiry I found out that, though there was no obvious interactive 
setting, the GATTEL Planning Team set in motion a collaborative group process that had a 
considerable impact, particularly at the level of the technical community. This experience 
resulted in a lot of networking and interaction, besides favoring the development of important 
meaning of the technical information and a good articulation among the different topics. It 
produced highly credible documents. In fact, these publications were, widely used later on by 
whomever sought arguments in this public process. 
Simultaneously, I found that the local politicians and technicians operating in the region 
were already invested with a previous period of reflection on the future of the metropolitan area 
of Lisbon as a whole. It was this group, particularly at the technical level, that expressed their 
distress for not being heard by the central government. Although the population, particularly 
the Southern residents, followed attentively the evolution of this decision process, they really 
only expressed themselves when they were directly affected by the increase of the toll fare, 
already in June 1994. Somehow, this resulted from the perception previously developed that 
the bridge located towards the far west of the estuary would not solve their problem -- 
everyday congestion. At this time, once more the complaints were that they were not heard, 
even when they tried to call attention, and there were no participative mechanisms. This 
frustrated feeling of not being heard is an indicator of the gap between the traditional 
bureaucratic administration and the remaining society. A growing demand to fill it in has been 
expressed frequently by several players. 
Initially, I was concerned with what factors made information used. However, I soon 
found out that interaction among users was a result of the use of information and a strong 
factor in substantiating information coming from the different sectors, giving it powerful 
meaning and a coherent articulation of knowledge. This favored acceptance. Along the process 
I learned about the changing processes and demands on public choice in Portugal. The case of 
the location of the new bridge over the Tagus estuary represents the paradigm of public 
decisions in the Portuguese context. This case study explores this paradigm. 
The thesis research is a contribution to knowledge because it documents an innovative 
case, looks to it critically in the light of the literature. This case allows to build theory providing 
support to further more structured comparative studies. It does help to illuminate issues in the 
bureaucratic system, providing understanding for dealing with complex technical multiuse 
tasks. The dissertation looks at questions such as how information was used and what made a 
difference. It explores how consensus building was designed in several arenas to deal with this 
complex, multiparty, multi-issue problem. The study focuses mainly on the one year process 
(from the creation of the GATTEL in January 1991 to the decision of the Council of Ministers 
in July 1992) to prepare a proposal for a new crossing of the river via a special steering 
committee and a technical advisory group that was unlike any set up before in Portugal. 
However, the aftermath was closely followed to help clarify some less understood features. 
This is a dissertation designed to document the public decision on the location of the new 
crossing over the Tagus, to illustrate the tensions in the current system and show how an 
innovative introduction of group processes enhanced the use of technical information. The 
purpose is to see how this innovation worked and why it did or did not have an impact on the 
final product and recommendations. It shows that the findings of this participatory analytic 
project did not get integrated into the final result and explains this in terms of the structure of 
Portuguese central government and the expectations of its members. 
The group reached agreement but the government did not accept their proposals. This 
created considerable problems to the government, although such a disagreement with a 
consulting group might not have had that effect. This group did something unusual in creating 
a new alternative that was not in its work agenda when it found the alternatives expected to 
consider could not meet the goals they were given. This study asks how it happened that they 
refrarned the problem and came up with a new solution, although it was not in their mission to 
do so. It also asks how and why, despite the technical groups strong consensus, the central 
government did not use their conclusions. 
The process on the decision about the second crossing over the Tagus in the metropolitan 
area of Lisbon was set up to generate technical advice, but by the end it seems that not much 
attention was given to the proposed suggestions. However, the GATTEL Planning Team, 
designed to achieve technical consensus, accomplished its tasks in accordance with the phasing 
of the GATTEL project. Furthermore, other restricted arenas also built consensus through 
debate (e.g., environmental associations). What was regarded by participants as a simple, 
straightforward analysis and decision, between two obvious one choice alternatives, doable in 
a short span of time, changed when an unexpected solution developed during the studies 
emerged. This new option broke consensus and transformed the process into an endless 
conflictual decision between the unexpected and the initially obvious solution, challenged by 
several entities at all levels. 
What makes this case so much interesting is the wide debate it generated involving all sort 
of entities, the innovative processes it created, the new solutions it produced and the intense 
use of information. Information was used by professionals and the community at large, in the 
sense that they argued over it and it entered the debates, supported positions, generated new 
solutions. The large amount of technical information available among politicians and 
technicians working in the metropolitan region and the previous reflection on the metropolitan 
area issues were key factors for this to happen. 
I found out with this case that the use of information triggers action. This is because it 
provides support for argumentation, it supplies people with the necessary tools to take a stand 
while giving them self assurance. Once this happens players may take action. While doing this 
they often revise their ways of operation or their strategies. This is done through interaction 
with other people. Interaction makes a difference because it favors further exchange of 
information and ideas, rendering the process richer. It might however contribute to growth in 
complexity by bringing to the debate additional interests and factors. 
Information affects action. I found out that in this case information was used. Not in the 
way most people look at it, as a "direct link between data and decisions" (Innes, 1988), but as 
an essential ingredient for action. Information was used by professionals, activists and the 
public in general, and while using it made them get involved in action. 
COMPLEX DECISIONS IN A SHARED POWER CONTEXT 
This problem of making public decisions in multiobjective contexts, with many players and 
under increased public scrutiny, is the result of a complex interplay of several factors. The 
extraordinary scientific and technological developments of recent history provided powerful 
means of transformation of energy, exploitation of natural resources, production of goods, 
storage, processing and dissemination of knowledge and information, shortening distances and 
time. The large demographic growth that occurred generated new needs and interconnections 
due to increased population densities. The associated depletion of natural resources and the 
approach of 'limits of growth' brought to the decision processes new serious restrictions. A 
larger educated society raised the general understanding of issues and provided a much wider 
group of people with techniques for analysis, for expressing their points of view and for 
defending their interests. .The more recent development of extremely powerful means of 
knowledge and information handling and communication, and the associated growth of public 
information through the media, led to a much wider constituency in public issues. The 
emergence of an 'open society' called for a wider participation of people in public decision 
processes. 
From a practical point of view, the problem is how to make competent decisions taking into 
account the possible satisfaction of involved interests and leading to feasible solutions in this 
complex 'shared-power' context. Though this problem arises in increasingly common 
situations, we have very little guidance from the literature on how to handle it. The standard 
practices of using top-down centralized planning and decision making, and relying on separate 
functional agencies are increasingly inadequate for such complex tasks. Moreover, the 
simplistic models of decision making that we have, and the role of analysis, are not sufficiently 
helpful. 
This is a problem across all developed nations, and Portugal is particularly becoming 
confronted with it today due to an increasing educated population, a wider awareness of the 
factors involved in public decisions, an increased organization of interest groups and an 
expanded information delivered through the media, enhanced by the emergence of the first 
private TV channels in the country. The recent entrance to the EECIEU accelerated the process 
through a tremendous increase of available development funds, new requirements of public 
participation and an enlarged decision context involving new instances of conflict resolutions, 
namely at the European level. 
CONSENSUS BUILDING THROUGH GROUP PROCESSES 
Proponents of a wider participation, in particular environmentalists, are insisting on the 
need of more consensual decisions, involving the participation of people with different 
knowledge and stakes in face-to-face discussions. 
The literature on consensus building points out that, although its methods are based on 
mediation and negotiation techniques and on experience in disputes, for policy purposes it also 
performs a broader and more anticipatory role, involving "the framing of public issues, 
developing agreement on facts, and then setting desired policy directions, developing plans, 
regulatory principles and even implementation strategies" (Innes et al., 1994)ll. The crucial 
points in effective consensus building processes are identified as getting the involvement of the 
right people, providing access to the adequate data, and assuring an efficiently managed 
process. 
l1 Innes, Judith, Judith Gruber, Michael Newman and Robert Thompson (1994) Coordinating Growth and 
Environmental Management Through Consensus Building. A Policy Research Program Report. California 
Policy Seminar. Berkeley, University of California. (pp.5). 
An earlier and wider involvement of diversified constituents in well designed forums will 
have consequences at four levels: identification of stakeholders interests, conflicts avoidance 
and resolution, problem solving, and decisions legitimation. 
In fact, open wide debates involving stakeholders at early stages of the decision process 
will: (i) improve the knowledge on different actors interests and commitments, bringing to the 
forefront possibly unexpected points of view; (ii) help to avoid andfor resolve conflicts, create 
relationships and networks between participants with varied and maybe conflicting interests, 
and develop a common social and intellectual capital hardly attainable otherwise; (iii) generate a 
greater diversity of solutions, allow for different approaches accounting for a greater variety of 
interests and issues, increase the likelihood of coming out with better decisions by widening 
the range of options and by confronting them with unforeseen points of view; (iv) enhance the 
legitimacy of decisions and even allow gains in power to politicians. This may at first sight 
appear as a sharing and weakening of the decision makers power, but such a process can be a 
way of strengthening and rendering more effective that same power by expanding the 
supporting constituency, thus providing an appropriate setting for linking representative to 
participative democracy. 
THE CENTRAL ROLE OF INFORMATION 
Bridging the gap between the interests of stakeholders as well as supporting the analysis of 
different decision options and a choice between alternatives requires the contribution of 
information. A central role is played by information and knowledge in the two following 
extreme decision process models: (i) the hierarchical, bureaucratic, goal oriented, highly 
rational, expert-based decision making around narrowly defined problems, and (ii) the shared- 
power, fragmented, issue oriented, multiobjective, broad agreement decision-making around 
complex problems. These models represent two extremes of conceptual frameworks and can 
appear mixed together in real decision processes. Information is used differently in each one of 
them. It is mostly used in a restricted expert based context in the former pure model and in a 
broader interactive setting in the latter. 
In the second model, the achievement of shared views and consensus or broad agreement 
among different stakeholders requires "a process of constructing, deconstructing and 
reconstructing beliefs" (Dunll, 1989) for which the confrontation with information is essential. 
Facts are interpreted within an existing social and cultural context. Information is not value 
free, but acquires meaning as it is exposed, debated and used. This 'socially constructed 
information', as it is sometimes called, is important in public decision processes and constitutes 
an "intellectual capital, in the form of shared and agreed upon facts and understandings, (that) 
provides a common basis for discussion and moves the players towards agreement on policy 
issues" (Innes et al., 1994)12. 
THE LOCATION OF A NEW TAGUS CROSSING IN LISBON 
THE CASE: BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
One century old history, two historical pathways 
The one century old history of debates over crossings of the Tagus river in Lisbon evolved 
since the end of the last century. The high potential for reshaping a whole metropolitan area and 
the impact on the transportation network are already reasons enough for generating controversy 
and debate. For more than a century studies and projects have been proposed by engineers, 
firms and public agencies. Technical limitations and costs, forced the search for the shortest 
path between both banks. Since the first proposal in 1876 until nowadays, the projects 
presented considered just the two shortest pathways connecting Lisbon to the other bank in 
Mon tijo and Almada. 
The professionals working in the area usually considered only the two shortest pathways, 
despite more recent technological advancements, the new emerging urban approaches and the 
changes in the urban features of the metropolitan area in recent years. But things changed since 
the initial crossing proposals. Nowadays, technological advancements allow for wider 
alternative locations which were difficult at the end of last century. Plus, the new concerns with 
the environment, and the concept of sustainability associated with the notion of limited natural 
resources, forced urban planners to revise the old planning models and to give higher priority 
to the way land is used. Moreover, the changing demographic and economic trends in Lisbon 
called for new policies. The decreasing of the number of residents in Lisbon and the shifting of 
the tertiary functions upwards North is having negative effects on the core of downtown and 
requiring revitalizing policies. 
These new realities did not trigger significant changes before the creation of the GATTEL. 
The historic restriction of the possible Tagus estuary crossings reduction to the two shortest 
pathways influenced the plans and debates developed in the area, keeping professionals 
operating in the region attached to this mental framework. This is easily confirmed by the plans 
in development for the area prior to the GATTEL studies, which only considered the crossing 
in Monti jo  (e.g., PIDDS13, municipal plans, written documents from the forum of 
municipalities issued before the creation of the GATTEL, Electoral Manifest for the Lisbon 
Municipality in 1989). 
l2 idem (pp.47). 
l 3  PIDDS - Plano de Desenvolvimento do Distrito de Setu'hal - Distrito of Setu'bal Development Plan. 
The 25th of April Bridge follows the two shortest pathways rationale 
The construction of the first bridge14 across the estuary, under Salazar, followed the two 
historic pathways rationale, fulfilling one of them -Almada. Opened to traffic in 1966, this 
bridge generated high development in the Southern bank, due to lack of experience, 
underestimation of the consequences, and inadequacy of controls. Fixed bridge fares over the 
years did not take into account inflation, contributing in real terms to increase accessibility to 
the South. 
Already at the end of the 19501s, the governmentally mandated commission for the 
construction of the existing bridge showed concern with the possibility that the accessibility 
provided by the bridge would generate undesirable development. The Commission expressed 
concerns that the bridge would lead to "urban expansion". It defended turning the bridge into 
an exclusive interaction device and suggested ways to avoid development side effects usually 
brought by increased accessibility. The existing bridge opened a new front of development in 
the much less expensive land of the Southern municipalities. Almada, Seixal and Barreiro, the 
municipalities closer to the bridge, grew chaotically, due to the unmanaged expansion pressure. 
The Southern population growth, the increasing number of vehicles in circulation and the 
strong dependency on jobs located in the capital generated traffic growth that exceeded the 
bridge capacity. Congestion on the bridge compromises the residents quality of life and the 
economic development of the region. The government concerned with the situation decided to 
initiate the studies for a second bridge and enacted legislation to create the GATIEL. 
Effects of the 25th April Bridge imprint on the minds of concerned 
professionals 
A large number of professionals working in the area still have in their minds the urban 
development of the Southern municipalities that followed the construction of the 25th of April 
bridge. They associated these consequences not only with the increase of accessibility, but also 
with the fact that it established a direct link between an urban and a rural area, without having 
assured adequate land development controls. Even today, some professionals consider that 
adequate controls would prevent this from happening again, while others think that it is not 
possible to enforce them. 
Open to expansion by the increase of accessibility provided by the new bridge, the rural 
Southern bank went through drastic urban development during the years that followed the 
construction. Cheaper land for development was available in the Southern bank as soon as the 
l4 First called Salazar Bridge, after the political regime strongman and afterwards changed to 25th of April 
Bridge following the ~niitary coup of April 25, 1974, that overthrew a 48 years old authoritarian regime. 
decision to construct the 25th of April Bridge was made known, creating a reserve of land for 
needs well beyond the year 2,000. 
With the development of the South, mostly for residential purposes, and the continuous 
dependency of its residents on North bank jobs, the traffic grew and exceed the bridge 
capacity. The generated congestion compromised the quality of life of everyday commuters. 
Long lines15 of vehicles line up every morning to enter Lisbon, frequently taking up to 2 hours 
to reach the 3 km long bridge platform. Presently, the North-South road connection has proved 
insufficient. Both bridges serving the area - the 25th of April Bridge in Lisbon and the Vila 
Franca de Xira Bridge 25 km North of Lisbon - have reached their maximum capacity and 
the traffic is subjected to delays caused by congestion that generates long lines of vehicles. 
Other paths to the South 
The other crossing proposed and assumed generally by the professionals is in Carregado. 
The National Road Plan (1985) proposed this bridge to capture the North-South traffic and to 
relief congestion of the Vila Franca de Xira Bridge. Carregado is well away from the estuary 
in a narrower river path about 30 km North of Lisbon. 
Decision on the construction of a new bridge 
The government decided to construct a new crossing over the Tagus river in Lisbon 
connecting Sacave'm to Montijo16. This brought to an end, in a remarkably short time, one of 
the most controversial public decision processes in Portuguese history. "Never has a public 
work of such a dimension generated so much debate nor led to such a controversial 
solution"17. It was even called by an environmentalist the "error of the century"18. 
The media began referring to the possible construction of a new bridge in 1990, when the 
government had a working group considering that possibility. In January 1991, the 
government created the GATTEL, the group assembled to "execute, coordinate and control the 
needed activities to promote the construction and exploration of a second road crossing of the 
Tagus in the Lisbon Region"l9. 
The GATTEL appeared in a period of an intensive local and regional urban and 
transportation planning activity. Policy guidelines for the restructuring of the metropolitan area 
and some of its subsections were under way. The involvement of several entities in these 
processes (municipalities, regional commission, municipalities association, transportation 
agencies) created space for debate and interaction. Professionals working in these plans and 
- 
l5 frequently 12 km long. 
l6 Council of Ministers 92.07.30. 
l7 JM Fernandes - Publico (94.04.03). 
l8 JJ Me10 - Pu'blico (94.04.03). 
l9 DL 14Al91. 
studies became more acquainted with the region and had the possibility of reflecting on the 
issues. This developed the "intellectual capital" that made the process unique. A high 
interaction among public agencies, professionals, municipal politicians and technicians 
developed as a result of the simultaneous involvement of several agents in these plans. This 
interaction grew during the development of the GATTEL studies for the location of the new 
bridge. 
Previously and simultaneously with the studies developed by the GATTEL on the bridge 
location, planning and transportation plans under way in the region created a space for 
discussion and reflection on the future of the metropolitan area. Information flowed, interaction 
among entities and debates developed. The municipalities were preparing their local plans. 
Meetings among politicians, professionals (consultants and municipal technicians) and, in 
some cases, the population were held. By the end of the 19801s, due to the forthcoming 
regional land use plan for the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon, these entities held joint meetings, 
searched for consensus, carried on debates on concerns and future expectations either for their 
territory or for the region as a whole. For the first time, wide debates among professionals and 
politicians operating at the municipal level were organized to agree upon the desired future for 
the metropolitan area. Written documents came out of these meetings, a focus that continued 
throughout the development of the Regional Land Use Plan for the Metropolitan Area of 
Lisbon (PROTAML) . 
As a municipal technicians said: 
"there were almost daily meetings between groups for discussing 'everything'; it was a very 
interesting period. ... There was a 'metropolitan reading', a will developed in the people to not only 
look at hislher municipality per se but also in relation to the metropolitan area, (considering) the 
vocation of each municipality within the metropolitan area, and understanding what was expected 
from it." 
This means that the municipalities increased their capacity to think regionally. 
The unexpected alternative 
With the location in Almada covered by the existing bridge, the municipalities and the 
GATTEL assumed that the future connection would be in Montijo, the historically rooted 
alternative. It is within this setting that an unexpected solution was developed by the G A m L  
during the studies, transforming the once innocuous straightforward decision between two 
agreed one choice alternatives, into a controversial choice between an unexpected additional 
option and the previously widely accepted solution. 
In reviewing the data and discussing the issues, the GATTEL Planning Team observed that 
the alternatives considered were inadequate, including the one everyone initially accepted. The 
GATTEL Planning Team organized brainstorming sessions to generate all possible 
connections. Individuals involved in these sessions put together the environmental constraints 
map and the road network system in both banks to obtain the possible crossing corridors. The 
corridors generated by this process were debated and their feasibility assessed. One of these 
corridors obtained support in these sessions - the central option. Though feasible for a road 
connection, it was not clear that it could also be adequate for a train crossing. Not sure about it, 
one of the professionals gathered a few other team members to check this possibility in the 
field. And, as a surprise to all, including themselves, a third alternative for a road and train 
crossing, that nobody anticipated at the outset was developed. 
The GATTEL made public the unexpected crossing - the central corridor or Barreiro 
crossing - and it gained acceptance and legitimacy within the technical community. One 
transportation planner, while interviewed, showed amazement about the unexpected alternative, 
by stating 
"It is incomprehensible how it took so long to find out. No one had seen what was under our eyes." 
The unexpected option represented a change to an already institutionalized solution. Some 
professionals had a first negative reaction to it, due to a perceived overburden that would result 
from connecting two already developed areas. However, the proponents of the new alternative 
argued that this option was a recovery device for two economically depressed areas and that it 
had greater potential to capture the traffic on the existing bridge. After understanding the 
rationale of the arguments in favor of this option and getting used to the idea, a growing 
number of professionals perceived the opportunity created by the new alternative and 
enthusiastically adopted it. Even the professionals who insisted in sticking to the East corridor 
in Monti.jo, sometimes said during the interviews that both bridges were needed and the 
question was just a matter of priority. 
Initially, in accordance with the problem definition, the search was for a solution for the 
existing congestion on the 25th of April Bridge. As the studies developed and the unexpected 
alternative emerged the discussion shifted to the wanted future image of the metropolitan area. 
The municipalities had to revise their options and, mostly in the South, they lined up on the 
issue according to geographical location. The unexpected central corridor option, favored by 
the GATTEL Planning Team, as stated in its reports, connects Lisbon to one of the most 
populated areas in the South. Most municipal technicians and politicians of Almada, Barreiro 
and Seixal, the more populated Southern municipalities responsible for the generation of most 
of the traffic in the existing bridge, saw the newly developed alternative as an opportunity. It 
would more efficiently address the congestion problem by capturing traffic from the existing 
bridge. Simultaneously, this option was an economic opportunity for two depressed urban 
areas - Chelas and Barreiro. It also avoided damaging the environmental amenities in the 
periphery of Lisbon, preventing from opening new development fronts and taking advantage of 
already infrastructured spaces. So it was also an attractive solution for environmentally 
concerned individuals. These were not, at the time, considered goals for the location decision, 
but were seen as strong advantages of this solution. 
The whole debate centered around the new option and the previous widely accepted 
solution that came to be the governmental choice. This decision was strongly opposed by 
environmental groups. They argued that it would irreversibly damage an area of high natural 
value. For the first time in Portugal a decision of the Ministry of Public Works was publicly 
challenged by other Ministries (Ministry of Planning and Ministry of Environment). Also for 
the first time, a judicial complaint was filed by an environmental association against the 
Portuguese government. 
Besides the high potential of the bridge to spatially reshape a whole metropolitan area, what 
makes this case so interesting is the public controversy generated over the solutions proposed, 
and the amount of available information a wide number of participants debated, changed and 
articulated during the whole process. Though congestion and the North-South connection were 
stated in the legislation, several other issues emerged, namely environmental protection, urban 
development model, cost, technical problems of bridge construction, improvement of quality of 
life, infrastructures, train connection, location of the new airport. 
Some arguments played a powerful role in reframing the people's views along the process. 
Change occurred because the arguments used became meaningful and accepted. This meaning 
was developed along the process in the forums created. During the whole process forums 
developed while informal information links were created to exchange updated information. 
This built trust and provided space for debate. The more formal forums, organized by the 
GATTEL, municipalities, the Municipalities Association, political parties, professional 
associations and interest associations, expanded the opportunity to display and debate a large 
amount of information. The strong link established between the central corridor and the 
economic recovery of two depressed areas North and South of the river, the amount of traffic 
capture from the existing bridge and the challenge of the old urban development model for 
Lisbon, were central for people changing opinion. The importance of these arguments can be 
appreciated by recalling that previous plans considered the Montijo crossing. Several 
municipalities were reaching the final phase of their Municipal Plans, what made this change 
more difficult to them due to the necessity of adopting the plans to the new option. 
There is evidence that some participants who initially did not accept the new alternative 
changed their minds later on. One municipal technician, who at first reacted against the new 
solution, came to accept the arguments supporting it and in one week generated the necessary 
layouts to make that option possible in his municipality. Initially, the process was set up to 
achieve technical consensus, but by the end it was not clear how much attention the 
government gave to the developed technical advice. The technical reports produced by the 
GATTTEL reveal a preference for the central corridor, contradicted in the final recommendations 
of the GATTTEL Document 6 written and signed by the Steering Committee. 
Most of the interviewees said that "it was a political decision", implying that factors other 
than the technical advice had far more weight. A transportation planner stated that 
"never was the gap between a technical study and a political decision so wide." 
Once more the usual complaint that the information processed was not used afterwards for the 
final decision came out. 
According to many actors, this process was not so different than most public decision 
processes they knew. However, some actors considered that there was much information 
going around and that it was a "more open" process, meaning that it had a greater access to 
information and involved wide debates. It is true that information was not fully used in the 
traditional rational model view. However, beneath the surface, the feverish activity generated 
by the opposing groups, urged to defend their positions, created informal information 
exchange, networking, joint studies, concerted actions and the emergence of interest groups. 
This whole debate led, among other things, to innovative processes of informal organization. 
This is more important because Portugal is in an early stage of the participation process and 
therefore, in a period of designing adequate institutions to carry the task. A wider use of 
technical information is a key factor in the process of developing participative mechanisms, but 
it is far from being the only one. It is, therefore, crucial to analyze the way technical 
information is used, changed and reformulated, as well as the processes established to do it. 
This may provide us with some clues on how to design the settings for enhancing participative 
mechanisms. 
Debates over the data collected (land use, environment and transportation), particularly 
within the technical community, produced information and generated new concepts reshaping 
the way people were looking at the issue, sometimes making them abandon the previously 
position for the new one, but surely there was no consensus. The objectives stated in the 
legislation influenced the problem definition, though people interviewed molded the problem 
according to their interests, views, factors at stake, images and convictions. The unexpected 
alternative brought a new way to look at the problem affecting people's views. In the process 
(1) consensus was broken, (2) the old image of the town was challenged, (3) the old 
consensual urban model was challenged, (4) the problem was reframed, (5) new images 
developed, (6) new alternatives emerged, (7) innovative actions appeared, (8) debates 
occurred. I argue here, that all this activity was only possible because technical information 
was used, debated, reframed, changed, added. It had an important role in educating, in 
promoting regional thinking, in making people aware of solution packages, in creating new 
shared meanings and myths, in developing new images, in establishing informal interaction 
networking, in circulating information that would otherwise stay indoors. This new intellectual 
capital will influence the regional and local policies in the years to come. 
A change already happening is that people who continued defending the Montijo 
connection consider a second bridge in the central corridor as essential, though as a second 
priority. Some people even reported that the Minister of Public Works, who stood for Montijo, 
is one of them.20 My arguing here is that the initial framing of the problem of the crossing was 
inadequate, as it was proved later. It was not a one solution issue, therefore lack to provide 
space for reframing the problem made the conflict unavoidable because of the number of 
interests in the area. 
This dissertation focuses on the use of technical information, why it was so widely used 
and whether its use made a difference. It is not a political science dissertation. Therefore, it 
does not focus on the government decision, but in the whole process. In sum, it is a thesis in 
planning. 
20 Enacted legislation reserves land for the construction of a future bridge in the central corridor. 
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CHAPTER I1 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
To lay a background for the study, it is important to conduct 
a review of the literature on relevant conceptual and 
methodological aspects, and on the topics of direct interest. 
Underlying the whole research are central issues of knowledge 
use in policy. To set up the stage, these issues are briefly 
reviewed here inspired in the line of thought of the survey in 
Judith Innes introduction to the second edition of her book 
Knowledge and Public Policy (1990). Aspects regarding 
bureaucracies, as well as pluralism and interest groups are also 
considered. The rest focuses in the following topics: (i) 
communicative action; (ii) critical theory; (iii) discursive 
democracy; (iv) forums, arenas and courts; (v) stories and 
myths in the creation of shared meaning; (vi) consensual group 
processes; (vii) growth management; (viii) complexity of 
environmental problems. 
POSITIVISM, THE SCIENTIFIC MODEL 
AND BUREAUCRACY 
The dream of reason in public affairs marked the 18th The 18th century 
century Enlightenment and was reassured in the 19th century dream of reason in 
positivism. The promise of the positivists was that "misery and public affairs is 
ambiguity" or the "speculations of theology and metaphysics" reassured by 
would be abandoned and "knowledge would replace politics". positivism-- 
--and reinforced by 
scientific management 
in the 20th century 
Policy makers were 
expected to use 
research knowledge to 
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scientists use the 
empirical evidence of 
experiments to test a 
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absolutely objective 
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impersonal 
instruments for the 
realization of ends 
determined by policy 
makers. The norms of 
rationality of a 
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those of cost-benefit 
analysis 
In the positivist view all "real" questions would be answered by 
the empirical methods of the "natural" sciences or the formal 
methods of logic and mathematics. Anything that could not be 
formulated in terms of these methods would be considered 
meaningless. 
The 20th century scientific management in industry and 
government reinforced this promised logical positivism. This 
movement was especially significant before the Second World 
War, but its implications for the social sciences were felt 
through the 1950's and 1960's when determined efforts were 
taken "to cast the social sciences in the mold of the 
positivistically conceived natural sciences" (Torgerson, 1986). 
The key of the scientific model of knowledge use in policy 
is the belief that policy makers should use facts, statistics, 
theories and findings of formal research and analysis to make a 
decision in much the same way as scientists use the empirical 
evidence of carefully designed experiments to test a hypothesis. 
Knowledge production and use are separate activities. Policy 
makers do the goal setting, experts produce the knowledge and 
do the analysis, and policy makers make the decisions. Experts 
are supposed to be unbiased and absolutely objective (Innes, 
1990). Their work, when competent, is expected to be 
impersonal, independent of whoever performs it in practice. 
It is precisely as impersonal instruments for the realization 
of ends determined by policy makers that bureaucracies were 
conceived (Max Weber, 1947). "A bureaucracy is set the task of 
achieving within the limits set by certain legal and physical 
constraints the most efficient solution of the problems of 
realizing such ends with the means available" (MacIntyre, 
1977). Its impersonality allows those that have to deal with it 
over time to have intelligible "continuous relationships" with the 
organization, no matter who are the acting individuals. This 
implies that files or computarized records are essential to 
bureaucracy, and that "established and agreed criteria of sound 
reasoning" are presupposed, independently of the particular 
agents involved. Therefore, there must also exist presupposed 
methods for estimating costs and benefits for every proposed 
course of action. Thus, the norms of rationality of a 
bureaucracy are those of cost-benefit analysis (MacIntyre, 
1977). 
In a bureaucracy, questions of alternative policies appear to 
be answered in the same way as simple questions of fact. The 
point of view of utilitarianism is adopted: courses of action are 
selected by their greatest expected balance of benefits over 
harms -- their utility - pretty much in the same sense as 
scientific hypotheses are selected in science by their greatest 
explanatory utility of empirical evidence (MacIntyre, 1977). It is 
a point of view supported in instrumental rationality: courses of 
action and institutions are judged and justified as instruments to 
resolve well-defined problems under given goals. 
There are social scientists concerned with making social 
science knowledge more useful to the improvement of society at 
least since the publication of Lynd's Knowledge for What? 
(1939). In this book, to the claim "social science is not a 
scholarly arcanum, but an organized part of the culture which 
exists to help man in continually understanding and rebuilding 
his culture" Lynd adds that "culture presents acute problems 
demanding all the intelligence science can muster" and that 
"social research appears to him to be falling short of meeting this 
need". He was worried that what he perceived as the 
overspecialization, the fragmentation, of the social sciences 
would be an obstacle to its contribution to human emancipation 
and betterment, and criticized the tendency found among social 
scientists to divorce research from values. 
With the Great Society programs of the 1960ts, an 
expanding group of academics shared Lynd's ideal of rendering 
social science knowledge to the service of society improvement, 
some of them drawn from professional fields such as planning. 
The scientific model of knowledge use was predominant at this 
stage, with the development and application of techniques such 
as evaluation and program planning, system analysis, cost- 
benefit studies, data banks, large-scale computer models (Innes, 
1990). 
In a bureaucracy, 
alternative policies 
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Karl Popper (1966) argued that instrumental rationality can 
succeed in politics only under conditions of wide free conjecture 
and criticism, due to the necessarily imperfect knowledge that is 
possible in a complex and uncertain world. He considered 
hierarchy and centralized bureaucracy as obstacles for such 
criticism and called for an open society based on democratic 
pluralism, the participation and influence in everyday politics of 
a plurality of individuals and groups, including not only policy 
makers and experts, but also ordinary citizens, organizations 
and interest groups. 
The open society is viewed as an adaptation to the political 
context of the ideal of a scientific community governed by free 
conjecture and criticism for problem solving, subjected only to a 
shared set of "good practice" norms. From this perspective, 
public policies should be carried out in a way similar to scientific 
experiments, under controlled conditions for a clear analysis of 
causes and effects and open to open criticism before and after 
their adoption and during their implementation. This leads to the 
conception of an "experimenting society" based on a maximal 
generation and dissemination of information about possible 
policies which are to be subjected to open public scrutiny and 
discussion in properly designed forums (Dryzek, 1990). 
From the point of view of pluralism, interest group politics 
is both legitimate and necessary in democratic policy processes. 
Interest groups are, in general, small organized minorities, 
single cause or single interest in their focus, which attempt to 
influence public policy. As such, they provide a linkage between 
the state and major sectors of society, induce the use of more 
information and analyses in the discussion of policy problems, 
create informative networks among the group members, help to 
educate citizens on questions of importance for public issues, 
allow forming feasible working agendas by bringing groups of 
people together behind common preferences and interests, 
provide a plural surveillance mechanism on public policy 
practice, allow for interactive policy making (Lindblom, 1980). 
INADEQUACY OF THE SCIENTIFIC 
MODEL OF KNOWLEDGE USE 
The scientific model of knowledge use began to be widely 
questioned in the 1970's with several objections being raised 
pointing out some of its limitations and flaws. 
Alice Rivlin, after several years in the White House Budget 
Office, recognized cost-benefit analysis as good in comparing 
costs but not in saying what actions should be taken (1971). 
In cost-benefit analysis, a range of alternative courses of 
action are subjected to utilitarian tests. These always presuppose 
some prior choice of alternatives. Furthermore, they presuppose 
one single concept of benefit and harm which can be 
quantitatively graded. They also assume the possibility of a 
calculus of overall benefit and harm summing up the range of 
benefits on one hand and that of harms on the other to calculate 
which course of action is expected to lead to the greatest utility. 
However, benefits and harms are often incommensurable. 
Measuring and rank-ordering them presupposes the adoption of 
a scheme of values. Not only there are alternative methods of 
rank-ordering, but also different actors will adopt and argue for 
different methods. There is also the question of what are the 
effects of a possible action which, in turn, raises the issue of 
how to settle on reasonable standards of prediction. Besides, on 
deciding what effects are to count as consequences of a 
particular action, some judgement is necessary on how far the 
responsibility of the action goes to decide where the chain of 
effects to be evaluated ends. This is again a matter of value 
judgement. Furthermore, a decision must be made about the 
time-scale to be adopted in evaluating consequences, how short- 
term utility should be weighted against long-term utility and how 
to account for differences in predictability. Utilitarianism thus 
requires a background of beliefs, values and evaluative 
commitments (MacIntyre, 1977). 
Allison's study on the Cuban missile crisis under different 
approaches challenged the usefulness of the positivist model by 
showing that the decisions afford easier explanations either in 
terms of bureaucratic behavior or game playing than rational 
The scientific model 
began to be widely 
questioned in the 70's 
Cost-benefit analysis 
does not say what 
actions to take-- 
--and stands on an 
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Policy makers who 
reported using social 
research knowledge 
frequently meant the 
use of concepts and 
perspectives rather 
than specific 
findings. The two-  
communities theory 
attempts to explain 
options. This work, entitled Essence of Decision - Explaining 
the Cuban Missile Crisis (1971), explores three alternative 
conceptual frameworks of analysis: the "rational actor model", 
the "organizational process model" and the "governmental 
(bureaucratic) model". However, many other alternative models 
are possible, focusing, for example, on individual cognitive 
processes, or the psychology of central players, or the role of 
external groups, as well as different blends of the several 
models mentioned. Allison study calls attention to the possibility 
of coherent rational analysis reaching different conclusions from 
the same facts, according to the underlying assumptions and 
categories associated with the conceptual model adopted as 
frame of reference. 
The idea that social data could be value-free and unbiased 
was also challenged. Ethical and legitimacy concerns in policy 
settings were raised. Probably one of the most important 
critiques of the conventional policy analysis model was 
advanced by Tribe, who argued that "analysis is often intended 
not only to aid the decision-maker in choosing a course of 
action, but also to help persuading others of the justifiability and 
wisdom of his choice" (Tribe, 1972, 1973), suggesting that 
"politics wears the mask of knowledge" (Torgerson, 1986). 
The disappointment, felt by the mid 1970's was expressed 
through criticisms that social scientists got the theory wrong, 
policy makers were too "political" to use the information, or "the 
world was too complex for scientific knowledge to be of much 
help" (Innes, 1990). 
It is worth mentioning here Caplan's research on social 
science knowledge use within high level federal policy makers 
(Caplan, 1975). The study involved about two hundred 
interviews. Curiously, respondents showed positive attitudes 
towards this type of knowledge, claimed an ability to assess its 
objectivity and even perceived themselves as using it. However, 
the study finds little evidence of use of specific social science 
findings for specific purposes. Those who said they used social 
research knowledge in policy meant mainly the use of social 
research perspectives and concepts. This widely cited study was 
the basis for the two-communities theory (Caplan, 1977) that 
explains the findings by observing that social researchers and 
policy makers are part of different cultures with different values 
and incentives. 
Other studies that, approximately at the same time, obtained 
similar results regarding to the use of social research in policy 
were those of Knorr and Weiss. The first study was based on 
interviews of seventy governmental officials of the federal, 
provincial and city governments in Vienna, and on 
questionnaires sent to over 600 Austrian social researchers 
(Knorr, 1977). The point of departure for this study was the 
belief that research was mainly used to legitimate decisions taken 
even before the research was done, and to manipulate the 
consent of the citizens, very differently from that of Caplan who 
was looking for confirmation of direct and instrumental 
applications of research findings to decision making. Weiss' 
study was directed to identify which characteristics of research 
studies were associated with usefulness. Over 250 decision 
make.rs in issues related to drug abuse and mental health were 
interviewed on the basis of their reading of actual research 
reports (Weiss, 1976). 
The study conducted by Weiss revealed that research quality 
(technical quality, objectivity, consistency), conformity to user 
expectations, action orientation (practical implications and 
feasibility), and challenge of the status quo are factors that 
impact positively on usability, the first two providing a basis for 
trust in the research and the two others offering a sense of what 
to do (Weiss, 1976). 
There were limitations in the conceptual frameworks 
adopted. For instance, like in most contemporaneous studies on 
knowledge use, Caplan focused on the "scientific variety" of 
knowledge an relied on the survey methodology, inquiring on 
the individual perceptions and leaving aside the context within 
which the information was processed. Although interaction was 
identified as a key factor, it was not found how providers and 
users of information interacted. Furthermore, since he relied on 
the assessment of the policy maker to identify information, his 
interpretation of results was limited (Innes, 1990). 
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problem-solving 
KNOWLEDGE USE 
A "more useful framework for examining knowledge use" 
(Innes, 1990) was essential to understand its role in the policy 
process context. Several new ideas arose. 
Enlightenment of decision makers 
The enlightenment concept (Janowitz, 1970) considers that 
social science knowledge has its most important role as 
influencing the decision makers through "enlightening" them, 
changing the way they see issues, rather than providing 
answers, solving problems or even playing a quantifying role in 
the decision malung process. Actual findings are not directly 
translated into decisions but are transformed into a "story". 
Knowledge influences decisions through gradually changing 
concepts, insights and assumptions over time. This influence is 
observed in two ways: by confirming things policy makers 
already suspected but could not state with confidence, or by 
making them see issues in a new way (Weiss, 1977). Policy 
makers value particularly the last one since they welcome the 
opportunity to use the research to justify reforms (Innes, 1990). 
The enlightenment concept does not have room within the 
scientific model of knowledge use, since it represents a rather 
"elusive" phenomenon (Innes, 1990). 
Lindblom and Cohen, in their book Usable Knowledge - 
Social Science and Social Problem Solving (1979), go further to 
argue for the relative importance of "enlightenment" over 
"authoritative" problem-solving. They point out that 
in some minds, only social engineers need authoritative 
knowledge-that is to say, only pPSI1 who are pushing for specific 
practicable solutions to well-defied problems 
whereas 
when one casts for examples of PSI'S contribution to social problem 
solving, the most obvious examples are not the social engineering 
studies offered to govenunent agencies, but seem to be the more 
To stress the point that they were addressing studies, analyses and research activities of "professional 
investigators of the social world in a wider sense than most academic social scientists would regard as social 
science, Lindblom and Cohen use the expression professional social inquiry, abbreviated as PSI, and refer to 
practitioners of PSI as pPSI. 
fundamental enlightenment of thought achieved by such practitioners 
of PSI as Adam Smith, Marx, Freud, and Dewey. 
Public policy problems are wicked 
In 1973, Rittel and Weber claimed that nearly all public Public policy 
policy prohlems, like "the location of a freeway, the adjustment problems, such as the 
of a tax rate, the modification of school curricula, or the location of a freeway, 
confrontation of crime", are wicked in contrast with the are wicked-- 
problems that scientists and engineers have usually focused 
upon. Some characteristics of wicked problems are: 1 )  there is 
no definitive formulation of the problem; 2) it has no stopping 
time; 3) there is no immediate and no ultimate test of solution; 4) 
there is no enumerable (or an exhaustively describable) set of 
potential solutions; 5) the problem is a symptom of another 
problem; 6) its existence can be explained in numerous ways; 
the choice of the explanation conditions the nature of the 
solution (Rittel and Weber, 1973). 
A consequence of this view is that problem selection and --and problem 
framing in policy research is not value free. Arbitrary choices selection and framing 
are made which have important action consequences (Innes, is not value free 
1990). 
Different types of research utilization 
Weiss (1979) proposed the following typology of research 
utilization (Weiss 1979): 
- knowledge-driven -- knowledge generated by research 
stimulates new ways of action; 
- problem-solving - the problem is first defined with basis 
on practical concerns and the research is then designed to 
solve it; this mode corresponds to the scientific model of 
knowledge use; 
- enlightenment - the decision maker's ideas are framed by 
the research; this ,is the most common mode in which social 
science research enters the political process; 
In policy, the use of 
research falls into 
several different 
types, e.g., 
knowledge driven, 
problem-solving, 
enlightenment, 
tactical, practical, 
interactive-- 
- tactical - research is used not to learn or to inform, but to 
--most of which 
cannot be framed by 
the scientific model 
The conditions for the 
influence of research 
in policy are different 
for different types of 
research results, 
as for data, ideas 
and arguments 
win legitimacy, organize a constituency, or enhance a 
position; 
- political - findings are selected for supporting decisions 
already assumed and for persuading others; 
- interactive - social science knowledge is combined with 
experience and insight, as ideas of a variety of individuals 
are pooled, communicated and changed in such a way that 
the variety of interconnections and interactions make it 
difficult to trace the paths of knowledge influence in the 
process. 
Weiss' typology of research utilization brought to light the 
need to rethink the meaning of social science knowledge "use" 
and to develop explanations of knowledge use in policy. It made 
clear that such an endeavor could not be pursued within the 
scientific model of knowledge use, as this model is unable to 
frame several of the proposed typology modes (Innes, 1990). 
In 1991, Weiss examined "the influence on policy of three 
forms of policy research: (1) data and findings, (2) ideas and 
criticism, and (3) arguments or beliefs for policy action." and 
offers hypotheses about their influence as follows. 
Research as data is more likely to be influential: 
- in situations of consensus on values and goals 
- when two or three alternatives are sharply posed and findings support 
clear-cut choices 
- in rapidly changing situations when nobody knows what the situation is, 
particularly if they signal that present conditions are not acceptable 
- when decision makers (or their staffs) are analytically sophisticated to 
assess the quality and limitations of the data. 
Research as ideas is more likely to be influential: 
- at the early stages of policy discussion, when there is latitude for 
consideration of different facets of an issue and of alternative solutions 
,, - when existing policy is in a disarray, under conditions of failure or crisis 
- when uncertainty is high and nobody knows what to do 
- in decentralized policy arenas, where authority for decisions is dispersed 
and simple ideas can travel farther and faster than detailed data. 
Research as arguments is more likely to be influential: 
- when conflict is high and the different sides have staked out their 
positions, looking for justifications to strengthen their own cases for 
reassuring supporters, convincing the undecided and weakening rival 
positions 
- in legislatures, as they are a site for the resolution of ideological and 
interest-based differences 
- after decisions have been made (as legitimation). 
Problem defining shapes policy action 
Rein and White (1977) argue against the idea of policy 
research as problem solving. They defend that policy m&ng 
and the informing of policy making are not freestanding 
activities, being both part of everyday political action; the 
researcher helps to create issues and the policy maker helps to 
define knowledge. 
Rein and Schon (1977) contend that it is part of the policy 
analysis tasks to uncover hidden world views, reveal tacit 
assumptions and perspectives that underlie problems defined in 
policy settings, and examine their sources in the culture. 
The literature suggests the inappropriateness of the scientific 
model of knowledge use in this setting, as it offers rules for 
problem solving, based on factual knowledge, and not for 
problem defining, that requires the setting of goals based on 
values (Innes, 1990). 
Legitimacy of ordinary knowledge 
In Usable Knowledge (1979), Lindblom and Cohen analyze 
what kinds of knowledge are involved in social problem 
solving, concluding that they are not restricted to knowledge 
produced by social science research. Instead, knowledge 
involved in social problem solving includes contributions of 
policy professionals obtained in the exercise of skills or crafts, 
and ordinary knowledge originating in common sense, casual 
empiricism or speculation, by journalists, civil servants, 
businessman, interest-group leaders, public opinion leaders, 
elected officials or thoughtful common citizens. 
Lindblom and Cohen (1979) contend that most of the 
knowledge which appears in the work of practitioners of 
professional social inquiry is ordinary knowledge and that even 
much of the "new" knowledge they produce is ordinary 
knowledge, in the sense that it is produced by the same common 
techniques of speculation and casual verification, and "is not by 
any significative margin more firmly verified". They argue for 
the "legitimacy and centrality of ordinary knowledge and casual 
Problem solving and 
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--while the scientific 
model does not 
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Ordinary knowledge 
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The reflective 
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unders tandings, 
define and redefine 
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analysis in the policy process", observing that professional 
inquiry has and should have a limited role, even in problem 
solving (Innes, 1990). 
Reflective practitioners and advocacy planning 
Based on epistemological issues of professional knowledge 
which are centrally concerned with design (in the sense of the 
process of changing existing situations into preferred ones), as 
in engineering, medical, law or artistic practices, Schon (1983) 
advances the idea of the reflective practitioner, calling for a close 
and interactive work relationship of the practitioner with the 
client, in order that they cooperatively develop shared 
understandings, define and redefine problems, explore 
assumptions and create new possibilities until finding a joint 
solution. According to this idea, knowledge use is highly 
contextual and dependent of the client's evolving understanding 
(Innes, 1990). 
The possible objects of a practitioner reflection are varied, 
as they may be, for example, the tacit norms and appreciations 
underlying a judgement, the strategies and theories implicit in a 
pattern of behavior, the feeling for a situation that led to 
adoption of a particular course of action, the way the problem to 
be solved was framed, the role played within a larger 
institutional setting (Schon, 1983). 
The idea of the reflective practitioner has connections with 
the "classical" form of advocacy planning, which together with 
the "activist" and the "radical" make for the three forms of 
advocacy planning identified by Peattie. In "classical" advocacy 
planning, "desirable processes of change are arrived at by a 
more inclusively pluralistic political process which incorporates 
into decision-making and intervention the ideas and interests of 
the broadest social spectrum of people concerned" (Peattie, 
1978). In reflective practitioner roles, analysts drop their pose of 
scientific neutrality to become advocates for their and other 
people ideas (Metsner, 1976; Jenkins-Smith, 1982; Nelson, 
1987). 
In the words of Lindblom: 
Although partisans will use analytical resources only in furthering 
their own interests, they interact with many other partisans who do 
the same on behalf of their respective interests. As each feeds 
analysis into interactive processes for his or her own benefit, at least 
some of it becomes the common possession of all the participants. 
Quite possibly, the fabled 'competition of ideas', thought to be 
essential to pluralist democracy, largely takes the form of exchange 
among partisan analysts and partisan policy makers who use their 
analyses (Lindblom, 1980). 
And 
Democratic political discussion is overwhelmingly partisan 
discussion. Its effectiveness lies in the frequency with which it turns 
out that your partisan values and mine, though different, can both be 
satisfied by one and the same policy. If social science and social 
research are to be made more fully helpful to public policy, they 
must enter into that partisan discussion, rather than obscure it with a 
pretense of neutrality. ... In social research, the principle of 
nonpartisan pursuit of the public iinterest ... sabotages a 
competition of ideas. It starves the growing innovating points of 
desirable social change. By contrast, the principle of partisanship 
moves in the direction of allying social research with a still 
unrealized pluralist aspiration (Lindblom, 1986). 
Socially constructed knowledge 
The idea that more influential knowledge is socially 
constructed appears in a variety of sources and with different 
overtones. Socially constructed knowledge is the result of the 
interaction and communication within a group of people while 
generating, analyzing, criticizing, debating, legitimizing and 
using data and concepts. 
While studying social indicators, Innes reached the 
conclusion that "the most influential, valid, and reliable social 
indicators are constructed not just through the efforts of 
technicians, but also through the visions and understandings of 
the other participants in the policy process. Influential indicators 
reflect socially shared meanings and policy purposes as well as 
respected technical methodology" (de Neufville, 1975). 
Based on a series of studies conducted between 1977 and 
1985 in diverse policy contexts and focused on cases of public 
policy making associated with requirements to produce and 
publicly debate quantitative and other professional information, 
--as the competition 
of ideas essential to 
pluralist democracy, 
largely takes the form 
of exchanges among 
partisans 
In policy processes, 
socially constructed 
knowledge is more 
influential-- 
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instance, in social 
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Where the opportunity 
and incentives exist 
for technical experts, 
other professionals, 
and policy makers to Innes (1988b) reports that data requirements offer "formidable 
negotiate over weapons to citizens who wanted to challenge decisions"2. They 
information, all are also "change the content and structure of the discourse through 
likely to alter their which perceptions and understandings are formed and out of 
understandings which formal decisions and actions emerge" and "help legitimize 
the participation and increase the capability to debate of groups 
with interests in these topics" (Innes, 1988b). The same field 
research illustrates that "where the opportunity and incentives 
exist for technical experts, other professionals, and policy 
makers to negotiate over information, all are likely to alter their 
understandings (Innes, 198 8b). 
Knowledge is Barnes, in the book Who Should Know What? (1979), 
developed in a identifies social inquiry as a "process of interaction and 
process of interaction negotiation" and argues that social research "depends on the 
and negotiation acceptance of a plurality of interests and views within a 
involving community" (Barnes, 1979). Research becomes a particular 
participant-observer mode of social action with the analyst assuming a participant- 
analysts observer role (cf. Cicourel, 1964). 
Advocacy coalitions 
Policy change results On another line of reasoning, Sabatier (1986, 1988) argues 
from competition of that policy change is better understood as the product of 
advocacy coalitions, competition between several advocacy coalitions integrating 
with shared beliefs "people from a variety of positions ..., who share a particular 
providing the belief system and who show a non-trivial degree of coordinated 
principal glue to activity over time". This concept assumes that "it is shared 
politics-- beliefs which provide the principal glue to politics" (Sabatier, 
1988). 
--a view that This view departs from the more traditional separation of 
contrasts with that of actors by formal institutional affiliation, as in the iron triangles 
the iron triangles of limited to interest groups, administrative agencies and legislative 
interest groups, committees. It is presupposed that advocacy coalitions are 
administrative composed of members from a variety of institutions, joining 
US Department of Housing and Urban Development Community Development Block Grant funds in 1977- 
78 in five California jurisdictions (de Neufville, 1981; Innes, 1988b); US State Department Country Reports, 
describing human rights conditions in all nations (de Neufville, 1982, 1986); Environmental Impact Reviews 
of four proposals for large-scale, mixed-use land development projects in California (de Neufville and Solloway, 
1986; Innes, 1988b). 
actors at several levels of government and from different 
agencies of the bureaucracy with journalists, researchers, 
interested citizens and others who play important roles in the 
generation, dissemination and evaluation of policy ideas, or 
have stakes or opinions about them. They have formed around 
varied public issues, such as pollution control, disposal of toxic 
waste, wilderness protection, water policy, land-use, health, 
safety, highways (Sabatier and Pelkey , 1987). 
Sustained interactivity 
In the same direction goes Huberman's (1989) finding that 
sustained interactivity involving a continuous long-term 
interaction among producers and users of information 
throughout the different phases of a project is an effective way 
to promote knowledge use. 
Exchanges between producers and users prior to a project 
aim at relating the scope of the project to the "priorities" or 
"interests" of the users, involving them in the details of project 
specification and programming, and at assessing the users' 
capacity for understanding the results and gaugeing how they 
should be communicated to be correctly interpreted. Exchanges 
during the initial phase of the project include definition of 
procedures for review and analysis of intermediate findings by 
the users, identification of data sets of greatest potential interest 
to the users, and agreement on the forms of data flow in internal 
channels of communication. During the intermediate and final 
phases of the project, exchanges involve specification of a plan 
for the dissemination of the project findings, including the roles 
to be played individually and interactively by researchers and 
users, the translation of findings into contextually grounded 
operational forms, the discussion of connections between the 
study's findings and policies or practices within the user 
environment that are judged amenable to change, the 
consideration of issues of significance to the users for which the 
study has no specific answers (Huberman, 1989). 
agencies and legisla- 
tive committees. They 
have formed around 
issues such as pollu- 
tion control, waste 
disposal, wilderness 
protection, land-use, 
highways 
Sustained interactivity 
among producers and 
users of information 
is effective in promot- 
ing knowledge use-- 
--by relating the 
scope of a project to 
the users interests, 
gauging how the 
results should be 
communicated to be 
correctly interpreted, 
defining procedures 
for review of findings 
by the users, 
identifying data of 
greatest interest to the 
users, translating the 
findings into 
operational forms, 
identifying questions 
of significance to the 
users which the study 
does not answer 
EMERGENCE OF' THE INTERPRETIVE 
MODEL 
An interpretive The failure Of the scientific model in adequately explaining 
view of knowledge knowledge use in policy led to other conceptual frameworks 
developed, as modern based on an interpretive, rather than a positivist, view of 
social theory evolved knowledge. This development follows the evolution of modern 
social theory. 
Parson's structural- 
-functionalism sees 
the social world as a 
system of functional 
parts that evolve to 
meet social needs. 
The most important 
social processes are 
the communication 
of meaning between 
subsystems 
One of many 
objections it received 
was that proper social 
explanations must 
refer to actors 
and to actions 
From World War I1 to the mid 1960s social theory was 
much influenced by Talcott Parsons' structural-functionalism. 
Parson adopted the metaphor that social systems are like 
biological systems. The social world was seen as a system 
which has needs that must be met for its survival, and has 
several parts which function to meet those needs. As for a living 
organism, the social system was expected to tend to an 
equilibrium of balanced relationships between its different parts. 
Society was viewed as a network of status roles, characterized 
by norms and values, with the most important social processes 
being the communication of meaning, of symbols and 
information between the different subsystems (Bernstein, 1978; 
Craib, 1992). 
Structural-functionalism was criticized and reviewed from 
several different angles (cf., Bernstein, 1978; Craib, 1992). One 
of the objections is that it fails to provide adequate explanations, 
giving only descriptive accounts of social systems and their 
functions, while proper social explanations must involve the 
reference to actors and actions. 
Symbolic interactionism 
Symbolic It is pertinent to mention here the symbolic interactionism 
interactionism school that, beginning in the 1920s, developed mostly in the 
developed on the University of Chicago by pursuing elements of the American 
assumptions that philosophical pragmatism, a sociological interpretation of 
acts are based on ecology, and the anthropology field methods known as 
participant observation. The main assumptions of symbolic meanings which 
interactionism are (Blumer, 1969): 1) human beings act towards result from 
things on the basis of the meanings that the things have to them; social interaction and 
2) these meanings are the product of social interaction; 3) they are handled by an 
are modified and handled through an interpretive process used interpretive process, 
by each individual in dealing with signs. In a certain sense, the as happens in human 
social world is assumed to have the same qualities of flow, conversation 
development, creativity and change as human conversation 
(Craib, 1992). 
Phenomenological sociology 
An alternative concern with interaction emerged in the 1960s 
from the phenomenological philosophy that has roots in the 
work of Husserl at the end of the nineteen century. He argued 
that scientific knowledge had become divorced from everyday 
experience and that the connection could be restored through 
phenomenology. 
The main stand of phenomenology, in opposition to the 
naturalistic view, is that the outside world has meaning only 
through human consciousness. Husserl defends that a 
phenomenological understanding of the world projected by 
objective science and of the life-world requires the "suspension" 
of judgment about the reality of both these worlds. The question 
of existence of these worlds is simply put "in brackets" and set 
aside while we go about describing conscious meaning, and is 
not to be confused with the epistemological doubt whether 
world objects really exist. 
we have two different things: life-world and objective-scientific 
world, though of course [they are] related to each other. The 
knowledge of the objective-scientific world is "grounded in the self- 
evidence of the life-world. The latter is pregiven to the scientific 
worker, or the working community, as ground; yet, as they build 
upon this, what is built is something different. If we cease being 
immersed in our scientific thinking, we become aware that we 
scientists are, after all, human beings and as such among the 
components of the life-world which always exists for us, ever 
pregiven; and thus all of science is pulled, along with us, into the - 
merely "subjective-relative" - life-world. (Husserl, 1970). 
An alternative concern 
with interaction 
emerged from 
phenomenological 
philosophy 
The main stand of 
phenomenology is 
that the outside world 
has meaning only 
through human 
consciousness-- 
--so that knowledge 
is inherently 
subjective-- 
--and the substitution 
of the life-world 
by the objective- 
scientific world 
is untenable 
What is essential is to 
understand the 
structures of meaning 
and how both worlds 
are made meaningful 
The application of 
phenomenology to the 
social domain led to 
the concept of-- 
--social reality as 
including the objects 
and occurrences, of 
nature and of culture, 
intersubjectively 
experienced by 
common-thinking 
persons, and 
involving 
intercommunication 
and language 
Accordingly, the 
meaning of actions 
must be interpreted in 
an in tersubjective 
context which, in 
itself, provides the 
Husserl claims that the objective-scientific world, with its 
"idealities" and causality laws, had been taken to substitute the 
life-world which is experienced through perception. In his view 
the difficulties in accounting for the "subjectivity" of human 
experience result from adopting a conviction that the "scientific 
objectized nature" is "the measure of all that is genuinely real". 
The essential contribution of phenomenology was to bring 
attention to the general structures of meaning and how the two 
worlds - the life-world and the objective-scientific world - 
are made meaningful, while "suspending" any judgment 
concerning the existential primacy of any of them over the other 
(cf., Bernstein, 1978; Craib, 1992). A nice way to emphasize 
this is the observation that 
an activity of marking and counting papers has to bear intentional 
descriptions which fall withii a certain range before we can agree to 
call it voting, just as the intercourse of two men or teams has to 
bear descriptions of a certain range before we call it negotiation 
(Taylor, 1971). 
Half a century after Husserl, sociologists applied his 
argument to social theory, in particular structural-functionalism, 
pointing out to its divorce from everyday social experience. The 
ideas of phenomenological sociology have been put forward 
more forcefully by Schutz, who had been a student of Husserl, 
beginning with the concept of "social reality" itself: 
By the term "social reality" I wish to be understood the sum total of 
objects and occurrences within the social cultural world as 
experienced by the common-sense thinking of men living their daily 
lives among their fellow-men, connected with them in manifold 
relations of interaction. It is the world of cultural objects and social 
institutions into which we are all born, within which we have to 
find our bearings, and which we have to come to terms. From the 
outset, we the actors of the social scene, experience the world we 
live in as a world both of nature and of culture, not as a private but 
an intersubjective one, that is, as a world common to all of us, 
either actually given or potentially accessible to everyone; and this 
involves intercommunication and language (Schutz, 1962). 
According to Schutz, human action cannot be understood 
from a position of outside detached observation of other persons 
acts. Instead, the meaning of our actions and those of others 
with whom we interact must be interpreted in a complex 
intersubjective context. This stands on the postulate of 
subjective interpretation which "is to be understood in the sense 
that all scientific explanations of the social world can, and for 
certain purposes must, refer to the subjective meaning of the 
actions of human beings from which social reality originates" 
(Schutz, 1967). "Truth" or accuracy of interpretation is validated 
through a commonly shared "intersubjectivity", differently from 
the validation of truth in the positivist model which relies on the 
supposed correctness of the method used and on the 
researcher's posture as a "detached observer". 
Each interpretive analysis necessarily bears the personal 
mark of its author. In fact, Schutz (1967) sustains that 
traditional epistemological analyses of knowledge, which are 
dominated by a "spectator", "contemplative", "detached" or 
"theoretically disinterested" view of knowledge, are 
inappropriate. In fact, this is not the primary human stance in 
everyday life since knowledge is oriented toward interaction 
with the world, and is conditioned by the circumstances of 
action. 
The view of "social reality" proposed by Schutz had a 
strong influence in later developments of social theory. In 
particular, it provided a point of departure for the highly 
influential book of Berger and Luckman The Social 
Construction of Reality - A Treatise in the Sociology of 
Knowledge (1967). Its first sentence reads: 
The basic contentions of the argument of this book are implicit in 
its title and subtitle, namely, that reality is socially constructed and 
that the sociology of knowledge must analyze the processes in which 
this occurs. 
And further down: 
It is our contention, then, that the sociology of knowledge must 
concern itself with whatever passes for "knowledge" in a society, 
regardless of the ultimate validity or invalidity (by whatever criteria) 
of such "knowledge." And insofar as all "human knowledge" is 
developed, transmitted and maintained in social situations, the 
sociology of knowledge must seek to understand the processes in 
which this is done in such a way that taken-for-granted "reality" 
congeals for the man in the street. In other words, we contend that 
the sociology of knowledge is concerned with the analysis of the 
social construction of reality. 
Interpretive social science 
criteria of truth of 
the interpretation 
Each interpretive 
analysis necessarily 
bears the mark of its 
author. The spectator 
or detached view of 
knowledge is 
inappropriate 
A further development 
of phenomenological 
sociology led to the 
influential idea that 
reality is socially 
constructed 
The interpretive or hermeneutic perspective of social science Interpretation stands 
has roots in the work of Wilhem Dilthey by the middle of the on the postulate that 
the fundamental, 
irreducible element of 
human existence is 
intersubjective 
cultural meaning. 
So, interpretive social 
science can be seen as 
a return to the 
objective world 
The postulate of 
irreducibility of 
meaning affirms the 
primacy of context in 
the understanding of 
everyday life 
Understanding an 
action is analogous to 
textual interpretation 
and judging between 
interpretations is like 
textual criticism 
The stock of common- 
sense knowledge is 
socially preformed 
and socially 
distributed so that, 
when knowledge is 
used for action, a 
diversified group 
should be brought to 
contribute 
We cannot know what 
a phenomenon is until 
we know, what it 
present century. Interpretation stands on the postulate that the 
web of intersubjective cultural meaning constitutes human 
existence in a fundamental way that cannot be reduced to prior 
speech acts, relations, or predefined elements. Also, the basic 
social realities are practices that "cannot be identified in 
abstraction from the language we use to describe them, or 
invoke them, or carry them out" (Taylor, 1971). The meanings 
are not subjective psychological states, beliefs or propositions of 
an individual. They are intersubjective. It is for these reasons 
that "interpretive social science can be called a return to the 
objective world" (Rabinow and Sullivan, 1979). 
Besides, the postulate of irreducibility of cultural meaning 
affirms the primacy of context in the understanding of social 
phenomena. "Things only have meaning in relation to the 
meanings of other things" (Taylor, 1971). This contrasts with 
the aim of positivist science to replace the "contextual 
understandings of everyday life by context-free categories" 
(Rabinow and Sullivan, 1979). 
Ricoeur (1974) explains the interpretive perspective by 
drawing an analogy between the interpretation of actions in 
society with the interpretation of texts. In the interpretive 
approach understanding an action is analogous to textual 
interpretation, and mediating or judging between conflicting 
interpretations is like textual criticism. 
Although in the interpretive view an individual's stock of 
knowledge is continually changing, it stands on socially shared 
common-sense constructs. In this context, it is important to 
note, as Bernstein (1978) did, that "the stock of common-sense 
knowledge is socially preformed, and it is also socially 
distributed". So, when using knowledge for action, it is 
advisable to take advantage of socially distributed common- 
sense knowledge by creating conditions for the contribution of 
knowledge from a diversified group of individuals and 
institutions. 
One consequence of the interpretive view, where the 
subjective notion of meaning and socially shared beliefs are 
regarded to be "constitutive" of social reality, is that "we cannot 
know what a phenomenon is until we know what it is believed 
to be". Therefore, shared meanings and beliefs are essential 
"data" for any analysis. Accordingly, "the process of knowing 
and learning engages the expert knower deeply in everyday life" 
(Innes, 1990). 
The objects of interpretive research are the understanding of 
particular phenomena in their specific settings and in their proper 
terms. The goal is to make sense of particular, possibly unique, 
situations through exploratory probing that may be mostly 
qualitative, and will rarely resort to strict hypotheses testing or 
measuring methods characteristic of the scientific model. 
Knowledge in this perspective is situational, grounded in particular 
contexts. It need not be generalizable to count as knowledge. 
Moreover, this knowledge is about whole phenomena rather than 
simply about relationships among selected variables or facts isolated 
from their contexts. 
Interpretive knowledge may take the form of a story which can make 
sense of a complex set of components and link actions to contexts in 
ways that scientific knowledge cannot (Innes, 1990). 
KNOWLEDGE IN POLICY ANALYSIS 
PRACTICE 
An interpretive conception of knowledge helps in 
overcoming the difficulties encountered in the positivist model 
of knowledge use. At the same time, it provides a setting where 
integration of knowledge developed in the positivist mode can 
be naturally accomplished, while accounting for the 
consideration of the topics raised above under the heading "New 
ideas for understanding knowledge use". 
Table 11.1 contains a synthesis of the main aspects of the 
positivist and the phenomenological perspectives of knowledge 
use. 
In fact, the interpretive perspective has a high potential for 
better linking knowledge to action, when compared with the 
positivist model, because it (de Neufville, 1987b): 
- reflects the world that analysts and policy makers must 
understand 
isbelieved to be. 
So, shared meanings 
and beliefs are 
essential data 
Interpretive research 
is directed to 
particular phenomena 
and mostly adopts 
qualitative methods 
In this perspective, 
knowledge is 
situational, it need 
not be generalizable, 
and it is about 
whole phenomena. 
It may take the 
form of a story 
An interpretive 
conception of 
knowledge helps in 
overcoming the 
difficulties found in 
the positivist model 
of knowledge use 
The interpretive 
perspective has a 
high potential for 
better linking 
knowledge to action. 
It provides an 
integrative view of 
what analysts really 
do in policy practice; 
it employs concepts 
based on ordinary 
language, provides 
results in the form of 
stories and deals with 
particular issues and 
specific situations, so 
that results are more 
recognizable to 
citizens and decision 
makers; it considers 
whole problems 
without setting aside 
values and problem 
definition; 
it engages decision 
makers, executives 
and citizens in the 
knowledge production 
process so they are 
more prepared to 
support action based 
on the results 
Social learning and 
communicative action 
provide ideas for 
- deals with particulars rather than universals and is tailored to 
fit specific situations 
- employs concepts based on ordinary language 
- focuses on the everyday of the world 
- deals with whole problems rather than artificially isolated 
pieces 
- gives direct attention to the understanding of goals and values 
- does not require the analyst to emulate the neutrality pose of 
the scientist 
- blurs the distinction between knowledge user and provider as 
knowledge is partially created through the application of ideas 
- involves analysts in working with citizens and policy makers 
to develop shared goals and beliefs 
- intrinsically includes a two-way communication of knowledge 
between expert and layman 
- provides results in the form of stories that can engage beliefs, 
emotions and values 
- engages policy makers, clients and citizens in processes of 
decision on values, concepts and methods 
- leads the participants to feel that the knowledge produced is 
their own 
- permits ideas and findings to evolve along with public 
perceptions and values 
- provides a setting for practical continuous checking against a 
bias of many professionals for reinforcing the status quo and 
the views of already powerful interests, in particular if the 
participation of the least powerful community members is 
assured. 
The analyst can legitimately be simultaneously knowledge 
provider and user, researcher and actor. Interpretive knowledge 
is more important in problem defining than in problem solving; 
more in describing processes than predicting an outcome, more 
in saying what happens than what works, more in generating 
alternatives than in comparing them, more in negotiating than in 
providing simple decision criteria (de Neufville, 1987b). 
An important question raised by interpretive research is how 
can it be assured that the resulting knowledge corresponds to the 
world of life and action? In fact, one must be sure to adopt 
Table 11.1 - The positivist and the phenomenological perspectives of knowledge use 
(adapted from de Neufville, 1987b) 
Objectivity 
Implications 
Link between 
knowledge and action 
observer applying explicit, replicable 
methodology; 
- knowledge also consists in general laws 
and principles relating different variables; 
- such laws can be identified through 
logical deduction from assumptions and 
other laws and through testing 
hypotheses empirically under controlled 
external conditions; 
- the m e  scientist will give up his 
ideas in face of convincing evidence 
- sought through a single, supposedly 
correct method 
- information generation and policy 
choice are distinct; 
- planner, value neutral expert, 
distanced from the political fray; 
- planner's goal is to provide certainty 
to the policy maker 
- Little opportunity to link knowledge 
and action, partially because: 
knowledge produced offers poor fit to 
the world of decision maker 
research function is separated from 
the world of action and motion 
simplified, reduced variables are 
considered under hypothetical, controlled 
conditions; this is essential to this kind 
of knowledge and bears little resemblance 
to the experiential world; 
- The methods are apt to employ formal, 
specialized concepts and language 
different from the policy maker's; 
- Context is largely ignored in these me- 
thods, though it is crucial to planning; 
- Exclusion of ambiguity and subjective 
questions often means the researcher 
cannot study the very issues of central 
concem; 
- Politicians uninvolved in the learning 
process are not likely to feel any 
proprietary attachment to findings, nor to 
be convinced their concerns have been 
addressed 
situations rather than primarily to 
make generalizations; 
- focus on meaning, accuracy of 
interpretation attainable through 
'intersubjectivity'; 
- inevitable difference among observers 
dealt with through consensus building 
- sought through reliance on a variety of 
sources and perspectives 
- information generation and policy choi- 
ce are interactive - mixed and messy; 
- planner is part of the whole process and 
interacts with the policy setting; 
- planner goal is to provide the basis to 
create meaning and achieve consensus 
- Provides ways to helplink knowledge 
and action by: 
understanding of a particular pheno- 
mena in their own terms and context 
paying attention to ordinary know- 
ledge and beliefs 
having as goal to make sense of part- 
icular situations rather than primarily 
to make gener alizations; 
- Research is qualitative and exploratory; 
- Analyses of context assume great 
relevance; 
- Focuses on the central concern, building 
insights out of that; 
- Technicians and politicians are involved 
in the learning process and are expected 
to develop shared meanings 
enhancing the frameworks and methods guaranteeing that the knowledge 
adequacy of resulting from interpretive knowledge is not simply a construct 
interpretive of our minds, eventually concealing important features of the 
knowledge to the world of life and action (Innes, 1990). Among the ideas for 
world of life and addressing this question we find those coming from social 
action learning and communicative action. 
SOCIAL LEARNING 
Social learning is 
rooted in the 
American pragmatists 
advocacy of learning 
by doing. In this 
view, the main 
criteria for validation 
of knowledge is a 
consensus theory 
of truth 
Goals and problem 
definition tend to 
emerge and change in 
the course of social 
learning 
The researcher is a 
participant in the 
group involved in 
mutual learning 
Social learning is: 
dialogical, collabora- 
tive, practical, 
problem-focused, 
reflective, creative, 
emancipatory 
Social learning has its roots in the philosophical school of 
American pragmatists, particularly John Dewey (1950, 1963, 
1980) who was a strong advocate of "learning by doing" and 
argued that all valid knowledge comes from experience - the 
interaction of human beings with their material environment. 
The principal focus of the social learning approach is on action. 
Preferably, the learning takes place in small action groups 
organized around specific tasks, through interpersonal relations 
or dialogue and may involve actual problem solving. The criteria 
for the validation of knowledge is a consensus theory of trzith. 
Goals and problem definition tend to emerge and change in 
the course of social learning. Frequently, the views held by the 
participants stand on prior experience, in the form of beliefs, 
ideas, memories, visions or values supported by peer or 
reference groups. Often, these views are difficult to change as 
changes may transcend the cognitive domain and involve 
affection. 
The researcher or expert knower is a participant in the group 
rather than a passive observer and must develop a transactive 
relationship with its members conducive to mutual learning 
(Friedman, 1987). 
Marshal1 and Peters (1985) enumerate some characteristics 
of social learning: dialogical, communal-collaborative, practical, 
problem-focused, reflective and reflexive, normative, fallibilist, 
creative/transformative, emancipatory. These characteristics 
pave the ground for a possible development of standards for 
effective social learning. 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 
In his book The Theory of Communicative Action -- 
Reason and the Rationalization of Society (1983), Habermas 
sets up a philosophical framework for linking knowledge to 
action. 
According to Habermas, action can be seen from several 
sociological perspectives: 
(l) the utilitarian concerning to beliefs about a world of 
experiences or existing states of affairs, and to intentions to 
bring desired states of affairs into existence or change; 
(2) the normative regarding to cultural values and consensual 
action; 
(3) the dramaturgical associated with self-presentation for 
bringing to appearance something of the actor's 
subjectivity like desires and feelings; 
(4) the communicative involving negotiation of common 
definitions and understandings between people out of their 
pre-interpretations of the lifeworld. 
Examples of actions where each one of the perspectives is 
presupposed are easy to give. The utilitarian perspective is basic 
for actions directed to the physical world, and also for 
propaganda, publicity and intentionalist semantics; the normative 
is widespread in cultural anthropology and content-oriented 
linguistics; the dramaturgical is present when conveying a 
personal image to a new acquaintance, to a potential employer or 
to a citizens audience; the communicative is presupposed in 
symbolic interactionism, in Wintgenstein's language games, in 
Chomsky's linguistic competence, in cooperative action. 
As a matter of fact, the communicative perspective of action 
can take into consideration all the other three providing a 
framework for unifying them in a single encompassing 
perspective with several overtones. 
The theory of communicative action was developed by 
Habermas from the assumption that action and communication 
are so closely intermeshed that their conceptual separation is 
artificial and inappropriate. In communicative action participants 
negotiate definitions, values and meaning, trying to reach an 
Action can be seen 
from several 
perspectives: 
the utilitarian 
concerning to beliefs 
and intentions, the 
normative regarding 
values, the 
dramaturgical 
associated with 
self-presentation, 
thecommunicative 
involving negotiation 
of definitions and 
understandings 
The communicative 
perspective provides a 
framework for 
unifying all others 
Action and 
communication are 
closely intermeshed; 
participants negotiate 
an intersubjective 
understanding about intersubjective understanding about actions and their very 
actions specific outcomes. 
Language is 
prominent in action. 
It stands on validity 
claims of truth, 
legitimacy, sincerity, 
comprehensibility 
As communicative 
action involves the 
other perspectives of 
action, in its case the 
four validity claims 
have to be measured 
against the three 
worlds of action: 
objective world, 
social world, and 
subjective world 
Argumentation is the 
form of assessment of 
the rationality of 
communication 
implied by the 
validity claims 
Distorted 
communication occurs 
when a political 
problem is said to be 
just technical; profit 
seeking interests 
misrepresent public 
benefits and dangers; 
professionals 
create unrealistic 
expectations in their 
clients 
Language has a prominent place in action. To perform its 
function, a background consensus on its use is necessary. This 
consensus can be expressed in terms of validity claims that can 
be derived from the four sociological perspectives of action 
described above: truth, legitimacy, s incer i t y  and 
comprehensibility. 
A speaker claims truth for statements or existential 
presuppositions, legitimacy for normative actions, sincerity 
for the manifestation of subjective experiences, and 
comprehensibility for communication. These are the four 
sociological relations of actor to world presupposed in the social 
perspectives of action mentioned above. As communicative 
action involves the other three perspectives, in its case the four 
validity claims are ascribed both to speakers and hearers who 
have to measure them against the three worlds of action: the 
objective world about which true statements are possible, the 
social world of normative interpersonal relations, and the 
subjective world of experiences to which the speaker has 
privileged access (Habermas, 1973, 1983). 
The preceding validity claims are norms of pragmatic 
communication that in usual contexts are not questioned. 
However, when the language game is disturbed or the 
background consensus breaks down, an appropriate form of 
discourse with argumentation is required to assess the validity 
claims (Habermas, 1973). Argumentation is a kind of "court of 
appeal" for the rationality of communication: it makes possible 
the continuation of communicative action when disputes arise, 
without recourse to enforcement (Giddens, 1985). 
Distorted communication that does not conform to the 
validity claims mentioned above is rather common, as it occurs 
when politicians or administrators pretend a political problem to be 
simply a technical one; when private profit seeking interests (such as 
the nuclear construction or pharmaceutical industries) misrepresent 
benefits and dangers to the public; when professionals (such as 
physicians, planners, or social workers) create unnecessary 
dependency and unrealistic expectations in their clients; or when the 
established interests in a society avoid humanitarian social and 
economic policies (such as comprehensive health services) with 
misleading rhetoric and falsehood, e.g., "the public sector is always, 
inevitably, less efficient tha the private sector" (Forester, 1985). 
CRITICAL THEORY 
Critical theory refers to a philosophical contribution that has 
roots in Hegel, but found its most central figures in the so called 
Frankfiirt School that originated in 1923 with the foundation of 
the Institute for Social Research. Its most prominent figures 
were Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse. In the words of 
Horkheimer in his book Traditional and Critical Theory (1972), 
by critique is meant: 
that intellectual, and eventually practical effort which is not satisfied 
to accept the prevailing ideas, actions, and social conditions 
unthinkingly and from mere habit; effort which aims to coordinate 
the individual sides of social life with each other and with the general 
ideas and aims of the epoch, to deduce them genetically, to 
distinguish the appearance from the essence, to examine the 
foundations of things, in short, really to know them (Horkheimer, 
1972). 
At the same time, critical theory is seen by Horkheimer to have a 
practical interest in improving human existence and stimulating 
change. 
Habermas devised an ambitious project to provide a sound 
support of critical theory that none of his predecessors of the 
Frankfiirt School had succeeded in approaching. This project 
involved subjecting the critical theory itself to analysis by 
examining its epistemological foundations. A result of this 
project was the theory of communicative action described in the 
preceding section. The central concept in Habermas' work for 
the understanding of knowledge was that of cognitive interests. 
In the book Knowledge and Human Interests (1971), 
Habermas stresses the importance of dialogue involving three 
kinds of cognitive interests: technical, practical, and 
ernclncipatory. Each of these cognitive interests corresponds to 
one social dimension, respectively: work, interaction, and 
power. The technical interest is pursued by the empirical- 
analytic scienti3c method, the practical interest by the historical- 
interpretive method, and the emancipatory interest by the method 
of critique. 
Critical theory had its 
most central figures 
in the Frankfiirt 
School. By critique is 
meant the effort to not 
accept unthinkingly 
the prevailing ideas, 
actions and social 
conditions, 
to distinguish 
appearence from 
essence, to examine 
the foundations 
It has a practical 
interest in change 
and improvement 
Habermas subjected 
critical theory to 
epistemological 
analysis and advanced 
the concept of 
cognitive interests as 
central to understand 
knowledge 
Dialogue involves the 
cognitive interests -- 
technical, practical, 
and emancipatory -- 
which are pursued by 
the methods of 
empiricism-analysis, 
interpretation, and 
critique 
It is the emancipatory 
interest that provides 
the epistemological 
basis of critique and 
critical social sciences 
The methodological 
framework that 
determines the 
meaning of the 
validity of critical 
propositions is 
established by 
the concept of 
self-reflection 
Critique is central for 
a new prescriptive 
model of practice. 
It demands that the 
knower question all 
assumptions, be self- 
reflective examining 
biases, take a stance 
against the status 
quo, avoid that 
professional 
knowledge serve 
certain interests at the 
expense of others and 
be a tool of 
oppression. Critique 
is connected to 
freedom and justice 
Discursive designs 
locate political 
institutions in a 
separate public sphere 
As Bernstein (1978) points out, "it is the emancipatory 
cognitive interest that provides the epistemological basis for 
Habermas' understanding of critique, and the goal of the critical 
social sciences". In the words of Habermas, a critical social 
science is concerned with determining 
when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of social 
action as such and when they express ideologically frozen relations 
of dependence that can in principle be transformed. To the extent that 
this is the case, the critique of ideology, as well, moreover, as 
psychoanalysis, take into account that information about lawlike 
connections sets off a process of reflection in the consciousness of 
those whom the laws are about. ... The methodological framework 
that determines the meaning of the validity of critical propositions of 
this category is established by the concept of self-reflection. The 
latter releases the subject from dependence on hypostatized powers. 
Self-reflection is determined by an emancipatory cognitive interest 
(Habennas, 197 1). 
Innes (1990) states that in her view critique is "the central 
concept for a new prescriptive model of practice". This 
conviction stems from her earlier conclusions (Neufville, 1983) 
that critique demands that the knower question all assumptions, 
be self-reflective examining possible biases, be aware of how 
formal knowledge reinforces the status quo, and take a stance 
against this status quo. The emancipatory interest requires 
critique to avoid professional knowledge to "routinely serve 
certain interests at the expense of others" and be a "tool of 
oppression". Thus, critique is intimately connected with 
questions of freedom and justice (Forester, 1993). 
So a critical theory of public policy leads us first to locate policy 
implementation in the mediating social infrastructure of action, and 
second to examine policy-altered social interactions of norms of 
consent, expressions and trust, and attention or comprehension 
(Forester, 1982, 1989). The analysis leads, third, to empirical and 
critical questions probing the degree to which these everyday 
practical claims are institutionally imposed or conversely criticizable 
(redeemable, legitimated, noncoercively and generalizably 
established) through processes of democratic and scientific criticism 
(Forester, 1993). 
DISCURSIVE DEMOCRACY 
In the book Discursive Democracy - Politics, Policy and 
Political Science, Dryzek (1990) outlines discursive designs for 
political institutions adapted to the critical theory point of view 
and based on communicative rationality. These institutions are 
located in a separate public sphere between individuals and the 
state, to avoid the risk of formalized institutions for being co- 
opted and absorbed by the state. The participation of individuals 
should be as citizens and not as representatives of the state or 
any corporate hierarchical body. All concerned individuals must 
be allowed to participate and should have open access to 
information about the problems to be addressed. It is not 
necessary that all members participate in all facets of decisions, 
simply there should be no barriers to competent participation. 
The deliberations should include, but not be limited to, the 
interests of the participants. They should be oriented to the 
generation and coordination of actions within a particular 
problem context. There should be no hierarchy or formal rules, 
but the debates are to be governed by the informal standards of 
free discourse and competent communication. Decisions should 
be sought through consensus. Even without complete agreement 
on goals and analyses, communicative rationalization enables 
consensus based on mutual recognition of different legitimate 
interests. 
Some "incipient" discursive designs with part of the features 
just described can be found in situations like mediation of civil, 
labor, international, and environmental disputes, alternative 
dispute resolution as in "informal justice" settings, or regulatory 
negotiation. Dryzek (1990) points out some common 
characteristics of these practices: 
First, they proceed in the context of a pressing unresolved problem 
of interest to all parties. Second, that context is characterized 
initially by a degree of conflict, indicating interaction between 
divergent ends favored by these actors. Third, some neutral third 
party (a mediator, a facilitator, or convener) generally initiates, 
lubricates, and oversees discussions among the interested parties. 
Fourth, discussion among the actors is prolonged, face to face, and 
governed by formal and informal canons of reasoned discourse ... 
[where the] parties involved reconstruct the nature of their 
relationships ... [and in] some cases, especially international conflict 
resolution, this reconstruction ipso facto contributes to problem 
resolution. Fifth, any product of the process is a reasoned, action- 
oriented consensus. ... Sixth, such exercises are fluid and transient, 
lasting no longer than a particular problematic situation (Dryzek, 
1990). 
Discursive designs, beyond contributing to problem 
solving, "expose the deficiencies of established institutions 
operating in the same area" and "help erode the idea that it is 
between individuals 
and state. Individuals 
participate as citizens. 
All the concerned are 
allowed to participate 
and have open access 
to information. There 
are no barriers to 
participation. 
Deliberations are 
sought through 
consensus and 
oriented to action 
within a specific 
problem context. 
There is no hierarchy 
or rules beyond those 
of free discourse 
Some "incipient" 
discursive designs are 
mediation, alternative 
dispute resolution, 
and regulatory 
negotiation 
These practices 
proceed in the context 
of a pressing problem 
with an initial degree 
of conflict, involve 
a third party, 
presuppose face 
to face discussion 
among the actors, 
have as product 
a reasoned, action- 
oriented consensus, 
and are fluid transient 
exercises 
Discursive designs 
contribute to expose 
the deficiencies of 
established 
institutions and help 
to denounce the 
exercise of authority 
except that implicit in 
a good argument 
When a conflict is 
involved, the 
articulation of the 
participants positions 
should be discouraged 
in favor of their 
interests 
The mainstream 
policy analysis 
aspires to 
instrumental 
rationality, in 
technocratic terms. It 
faces unsurmountable 
obstacles in modern 
complex problems. 
Instrumental 
rationality is applied 
in policy at the 
expense of democracy 
Technical reason, 
when separated 
from democratic 
self-governance, 
is bound to have 
destructive 
legitimate to exercise authority on the basis of anything other 
than a good argument" (Dryzek, 1990). 
As noted by Raiffa (1982) a discursive forum enables 
participants who in isolation have only partial information and 
control to pool information, coordinate actions and pursue their 
objectives more effectively. They have the potential to provide 
collective contributions superior to a simple addition of those 
separately advanced by individuals. 
In discursive designs, effective problem solving can arise in 
conjunction with conflict resolution. In such a case, a third party 
can discourage the articulation of the positions of the participants 
in favor of their interests, thus facilitating the emergence of 
acceptable solutions. The focusing on interests includes the 
exploration of means to achieve ends trhough instrumental 
rationality constructs, but discursive designs also allow for the 
exercise of communicative rationality in relation to normative 
judgements regarding interests, goals, values, and problem 
definitions or redefinitions (Dryzek, 1990). 
As mentioned before, the mainstream policy analysis aspires 
to instrumental rationality, in technocratic terms. The efficacy of 
instrumental rationality rests on constructs like analytical 
problem disaggregation, systems modeling, and integration of 
different perspectives. It faces unsurmountable obstacles in the 
highly complex problems which are prevalent in modern policy 
settings and involve controversial, conflicting and fluid value 
positions. More serious, however, is that the application of 
instrumental rationality in policy is done at the expense of 
democracy, without a critical legitimized questioning of goals, 
problem definitions and values. 
In his book Planning in the Public Domain: From 
Knowledge to Action (1987), Friedman advances a far-reaching 
argument for the social construction of knowledge that may be at 
the heart of democracy: 
technical reason, when separated from democratic self-governance, is 
bound to have destructive consequences. The scientific mind, applied 
to practical affairs, cannot be trusted to itself: it lacks the "requisite 
varietyN3 (Ashby, 1956). By serving corporate capital, it is caught 
up in the vortex of unlimited economic expansion. By serving the 
state, it works for the economy of destruction. Only by serving 
people 
Ashby's "law of requisite varie 
channel of comunication" . 
:Q" states that "R's capacity as a regulator cannot exceed R's capacity as a 
directly, when the people are organized to act collectively on their 
own behalf, will it contribute toward the project of an alternative 
development (Friedman, 1987). 
consequences; it lacks 
the requisite variety-- 
Some of the charges advanced from this point of view 
against the mainstream policy analysis are that it: 
--it imposes dubious 
value judgements, 
treats ends as fixed 
beforehand, conceives 
of politics in terms of 
manipulation, 
reinforces hierarchy 
and bureaucracy, and 
assumes a consensus 
on values, giving an 
implicit support to the 
status quo 
- preempts political debate with the imposition of dubious value 
judgements, such as economic efficiency; 
- treats ends in simplistic form, as capable of being fixed prior to 
contemplation of a problem and action upon it; 
- conceives of politics in terms of the technological manipulation 
of causal systems by an elite composed of, or advised by, 
analysts; 
- reinforces hierarchical and bureaucratic notions of the control of 
human beings; and 
- posits an unproblematic consensus on values, and so slides too 
easily into stands on behalf of some ideological status quo 
(Dryzek, 1990). 
Instrumental or technical rationality by itself, standing on the Instrumental or 
unquestionable acceptance of values and ends, ruling out technical rationality 
questions of political legitimacy, pretending to be politically by itself can lead to 
neutral and imune to political influences, can lead to socially socially unacceptable 
unacceptable actions. "Thus a murderous regime may be served actions 
in rational ways; murder might be performed not just efficiently 
but rationally - if this account of rational action is accepted" 
(Forester, 1993). As Churchman (1962) points out: 
It is simply a mistake to think that game theory, or much of so- 
called decision theory, is an analysis of rational behavior. The work 
in these fields is undoubtedly very important, but it has very little to 
do with our learning about rationality. This is because the problem 
of rationality is not to define rules of behavior, given the goals, but 
rather to define rational goals. To relegate rationality to the study of 
means only is to trivialize it. It is to loose the whole traditional 
spirit of the concept of rational behavior to say that a man may 
"rationally murder his friends in cold blood, as long as he structures 
his choices according to "rational" rules (Churchman, 1962). 
It is a mistake to 
think that game theory 
or decision theory is 
an analysis of rational 
behavior. The 
problem of rationality 
is not to define rules 
of behavior, given the 
goals, but to define 
rational goals 
The fusion of instrumental rationality and democracy, in a The main role of 
policy making process driven by private interest, expedient the analyst in 
compromise and representative government, is problematic. An participatory 
alternative is a participatory democracy based on discursive democracy based on 
institutional designs. The main role of the analyst would be the discursive designs 
creation and maintenance of conditions and institutions for free is the creation and 
democratic discourse supported with adequate information, in a maintenance of 
public space between individuals and the state. Rather than a conditions for free 
technocrat, the analyst should be a participant in and facilitator democratic discourse 
of effective open discourse. Along these lines, and following supported by adequate 
information, in a 
public space between 
individuals and state 
Analysts who simply 
accept concepts 
established in 
discursive democracy 
settings also risk to 
support the satus quo. 
They must play a 
critical role-- 
--in shaping attention 
to issues of stakes, 
setting, approach, 
politics and 
effectiveness 
Hierarchy fosters dis- 
torted communication 
It can obstruct the 
free dissemination of 
information, 
conjecture and 
criticism, the 
incentives being for 
its use in internal 
power struggles 
Hierarchical systems 
are inadequate for 
problem solving in a 
complex environment 
The reconciliation of 
rationality with 
democracy can be 
done under the banner 
of communicative 
rationality. It leads to 
discursive democracy 
Dewey, Kaufman-Osborn (1985) defends that the aim of policy 
inquiry should be "the generation of a community capable of 
taking political action" on particular social problems. 
However, professionals or analysts who simply accept 
concepts established in democratic discursive settings or 
generate consensus among participants are likely to contribute 
for misinformation and support of the status quo. A critical role 
has to be assumed challenging given knowledge, questioning 
problem definitions, examining the hidden assumptions in 
myths and shared convictions, advocating for the poorly 
represented groups and calling attention to ethics (Innes, 1990). 
By "shaping attention to issues of (1) problem formulation (the 
stakes), (2) strategy and context articulation (the setting), (3) fact 
selection and scope (the approach), (4) processes of management, 
intervention, and implementation (the political positions), and (5) 
responsiveness and learning (effectiveness), planners, policy 
analysts, and public adminstrators shape practice (Forester, 1993). 
It  is to be noted that hierarchy fosters distorted 
communication. In fact, 
hierarchy can obstruct the free dissemination of information, 
conjecture, and criticism essential to effective problem solving. The 
incentives are such that individuals use information as a resource in 
interorganizational struggles rather than an aid to joint problem 
solving (see Wilensky, 1967). Those at higher levels use their 
priviledged command of information to solidify claims to authority. 
For their part, subordinates release and slant information in a manner 
designed to put a positive gloss on their performance (Dryzek, 
1990). 
In fact, hierarchical systems may be adequate for routine 
execution and decision making in simple tasks, but "not for 
problem solving in a complex and variable environment" 
(Dryzek, 1990). 
Max Weber (1968) believed that rationality in policy implies 
bureaucratization and hierarchy, strangling democracy and 
forming an "iron cage" around human existence. He predicted 
that the increasing complexity of modern society and the rapid 
development of technology would require an increase and an 
expanded role of bureaucracy. Ironically, the complexity of 
modern issues is one of the driving forces bringing into 
existence alternatives to bureaucratic policy making. The 
reconciliation of rationality with democracy can be done under 
the banner of communicative rationality. It leads to discursive 
democracy, where there is room for choice based on good 
cognitive reasons, as well as for instrumental action, but whose 
streamline is participatory and discursive, and is oriented to a 
public sphere between citizens and state. 
FORUMS, ARENAS AND COURTS 
Bryson and Einsweiler (1982) proposed three settings of The settings of social 
social interaction in policy processes that are compatible with the interaction in policy 
requirements of discursive democracy, classifying them as: processes are: 
.forums, arenas and courts (see also Bryson and Crosby, 1992). forums for the 
Forums are the settings for the creation and the communication 
of meaning; it is in forums that ideas are articulated, discussed 
and refined. Arenas are the settings for legislative, executive, 
and administrative decision making; it is in arenas that the 
practical implications of the ideas emerging from forums are 
adopted, hammered into different shapes, or rejected. Courts are 
the settings for enforcing ethical principles, constitutions, and 
laws for resolving residual conflicts; they provide the ultimate 
social sanctions for conduct mandated or promoted through 
policy-making arenas. Refer to Table 11.3 for a summary of the 
characteristics of forums, arenas and courts. 
For designing effective forums, arenas and courts, a careful 
stakeholder analysis should be done to answer the following 
questions: 
- Who are the stakeholders? 
- What are the goals, expectations, or criteria each stakeholder 
should want in a problem area and how the stakeholder should 
evaluate any solution? 
- How well does the status quo meet each stakeholder's goals, 
expectations, or criteria? ... 
- How important is each stakeholder to the success of the policy 
change effort? 
- How can each stakeholder influence the policy change effort? 
- What is needed form each stakeholder to initiate and complete a 
successful policy change effort? (Bryson and Crosby, 1992). 
STORIES AND MYTHS IN THE CREATION 
OF SHARED MEANING 
As mentioned before, the creation and communication of 
meaning plays a central role in policy processes. The most 
creation and 
communication of 
meaning, 
arenas for decision 
making, and 
courts for enforcing 
ethical principles, 
constitutions and laws 
for resolving residual 
conflicts 
Their design requiress 
a careful stakeholder 
analysis 
The most important 
interpretive schemes 
for creating and important interpretive schemes for creating and communicating 
communicating 
meaning are stories 
deeply rooted in 
culture. The most 
powerful are myths 
which link actions to 
values and to 
expected results-- 
meaning are stories deeply rooted in culture. In the words of 
Rukeyser4, "the world is made of stories, not atoms". The most 
powerful stories are widely shared and believed myths; they are 
particularly important in defining public problems (de Neufville 
and Barton, 1987; Innes, 1990). 
Myths provide an important link between knowledge and policy 
because knowledge that is acted on generally comes packaged with a 
story (though often one that is not explicit) that has a meaning to 
the actors and that links actions to valued things and to expected 
results. The scientific form of knowledge is too abstract to transform 
directly into practice in a particular situation, or to stir the emotions 
necessary to motivate change (Imes, 1990). 
--provide a way of The consideration of myths in policy processes is important 
effectively for two reasons in opposing directions. They provide a way of 
communicating action translating community values into action proposals, effectively 
proposals in reference communicating them in reference to traditional beliefs, 
to traditional beliefs, simplifying them by the use of analogies, and allowing new 
simplifying them by policies to carry familiar meaning. But they can also give 
the use of analogies, support to old-fashioned perceptions of problems and to the 
and allowing new status quo by hiding important factors that are not readily 
policies to carry identified for analysis because they are, often implicitly, wraped 
familiar meaning. But in familiar unquestioned ideas; a myth persuades by simply 
they can also support accounting for the way the things are and not by linking causes 
old-fashioned to effects. So, myths "can provide new ways of seeing issues" 
perceptions and the and point toward proficuous policies, but "they can also blind 
status quo, concealing people to alternative ways of seeing a problem" diverting their 
important factors attention from possibly better policies. For both reasons, myths 
from analysis by must be carefully considered by policy makers and analysts who 
wraping them in must critically analyze and publicly expose the assumptions 
familiar unquestioned underlying them to evaluate their worth for policy action (de 
ideas Neufville and Barton, 1987; Innes, 1990). 
Because myths legitimize and rationalize a political and social 
system, in practice the construction, maintenance, or alteration of a 
myth may itself become the crucial policy problem (Innes, 1990). 
as cited by Bryson and Crosby (1992) 
Table 11.3 - Forums, arenas and courts (adapted from Bryson and Crosby, 1992) 
Courts 
A practice of judging or 
evaluating policies or 
conduct in relation to laws or 
norms, usually in order to 
settle disputes. 
Court of public opinion, 
professional licensing 
bodies, deans' offices, formal 
courts --- for example, the 
Supreme Court, military 
tribunals, traffic courts. 
Maintenance or change of 
laws and other modes of 
sanctioning conduct, 
especially through 
distribution and 
redistribution of access 
to legitimacy. 
Two disputants and a third 
party to resolve their dispute, 
plus at least partially shared 
norms. 
Moral evaluation and 
sanctioning of conduct, and 
especially conflict 
management and dispute 
resolution. 
Conflict management and 
sanctioning capabilities, 
along with differing norms 
as mediated by jurisdiction, 
conflict management 
methods, access rules. 
Principles of legitimation. 
Structural basis for 
potentially permitted policy 
decisions and modes of 
conduct and their 
transformation into actual 
policy decisions and modes 
of conduct that are permitted 
and those that are not. 
Definition 
Examples 
Policy- 
related role 
S t r uc t ur a1 
properties 
Human 
action 
Ideas, rules, 
modes, media 
and methods 
- vehicles of 
bias 
affecting 
decision and 
action - 
Principles 
Effect or 
outcome 
Forums 
Apracticeoflinking 
speakers and audiences 
wherein meaning is created 
and communicated through 
discussion, debate, or 
deliberation. 
Task forces, discussion 
groups, brainstorming 
sessions, public hearings, 
formal debates, newspapers, 
television, radio, plays, 
conferences, iournals. 
Maintenance or change of 
symbolic orders and modes 
of discourse, especially 
through distribution and 
redistribution of access to 
the communication of 
meaning. 
A speaker and audience 
(of at least one) along with 
a minimum set of common 
linguistic rules and 
resources. 
The use of symbols to create 
shared meaning and values 
among participants. 
Characteristic activity is 
discussion, debate, or 
deliberation. 
Communicative capability, 
interpretive schemes, and 
ways of deciding among 
interpretive schemes --- for 
example, relevance, norms 
of communication, modes of 
argument, access 
detennhnts. 
Principles of signification. 
A potential list of decisions, 
issues, conflicts, or policy 
preferences for discussion. In 
addition, the mediation 
between that list and an 
actual list of decisions, 
issues, conflicts, or policy 
preferences to be discussed. 
Arenas 
A practice of participation of 
actors in a delimited domain 
of activity as part of the 
process of policy-making. 
Corporate executive 
committees, city councils, 
cartels, markets, faculty 
senates, boards of directors, 
legislatures. 
Maintenance or change of 
political and economic 
relations, especially through 
distribution and 
redistribution of access to the 
exercise of power. 
A policy maker and at least 
one other participant in an 
institutional framework of 
asymmetrically distributed 
resources. The policy maker 
must be able to affect a 
shared resource base that 
makes policy-making 
necessary and possible. 
The use of actors' interacting 
capabilities to secure 
outcomes through the agency 
of others. Characteristic 
activity is policy-making 
that establishes rules, laws, 
norms, principles, policies, 
standards, plans, or prices. 
Capabilities and means of 
mediating among capabilities 
--- for example, domains; 
agendas; permitted methods 
of planning, budgeting, 
decision making, and 
implementation; access 
rules. 
Principles of domination. 
Structural basis for a set of 
potential nondecisions and 
decisions about policy, and 
transformation of that set 
into actual nondecisions and 
decisions. 
CONSENSUAL GROUP PROCESSES 
Group processes 
involving 
stakeholders, 
experts, and citizens 
are playing a growing 
role in complex, 
multi-party, 
multi-issue planning 
problems-- 
--as responses to the 
complexity and 
interdependency of 
problems like 
physical development, 
traffic management 
and environmental 
quality, in a shared 
power world 
In consensual groups 
all members are to be 
treated as equals. 
They can be run by 
methods built on the 
techniques of 
mediation and 
negotiation. 
They are forums 
where the ideals of 
social learning, social 
construction of 
knowledge, 
communicative action, 
Group processes involving stakeholders, experts, and 
citizens in a concerted effort to reach consensus about a 
particular complex, multi-party, multi-issue problem are playing 
an increasing role in planning. According to Innes (1991b), 
these processes are being used for varied purposes: strategic 
management and strategic planning in business (e.g. Rowe et 
al., 1989), strategic issues identification and problem solving 
(Bryson, 1988), integration of science and policy (Ozawa, 
1991), dispute resolution (Amy, 1987; Rabinovitz, 1989), 
community goal setting (Bryson and Einsweiler, 1988). In the 
words of Innes (1993): 
These consensus building processes have been created largely because 
of a felt need to coordinate across many entities -- jurisdictions, 
sectoral agencies and interest groups - to accomplish most physical 
development and environmental tasks. They are responses to the 
complexity and interdependency of the elements of these systems and 
to the inadedquacy of standard top-down hierarchical systems and 
bureaucratic routines to deal with problems such as traffic 
management and air quality protection. They are a recognition that 
the world of the nineties is a shared power world (Bryson and 
Crosby, 1992). No one agency or player is as capable as in the past 
of achieving its goals or accomplishing a mission without the 
cooperation of others (Innes, 1993). 
In consensual groups, all members are supposed to be 
treated as equals and all views are heard, attempting to seek 
consensus. Typically, they are run by communication facilitators 
who adopt methods built upon the techniques of mediation and 
negotiation5, and provide information, record discussions and 
agreements, prepare position papers. The knowledge used is not 
only technical knowledge provided by experts but includes its 
interpretation and modification, and the social construction of 
knowledge by the group itself. The design and management of 
the groups is careful, trying to set up a "microcosm of the larger 
public debate" with the aim of "building creatively on tensions 
among the interests". Throughout the process, assumptions can 
be challenged and problems redefined by the force of argument 
(Innes, 1993). 
c.f. Raiffa (1982), Susskind and Cruikshank (1987), Fisher and Ury (1992), Hall (1993) 
Thus, consensual group processes are a kind of the forums 
proposed by Bryson and coauthors. They are settings where the 
ideals of social learning, social construction of knowledge, 
communicative action, communicative rationality, critical theory, 
and discursive democracy, as described above, can be sought. 
In Breaking the Impasse - Consensual Approaches to 
Resolving Public Disputes (1987), Susskind and Cruikshank 
identify three phases of a consensus-building process that can be 
broken into several items: 
- prenegotiation phase -- getting started, stakeholders 
representation, drafting protocols and setting an agenda, 
joint fact finding; 
- negotiation phase -- inventing options for mutual gain, 
packaging agreements, producing a written agreement, 
binding the parties to their commitments, ratification; 
- implementation phase -- linking informal agreements to 
formal decision making, monitoring, creating a context for 
renegotiation. 
Consensus building is reported by Innes et al. (1995) to 
create among the participants three forms of shared capital - 
social, intellectual, and political: 
Social capital, in the form of mst, norms of behavior, and networks 
of communication, creates the potential for serious discussion to 
take place among otherwise conflicting stakeholders. Intellectual 
capital, in the form of agreed upon facts, shared problem definitions, 
and mutual understandings, not only provides a common basis for 
discussion and moves the players toward agreement on policy issues, 
but allows them to use this shared information to coordinate many 
of their actions. Political capital, in the form of alliances and 
agreements on proposals that provide mutual gain, creates the 
possibility that proposals will be adopted and implemented. This 
capital lives on among .participants even after the group disbands, 
and it helps to institutionalize coordinated action in the long run 
(Innes et al., 1995). 
The incorporation of the results of consensual groups in 
policy decisions is, however, problematic. In general, these 
groups face legitimacy questions that remain unresolved and are 
poorly compatible with the hierarchical bureaucratic institutions 
of government. These problems need attention to be solved 
institutionaly for group processes to effectively contribute to 
legitimate deliberation and choice (Innes, 1993). 
communicative 
rationality, critical 
theory, and discursive 
democracy can be 
sought. 
Consensus building 
creates three forms of 
shared capital: 
social capital, in the 
form of trust, norms 
of behavior and 
networks; intellectual 
capital, in the form of 
agreed upon facts, 
shared problem 
definitions and mutual 
unders tandings ; 
political capital, in  
the form of alliances 
and agreements 
However, consensual 
groups lack 
legitimacy and are 
poorly compatible 
with hierarchical 
bureaucratic 
institutions 
GROWTH MANAGEMENT 
Problems of growth 
management raise 
questions of how to 
achieve efficient land 
development, secure 
transportation 
infrastructure, 
promote economic 
improvement, protect 
natural resources and 
open space. These are 
complex problems 
involving uncertainty 
and a plurality of 
agencies, interests 
and individuals, 
whose actions have to 
be coordinated 
Consensual groups 
have been used in 
growth management 
programs which 
involve conflict 
among developers, 
environmentalists 
and local 
governments, 
as the conventional 
top-down approach 
frequently fails 
They supplement and 
sometimes substitute 
assignments 
traditionally ascribed 
to experts, 
The problems associated with growth pressures in a world 
approaching the limits of sustainability brought growth 
management to the forefront of planning concerns. Such 
problems may raise varied questions, as how to achieve efficient 
land development patterns, secure mobility through adequate 
transportation infrastructure, promote economic improvement, 
assure the provision of needed facilities in a region, or protect 
natural resources and open space. These are highly complex 
problems involving uncertainty and a plurality of agencies, 
interests and individuals, whose actions have to be coordinated. 
The coordination involves several dimensions, as it must 
frequently deal with different levels of government (local, 
regional, state), several agencies and actors whose actions 
jointly affect a spacial area, varied institutional frameworks of 
the relevant actors (governments, nonprofit organizations, 
corporations, unions, individual citizens), extension over time 
and phasing of the actions (Innes, 1991a; Gruber, 1994; Innes 
et al., 1995). 
Due to the high complexity and difficult coordination in 
growth management problems, even the definition of the 
problems is by itself problematic. Consequently, solutions 
developed by experts in the conventional top-down approach 
frequently fail. A trend toward using consensual groups is 
evident in growth management programs adopted in several US 
states since 1985. These programs aim at balancing economic 
development with environmental protection, in connection with 
problems such as traffic increase, air and water quality, urban 
sprawl, estuaries, wildlife habitats. Frequently they involve 
conflict among developers, environmentalists and local 
governments. 
Based on the study of concrete growth management cases, 
Innes (1991b) reports that consensual groups sometimes 
supplement or even substitute assignments that traditionally are 
ascribed to particular actors, such as goal-setting by citizen 
commissions, analysis by experts, standard-setting by 
bureaucrats, program design by consultants or planning staff 
and even formal policy-making by agency heads and elected 
officials. 
Group process, if run in a way that empowers and engages the 
participants, has a dynamic of its own. Members come to care about 
finding a solution that meets each others' concerns. They put creative 
energy into the invention of new strategies which may run counter 
to their original assumptions (Innes, 1991b). 
In the same study, Innes (1991b) notes that in a review of 
innovations in the practices and norms of a wide range of 
organizations, Rogers (1983) finds that three of the critical 
factors of success are: compatibility with values and 
understandings of the players, observability of the benefits, and 
comprehensibility. 
Successful adoption requires the creation of shared meaning for the 
innovation and its application (Eveland et al., 1977). Group 
processes provide the best opportunity to achieve most of theses 
results (Innes, 1991b). 
COMPLEXITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROBLEMS 
Environmental problems are in general highly complex, as 
they involve a large number of interactions between a variety of 
elements. Ecological systems are extremely complex by 
themselves. To this complexity, that arising from the effects of 
humans on nature must be added. High population and 
economic growth leads to an extended occupation of land, 
higher production of litter and pollution, depletion of natural 
resources and negative effects on living systems. On the other 
hand, knowledge about the natural systems is relatively limited, 
leaving a wide space for uncertainty in the comprehension of the 
effects of particular conditions, even in the simplest situations 
that involve the environment. The planning and control of 
economic growth, land occupation and the resulting increases in 
traffic, and the understanding and prediction of human behavior 
regarding the environment involves, by itself, extremely difficult 
problems. 
On top of the points referred above, one must add to the 
complexity of environmental problems the variety of human 
bureaucrats, policy 
makers 
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values that frequently are involved, combining aspects related to 
human health, aesthetics, life-styles, the intrinsic worth of 
ecosystems, intergenerational equity, etc. Besides, the success 
of economic liberalism depends on economic growth, but 
growth in a crowded world leads to resource exhaustion, 
pollution and disruption of ecosystems. Thus, human 
stakeholders bring to environmental issues a variety of, 
frequently conflicting, positions related to their specific interests 
or values (Dryzek, 1990). 
Alluding to the difficulties faced by policy action in the 
United States, Susskind and Cruikshank in 1987 remark: 
Almost every effort to build prisons, highways, power plants, 
mental health facilities, or housing for low-income families is 
stymied by nearby residents. There has not been a single hazardous 
waste treatment facility built in this country since 1975, even 
though everyone agrees that such plants are needed to avoid 
"midnight dumping" of dangerous chemicals (Susskind and 
Cruikshank, 1987). 
CHAPTER I11 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND 
METHODOLOGY 
This is an exploratory dissertation. The major part of it deals with framing the issue. The 
idea is to understand how people use information, why they use it and how they value it in 
complex environments. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Most people think that if information is not used for a decision it is not used at all. I think 
otherwise. I think that even if information is not used for the final decision it may make people 
think, act, take a stand or reframe views. I also think that information has a greater chance to be 
used by people if there is an interactive process that gives a better opportunity to people to look 
at the information, talk about it and reflect on it. My belief is that interactive processes create a 
special dynamics, increasing the opportunity for information to be used. 
Having this in mind I constructed the research question: 
When there is .a group process and that group uses information 
does that information make a difference? 
Therefore, what I searched in this case was: first, if there were group processes; second, 
if the existence of an interactive way to deal with information made a difference; third, if the 
information used in such a setting was more influential than the information used elsewhere 
and why. 
My second concern, that emerged during the research, was about linking simultaneous 
group processes. What I argue is that if there is no horizontal link, information used in an 
interactive process may make a difference to the participants of that process but has limited 
influence outside it. More, if there are several group processes operating simultaneously on the 
same issue, the lack of some kind of link among them may restrict the influence they may have. 
So, with this in mind, I developed a second set of questions. 
Does information developed in a specific interactive process 
make a difference elsewhere when there is not an overall link? 
If it does, what factor(s) played the major role(s) in making 
information to be used? 
Having this in mind it was crucial to decide the type of study to carry on. From analyzing 
the literature I found out that the best way to construct insights on this theory was to focus on a 
single case study. That gave me the opportunity of a in depth analysis linking my theory to 
practice. 
WHY THIS CASE 
Therefore, my study was designed around a specific case, highly conflictual, with high 
circulation of information, particularly in the media, and widely debated: the new crossing of 
the Tagus estuary in the Lisbon region. 
"environmental conflict is already being studied from many angles and in many ways. Perhaps the 
most common approach is that of detailed individual case histories. The case study method allows 
the observer to dig deep into the social psychology or political science of a particular dispute, and 
is thus of great value, particularly from the standpoint of generating hypotheses." (Gladwin, 1987)~ 
What is presented here refers to an in depth analysis of one case study, though some 
differences and similarities are established and explored having in mind comparison with other 
case studies carried out by other specialists. This is a good example to look at the role of 
information because the issue was highly controversial and attracted substantial public 
attention. If information made a difference that would mean something because there were so 
many political pressures. 
There are several other reasons that explain why a single case study is appropriate: 
m: This is a new area of research. Literature offers a limited understanding of why 
information is used. To opt for a tightly structured set of assumptions valid for several 
Thomas N. Gladwin, Patterns of Environmental Conflict Over Industrial Facilities in the United States, 1970- 
78, in Resolvin,~ Locntionnl Conflict, edited by Robert W. Lake, center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers - 
The State University of New Jersey, 1987, chapter 2, pp.15. 
cases does not seem the best way to construct the insights still missing in this domain. 
Therefore, while setting the methodology I found out that it was necessary to do a 
much more in depth analysis, making it difficult to consider another case. I preferred 
to focus in a single case study, high in complexity and with a richer context, to make 
the most of it. This choice allowed me to explore the case in greater depth. 
Second: If I had much more time available, I might have considered two or three 
cases. However, each complex case has so many unique features that probably 
substantial significant details that might be important for the interpretation would be 
lost in the need of generalization out of comparison. 
Third: Moreover, the chosen case - the location of the new crossing of the Tagus in 
the Lisbon region - is fundamental in several aspects and reveals new patterns in the 
public decision processes in our national context. I have reasons to believe that this is 
a prototype of many other cases occurring, revealing key features that are in 
transformation. It is the kind of case that I want to talk about, because it depends on a 
lot of technical information and it was strongly controversial, involving competing 
interests. I cannot generalize from this. Others will have to do additional studies, now 
that there is more understanding of how these processes develop. 
Fourth: This case also presented two other features essential for its selection: the level 
of controversy it attained and the public attention it caught. In fact, the decision on the 
location of the new crossing achieved high levels of controversy when an unexpected 
alternative was taken to respond to the interests of more players. This new alternative 
was not pursued by the Minister of Public Works and generated substantial conflict 
drawing a great deal of public attention. This conflict, played a key role in the use of 
information because people recurred often to information to defend their positions or 
to explain their option. 
The study goes in depth to see the dynamics and relationships of complexity that can give 
researchers a full understanding of how the process of using or not using information work. 
WHAT WAS ACHIEVED 
This research allowed me to construct new understandings on a case that has been mostly 
argued on the basis of technicalities and normative facts. Moreover, it allowed me to identify 
innovative processes behind the use and production of information. It also identified a need for 
restructuring new institutions and for restructuring some others by revising their strategies and 
modes of operation. 
Following my study, someone can look at the case and make hypotheses to do further 
studies, namely through quantitative research. Now, they have the variables to pursue 
quantitative hypotheses and assumptions. The qualitative analysis is essential to establish the 
basis for more quantitative type of approach. This is the right way to do it. When I began, the 
case was not ready for quantitative methods. Now, after this study, we know what the 
variables are. 
The impact of information gives a bottom line on if information was used. The main 
contribution of my research is in reformulating issues. Nobody knew how to approach this. 
This dissertation is a contribution for a little understood area, mostly perceived through 
qualitative approaches. It also explores the role of technical information in the decision making, 
somewhat in the line of Innes (1995). 
This is a theory building, not a problem solving work. I dealt with a 'wicked' problem2 to 
explore how information was used in a highly complex no unique solution context. I could not 
set it up as a problem solving type of approach, because there was too much complexity and 
numerous possible solutions. I was able, though, to come up with sensible suggestions of 
what the researcher need to do to find out what methods in participation and information work 
best. 
MAIN ISSUES BEING ADDRESSED 
Locational decisions are not exclusively technical issues 
Nowadays, most planners have to deal with complex environments throughout their 
professional lives. They often have to address problems difficult to define, 'wicked' problems 
in the words of Rittel and Webber (1973), that are not bound to natural unique solutions. This 
is particularly apparent in growth management decisions involving location of big 
infrastructures, specially when environmental concerns are at stake. 
"The nature and intensity of conflict are markedly transformed when debate shifts from 
technological and fiscal matters to the geographical question of location." (Lake, 1987) 
The failure to recognize the several dimensions and the level of complexity and uncertainty 
of geographical locations frequently results in conflict. According to Lake, these locational 
conflicts arise due to "the inevitable emergence of unresolved political debates that have been 
submerged in earlier phases of policy development and facility planning". 
"Location conflicts arise from two false dichotomies that pervade the facility planning process. 
First, the potential for locational conflict arises from the tendency to separate facility planning and 
In 1973, Rittel and Weber claimed that nearly all public policy problems, like "the location of a freeway, the 
adjustment of a tax rate, the modification of school curricula, or the confrontation of crime", are wicked in 
contrast with the problems that scientists and engineers have usually focused upon. Some characteristics of 
wicked problems are: 1) there is no definitive formulation of the problem; 2) it has no stopping time; 3) there is 
no immediate and no ultimate test of solution; 4) there is no enurnerable (or an exhaustively describable) set of 
potential solutions; 5) the problem is a symptom of another problem; 6 )  its existence can be explained in 
numerous ways; the choice of the explanation conditions the nature of the solution (Rittel and Weber, 1973). 
design decisions from the process of facility siting. Planners, developers, and officials too often 
engage in an elaborate facility planning process, and only then turn to the problem of deflecting or 
accommodating local opposition as a discrete policy objective. 
The facility planning process contains within it multiple policy decisions regarding local impacts, 
the spatial distribution of risk, and similar inherent spatial implications that emerge an become 
manifest in a context of locational conflict. Attempting to separate facility planning from resolving 
locational conflict ignores the implicit spatial decision already made in the former process. 
This is not simply to argue that the obvious point that different facilities have different locational 
requirements and spatial impacts. It is to say that the process of facility planning and the process of 
resolving siting conflicts cannot be disaggregated. The seeds of locational conflict are sown in the 
earlier round of decision making. Subsequent siting debates simply resurrect decisions that were 
avoided, ignored, or simply adopt without scrutiny in the course of facility planning. Locational 
conflict is a political process that demands that these policy decisions be demanded and made 
explicit. 
The second false dichotomy giving rise to locational conflict is attempted separation of 'objective' 
science from policy and politics. Facility planners and developers too often seek to portray 
planning and siting decisions based on and objective, scientific process. The process instead is far 
from objective and value-free but rather contains innumerable political decisions and value 
judgments." (Lake, 1987, pp. xvii, xviii) 
This argument supports that locational decisions are not an exclusively technical problem 
but integrate several other aspects, such as values, interests, risk. Public locational decisions 
are therefore far more complex than the technical view is able to reveal. 
Alternative approaches offered 
The recognition that there is much more to a locational decision process than merely 
technical issues led several people in the literature to offer other approaches, in an effort to 
include the multitude of issues involved, the variety of players and the information generated 
by the different sectors. The call for new approaches grows in urgency as people recognize 
substantial changes in our contexts (e.g., new ways to see governance, new ways to deal with 
public processes, new sustainability concerns due to the awareness of limited resources). 
Changes in our reality are obvious and have contributed to the increased complexity of the 
context. The old forms of governance are inadequate to deal with the new pluralism (Drucker, 
1989). This is causing the emergence of new institutions and of restructuring public processes 
in different ways. It is within this line that Drucker discusses the counterculture of the Third 
Sector as an alternative, and that Bryson and Crosby (1992) suggest the development of 
forums, arenas and courts as an underlying framework (see literature review). 
Innes goes even further suggesting that consensus building is the answer "for dealing with 
complex, multiparty, multi-issue problems". In her view this differs from other approaches, 
such as: the pluralist, political free for all, the top-down bureaucratic system of using expert 
knowledge to implement known goals, the elitist recourse to politically insulated commissions" 
(Innes, 1993). 
On the other hand, environmental concepts have also been restructured along different eco- 
crisis, and the aim now is the search for sustainability (Harrison, 1993). This greater 
awareness of the limits to growth (Meadows, 1972) made people realize the need for a 
balanced environment if life is to have a future (Drucker,1989). 
The above makes clear that: 
(1) locational decisions are not exclusively technical issues, 
(2) the old top-down bureaucratic model is inadequate to deal with all public decisions, 
(3) more interactive settings are needed to make better decisions, 
(4) the search for sustainability increases the urgency to improve decision processes 
whenever environmental concerns are at stake. 
Exclusively technical approach is unsuitable 
Since the case study selected deals with a complex locational decision process, it was clear 
that the analysis could not be simply restricted to technical matters. It had to encompass the 
understanding of the complexity of the context. 
As stated before, the broader issue of facility planning processes is the result of two 
distinct types of actions. One dealing with facility planning and design decisions, and the other 
related to the process of facility siting. While the first may be understood as mostly a technical 
endeavor, the latter involves a multitude of decisions, including local impacts and spatial 
implications for residents and other stakeholders. This one can hardly be considered a technical 
issue in a narrow sense, because it interferes with values and interests of people. Therefore, it 
calls for a wider involvement of the players with interests at stake. It is a policy decision that 
has a high potential for generating conflict. 
The selected case study deals with the process of a major infrastructure location decision in 
a metropolitan area. Therefore, the decision had to encompass the values and interests of a 
group of people suffering directly or indirectly the effects of the various alternative locations. 
Moreover, the powerful impact of each crossing alternative over the Tagus on land use and on 
the urban structure has strong effects on the work of several professionals developing land use 
policies for the area. Therefore, these professionals felt the need of getting involved in the 
issue. This brought along to the discussion the values, interests and risks underlying their 
studies. The choice between the several possible alternative locations was not one with a 
unique solution. It should result from putting together several types of information, 
considering people's views, identifying the perception of risk, bringing up the stakeholders' 
interests. To ignore these leads to conilct. Acknowledging the need to include all these factors 
requires a more elaborate procedure, a kind of a collective answer that can hardly be achieved 
by a single person, or by a technical team per se. 
Difficulties with the definition of 'use of information' 
We have to look into the 'use of information' in several ways. People perceive the use of 
information in various manners, for example, information is used because it appears in a 
document, or because it was argued about, or because it influenced a change of view. Weiss 
acknowledges that "because the process is so indirect it is not easily discernible" (Weiss, 
1977). 
In certain situations the users have difficulties in identifying that they are using 
information. For example, when professionals are directly asked if information played a role in 
some decision, frequently they fail to mention subtle types of information influence restricting 
themselves to acknowledge normative use of information (see large scale surveys below). 
Moreover, part of the failure of people to sometimes recognize information use comes 
from the adoption of a too narrow concept of what information is, limiting it to expertise 
knowledge and ignoring what was identified by Lindblom as 'ordinary knowledge'. In fact, 
people frequently consider information as speciahzed structured data leaving out as unimportant 
all the other knowledge. This ignored knowledge is frequently influential in the way the 
problem is framed or perceived, and decisions are taken. 
Most of the understanding people have on issues was built up along their personal and 
professional lives and is frequently so ingrained in the subconscious, that making it is rather 
difficult to be aware of all the information that is in fact used in any situation. For example, 
there are cases when professionals are influenced and restructure their views on a specific 
issue. Unless they can either establish a direct llnk to factual information or justify it based on a 
technical issue they rarely recognize the influence of knowledge. They may instead justify 
some opinion on facts that they think credible though they have arrived to that through more 
subtle and messy ways of information influence. This often results from difficulties in 
recognizing, or even rationalizing, how they constructed their views along the process. 
Furthermore, information can have an influential role even when it is not actively used. 
Innes (1987b) says that knowledge is more influential when it becomes embedded in 
assumptions, even if it is not consciously acknowledged. For my case, I am particularly 
interested on how people changed their views along the way due to the contribution of 
knowledge. 
Little knowledge on the context of information use 
Limited insights from large scale surveys 
The research on contexts of information use is still in a beginning stage. This is a recent 
area of research. In particular, it it difficult to draw quantitative analysis when there is so little 
knowledge on these problems. Therefore, this area still needs exploratory studies with more 
qualitative approaches to set the grounds for more structured types of analysis. In fact, the few 
studies in this area make it difficult to draw specific assumptions to be explored through framed 
questionnaires. More research is needed to clarify these processes. 
The studies conducted by Caplan, Morrison and Stambaugh (1975), Knorr (1976) and 
Weiss (1977) are some of the few large scale surveys on information use. These studies 
focused in the utilization of research - such as policy evaluation -- in a large number of 
cases. These authors examined the interaction among characteristics of the research, user 
expectations and preferences, and the perceived utility of the studies through interviews with 
the producers and the users of the research. They reported the results focusing on the actor's 
perceptions. For example, Caplan and a group of researchers at the University of Michigan 
surveyed 204 executives of the Federal Government, focusing the interviews in the use of 
specific research studies by the respondents. They expected to find instrumental applications of 
research findings in decision making. The first reports of the study "Science Is Seldom Put to 
Good Use by U.S. Officials" (1974) sounded very negative. However, in 1975 the team 
reheard the tapes and adopted a wider concept of 'use of information' to include social science 
knowledge other than specific data or research conclusions. Broadening of the scope of the 
concept of 'use of information' gave new insights: 85% considered that "the social sciences can 
contribute a great deal to the formation of intelligent policy" and 87% that "government should 
make the fullest possible use of social science". This shows a positive attitude towards social 
science research influence at the same time as acknowledging the lack of instrumental use of 
knowledge. One of the main conclusions of this study was that the interactions between 
technicians and politicians was unsufficient. However, it did not provide much insight on how 
and why information was used. 
Others, like Caplan and collaborators, used the rational model (questioning people about 
instrumental application of research findings) in similar analyses (large scale surveys), and they 
did not get very far. People interviewed saw themselves not using information, but they valued 
it, and could not explain why. 
Knorr (1977) interviewed 70 government officials from federal, provincial, and city 
governments in Vienna, and sent 600 questionnaires to Austrian social researchers. She was 
searching for identifying symbolic use of research, convinced that government officials 
employed research to legitimate bureaucratic activities. Instead, Knorr found that research 
influences changes in bureaucratic thinking in subtle ways. Out of 58 government officials 
sponsoring social research, 65% said they had changed their opinions to some extent and 43% 
reported moderate or strong opinion changes. The use of research was more in changing the 
views of the decision makers, than in determining the final decisions. 
Weiss conducted a study with a Columbia University team to identify characteristics of 
research studies that enhance their use. They carried out interviews of 255 decision makers 
about their opinions on abstracts of reports given to them for reading during the appointment. 
They asked interviewees about the potential usefulness of the reports for their work and the 
most appropriate use of that research. They also asked them to identify the characteristics of 
each study along 26 dimensions3. The survey shows that the decision makers identify 
"likelihood of use" and "conceptual usefulness" of the information considered. The researchers 
also collected opinions on what makes some studies more useful than others. According to 
Weiss (1977), the results of the studies suggest that decision makers value "controversial 
research, challenging research, research that makes them rethink confortable assumptions". 
She concluded that knowledge influences decisions through gradually changing concepts, 
insights and assumptions over time. This influence is observed in two ways: by confirming 
things policy makers already suspected, but could not state with confidence, or by making 
them see issues in a new way (Weiss, 1977). 
From these three surveys, it is obvious that research conducted on knowledge use 
assuming that it is consciously and deliberatly used for specific decisions on the rational model 
have substantial limitations. A better understanding emerges when the researchers adopted an 
approach that allowed other concepts of information use to emerge in the interviews. Caplan's 
first report was rather inconclusive. His results were far more substantial when he broadened 
the concept of information use. Knorr, though looking for symbolic use, came to recognize 
that "research sometimes permeates decision making", mostly in the "'preparation' of 
decisions" rather than in making decisions (Weiss, 1977). Weiss developed the idea of the 
enlightenment function of knowledge. She identified the subtle influences of knowledge 
showing how it equipped policy makers with a new perspective on a problem and a new way 
of approaching it. 
One of the reasons why insights on knowledge use were limited was that the researchers 
were mostly focusing on the effects of measurable variables at moments of decision. Little was 
explored in terms of the context in which the information was used. Other researchers began to 
focus on knowledge use in problem definition. These researchers applied a qualitative 
phenomenological approach to the research. 
Overall, what this shows is that more adequate forms of research on knowledge use can be 
developed if we move to understand the use of information in specific contexts perceiving it as 
influencing users in a more subtle way through changing their final decision. Frequently, the 
users themselves are unware of the influence. By moving away from analyzing only "direct 
The study conducted by Weiss revealed that research quality (technical quality, objectivity, consistency), 
conformity to user expectations, action orientation (practical implications and feasibility), and challenge of the 
status quo are factors that impact positively on usability, the first two providing a basis for trust in the research 
and the two others offering a sense of what to do (Weiss, 1976). 
links between data and decisions" and focusing on the process and less visible influences of 
knowledge, researchers brought new potential to studies of knowledge use. Since my study 
involves looking at effects of information that users are unware of using. I could not 
understand the problem if I had a closed view on the issue. 
Theories of knowledge use in decisions 
The literature on research conducted on the use of information reports three main 
explanations for why knowledge is not used: 
(1) the partisan view that knowledge is selectively used to support previously taken 
positions; 
(2) the two worlds view that knowledge is irrelevant because the technical and political 
contexts operate with divergents assumptions, problems, variables and temporal 
scales, so that technical knowledge is irrelevant to the political settings; 
(3) the enghliphtnment view that says that knowledge is used because it subtly 
influences without being directly used. 
The two first explanations simply describe reality, giving little room for innovation and 
exploration about the use of knowledge. However, the enghlightnment function (Janowitz, 
1970; Weiss, 1977) brought a new potential for exploring the reasons why knowledge is used. 
And it is with this approach in mind that I designed my methodology, building as well on more 
recent work developed by Innes (Innes, 1995) . 
The methodology used for research had to take into account three key challenges: 
(1) difficulty of defining the use of information in a too restricted way that could lead to 
substantial limitations in analyzing the context; 
(2) limitations of people in recognizing when they use information in its different forms; 
(3) little knowledge of researchers on the contexts determining information use. 
Information in planning 
Traditional model of planning 
Before describing the interpretive method, let us look into the different stages of 
information in planning, as described by Innes (1995). According to the instrumental model, 
the handling of information viewed exclusively as quantitative data framed in "countable units", 
or formalized in studies and reports "based on calculations and scientifically validated 
knowledge", involves three stages (Innes, 1995): 
First staFg: Generation of information - Experts develop information, at the request of 
the decision makers, to answer questions or to address specific problems. The planners 
are expected to produce analyses, select and interpret data digesting it in an 
understandable form and offering professional opinion about the "validity and 
implication" of the studies. 
Second stage: Use of information -- Decision makers use information to make 
decisions. 
Third stape: Gathering and analysis of more information - The implementation of the 
decisions leads to more information, that is analyzed for the following phases. 
The legitimacy of planning was traditionally built essentially on the "ability to generate 
analyses, use information, and help decision makers to use information" (Innes, 1995). 
According to Innes the instrumental model of knowledge use is based on several assumptions: 
(1 )  information generation is the function of a value-neutral expert and policy choice is 
the responsibility of the decision maker. Therefore, these are distinct activities 
carried out in separate spheres; 
(2) attention is focused on measurable objective facts, avoiding the ambiguities related to 
values and interests; 
(3) emphasis on abstract laws by the value-neutral expert favors the search of 
generalizable principles, rather than the understanding of particular situations. 
Generalized principles however, are not very useful for specific decisions. 
This instrumental4 model of knowledge use has a role to play in public policy, but several 
conditions have to be met in the policy arena: 
( l )  players should have enough knowledge of the context to understand the underlying 
hypotheses; 
(2) values and goals should be explicit and either unitary or not conflicting; 
(3) research should be completed before changes occur in goals or conditions; 
(4) findings must be operational (suggestions for action); 
(5) the analysts are accepted as providers of accurate information (Innes, 1987, 1995). 
After enumerating the necessary conditions to be met, Innes concludes that "it is perhaps 
unsurprising that those who use this traditional model of knowledge seldom can identify 
effective applications" of it. However, she points out that this model has more appropriate 
application to some tasks, such as fact finding under known conditions, problem solving with 
well defined variables, comparing alternatives under established criteria. In sum, the traditional 
Also called positivist/scientific. 
model operates effectively under certainty. However, uncertainty about technology and goals is 
far more common in planning situations. 
Challenging the traditional model of planning 
If planning is understood as communicative action (Sager, 1994; Forester, 1989; Innes, 
1995; Healey, 1990), then the research on practice "contradicts the analyst model of planning" 
(Innes, 1995). Literature is full of examples where formal information has only partial 
influence on decisions (Caplan,1975; Weiss, 1977; Knorr, 1976) and of complaints that expert 
advice is ignored in the decision (Vasconcelos, 1993) or is only used to substantiate an already 
taken decision. The neat process of instrumental rationality5 described above is challenged, 
since it fails to translate a messier reality where all the above mentioned stages "merged to be 
indistiguishable" (Innes, 1995). Moreover, it also fails to uncover unanticipated processes, or 
hidden knowledge and its effects (Innes, 1987). 
The old model offers limited opportunity to identify subtle types of knowledge use. Since, 
"enlightenment" (Javonitz, 1970; Weiss, 1977) and "invisible" (Innes 1995) knowledge are 
identified to be more influential in policy decisions, the instrumental model is not a good choice 
as a framework to my research. 
Opting for the phenomenological view 
I consider that information is used when it makes a difference. When people look at it, talk 
about it, think about it in the light of a problem. The interactive processes give the participants 
an opportunity to explore these ways of information handling. While participating in them, the 
players are likely to reformulate their views and to generate new ideas. Frequently, these 
interactive settings favor creativity. I am interested in the use of information in these settings. 
Particularly, when it influences the way people think about the issues, the generation of new 
alternatives, or changes in opinions. It is a more subtle use of information that attains powerful 
meaning among participants and brings up change. It is a type of information use strongly 
related to the underlying context. 
If this is the case, then a phenomenological qualitative approach to research is a natural 
form to look into knowledge and has a greater potential to build up better insights than the just 
a quantitative study that cannot by itself uncover stories and meanings. In this view, 
knowledge results from the understanding of a particular phenomena within a specific context. 
It is built on ordinary language and incorporates people's beliefs and intentions. It makes sense 
out of particular situations rather than generalizations (Innes, 1987). 
"goal and problem identification, analysis and alternative generation, evaluation, choice and implementation" 
(Innes, 1995). 
The phenomenological approach is qualitative and exploratory. It searches for answers to 
questions such as "what is it like?", and "how does it work?", rather than "how large is it?" or 
"does factor X influence it?". Most of the research is critically built on interpretation of stories 
told by the actors involved. The main function is to search for invisible forms of knowledge 
(Innes, 1987) that influenced in a subtle way. 
Meaning and intention, as viewed by the actors, are the main focus of phenomenological 
research. Thus, this approach is completly different from the positivistic. Researchers rely on 
their subjective capacities to understand, putting themselves on the place of others (Innes, 
1987). Moreover, objectivity is drawn from a variety of sources and perspectives, rather than 
"one single correct method or an effort to observe without bias". (Innes, 1987). 
The type of research questions that interest me fit better the interpretive model of research 
rather than the instrumental. First, because I am interested in knowledge use dependent of 
specific contexts. Second, since my questions stress the understanding of a process, this is a 
more adequate option. Third, my main focus is in drawing out understandings of why and how 
information was used, through the way players saw the issues, talked about them and 
argumented using information. Participants' stories of the process represent a key feature of 
my analysis. Furthermore, the interpretation of these stories depends from the context within 
which they occurred. Since the phenomenological method is built on interpretation of stories 
whithin specific contexts it is this method that fits my purpose. 
The literature says that a way to capture the essence of a setting is through storytelling. 
This is particularly suitable to analyze complex contexts due to the potential for uncovering 
hidden untold pieces of the process and glueing them together. 
"We argue that thinking about stories in our data can enable us to think creatively 
about the sorts of data we collect and how we interpret them. Using examples drawn 
from our anthropology data, we try to emphasize that stories our informants tell can be 
seen, on one hand, as highly structured (and formal) ways of transmiting information 
... The collection of stories and narratives in qualitative research extends what 
Riessman (1993) calls the 'interpretative turn' in social science ... Denzin describes a 
narrative as a story of a sequence of events that has significance for the narrator and her 
audience." (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). 
In fact, story telling proved to be an appropriated method for my research, since my 
interests focused in the process and in revealing its interpretation. I listened to the stories of 
players in the case because it was through the story each one told that I was able to understand 
their way of seeing the issue at stake, and to refocus my questions to fit what seemed to be 
their understanding of the process. This procedure revealed to be a powerful tool for achieving 
substantial knowledge for the research. 
Planning as an interactive activity 
Theorists claim that "planning is best understood as communicative action rather than 
analysis for decision makers" (Sager, 1994; Forester 1989; Innes, 1995; Healey, 1990)6. 
Therefore, I am using Judith Innes method constructed out of the understanding of planning as 
an interactive activity and assuming that planners are "engaged in a range of communicative 
activities that result in public action" (Innes, 1995)7. This method has been very useful in 
shedding light on issues related to the processes of use of information from a communicative 
perspective. This implies a new view of the role of information, abandoning the traditional 
"delivery of unbiased, professional advice and analysis to elected officials and the public who, 
in turn make decisions" and focusing in "the role of information in the deliberations" (Innes 
1995). Additional attention is given to the way technical information is developed and used 
within a variety of settings. Recognizing that planning is essentially an interactive activity, I 
used an exploratory model to conduct research in these contexts. I look at planning under a 
communicative view in order to understand the evolution of the way the information was 
viewed by players along the process. 
Discussing the need to link planning theory to practice - "bridging the gap" - as a way 
to overcome the "crisis" of theory failing to provide a "satisfactory mesh with experience", 
Innes defends a phenomenological and critical approach as a way for "understanding neglected 
but critical problems", such as "the interactiveness of knowledge generating and using 
processes". The remedy suggested is a mix of descriptive, predictive and normative approaches 
grounded in empirical research of planning practice, primarily qualitative and storytelling8. 
Knowledge in interactive processes is constructed by the users involved through a social 
process. It becomes part of the story translating meaning and understood by the actors (Innes, 
1987). This makes the storytelling approach appropriat to the research in this area. 
Defining 'use of information' 
My interests are not in how much knowledge played a role in the final decision on the 
political context, but how it influenced the players. This came out of my conviction (supported 
by the literature -- Weiss, 1977; Innes, 1987b) that knowledge influences without being 
actively used. Moreover, the "intellectual capital" being build along these conflicting, highly 
debated processes has a deep influence in the amount of knowledge circulating and in the 
in Innes, 1995. 
Innes, J .  The Role of Information in Communicative Planning, paper presented at the Annual Conference of 
the Association of European Schools of Planning, Glasgow, Scotland, Aug. 16-19, 1995. 
de Neufville, J. I. Planning Theory and Practice: Bridging the Gap, Institute of Urban and Regional 
Development, University of California at Berkeley, Working Paper 402, April 1983 
restructuring of the public processes. Therefore, my analysis focuses on the influential role of 
information. 
The central idea was to draw insights from how people see information and how they use 
it to justify specific views, stands or opinions. Furthermore, I was also interested in 
understanding what changes occured in the views of people and how people put information 
together to make sense of it. The meaning that information acquired along the process represent 
a substantial part of the research. The reason is that information acquires meaning and 
powerfully influences change by being used. 
For my purpose, information is important when it influences, when it makes a difference. 
I define use of information as a process where any data, event, fact, knowledge, research 
influenced the perception, views or actions of people. This means that important information 
changed people's views, made people see an issue differently, or led to the reformulation of an 
argument. 
Having this concept in mind I developed a list of key variables to operate as a research 
framework: (1) information influence, (2) evidence of knowledge use, (3) degree of 
controversy, (4) inconsistency of objectives or arguments, (5) multidisciplinary, (6) diversity 
of perspectives, (7) degree of technical agreement among experts, (8) degree of stakeholders 
representation, (9) degree of fitting between information and problem frame, (10) degree of 
information discussion and change. 
( 1) Information influence 
This category results from the conviction that a way to identify knowledge use is to 
find ways users may be influenced by informationg. For example, how it: 
- makes them ask the right questions 
- changes the way people think about a problem 
- makes people see a problem in a different light 
- becomes part of a standard, or indicator 
- gives power to one of the parts involved 
- solves a dispute, or a problem 
- changes the opinion about an option, or policy 
- brings unexpected powerful evidence into consideration 
- supports an argument 
- legitimizes positions 
- makes some players become noticeable 
- generates need for more information 
- makes people accept a problem definition 
- prioritizes issues. 
It is a surrogate way to know that people used data. 
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(2) Evidence of knowledge use 
This is related to more direct types of information use. It refers to clear types of 
knowledge mentioned in different settings. This variable aims to identify information 
being used for a specific reason, such as: 
- because it is mentioned in a report 
- because it is debated 
- because it influenced change of an opinion or a view 
- because it was used in an argument. 
(3) D e ~ r e e  of controversy 
This refers to the degree of controversy as evaluated by the level and frequency of 
conflictual or opposed positions expressed in: 
- articles in the media 
- press conferences 
- meetings 
- position papers 
- interviews 
- TV debates 
- arguments. 
(4) Inconsistency of arpurnents and objectives 
This lists situations of inconsistency that may leave room for reformulation of an 
issue. It is closely related with problem definition and with the way each person sees 
a problem. It can be applied to identify the various views in debate, and the 
assumptions behind them. Examples: 
- contradictory arguments 
- incompatible objectives 
- ambiguity of objectives 
- partial argumentation (e.g., traffic engineers left out most factors). 
(5) Multidisciplinary contributions 
This identifies knowledge commitments analyzed through the insertion of players in 
different disciplinary of professional sectors, in particular 
- players backgrounds 
- players agencies 
- players professions. 
(6) Diversity of perspectives 
This variable identifies arguments connected with the different perspectives people 
have on an issue or on related issues. This gives us information on the lens people 
use to see the situation. Examples: 
- different images players have on issues 
- different types of rationales expressed by players. 
ree of technical agreement amon? experts 
This measures the level of consensus of specialists on technical information being 
debated. It also identifies the type of information that assumed greater relevancy in the 
process. Examples: 
- arguments of experts by explicit mention to facts justifying a technical argument 
- reference of players to specific technical data to make a point or support an argument. 
ree of stakeholders representation 
This variable aims to identify if the key players got involved. Leaving out players 
may be a reason for conflict to occur. Examples: 
- stakeholders involved vs important stakeholders 
- technical-professional and policy entities involved. 
(9) Degree of fitting between information and ~roblem frame 
This category deals more with the adequacy of the information and the process, and 
identifies missing pieces. Examples: 
- does information respond to the questions asked? 
- what are the tools to reach the decision and is there information to address it? 
(10) Degree - of information discussion and c h a n ~ e  
Drawing from the existing debates this variable identifies changes occurred in the 
information along the process. Examples: 
- changes on how people expressed their views on the issue 
- changes on the way people argued about the issue 
- patterns of arguments and explanations of specific issues and their changes over time. 
My interests are in what information influenced the players, how and why. I soon realized 
that information use could not be defined in singular terms because that would limit my 
inquiry. It was clear that a structured questionnaire to research on how, why and what 
information is used, applying quantitative methods, offered limited possibilities. This would 
also leave out considerable possibilities of building new insights on how knowledge influences 
and is influenced. I had, therefore, to turn to qualitative methods. The impossibility of building 
up a one-dimensional definition of use of information, associated with the awareness of 
frequent failure of people in recognizing that they used information, led me to choose 
qualitative methods such as intensive interviewing, transient observation, and document 
analysis, as better devices to attain my purposes. 
In fact, the interpretive approach provides a more adequate framework to understand 
"particular phenomena in their own terms and contexts", "making sense out of particular 
situations"l0 (Innes, 1987). Since little understanding of these processes of generation and use 
l0 de Neufville, J. I. Knowledge and Action: Making the Link, Journal of Planning Education and Research, v01 
6 ,  number 2, Winter 1987, pp. 88-92 
of information in complex environments is offered by the literature, it is essential that further 
research be done before they become ripe for more structured types of analysis. 
WHAT WAS DONE 
The complexityll of locational decision processes and of the research questions considered 
call for a qualitative in depth approach, because: 
(1) this is a theory buildin? dissertation 
One of the important objectives of my research is theorizing about the use of 
information in complex issues. Qualitative analysis is adequate for this purpose 
building ways of thinking with data, for "going beyond" the data to develop ideas 
(Coffey and Atkison, 1996). This is my main objective in this dissertation. 
(2) it deals with complex environments 
Qualitative analysis is suitable to deal with a "complex network of events and 
processes" as it allows the researcher to identify mechanisms that go beyond a mere 
correlation of facts (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
(3) it analyzes multiparty. multi-issue settings 
Qualitative analysis gives greater opportunity to consider a multitude of views, issues, 
positions and settings. 
(4) it deals with qualitative and exploratory knowled~e. 
Since the questions of the research deal with the understanding of an issue (e.g., what it is 
like) and a process (e.g., how it does work), qualitative analysis, built critically on the 
interpretation of stories told by the actors, offers substantially more possibilities than 
quantitative analysis, which puts too much emphasis in abstract laws and generalized principles 
categorizing respondents answers. Therefore, analysis is conducted on a single case that due to 
its characteristics, is a paradigmatic example - the decision on the location of the new crossing 
over the Tagus in the Lisbon region. This single case is representative of the main key features 
of complex public decisions in Portugal nowadays. It is my conviction that the in-depth study 
of this specific case will bring into the open key factors of these complex processes and will 
shed light on the main mechanisms involved. Findings will be valued for telling us about the 
use of information, the clarifying of the context of public decisions, and providing ideas for 
new forms of public decision making institutions. 
The definition of the research objectives supported the development of a list of the 
variables to work with (see above -- defining use of information). This gave me the 
explained earlier in this section and in the literature review sections 
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framework to develop the interview guiding questionnaire (Appendix I). I opted for open 
ended interviews and, therefore, this questionnaire only represents a frame of reference to be 
adjusted as the process moves along. The interviews were conducted in conversational style 
and the respondents often brought up issues that I had not anticipated and which proved to be 
important for the study. 
The field work was structured in five phases, each one of them with specific objectives: 
Phase 1 - Construction of the factual history of the location of the Tagus crossing. It 
included the development of contacts with identified key participants and main sources 
of information. 
Phase - Exploration of controversial explanations provided by respondents and 
collection of a more in-depth understanding of changes occurring due to the circulation 
of information. 
Phase 3 - Interviews of key participants to obtain insights for understanding the case and 
for building up the context. 
Phase 4 - Checking of unclear aspects raised during the interviews and validation of the 
constructed story, by conducting additional interviews and further document reviews. 
Phase 5 - Preparation of the complete case history. Analysis and development of 
findings. 
Most of the information was collected through intensive interviewing12 (see below). 
However, I also used transient observation13 of participants in debates (see below) to complete 
and confirm the information, as well as document analysis14 (see below) for collecting most of 
the wtitten data. 
Interviews 
I began by identify key actors in the process, based on my preliminary knowledge of the 
issue, knowledge of a key participant, written documents of several entities and public 
information coming out in the media (e.g., newspapers, radio, TV). During the field work I 
identified other people to interview, based on the information obtained in previous interviews. 
This process of identification was an ongoing process leading to a closed circle. 
l2 "open-ended interviews ... unstructured, semistructured, nonstandardized, in-depth, elite, exploratory, 
journalistic, intensive" (Murphy, 1980). 
l3  "the transient observer observes without disguise, is clearly an outsider, and, is faced with tight time 
constraints" (Murphy, 1980). 
l4 "document analyses is better than interviewing for collecting some kinds of retrospective data" (Murphy, 
1980). 
Most of the selected interviewees belonged to the technical community. The criteria used 
for the selection were: 
( l )  being identified by another participant (I identified most of the interviewees this 
way), 
(2) belonging to an institution directly or indirectly related to the process, 
(3) being a representative of a stakeholders groups (such as, member of an interest 
organization, member or consultant of the GATTEL, professional working for a 
municipality), 
(4) being an individual or belonging to an institution with a relevant role in the process, 
(5) being deeply involved in the process. 
I interviewed players with different degrees of involvement who entered the process at 
different stages. With some key participants I kept a continuous contact throughout the study in 
order to confirm or understand further information I was collecting (such as dates, chronology, 
or restricted events). Whenever a key individual was not interviewed I made sure that 
information from other participants, or written documents, covered for the gap and provided 
good enough information. Occasionally, I also resorted to interviews in the media 
(newspapers, TV, radio) for additional data on the participants I did not interview. 
I concentrated in getting the accurate history of events, in identifying why this process was 
different from other public processes and up to which extent there existed similarities, what 
type of information influenced or did not influence, type of changes that occurred in the 
participants positions, or in the way the process was carried out, and why they did occur. 
The interviews focused on: 
- getting the chronology of the events; 
- understanding how, when and why people got involved; 
- identifying the type of player and level of intervention in the process; 
- identifying changes of views of the players during the process; 
- finding whether different types of information (facts, events, data, past 
understandings) influenced changes; 
- identifying information considered important by the participants but which did not 
achieve attention (or just received little attention) in the process; 
- identifying the information that, though considered irrelevant, achieved an exaggerated 
importance in the eyes of the player; 
- determining specific meanings given by a player to a particular type of information; 
- collecting information on strategies of action and their changes; 
- comparing the similarities and differences relative to other public processes; 
- understanding the way the actors defined the problem; 
- figuring out how the process was set up (procedures). 
Most players had only a partial knowledge of the story concerning either a period of time 
or a specific part of the process. Moreover, since this was an ongoing public decision some 
reticence was expected from the interviewees, contrary to what might happen with already 
accomplished processes. 
The interviews were mostly carried on face to face, with an unique individual, though in a 
few cases there were two to three individuals together and the interview assumed the form of 
an informal meeting. These instances were useful because interactivity among previously 
acquainted individuals brought up issues not approached in the standard interview setting. 
In procedural terms, the basic idea was to let people tell the story of their involvement in 
the process and their understanding of information, and to look at the interrelations among the 
different actors. The advantage of this method was the possibility to explore with the 
interviewees the parts of the story that were relevant to them, upon which they had already 
reflected and advanced explanatory ideas. This procedure had more potential to build up 
insights, clarifying the unknown story behind the decision process. 
The interviews were later typed out. Whenever I felt the need of further explanation or 
correction of doubtful points, I solicited additional comments and feedback from the 
interviewees. When the account of stories and perceptions differed among respondents, I tried 
to clarify the accounts. Finally, I offered my own interpretation on unmatching views. Stories 
told by the different players were critically analyzed and interpreted, giving special attention to 
contradictions and differences that came up. I often confronted some of the players with 
controversies to get a more throughout explanation. The use of written documents (see below) 
contributed to further clarify some of the more complex issues. I also constructed a 
comprehensive story making sense out of the pieces and stories collected. 
A total of 40 individuals were interviewed. More than 314 of the interviews were 
conducted during 1993 and 1994. The remaining ones were evenly distributed by 1995 and 
1996. Some individuals were interviewed at different stages of the process and some of the 
interviewees had overlaping roles (for example, the same individual could be an 
environmentalist and also a municipal technician). Of the total of the interviewees: 
- 6 were members of the GA'ITEL 
- 5 were consultants for the G A m L  
- 13 were environmentalists 
- 16 belonged to the public administration (I excluded from this category individuals 
working at public universities and research institutes) 
- 9 were municipal technicians 
- 8 were urban planners 
- 5 were transportation planners 
- 3 were politicians. 
This group was selected with the aim of assuring a reasonable diversity. 
Transient observation 
The period of the study was mostly the period between the decision to pursue a second 
crossing of the Tagus in the Lisbon region and the decision of the Council of Ministers. 
However, to understand the story I had to dig into the background history. Since this case 
involved substantial conflict, it received a lot of public attention long after the Minister of 
Public Works decision. Therefore, I could further follow up the process and build up my own 
interpretation through the observation of the different actors in the debates, either technical, 
public or in the media. 
Document analysis 
The people interviewed supplied part of the documentation. I also got written documents 
directly from the institutions producing them, associations of interest, colleagues and libraries. 
I classified those documents and organized them for reference and comparison with the 
information obtained from the interviews. 
The GATTEL Documents were collected at a very early stage. Meeting minutes, memos, 
technical statements, plans, policy documents or legislation related to the issue were also 
assembled when available. This proved to be extremely useful for setting up the chronology of 
events (Appendix 11) and building up the historical background. Moreover, it also shed light on 
the conflicting issues and positions of the different actors - either institutions or individuals. 
I also used news (Appendix 111) from the media as a reference. They were, however, 
mostly important in figuring out the peaks of conflict and the argumentation made public. This 
also helped in certifying the chronology of events and identifying the tone of the conflict. 
Frequently, they also provided the understanding of specific arguments of some players. 
CHAPTER IV 
A COMPLEX CASE IN GROWTH MANAGEMENT 
- LOCATION OF A NEW BRIDGE OVER THE 
TAGUS ESTUARY 
INTRODUCTION 
The Council of Ministers decided in 1992 to locate the second crossing over the Tagus 
estuary in Sacavh-Montijo. "Never has a public work of such a dimension generated so much 
debate nor led to such a controversial solution"1. One of the opponents even called it the "error 
of the ~ e n t u r y . " ~  
It was the extensive planning and transportation activity going on in the region that created 
the context to make this process unique. In fact, at that time several plans and projects were 
under way, namely the redefinition of the strategic policy and the development of planning and 
transportation guidelines for the municipalities and the metropolitan area. Some of these plans 
covered parts of the region (e.g., Peninsula of SetLibal) and others encompassed the region as a 
whole. 
For four years, politicians, professionals and environmentalists debated widely the issue of 
the location of the future crossing of the Tagus, without obvious alignments within boundaries 
of either the political parties, the municipalities, the professions or even the government. For 
the first time in Portugal a decision of the Ministry of Public Works, Transports and 
l JM Fernandes - Publico (94.04.03). 
JJ Me10 - Piiblico (94.04.03). 
Communications3 was publicly challenged by other Ministries (Ministry of Planning4 and 
Ministry of Environments). One environmental association filed a complaint to the Portuguese 
administrative courts. 
In June 1994 major popular protest occurred on the only existing crossing over the Tagus 
estuary - the 25th of April Bridge - when the Ministry of Public Works, Transports and 
Communications increased by 50% the toll fares as a contribution for the payment of the new 
bridge to be constructed, as he declared. Angry daily commuters considered it unfair and some 
of the users (in particular, truck drivers crossing the bridge several times a day) saw it as 
unbearable. After one week of unfulfilled efforts to call the attention of the government by 
intensive "honking" while passing through the toll booths, they took a more radical stand 
blocking the bridge for one day. These incidents were a dramatic reminder that the location of 
the new bridge, once considered a closed issue - "it is dead"6 - was still very alive. The 
more recent debate (March 22, 1995) over the future bridge location, with the presence of the 
President of the country, reinforced this idea. 
By legislation of January 1991, the government created the Office for the Tagus River 
Crossing in Lisbon (GATTEL)' to "develop, coordinate and control the activities needed for 
the promotion of construction and exploration of a second road crossing of the Tagus in the 
Lisbon region." This office operated under the Ministry of Public Works, Transports and 
Communications, with representatives of this Ministry and three others (Ministry of Planning, 
Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Finances8). 
The Steering Committee of the GATTEL, set up with representatives of the four 
Ministries, appointed a team of transportation management, planning and environment 
professionals - the GATTEL Planning Team - to study location alternatives for the new 
estuary crossing, its technical specifications and impacts. Emerging in a period of intensive 
planning activity, when several plans were establishing the policy guidelines for development 
and transportation in the metropolitan area, this group of professionals working for the 
GATTEL carried out studies to support the decision on the location of the bridge. For eight 
months (January to September 1991) they studied the alternative locations for the second 
crossing of the estuary, and submitted three possible options to the Steering Committee of the 
GATrEL. 
MOPTC - Ministe'rio das Obras Pciblicas, Transportes e Comunica~bes - Ministry of Public Works, 
Transports and Communications. 
MPAT - Ministe'rio do Planeamento e Administra@o do Territdrio - Ministry of Planning. 
MARN - Ministe'rio do Ambiente e Recursos Naturais - Ministry of Environment. 
Publico, 93.02.03, Ponte sobre o Tejo: urna polimica morta. 
GATTEL - Gabinete da Travessia do Tejo em Lisboa - Office for the Tagus River Crossing in Lisbon, created 
by the Decree-Law 14-Al91. 
MF - Ministe'rio das Finan~as - Ministry of Finances. 
The GATTEL Steering Committee prepared a report to the Minister of Public Works, 
Transports and Communications with a summary of the conclusions of the study and 
recommendations for the location of the new crossing. In the opinion of several planning and 
transportation professionals, the final recommendations of this report and the final decision of 
the Minister of Public Works, Transports and Communications were not in accordance with 
the technical suggestions of the studies carried out by the GATTEL Planning Team. As in 
many other cases, professionals complained that the final decision did not incorporate the 
technical information developed. 
The decision process for the location of the second crossing over the Tagus estuary was set 
up to achieve consensus on the technical requirements. At the beginning, the GATTEL 
Planning Team thought this process would be a straightforward decision between two possible 
well-known alternatives - the Almada and the Montijo pathways. However, none of these 
possibilities responded adequately to the two main stated objectives - the national North- 
South connection and the relief of congestion on the existing bridge. The team considered that 
the bridge proposed in the National Road Plan for Carregado, North of the Tagus river 
estuary, addressed adequately the first objective, and gave higher priority to solving the 
congestion in the existing bridge across the estuary, perceived as a bottleneck for the 
metropolitan area development. While the work continued, the GATTEL Planning Team 
developed a third alternative never considered before -- the Barreiro pathway (central 
corridor). This formerly unexpected solution developed during the studies transformed the 
once straightforward decision between two obvious one-choice alternatives, doable in a short 
span of time, in a long and controversial decision process. The controversy opposed the 
unexpected solution at Barreiro to the previously obvious location at Montijo. Several entities 
at all levels began supporting the new option, calling attention to the disadvantages found in the 
A4ontijo crossing. 
The unexpected alternative disturbed the assumptions of many people in responsible roles, 
mostly politicians and professionals working in the Lisbon region, previously confronted with 
just the other two possibilities. Besides, this option was quite attractive for some of the actors 
involved because it emerged simultaneously as a cure for two depressed zones of the 
metropolitan area on both sides of the river - Chelas and Barreiro. According to the studies, 
this choice had more potential to capture traffic away from the existing bridge and to solve 
congestion. At the same time, it had the advantage of having smaller negative impacts on the 
periphery of Lisbon, preventing the appearance of a new front of development in the South and 
reducing the disturbance of the Natural Protected Area in the Eastern part of the estuary. The 
organizations and individuals concerned with the environment considered these two aspects 
very attractive. 
Up to a certain extent, the GATTEL Planning Team, responsible to study and to identify 
the best crossing alternative, was highly successful. It achieved a considerable consensus 
within the technical community, including the GATTEL consultants and municipal officers, 
favoring the Barreiro option. It is not so clear what it achieved within a wider constituency or 
at the higher levels of decision in the central administration when the Minister of Public Works, 
decided in favor of the location in the Eastern corridor, a decision that was later on adopted by 
the Council of Ministers. 
By this time, professionals (urban planners, transportation specialists, environmentalists) 
raised questions about the clarity of the initial governmental problem definition for the new 
crossing. Environmental groups strengthened their positions, and the issue increased in 
complexity. Several entities carried out debates over the data collected and analyzed by the 
technical consultants. These included the GATTEL Planning team, the professional 
associations, the environmental NGOs and the political parties. These debates produced 
information and brought up new concepts reshaping the way people were looking at the issue, 
sometimes making them abandon the previously position for the new one. For example, 
information made some people see the bridge as a potential tool to recover declining areas by 
increasing in accessibility, influenced actors and gained substantial supporters. Moreover, the 
new alternative led professionals to recognize the limitations of the initially considered crossing 
locations. Debates brought up several variations to the alternatives being considered and even 
new possibilities (e.g., the environmentalists proposed a bridge in the Barreiro corridor with 
only the train mode). Politicians, professionals and environmentalists, unhappy with the 
proposed solutions generated new options and debated them frequently in the media. 
Part of the interest in this big infrastructure location had to do with its high potential to 
spatially reshape the metropolitan area. The decision would have major consequences for 
growth management of the area. Moreover, the land use and transportation plans and studies 
that were going on at the time had already created, for the politicians and professionals 
working in the region, a space of discussion and reflection on the future of the metropolitan 
area. This activity that took place before and during the present study, set up an interactive 
process within the technical community. The professionals involved had the opportunity to 
jointly debate issues that concerned the region and to share a more global understanding of the 
metropolitan area. While discussing the issues, they used information to defend their views 
and knowledge became integrated. The views of several politicians and technicians of the 
metropolitan municipalities changed during the process, as displayed afterwards in an 
increased capability for looking at the municipal issues in a more global way. As one 
interviewed municipal urban planner stated, the debate over issues concerning the whole 
metropolitan area, which had begun with the discussions for the Land Use Plan, made the 
participants to "have a metropolitan reading" of the development problems. This person 
meant, according to a more detailed explanation offered, that they began looking at the issues 
not just under the perspective of their own municipality but as part of a vast region the 
metropolitan area. The concern of each municipality exclusively with its own territory, with 
little or no awareness of the continuity of space, gave place to a new understanding of the 
metropolitan area as a whole. 
Several groups and individuals disagreed with the government decision on the location of 
the new crossing, in particular environmentalists. They looked for supporting data, most of it 
coming from the studies developed either by the GATTEL or by other entities. Municipalities 
in the South split between the East corridor (Montijo pathway) and the central corridor 
(Barreiro pathway), depending on their geographical location. However, the municipalities of 
the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon had a common stand defending the East corridor A alternative 
(North connection at Sacave'm) when the Minister of Public Works, Transports and 
Communications adopted the East corridor B alternative (North connection at Olivais). 
Some initially independent groups or individuals, realizing that they had common interests 
and points of view on the issue and being aware of the scarcity of available resources, joined 
efforts to come out with a common stand and actions. This happened with environmental 
associations and other participant groups, and led to the legalization of new citizen associations 
(e.g., the Montijo and Alcochete Association for Defense of the Quality of Life9 and the 25th 
of April Bridge Users Associationlo). 
There is plenty of evidence that the technical community, and even wide sectors of the 
community at large, were aware of most of the issues raised by professionals and had access to 
substantial information related to them, following the whole process attentively, taking 
positions and arguing over it. The media gave large coverage to the subject and had a 
determinant contribution for the subject to go public. 
It is also the first time that a team of professionals had the specific assignment of 
identifying the best crossing alternative of the Tagus estuary. Some interviewees stated that this 
was what made the difference, because it allowed a group of people to look at the data in the 
light of the problem. This partially explains the development of a new alternative (see Chapter 
V - Findings). 
Though the government did not adopt the new alternative developed by the GATTEL 
Planning Team, at the end of May 1995, it issued legislation to reserve land for a future bridge 
in the central corridor. This amounts to a considerable change of the government views on the 
estuary crossings. After all, the new alternative developed by the GATTEL may have 
influenced the government. 
AMA - Associap'io de Montijo e Alcochete para a Defesa da Qualidade de Vzda - Montijo and Alcochete 
Association for Defense of the Quality of Life. 
l0 AUP - Associa~cSo de Utentes da Ponte 25 de Abril - 25th of April Bridge Users Association. 

PART l 
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE 
THE SETTING 
The Metropolitan Area of Lisbon 
The Metropolitan Area of Lisbon (AML)ll consists officially of eighteen administrative 
units (municipalities)12, spreading over 2,600 Km2 almost equally distributed on the two sides 
of the Tagus estuary. Its core, Lisbon, is the capital and the headquarters of the government of 
Portugal, a country with about13 89,000 Km2 and 10 million inhabitants. Though the 
Metropolitan Area of Lisbon represents in area a small part of the mainland territory (about 
3%), it houses a considerable share of the overall socio-economic structure. In 1991, it had 114 
of the national residents, accounted for about 113 of the overall national employment and 215 of 
the national employment in the tertiary sector, and housed more than half of the headquarters of 
the main national corporations. 
The population densities in the AML are nine times higher than the national average and in 
almost 70% of the total national population living in urban places of ten thousand or more 
inhabitants. Recent estimates of the National Institute of Statistics show that the distritosl4 of 
l AML - Area Metropolitana de Lisboa - Metropolitan Area of Lisbon. 
l 2  According to the legislation (law n044/91, August 2,1991) that creates the two metropolitan areas in the 
country - Lisbon and Oporto - the municipalities of the Lisbon Metropolitan Area in the Northern Tagus 
bank are: Amadora, Azambuja, Cascais, Lisboa, Loures, Mafia, Oeiras, Sintra, Vila Franca de Xira, and in the 
Southern Tagus bank: Alcochete, Almada, Barreiro, Moita, Montdo, Palmela, Seixal, Sesimbra, Setu'bal. 
l3 1 000 acres = 4 Km2 . 
l4 Distrito is an administrative subdivision consisting of several municipalities and holding mostly political 
functions. Portugal has 18 distritos. 
Source: MOP - GPST, 1966. 
Figure IV.3 - Bridge over the Tagus opened in 1966. 

During the nineties the tertiarization of Lisbon economic activities continued, as well as the 
rehabilitation of existing housing. At the same time the number residents declined sharply 
(Lisbon lost about 150,000 inhabitants). Recent local policies aim at preserving and, in certain 
areas, enhancing residential uses as a way to avoid the declining of the centers. 
Evolution of the metropolitan area 
The last forty years were decisive to the metropolitanization process in Lisbon. The city 
grew in area and population, spreading over the neighboring municipalities and relying on the 
main radial road and train transportation lines (Lisbon-Cascais, Lisbon-Sintra, Lisbon-Alverca- 
Vila Franca de Xira) and the radial road line Lisbon-Loures-Torres Vedras (Figure IV.4). The 
construction of the bridge connecting both sides of the Tagus river in 1966 opened the door to 
the occupation of the Southern bank. Lisbon kept always its hegemony, working as a pole of 
attraction, although since the 1950's there appeared indications of a demographic stabilization 
of the City with diminishing rates of growth, and even a net decrease in resident population in 
the last decade (198 1- 1991). 
The residential expansion of the forties shifted to industrial growth in the sixties. Small 
industries spread all over the accessible locations within the existing transportation network, 
forcing the labor force to look for residencies either in the neighboring municipalities or in 
accessible places along the existing network. Bigger industrial plants, in turn, worked as poles 
generating the urbanization of its surroundings. 
The radiocentric spatial distribution of the metropolitan area was reinforced and new 
development fronts emerged and expanded. The periphery grew demographically. Despite 
efforts creating secondary sector jobs in the periphery, the employment dependency on the 
capital increased. This unbalanced economic and functional distribution is responsible for the 
important commuting traffic fluxes between periphery and center. 
Housing and industry gradually invaded fertile agricultural lands of the metropolitan area, 
in a disorganized way due to the lack of planning policies. This situation became even worse 
with the emergence of illegal housing resulting from pressing demands of lower income 
groups unable to find affordable homes and an associated crisis of regulatory authority. 
The sixties and the seventies brought up a new phase in the spatial structuring of the 
metropolitan space: densification, expansion and renovation of the existing urban centers, the 
opening of new development fronts and the fulfillment of empty spaces between main 
transportation axes. The unbalance between demand and supply generated new construction, a 
large part of it illegal, in particular in the municipalities surrounding Lisbon. These 
developments were substantially dependent on public bus transportation and the road network. 
In the seventies, the main growth occurred in the neighboring municipalities closer to 
Lisbon - Oeiras, Loures, Sintra, Cascais, Vila Franca de Xira. The balance of supply- 
demand in 198 1 was only larger than one for Lisbon and Sethbal, with the other municipalities 
in the metropolitan area exhibiting smaller values (Vasconcelos et al., 1991; Vasconcelos et al., 
1992). 
More than half of the metropolitan jobs are located in Lisbon, and about 80% of them are 
in the Northern bank. This dependence favored the emergence of huge urbanized areas around 
Lisbon with dormitory characteristics. Commuting traffic within the Metropolitan Area of 
Lisbon grew with further improvements of the road network. The demand for housing and 
infrastructures generated the emergence of large residential areas in the peripheral 
municipalities relying on high densities and large buildings, and a further increase of illegal 
construction. 
During the eighties, the influence of Lisbon over the surrounding region persisted and the 
interdependencies grew, although a demographic stabilization of the town became apparent. 
Within the whole area, the vacant lands between the main transportation network were filled, 
generating the spread of growth in successive circles from Lisbon outwards (PROTAML17). 
However, Lisbon presented a decline in population in the period 1981-1991, suggesting a 
spatial spread of the nucleus of attraction that now seems to include the municipalities of 
Oeiras, Amadora and possibly part of Loures (Vasconcelos et al., 1992). 
Although in socio-economic terms the Lisbon share has been decreasing within the 
metropolitan area, the whole area maintains its relative position in comparison with the country 
as a whole. This reinforces the idea that the pole of attraction of the Metropolitan Area of 
Lisbon is growing to a wider circle enclosing the neighboring municipalities around the town 
of Lisbon (Vasconcelos et al., 1992). 
As the access from the South to Lisbon has to deal with the barrier of the river, the 
municipalities in the North feel more strongly the attraction of the capital. The existing bridge, 
which is in operation since 1966, has only partially overcome this and is presently a serious 
traffic bottleneck. The commuting traffic to Lisbon originating in the municipalities North of 
the Tagus is five times stronger than from those in the South. Moreover, the alternative pole of 
Setu'bal has not been strong enough to compete with Lisbon for attraction, neither were the 
other Southern municipalities accounting for a substantial urban-industrial growth - Almada, 
Seixal, Barreiro and Montijo (Almeida et al., 1987) (Vasconcelos et al., 1992). 
The attraction of Lisbon over its surroundings, the growth of housing that necessarily had 
to look for regions further and further away, the concentration of employment in Lisbon, the 
lack of coordination policies of housing and employment locations, the radial transportation 
l7 PROTAML - Plano Regional de Ordenamento do Territdrio da Area Metropolitana de Lisboa - Regional Land 
Use Plan for the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon. 
Source: Adapted fiom GATTEL (1991) and ~ichelin@ (1995). 
Figure IV.4 - Main radial road and train lines in the AML. 
- Train lines 
- 
Road lines 

network, the reaching of the transportation network capacity threshold (Almeida et al., 1987), 
the increasing number of cars in circulation, among other factors, generated an increase of 
daily commuting traffic that led to serious congestion, particularly in the rush hours. 
Socio-economic profile 
The banks of the Tagus estuary with a coastline of beaches are mostly in use for port 
facilities, naval industries and recreation. They offer excellent conditions for these activities. 
Recreation (sailing, wind surfing, rowing, sport fishing, swimming) and economic activities 
(traditional fishing, clam catching) use intensely the estuary. 
Lisbon, the capital, shows a strong increase in the tertiary but still presents clusters of 
important industrial plants. It operates as the main site of international connections in the 
country and is by itself an important tourist attraction. 
The Northern part of the metropolis is highly urbanized and densely developed. The urban 
development borders the periphery of Lisbon and a great deal of spreads over the 
transportation axes (Cascais, Sintra, Loures and Vila Franca de Xira), leaving empty the 
spaces between them. Cascais and Sintra are important tourist resorts. 
The part of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon South of the Tagus consists on the Peninsula 
of Setdbal. The Southern bank urban development follows the waterfront along the Tagus 
from Almada to Moita, with concentrations depending on the location of boat connections, the 
road axes connecting to the existing bridge, and the train line to the South of the country 
leaving from Barreiro. It is organized around a few ancient satellite towns and industrial zones, 
such as Almada, Barreiro and Seixal. The town of Setdbal in the further South of the 
metropolitan area is an important industrial site and urban center. The Peninsula of Setdbal is 
currently undergoing a strong economic development with the attraction of some major 
European investments, with Palmela being the site of a European consortium car factory that 
accounts for the highest foreign investment in the country in recent years. A substantial part of 
the South of the metropolitan area has rural or quasi-rural features, with empty spaces scattered 
throughout the interior of the Peninsula of Setlibal. Tourists seek the ocean coast line due to the 
beauty of its beaches and landscape. Sesimbra, besides being a much sought tourist attraction 
is a traditional fishing resort. 
The socio-economic profiles of the municipalities of the metropolitan area are diverse. 
Setdbal is well known for being an important industrial pole, competing with Lisbon in 
attraction. Five municipalities are mostly industrial (Seixal, Vila Franca de Xira, Sintra, 
Barreiro and Moita) and some add to industry a share in the tertiary sector (Amadora and 
Almada). The most rural municipalities (Montijo, Alcochete and Palmela) live from a 
combination of the primary and industrial sectors. Cascais and Oeiras in the North bank show 
a substantial tertiarization and have some important industries. Lisbon is the most important in 
the share of tertiary employment. Mafia and Sesimbra and Azambuja are important in their 
primary sector and derived industries. The littoral municipalities within the AML have also 
important tourist activity, bringing the typical seasonal changes difficult to manage. From these 
Sesimbra plays a central role having its population duplicated each summer. 
Table N. 1 - AML municipalities socio-economic profiles 
Ecological value 
Amadora, Almada 
Montijo, Alcochete, Palmela, 
Mafia, Sesimbra, Azambuja 
Cascais, Oeiras 
Lisbon 
The Metropolitan Area of Lisbon, despite housing three million inhabitants, still offers 
highly diverse natural amenities. It includes several areas of recognized importance for nature 
conservation scattered over its territory (see Figure IV.6). Spreading over the two banks of the 
biggest West European estuarylg, it contains in the East one of the most important European 
wetlands that shelters several fish and birds threatened with extinction. The ecological value of 
this wetland lays in providing nursing and habitat to several natural species, and in being a 
seasonal resting place for migratory birds. It is one of the European ecological "sanctuaries", 
being part of the East Atlantic Flyway, a network of wetlands from Northern Europe to Africa 
that assure the survival of many birds all over the European and African continents. During the 
winter, the estuary provides shelter to more than 90,000 birdslg. 
urban, tertiary, industry 
rural, primary sector and 
industry 
urban, mostly tertiary, industry 
urban, mostly tertiary 
During recent decades the Tagus suffered strong urban, industrial and agricultural 
pollution, which resulted in the disappearance of part of its natural patrimony (e.g., 
disappearance of oysters during the end of the sixties due to TBT contamination, and of certain 
types of fishes and dauphins). The declining of the Environmental Quality of the Tagus also 
forced migrant birds to the South. 
l8 Approximately 40 000 ha (320 km2), with a length of 80 km (from S. Julido da Barra to Muge, limit of the 
tide influence); the salt intrusion goes as further as Vila Franca de Xira, 50 km from the sea. 
l9  Dossier Erros Histdricos de Ambiente - A  Nova Ponte Sobre o Tejo em Lisboa , GEOTA, IDD, LPN, 
Quercus, 1994. 
I Socio-economic profile (l 991 ) 
Urban, mostly tertiary 
Urban, mostly tertiary and industry 
Urban, tertiary and industry 
Urban and industry 
Rural, primary sector and industry 
Figure IV.5 - AML municipalities socio-economic profile 

Awareness of the decreasing environmental quality, international pressures and efforts of a 
few citizens concerned with the environment led to the creation of a Protected Area in the 
estuary. The Natural Reserve of the Tagus Estuary20, with about 15,000 ha, was created in 
1976 and is managed by the National Conservation Institute2'. The environmental management 
of this Protected Area contributed to the partial recovery of the estuary living species (e.g., in 
ten years the aquatic birds in the winter increased from 80,000 to 120,000). 
Two international environmental conventions - Rarnsar (1971) and Bern (1979) - have 
particular relevancy to the Tagus estuary. The Ramsar Convention aims at avoiding the 
destruction of the wetlands, while the Bern Convention refers to wild fauna and flora of 
European natural environments, including species and their habitats. With the signing of the 
Ramsar Convention in 1980, the Portuguese government registered the Tagus estuary in the 
list of the "International Important Wetlands", and assumed formal responsibility for the 
"rational exploration" of the Aquatic Birds Habitat. Portugal signed the Bern Convention in 
1981, assuming a further compromise to protect the habitat of a long list of endangered 
species. 
In 1988, the Portuguese government sent to the European Commission a list of zones for 
classification as Special Protection Areas for birds, complying to the 1979 European 
directive22 791409 of wild bird protection. Aware of the natural importance of the Tagus 
estuary for wild birds, the Portuguese government proposed a 40,000 ha Special Protection 
Area in this estuary, including the Natural Reserve of the Tagus Estuary but larger than this 
natural reserve. 
Natural constraints to traffic mobility 
Mobility restrictions have been, throughout history, a serious problem for the Metropolitan 
Area of Lisbon development that deserved considerable attention and debate. 
The wide river estuary is a natural barrier to land transportation, constraining the North- 
South mobility. This is a long recognized major constraint to the economic and social 
development of the region (e.g., by Birot in 1950 as referred in Fernandes, 1993). 
There are also more elusive severe constraints to traffic along both banks of the Tagus due 
to different physiographic features. In the North bank, hills separated by narrow valleys in the 
20 RNET - Reserva Natural do Estudrio do Tejo - Natural Reserve of the Tagus Estuary, created by the Decree 
Law 565176, July 19, falling in the territory of several municipalities (Benavente, Vila Franca de Xira and 
Alcochete). 
21 ICN - Instituto de Conserva~o da Natureza -National Conservation Institute. 
22 Transfered to the Portuguese Legislation by the Decree-Law 75/91, February 14. 
West and East of the Lisbon City (Alciintara and Chelas) develop perpendicular to the 
coastline, leaving a reduced number of easy natural alternatives for crossings. This reflects 
strongly on the congestion of traffic entering Lisbon along both directions of the Northern 
Tagus bank. In the urban developed part of the Southern bank from Almada to Alcochete, 
despite the flatness of the land, numerous peninsulas defined along the river bank by small 
bays and ramifications of the estuary are obstacles to transversal transportation links along the 
Tagus bank, restraining mobility among the Southern municipalities and contributing to 
accentuate the dependency of these municipalities on the capital through boat connections. 
A CENTURY OF HISTORY OF DEBATES OVER THE BRIDGE 
CROSSINGS 
The discussions of Tagus crossings in Lisbon have a long history. The bulk of the needed 
infrastructure, the potential for reshaping a whole metropolitan area and the impact on the 
transportation network are already enough reasons for generating debate. 
The issue of crossing the Tagus in Lisbon emerged several times since the end of last 
century, bringing with it studies and proposals developed along two main pathways connecting 
both banks: Montijo and Almada. The projects developed, up to the present time and since a 
first proposal in 1876, restrained just to these two shortest (see Figure IV.7) corridors 
connecting Lisbon to the other bank 
Miguel Pais 
By 1876, Miguel Pais, then Technical Director of the South and Southwest Train Line, a 
visionary engineer and a pioneer in the proposals for overcoming the Tagus, concerned with 
the need for a crossing, developed the first study proposing a road-train connection between 
Lisbon (at Xabregas) and Montijo. His idea was to construct a 4.5 km double-platform bridge 
- road on top and train below - connecting in the North the Beato (more properly called the 
Si'tio do Grilo) to Montijo in the South, next to the Air Base that exists now. 
Miguel Pais was at the time responsible for the project of the train station in Barreiro that is 
still nowadays the starting point of the train line to the South and Southeast of the country. His 
main concern was to provide a convenient train and road connection between Lisbon and the 
South train lines. The alternative, then, was to rely on time consuming and inconvenient boat 
river crossings Lisbon-Barreiro as it happened up to now. 
Around the end of the last century, Lisbon was a tiny capital with about 200,000 
inhabitants2" and Montijo was a remote rural village well away from the center of 
23 11 Censo de Populapio, INE, 1878. 
102 
Figure N.6- Crossing proposals 
in relation to important areas for 
nature conservation in the AML. 
(Adapted from Roxo et al., 1983) 

development. Since the monarchy, Montijo was a gate from Lisbon to the South (an 
"accessible place, a passage to the South - Alentejo" that loses "this status with the growing 
importance gained by Barreiro due to the train connection", as stated by one of the 
interviewees). Although the Miguel Pais project ended up receiving the support of renowned 
engineers of the time, of the Lisbon Municipality and of the public opinion, it was not further 
pursued. 
In 1890 a German firm presented a proposal for a bridge following the main lines of 
Miguel Pais idea. After that, a number of proposals appeared for a bridge in the Almada 
pathway (Lye - 1988, Bartissol and Seyrig - 1889, Andr6 de Proen~a  Vieira - 1890, a 
Portuguese firm - 1913, Alfonso Pefia Boeuf - 1921). 
Duarte Pacheco 
In 1933, Duarte Pacheco, then Minister of Public Works of Salazar, reassumed the Miguel 
Pais project for a road-train bridge in the Montijo pathway. He nominated a commission for 
programming the construction and preparing an invitation to tender. This followed the 
recommendations of a commission nominated by the government in 1930 and whose 
conclusions had led to a detailed geological study of the river bed commissioned to a German 
firm. After approval by the Council of Ministers, the call for bidders was opened in 1934 and 
arose much interest in international technical and financial circles. Four international 
consortiums submitted proposals, but the government canceled the tendering in 1935 claiming 
that the proposals did not conform to the requirements in the invitation to tender. In 1938, one 
of the consortiums submitted a revised bid, lowering considerably the construction costs. This 
bid did not receive any governmental decision. Of all the considered proposals, this project for 
a bridge Beato-Montijo was the only one based on actual geological studies of the river bed. 
In 194 1, several Southern municipalities (Barreiro, Alcochete, Moita and Seixal) requested 
to the Minister Duarte Pacheco the improvement of communications between them and with 
Almada. He nominated a commission to study an integrated solution of the road and train 
communications of the East of Lisbon with the South. The studies of this commission were 
interrupted in the sequel of the priority given by the government to the construction of the Vila 
Franca de Xira Bridge. This bridge was inaugurated in 1948 and is located 25 Km away from 
Lisbon upstream the Tagus, where the river becomes much narrower after the end of the 
estuary. It completed a series of connections between the two banks of the Tagus upstream the 
estuary, solving, at that time, the local and regional communications and the North-South long 
distance connection across the Tagus, without the need of resorting to the river crossing in 
Lisbon. 
The fulfillment of the Almada pathway - SalazarIZSth of April Bridge 
By the end of the 50's the Alrnada corridor is chosen, leading to the effective construction 
of the only bridge over the estuary that exists nowadays. This is a road crossing conceived to 
be later on extended to a train crossing in a lower level. However, this train crossing was not 
accomplished. The bridge started operating in 1966, establishing the only direct road 
alternative to the boat crossings of the estuary. 
The emblematic character assumed by this infrastructure is clear in the name it received - 
Salazar Bridge - after the strong man of the forceful political regime that had ruled the country 
for forty years and was still the Prime Minister at the time of the bridge inauguration. After a 
military coup overthrew the old political regime in April 25, 1974, the bridge received its 
present name - 25th of April Bridge - reinforcing its emblematic character. 
Objectives of the 25th of April Bridge 
In 1953, the government created a Commission for the Study of the Road and Train 
Connections between Lisbon and the Southern Bank of the T a g ~ s ~ ~ .  The legislation that 
created the Commission mentions that the previously proposed crossings are the "Sunrise 
connection - from Lisbon to Montijo; central connection - from Lisbon to Almada; Sunset 
connection - from Lisbon to West of Almada", and observes: 
"(The Vila Franca de Xira Bridge) brought relief to the river crossing in the capital and its 
surroundings. ... However, due to a steady traffic increase, the connections between Lisbon and 
Almada are daily becoming more time consuming and difficult, so it is not appropriate to consider 
that bridge as having definitively solved the general problem of the connections between the river 
banks. ... The Vila Franca Bridge may eventually have invalidated the justification of a connection 
to Montijo, but it did not weaken the economic interest of the other connections referred above." 
The new bridge in the Almada corridor intended to facilitate national and regional 
communications without inducing urban development. The report of the Commission25 
referred above, clearly states: 
"It can be considered that (the new bridge) influence in the development of the urban units in the 
Northern bank will be negligible, as these have development conditions much more related to the 
center of the country and to the Lisbon sea port. 
The connection, properly integrated in the regional organization of Lisbon, must exclusively be a 
communication link, since a basic underlying principle is that it shall not be a device for 
generating the urban sprawl of the Capital in the Southern bank." 
24 Portariu dos Ministkrios das Obras Pu'blicus e das Comunica@es, de 16 de Junho de 19.53, Diiirio do Governo 
- I1 Skrie, 19/6/53. 
25 LigagQo de Lisboa ci rnargem sul do Tejo, in Elementos para o Estudo do Plano de Fomento 1959-1964, 
Ministkrio das Obras Pliblicas e das ComunicaqOes, January 1957. 
Figure IV.7- Two corridors for crossing the river in Lisbon: 
several proposals along the years. 
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1929 - Eng. Ant6nio Belo a Beah Montijo (Train line) 
1959 - United States Steel Export Company Consortium 
(concluded in 1966) 
Corridor I - A, E, I 
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To avoid the unwanted urban sprawl, this study defends a policy of transformation of the small 
Peninsula of Setzibal urban units in poles of development "with a proper life and as 
independent as possible from Lisbon." For this purpose, the Commission report calls for a 
regionally planned attraction of industries and other economic activities to the Peninsula of 
Setzibal urban units and the creation of new centers of industrial and urban development in the 
area. To support the proposed development, the report defends the need of construction of 
road and railway rings along the Tagus Southern bank serving the population units that spread 
along the river bank from Almada to Alcochete and intersecting all the radials that leave these 
units to the South. Planning and transportation professionals consider that the lack of these 
connections contributed to prevented the development of autonomous urban centers in the 
Peninsula of Setzibal. 
In the report, the Commission also expresses its support for a future "central connection", 
as follows: 
"Although, the study of the crossing solution Beato-Montijo is not studied presently, ... the 
Commission thinks that this crossing, which is so relevant for the train connection proposed in the 
railway plan, should not be abandoned." 
"The expected connection Beato-Montijo will naturally be the central link of the whole system 
previously referred (Lisbon regional communication system)." 
Impacts of the 25th of April Bridge 
The bridge was constructed, but the desired autonomous economic development of the 
Southern bank urban units and the associated transversal road and train interconnections, 
intended to increase their independence from Lisbon, were never accomplished. Exposed to 
strong development pressures by the increase of accessibility provided by the new bridge, the 
Peninsula of Setzibal went through drastic urban development during the years that followed 
the construction. Cheaper land for development in the rural Southern bank was available in the 
market as soon as the decision of the bridge construction became known, leading to a pool of 
land for development well beyond the needs up to the year 2000. The rural features of the area 
changed deeply and construction in the Southern municipalities was chaotic due to the lack of 
enforcement of regulations, as stated by two interviewees. 
Greater accessibility between the two river banks, job dependency from the capital 
associated with a higher number of vehicles in circulation worsened congestion in the bridge. 
With the development of the South, mostly for residential purposes, and the continuous 
dependency of its residents on Northern bank jobs, traffic grew and exceeded the bridge 
capacity. The generated congestion compromised the quality of life of the everyday 
commuters. Long lines26 of vehicles heading to Lisbon develop every morning, frequently 
taking up to 2 hours to reach the 3 km long bridge platform. 
26 frequently 12 km long. 
Presently, the North-South road connection has proved insufficient. The Tagus bridges 
closer to Lisbon - the 25th of April bridge and the Vila Franca de Xira Bridge - have both 
reached their maximum capacities and the traffic faces delays caused by a serious congestion 
that generates long lines of vehicles. Congestion in the bridges became a problem of obvious 
concern, particularly for the Southern residents that have their jobs in the North bank. 
After the construction of the 25th of April bridge, several studies analyzed the effects of the 
increased accessibility it provided. Among them, a work of A. Fonseca Ferreira, Isabel 
Pimentel Guerra and Victor Matias Ferreira identifies three zones of influence in demographic 
and spatial terms, depending on the proximity to Lisbon and the bridge influence27: 
Zone I : "urban influence", where the proximity of Lisbon and the influence of the bridge 
are strong. It includes the municipalities of Alrnada, Seixal and Barreiro, generating a 
population growth of 157% between 1960 and 198 1 ; 
Zone I1 : "regional influence", where the proximity to the capital is weak and the bridge 
impact is strong. It includes Setu'bal, Palmela and Sesimbra, municipalities with a 
demographic growth of 64% in 1960-8 1; 
Zone I11 : "metropolitan influence", where there is almost no nfluence of the bridge and 
the influence of Lisbon can only be felt due to the boat connections. It includes Moita, 
Montijo and Alcochete, with a population growth of 48% in 1960-81. 
This study concludes that the construction of the bridge also had as consequences: the 
expansion of the metropolitanization process relieving the North bank from demographic, 
urban and industrial pressures and extending to the South the industrial and residential areas 
strongly dependent on the capital; the specialization of the Peninsula of Setu'bal in heavy 
industry, leisure areas and low density, single family residential areas; the dispersed and 
disorganized occupation and the lack of reinforcement of the Peninsula of Setu'bal socio- 
economic independence, as consequences of privileging individual car transportation over 
mass transportation. 
INTENSIVE RECENT PLANNING ACTIVITY IN THE AML 
At the end of the 80's and the beginning of the 90's several land use and transportation 
plans and studies appeared setting policies and priorities at the regional, sub-regional and local 
levels. For "the first time there was an intensive effort to develop regional and local plans of 
land use and to stimulate the coordination of all agents involved in the organization and 
management of the territory"28. The main planning activity of this period is associated with the 
27 Metodologia de Avaliap!io dos Corredores, Document 2, GATIEL, May 1991, pp. 9-1 1. 
28 J.P. Femandes, Nova travessia do Tejo em Lisboa - Equacionamento das Suas Irnplicap3es no Ambiente e no 
Territdrio. Socieciade e Territdrio, June 1993 (pp.76-93). 
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development of the Distrito of Setu'bal Development Plan (PIDDS)29, the Regional Land Use 
Plan for the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon (PROTAML)30 and the Municipal Master Plans 
(PDMs)~ l.
Developed in the mid eighties, these plans were mostly directed to inform the decisor on 
investment allocation and to propose overall policies for the region. The PDR is responsible for 
the definition of the regional policy and the identification of devices for its implementation. The 
PIDR can be considered as its spatial expression, being responsible for allocating the 
investments of the central government. The importance of these two plans lays in the setting of 
investment priorities within the region. 
The Integrated Operation of Development (OID)34 for the Peninsula of Setu'bal was 
launched as a device to recover an area going through socio-economic problems. The idea of 
this operation, supported by EUIEEC funds was to address the serious development problems 
of this region. While contributing to the fullfillment of policies of regional development they 
were also correcting economic unbalances in the National territory, as required by the national 
regional policy. 
Distrito of Setribal Development Plan (PIDDS) 
The Distrito of Settibal Development Plan was developed between 1987-1990 under the 
direction of the Association of Municipalities of the Distrito of Setu'bal . It aimed at the 
definition of criteria for the attribution of funds to these municipalities, taking into account the 
funds coming from the EUfEEC under the Integrated Operation of Development (OID). It was 
developed before the Municipal Master Plans (PDMs) and the Regional Land Use Plan for the 
Metropolitan Area of Lisbon (PROTAML), although the Municipal Master Plans for Barreiro 
and Moita were being developed since 1986. During the preparation of the PIDDS, politicians 
and technicians of the various municipalities debated the future for the Peninsula of Setu'bal and 
developed a set of policies and priorities to be pursued. In the opinion of some professionals 
working in the Southern municipalities, this plan represented the starting point of a reflection 
29 PIDDS - Plano de Desenvolvimento do Distrito de Setu'bal - Distrito of Setu'bal Development Plan. 
30 PROTAML - Plano Regional de Ordenamento do Territdrio da Area Metropolitana de Lisboa - Regional Land 
Use Plan for the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon. 
31 PDM - Plano Director Municipal - Municipal Master Plan. 
32 PDR - Plano de Desenvolvimento Regional - Regional Development Plan, Resolution of Council of 
Ministers 21/84, January 16. 
33 PIDR - Projectos Integrados de Desenvolvimento Regional - Integrated Projects of Regional Development, 
Decree Law 86/84, March 19. 
34 OID - Operaplo Integrada de Desenvolvimento - Integrated Operation of Development. 
on development options and contents that was later further extended and widened to the other 
municipalities of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon, supplying a framework for the development 
of their Municipal Master Plans. 
Regarding crossings over the Tagus estuary, this plan considers a new bridge in Montijo. 
It defended a model of poles of development to control growth, although some professionals 
involved in the planning effort recognize the need of a future connection in Barreiro. 
Regional Land Use Plan for the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon (PROTAML) 
The Regional Land Use Plan for the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon was started in May 1989, 
under the responsibility of the Ministry of Planning35 and coordinated by the Coordination 
Commission of the Lisbon and Tagus Valley RegioG6. Its goal was to establish land use 
guidelines for the region. 
It suggests a future Tagus estuary crossing at Barreiro as the most adequate for the 
proposed model of development of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon. It was initially submitted 
in December 1992, but the government requested a revision by mid 1993. This revision was 
concluded in 1995 but is not approved by the government yet. 
The Regional Land Use Plan for the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon was particularly relevant 
in generating a participation process, raising a lot of interest among specialists operating in the 
region, partially because it was the first time the metropolitan area was going to be planned as a 
whole. 
A wide technical participation process emerged even before the beginning of the plan 
development, when news of a forthcoming regional land use plan for the metropolis emerged. 
In fact, fearing that municipal authorities would not be heard during the plan development, the 
Mayors of Lisbon and Vila Franca de Xira mobilized other local politicians and technicians to 
get together and intensively debate the wanted future for the metropolitan area as a whole. In 
the words of a municipal technician: "there were almost daily meetings between groups for 
discussing 'everything'; it was a very interesting period." The same person went on saying that 
"there was a 'metropolitan reading', a will developed in the people to not only look at hislher 
municipality per se but also in relation to the metropolitan area, (considering) the vocation of 
each municipality within the metropolitan area, and understanding what was expected from it." 
The debates of municipal politicians and technicians aimed at coming out with an overall 
concept of development for the AML. Most of the issues gravitated around needs and location 
of big infrastructures and facilities, particularly the ones with structuring effects for the region. 
35 MPAT - Ministe'rio do Planeamento e Ordenamento doTerritdrio - Ministry of Planning. 
36 CCRLVT - Cornissdo de Coordena@o da Regiao de Lisboa e vale do Tejo - Coordination Commision of the 
Lisbon and Tagus Valley Region. 
The growing awareness and knowledge that developed among politicians and technicians 
of the municipalities of the metropolitan area, due to this process of redefinition of strategic 
objectives of land use planning and regional development, set up the context for the follow up 
debate. This represented a new development in the metropolitan area history and a shift in the 
municipalities concerns, as they became more aware of their regional roles and further realized 
the need for metropolitan approaches. 
Part of the planning effort carried on during this period resulted in the creation of a long 
needed and debated Metropolitan Area of Lisbon Board37 (1991), in response to concerns of a 
growing number of public officials and professionals about managing the area as a whole. Due 
to its short existence, its meager resources and limited power of intervention, the involvement 
of this entity in the discussion of location of the new Tagus crossing was quite limited. 
Municipal Master Plans (PDMs) 
Recently enacted legislation led to the development of Municipal Master Plans which are 
presently reaching completion. Each one of these plans is directed to the corresponding 
municipal territory and sets up local objectives, policies and guidelines for land use. 
Particularly important is the Municipal Master Plan for Lisbon. Besides being the capital of 
the region and the country, it is an area of long planning tradition where experts (including 
from other countries) have conducted urban experiments. 
Even before the planning process leading to the recent Master Plan for Lisbon, which 
included a triad of interrelated plan levels (Strategic Plan, Municipal Plan, Detailed Plans), the 
electoral campaign of the coalition ruling the municipality since 1989 produced a document 
that, among other things, stated the need of a second crossing in the region of Lisbon for 
improving traffic mobility. 
A team of professionals were developing the Lisbon Municipal Plan at the same time as the 
GATTEL was carrying out studies on the new crossing over the Tagus. Professionals working 
inside the municipality and external consultants formed this planning team. They covered 
several subject areas namely, urban planning, transportation and environment. Led by an 
external consultant, this team had as transportation consultant the coordinator of the GATTEL 
Planning Team. This was relevant because it established a strong relation between both works 
(the GATTEL study and the Lisbon Municipal Plan). 
Professionals working in the Lisbon Municipal Pan were particularly knowledgeable of the 
dynamics of the town. Therefore, the strategies proposed in the Plan strongly reflect this. The 
proposals resulted from interrelating land use and transportation. One of the central ideas 
37 Junta da Area Metropolitana de Lisboa - Metropolitan Area of Lisbon Board, created by Law 44/91, 2cd of 
August. 
on development options and contents that was later further extended and widened to the other 
municipalities of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon, supplying a framework for the development 
of their Municipal Master Plans. 
Regarding crossings over the Tagus estuary, this plan considers a new bridge in Montijo. 
It defended a model of poles of development to control growth, although some professionals 
involved in the planning effort recognize the need of a future connection in Barreiro. 
Regional Land Use Plan for the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon (PROTAML) 
The Regional Land Use Plan for the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon was started in May 1989, 
under the responsibility of the Ministry of Planning35 and coordinated by the Coordination 
Commission of the Lisbon and Tagus Valley Regi0n3~. Its goal was to establish land use 
guidelines for the region. 
It suggests a future Tagus estuary crossing at Barreiro as the most adequate for the 
proposed model of development of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon. It was initially submitted 
in December 1992, but the government requested a revision by mid 1993. This revision was 
concluded in 1995 but is not approved by the government yet. 
The Regional Land Use Plan for the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon was particularly relevant 
in generating a participation process, raising a lot of interest among specialists operating in the 
region, partially because it was the first time the metropolitan area was going to be planned as a 
whole. 
A wide technical participation process emerged even before the' beginning of the plan 
development, when news of a forthcoming regional land use plan for the metropolis emerged. 
In fact, fearing that municipal authorities would not be heard during the plan development, the 
Mayors of Lisbon and Vila Franca de Xira mobilized other local politicians and technicians to 
get together and intensively debate the wanted future for the metropolitan area as a whole. In 
the words of a municipal technician: "there were almost daily meetings between groups for 
discussing 'everything'; it was a very interesting period." The same person went on saying that 
"there was a 'metropolitan reading', a will developed in the people to not only look at hislher 
municipality per se but also in relation to the metropolitan area, (considering) the vocation of 
each municipality within the metropolitan area, and understanding what was expected from it." 
The debates of municipal politicians and technicians aimed at coming out with an overall 
concept of development for the AML. Most of the issues gravitated around needs and location 
of big infrastructures and facilities, particularly the ones with structuring effects for the region. 
35 MPAT - Ministe'rio do Planeamento e Ordenamento doTerritdrio - Ministry of Planning. 
36 CCRLVT - Comissdo de Coordena~ao da Regiao de Lisboa e vale do Tejo - Coordination Commision of the 
Lisbon and Tagus Valley Region. 
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The growing awareness and knowledge that developed among politicians and technicians 
of the municipalities of the metropolitan area, due to this process of redefinition of strategic 
objectives of land use planning and regional development, set up the context for the follow up 
debate. This represented a new development in the metropolitan area history and a shift in the 
municipalities concerns, as they became more aware of their regional roles and further realized 
the need for metropolitan approaches. 
Part of the planning effort carried on during this period resulted in the creation of a long 
needed and debated Metropolitan Area of Lisbon Board37 (1991), in response to concerns of a 
growing number of public officials and professionals about managing the area as a whole. Due 
to its short existence, its meager resources and limited power of intervention, the involvement 
of this entity in the discussion of location of the new Tagus crossing was quite limited. 
Municipal Master Plans (PDMs) 
Recently enacted legislation led to the development of Municipal Master Plans which are 
presently reaching completion. Each one of these plans is directed to the corresponding 
municipal territory and sets up local objectives, policies and guidelines for land use. 
Particularly important is the Municipal Master Plan for Lisbon. Besides being the capital of 
the region and the country, it is an area of long planning tradition where experts (including 
from other countries) have conducted urban experiments. 
Even before the planning process leading to the recent Master Plan for Lisbon, which 
included a triad of interrelated plan levels (Strategic Plan, Municipal Plan, Detailed Plans), the 
electoral campaign of the coalition ruling the municipality since 1989 produced a document 
that, among other things, stated the need of a second crossing in the region of Lisbon for 
improving traffic mobility. 
A team of professionals were developing the Lisbon Municipal Plan at the same time as the 
GATTEL was carrying out studies on the new crossing over the Tagus. Professionals working 
inside the municipality and external consultants formed this planning team. They covered 
several subject areas namely, urban planning, transportation and environment. Led by an 
external consultant, this team had as transportation consultant the coordinator of the GATTEL 
Planning Team. This was relevant because it established a strong relation between both works 
(the G A m L  study and the Lisbon Municipal Plan). 
Professionals working in the Lisbon Municipal Pan were particularly knowledgeable of the 
dynamics of the town. Therefore, the strategies proposed in the Plan strongly reflect this. The 
proposals resulted from interrelating land use and transportation. One of the central ideas 
37 Junta da Area Metropolitana de Lisboa - Metropolitan Area of Lisbon Board, created by Law 44/91, 2cd of 
August. 
included the overlay of a new grid system over the existing radial transportation system which 
represents a serious constraint for traffic mobility in the city. The intention here was to oppose 
the maintenance of the radial structure of the main transportation lines in the town. 
Furthermore, professionals working for this planning process saw a future Tagus crossing 
not as a vehicle to bring more cars into town, but as a way to improve traffic mobility and as a 
tool for structuring land use, if well used. It is this understanding, partially resulting from 
having the coordinator of the GATTEL Planning Team in the Lisbon Master Plan team that 
made a difference. Professionals in this team became, at earlier stages, more motivated to get 
involved in the discussions of the future crossings. This implied a greater involvement in 
debating extensively the possible alternatives for the future bridge anchorage and their effects 
to Lisbon. Most of the debates were informal discussions carried out among team members 
while working together. 
Transportation plans 
Several transportation plans and studies were developed in recent years with incidence in 
the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon: 
- Lisbon Region Transportation Study (ETRL)38 (70's): It is a comprehensive 
study of the whole region considering land uses, urban structure and transportation, in 
particular in what concerns to the infrastructure network and the transportation system. 
The study was developed by the Department of Terrestrial T r a n ~ p o r t a t i o n ~ ~  of the 
Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications. It is a "sound 
document" where it is "the structure of information that is important" (in the words of 
one of the interviewed professionals). It became a basic reference on information and 
trends regarding zoning, urban structure and transportation in the Lisbon region. 
- National Road Plan (1985186): Of the responsibility of the National Highway 
Authority40, this plan included a new national road crossing of the Tagus in Carregado, 
to the west of the Vila Franca de Xira bridge, well upstream the river from the estuary. 
This plan did not specifically consider crossings of the estuary since it was essentially 
concerned with national road connections. 
- Lisbon Train Interchange Office (GNFL)4l (1987): This cabinet was given the 
responsibility of developing studies of a train connection in the 25th of April Bridge and 
on a second train crossing of the Tagus estuary. The Office was dependent on the 
38 ETRL - Estudo dos Transportes nu Regiao de Lisboa - Lisbon Region Transportation Study. 
39 DGTT - Direc~iio Geral dos Transportes Terrestres - Department of Terrestrial Transportation. 
40 JAE - .Tunta Auto'nonuz das Estradas - National Highway Authority. 
41 GNFL - Gnbinere do No' Ferrovia'rio de Lisboa - Lisbon Train Interchange Office. 
Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications42 and had only executive 
functions, but later on the Minister added planning functions to its mission. 
- Lisbon Region Transport Infrastructure (ITRL)43 (80's): It is essentially a 
"desk study", important because it updates the Lisbon Region Transportation Study of 
the 70's and puts together all the infrastructure transportation projects developed for the 
region by diverse agencies (National Highway Authority, Lisbon Port A ~ t h o r i t y ~ ~ ,  etc.).
It is particularly innovative because it evaluates the underground network, using as 
consultant a French expert and the Department of Terrestrial Transportation. A computer 
transportation model is used in the study. 
- Plan for Modernization of Train Services (1988194): Approved by the Council 
of Ministers, it includes the development of a train connection between Campolide and 
Pinhal Novo, via Pragal, on a lower platform of the present 25th of April Bridge. This 
plan reflects the concern of the planning entity - the Trains of Portugal Company45 - 
with the difficulties that were felt for decades regarding the funding of a new bridge for 
the train connection between the railway networks North and South of the estuary. The 
plan resorts to the less ambitious alternative of constructing a train platform in the 
existing 25th of April bridge. 
Importance of the planning effort 
The importance of the intensive planning activity that took place recently in the 
Metropolitan Area of Lisbon for the questions addressed in the present study lies essentially in 
the role it played in framing the understanding of professionals operating in this region, in 
raising key issues, in promoting debate among the various players. It is, therefore, of the 
utmost importance to look to the land use and transportation planning activity, in particular to 
the plans produced. 
The plans developed were used as important sources of information (Lisbon Region 
Transportation Study (ETRL), Municipal Master Plans (PDMs)), they framed ideas and 
politics (Regional Land Use Plan for the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon (PROTAML)), they 
influenced the structuring of analytical and design methodologies (Lisbon Region 
Transportation Study (ETRL)), they provided information on existing and future expected 
trends, but most of all they generated debates among the technical and political settings 
involved in their development (e.g., the Distrito of Setribal Development Plan (PIDDS) 
42 MOPTC - Ministe'rio das Obms Pliblicas, Transportes e ComunicagBes - Ministry of Public Works, 
Transportation and Communications. 
43 ITRL - Infiaestrutura de Transportes da Regim de Lisboa - Lisbon Region Transport Infrastructure. 
44 APL - Adnzinistra~iio do Porto de Lisboa - Lisbon Port Authority. 
45 CP - Comhoios de Portugal - Trains of Portugal Company. 
brought together several municipalities, the Lisbon Region Transportation Study (ETRL) sat at 
the same table professionals coming from distinct backgrounds, the Regional Land Use Plan 
for the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon (PROTAML) led municipalities of the Metropolitan Area 
of Lisbon to create forums of technicians and politicians to debate and reflect on the future of 
the region). However, they were frequently restricted to the geographical area or to the sector 
under consideration. 
These plans provided substantial amounts of knowledge to the studies carried out by the 
GATTEL Planning Team. Professionals cared about the information they contain, the policies 
they propose and the guidelines they offer. These were frequently mentioned by technicians 
interviewed as acquired knowledge and a source of credible information. Once the GATTEL 
Planning Team started its operation, most of the plans regarding the Metropolitan Area of 
Lisbon were extensively used to supply the necessary basis for the study under way. 
SPECIAL PROJECTS IN THE AGENDA 
There are certain special projects currently under way in the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon 
that involve big infrastructures and have important land use and transportation impacts besides 
playing a very important role in shaping the way technicians look growth management issues. 
The most important an frequently referred in the studies and debates are the Lisbon Airport, the 
Expo 98 and the Lisbon Sea Port. 
Lisbon Airport 
Several studies have been developed since 1969, by national and foreign entities, 
proposing the relocation of the Lisbon airport. Two locations are currently being considered - 
Ota, North of Lisbon, and Rio Frio, in Montijo. This is an issue of major consequences for 
discussions of the transportation network in the metropolitan area that gains a further 
importance in connection to the location of future Tagus estuary crossings, in particular 
because one of the considered possibilities for the airport location is in the Southern bank of 
the estuary. 
Expo 98 
The Expo 98 is a major international exhibition scheduled for 1998 in Eastern Lisbon. Its 
project led to a strong effort of forcing industries and storehouses out of the area, clearing for 
development a vast area of land where the Expo constructions are being built. Due to its 
location in the North bank of the Tagus, this project affects the location of possible future 
estuary crossings, besides the effects that it has on the problem due to the high visitors traffic it 
is expected to generate in 1998, including visitors coming by road from the connections with 
Spain in the South. 
Lisbon Sea Port 
A project for a major restructuring of the Lisbon Sea Port is also under way under the 
responsibility of the Lisbon Port Authority, including an extensive development in the North 
waterfront. This project has consequences for the road network and obvious interferences with 
possible locations of future estuary crossings. 
THE PRESENT SITUATION 
Severe traffic congestion 
Since the beginning of the 80's the quality of service of the 25th of April Bridge has 
declined seriously, due to increased traffic and an expansion of rush hour periods traffic jams. 
The associated severe limiting effects on mobility generated unfair "costs to the user and the 
communityM46 leading the central government, several local politicians and planning and 
transportation professionals to agree that a second bridge over the estuary was needed. For 
instance, the government resolution of 1987 which approved several road infrastructures in the 
Lisbon Region includes the following: 
"In what concerns to the accesses from the Southern bank to Lisbon, the situation is different. The 
enlargement of the road platform in the Tagus bridge and the utilization of a lower platform for a 
train connection remain as possible and probable endeavors. 
This does not prevent that, in a longer range perspective, a second road crossing of the Tagus in the 
region of Lisbon begins to be studied, for which purpose the Ministry of Public Works, Transports 
and Communications proposes to take the appropriate initiatives." 
(Resolution of the Council of Ministries 14/87, 21st of March). 
On the other hand, in the electoral document of the coalition (ColigapTo sPor Lisboaw) that 
won the Lisbon municipality election in 1989 it can be read: 
"The "ColigapTo ~ P o r  Lisboaw " will give priority to the problems at the regional and metropolitan 
levels, in collaboration with the other Municipal Councils in order to: 
- establish agreements, with the peripheral municipalities interested in "welcoming" offices and 
diversified services, including those related to tourism and culture, aiming at decentralizing tertiary 
activities, thus reducing the pressure over the Lisbon central areas; 
- program and render compatible the construction of the local intermunicipal road network, the 
regional road network and a second bridge over the Tagus, in order to improve, with higher priority, 
the metropolitan ring connections and the local connections between municipalities, reducing the 
negative impacts of recent disparate decisions like the Cascais speedway; 
- establish with the peripheral municipalities agreements on projects and programs aiming at 
reducing the use of individual transportation in the accesses to Lisbon, through the construction of 
peripheral car parking spaces near the public transportation corridors and the corresponding 
improvement of transportation interfaces; 
46 Mentioned in the Decree-Law 14Al91. 
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- promote the offer of mass transportation (railway and subway) in the main metropolitan 
connections (Cascais, Sintra, Loures, Vila Franca de Xira and the South bank); 
(Lisbon Capital Atlbntica da Europa - Documento Eleitoral da Coligapio '%r Lisboa" Candidata a 
Cdmra Municipal de Lisboa, 1989) 
Efforts to relieve congestion 
In 1987, the government created the Lisbon Train Interchange Office (GNFL) with 
missions regarding the improvement of railway connections in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area 
that included two actions concerning future train crossings of the Tagus in the Lisbon region: 
the reinforcement of the 25th of April Bridge to allow for a train crossing in the short range, 
and a future independent Tagus train crossing in the Lisbon region to establish continuity 
between the North and South train lines, still assured by a boat connection47. 
As a response to the severe congestion developing in the existing bridge, the government 
decided to develop a fifth road lane to be operated in any one of the crossing directions, 
according to the traffic needs. This fifth lane was opened to traffic in July of 1990. At that 
time, the Minister of Public Works, Transports and Communications announced that the bridge 
would be reinforced to allow for a train crossing in a lower platform and that a new road bridge 
would be constructed in the Montijo corridor. More recently, it was decided that the 25th of 
April Bridge reinforcement should also account for the expansion of the upper platform from 
five to six road lanes. 
In January of 1991 the government created the Office for the Tagus River Crossing in 
Lisbon (GATTEL), under the direct responsibility of the Ministry of Public Works, Transports 
and Communications, to "develop, coordinate and control the activities needed for the 
promotion of construction and exploration of a second road crossing of the Tagus in the 
Lisbon region"48 including the study of crossing alternatives. The construction of this 
expensive infrastructure would be feasible by assuring the contribution of EUIEEC funds for 
its development. 
Besides the second road crossing of the Tagus in Lisbon, there is a planned road bridge for 
Cnrregaclo, approximately 30 Km from Lisbon upstream the Tagus, away from the estuary and 
where the river is much narrower. This bridge is intended to respond to the demand for the 
national North-South road connection across the Tagus avoiding Lisbon. In fact, the National 
Road Plan49 proposes a new bridge in Carregado to the East of the Vila Franca de Xira bridge, 
aiming to capture the overflowing traffic on this bridge. Both of these crossings, the 
47 Decree-Law 315187, 20th of August - the Lisbon Train Interchange Office (GNFL) is made responsible for 
the "train crossing of the Tagus in the 25th April bridge (...) and promotion, at the long range of the second 
crossing of the Tagus". 
48 Decree-Law 14-AI9 1. 
49 Decree Law 145185. 
Source: Adapted from MichalinO , 1995 
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constructed (Vila Franca de Xira, 25 kms from the Sacavbm knot in the North bank) and the 
proposed (Carregado, about 5 kms away from Vila Franca de Xira) are located away from the 
estuary in a narrower river path. Transportation professionals claim that these bridges intend to 
serve the North-South throughout traffic. 
Changed reality 
Today Lisbon is no more the tiny capital of the end of the century. Reality has changed 
over the years. The Southern municipalities went through a substantial growth encouraged by 
the accessibility provided by the 25th of April Bridge since 1966. 
The technological advance that occurred allows for an increased number of competing 
alternatives for the Tagus estuary crossing. 
An extensive transportation network is already operating serving the residents of the whole 
metropolitan area. 
Environmental concerns added one additional factor to the already complex issue. 
PUBLIC STRUCTURE AND PROCESS FOR HANDLING THE 
NEW ESTUARY CROSSING DECISION: THE GATTEL 
The GATTEL - Creation and formal structure 
In the 25th of January 1990, aware of the need for a new crossing of the Tagus estuary, 
the Council of Ministers considered essential the development of studies to support the 
decision. As a result, an inter ministerial working team was created to carry out these studies 
"due to the numerous implications of the actions required to accomplish the desired goalW5O. 
Following this, the government created the Office for the Tagus Crossing in Lisbon 
(GATTEL)51, an entity with legal and administrative autonomy operating under the Ministry of 
Public Works, Transports and Communications that was considered by the government to be 
the most adequate form to carry out the needed studies in the shortest span of time, including 
the coordination with projects already under way. 
The mission given to the GATTEL in the legislation includes "executing, coordinating and 
controlling the activities needed to promote the construction and exploration of a second road 
crossing of the Tagus in the Lisbon Region." Moreover, this legislation mentions that, with the 
50 Resolution of Council of Ministers, 25th of January, 1990. 
51 GATTEL - Gabinete da Travessia do Tejo em Lisboa - Office for the Tagus Crossing in Lisbon, created by 
the Decree-Law 14-A/91,9th of January, 199 1. 
goal of ameliorating the congestion problem, "the government defined actions to optirnize the 
use of the road existing platform" and that "it is simultaneously under way the implementation 
of the Integrated Plan of the Road Access to Lisbon" which was approved in 198752. The 
GATTEL was also given the roles of assuring the cooperation of services and entities involved 
in the studies and the construction, and of representing the government in all sessions related 
with the studies and the execution of the work. 
This procedure seems to be based on the traditional operation of the Ministry of Public 
Works, Transports and Communications for carrying on large projects, with the enacted 
legislation resulting from previous studies developed within this Ministry. 
The legislation creating the GATTEL also refers to the Lisbon Train Interchange Office 
(GNFL), createds3 in 1987, stating that it "is made responsible for the train crossing of the 
25th of April Bridge and the promotion of a second train crossing of the Tagus in the Lisbon 
Region." This description shows a particular concern for sectoring functionally the problems 
under consideration, attributing to different entities the functions related to the road and the 
train crossings. However, as mentioned in legislation, attention is called to the need of 
coordination with other studies being developed. 
According to the legislation, the administrative bodies of the GATTEL are the Steering 
Committee54 and the Advisory Boardss. 
The Steering Committee Chairman is nominated by the Council of Ministers and has four 
other members representing each one of the following ministries: Ministry of Public Works, 
Transports and Communications, Ministry of Finances, Ministry of Planning and Ministry of 
Environment. These elements are nominated by joint agreement of the Minister of Public 
Works, Transports and Communications and by the Minister of each specific areas6. The 
Steering Committee defines the functions of each one of its members. Decisions of this 
committee are made by majority, and the Chairman has a casting-votes7. The Steering 
Committee Chairman represents the GATTEL externally, calls for meetings, directs them, and 
assures the deliberations are carried out. 
The Advisorv Board responsibilities are to comment on issues submitted by the Steering 
Committee and to provide technical assistance whenever requested by the Steering Committee. 
According to the initial legislation, it integrates representatives of: the four ministries 
considered for the Steering Committee, the Ministry of Defense, the Office of Studies of the 
Ministry of Public Works, Transports and Communications, the Office of Studies of the 
52 Resolution of Council of Ministers 14187. 
Decree-Law 315187, of August 20, 1987. 
54 Comissfio Instaladora - Steering Committee. 
Conselho Consultive - Advisory Board. 
Joint dispatch A 15-91, XI. 
57 vofo de qqualidade - casting vote. 
Ministry of Planning, the Coordination Commission of the Lisbon and Tagus Valley Region 
(ccRLvT)~~, the Lisbon Municipality (CML)59, the Civil Engineering National Laboratory 
( L N E C ) ~ ~ ,  the Lisbon Port Authority (APL)61, the Highway Authority (JAE)62, the 
Department of Traffic (DGV)63 and the Department of Terrestrial Transportation (DGTT)64; it 
is chaired by the representative of the Ministry of Public Works, Transports and 
Communications, and it may integrate representatives of other municipalities when that appears 
appropriate in the course of the studies. 
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Figure IV. 10 - The GATTEL organizational structure: 
Steering Committee and the Ministries represented 
In May of 1991, the Advisory Board was enlarged to finally include representatives of the 
following municipalities: Alrnada, Moita, Oeiras and Vila Franca de Xira. In October of 1994 
representatives of the municipalities of Alcochete, Barreiro, Loures, Montijo and Settibal were 
added, accounting for the representation of all the municipalities in the Tagus banks of the 
Metropolitan Area of Lisbon. 
The technical and administrative support of the GATTEL is assured by a core team of 
professionals and a permanent clerical staff hired by the Steering Committee. 
An interesting feature of the GATTEL is that it integrates representatives of the Ministry of 
Environment, suggesting a special concern with the link of the environment with the issue at 
hand. It is the inclusion of this Ministry that seems a distinct feature from what is common 
practice in the area of transportation and public works in Portugal. 
58 CCRLVT - Conzisslio de Coordenago da Regiao de Lisboa e Vale do Tejo - Coordination Commission of 
the Lisbon and Tagus Valley Region. 
59 CML - Cdmara Municipal de Lisboa - Lisbon Municipality. 
60 LNEC - Laboratdrio Nacional de Engenharia Civil - Civil Engineering National Laboratory. 
61 APL - Administra@o do Porto de Lisboa - Lisbon Port Authority. 
62 .TAE - .Iunta Autdnoma das Estradas - National Highway Authority. 
63 DGV - Direcglio Geral de Via~lio - Department of Traffic. 
64 DGTT - Direcglio Geral dos Transportes Terrestres - Department of Terrestrial Transportation. 
Internal structure and tasks carried out 
In the first stage of operation of the GATTEL, specialists directed mainly to design and 
building suggested that professionals in planning and transportation management should be 
hired to coordinate and develop the studies for supporting the decision on the location of the 
new bridge. For this purpose, the Steering Committee decided to hire a transportation manager 
who had been previously involved in transportation studies in the Metropolitan Area and was a 
consultant for several municipalities in the region. A group of professionals - the GA'ITEL 
Planning Team - was assembled under his leadership, by the end of 1990 and the beginning 
of 1991. The members of this team were selected through informal networking, and included a 
traffic engineer, a land use planner and an environmental engineer. With the exception of this 
last member, brought in by the representative of the Ministry of the Environment, the team had 
done extensive consultant work in the region and had a good experience of working together. 
The GATTEL Planning Team worked under the supervision of the GATTEL Steering 
Committee which had, among other roles, to assure a regular link to the Ministry of Public 
Works. As stated by one of the interviewees, they sent each fifteen days working reports to the 
this Minister. The representatives of each of the Ministers, with seats in the Steering 
Committee were responsible to keep their respective Ministers informed. 
GATTEL Steering Committee 
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Figure IV. 11 - Formal organization and internal operation of the GATTEL 
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Generous funding was made available by the Steering Committee to the Planning Team in 
order to provide for the development of studies in a short period of time and with the best 
information available. The GATTEL used part of these funds to hire external consultants, part 
to gather existing reports and to update information. They had to comply to the tight dates 
imposed, and therefore resources were available to speed up the process. 
The Planning Team appears to have gathered the basic adequate capabilities for the task at 
haad, involving specialists on the main issues under consideration for the location studies. The 
whole process was initiated under consensus, with accepted tight due dates. There was a 
general belief that the technical support for the decision on the location was achievable in a 
short period of time since there were two alternatives being considered (Algks and Montijo) 
which could be easily compared, admitting the study as a ready-solution case. 
Immediately after being created, the GATTEL Planning Team developed efforts aiming to 
collect all the relevant existing information and hired consultants whenever necessary to cover 
specific areas to be addressed: transportation, traffic, land use and environment. As a result, 
by mid 1991 a report was produced compiling and summarizing the technical  suggestion^^^. 
The GATTEL Planning Team was the core of a larger structure, encompassing: 
- Planning Team: responsible for assuring the work continuity, this team set up the 
methodology and carried out the various phases within tight due dates, to assure results in 
one year period; the operation was organized on a model similar to a private firm 
operation, and reports were scheduled to be issued at the end of each key phase. 
- Data Base Team: formed by assistants responsible to collect needed data on 
transportation, supplyldemand, socio-economic, population, employment, etc. 
- Consultants: several consultants were hired in certain instances of the studies, 
depending on the issues under consideration and the fields of expertise; some of the 
consultants were more permanent than others in the follow up. 
- Dutch Consultant: invited to develop a traffic fluxes study and to run a cost benefit 
evaluation based on a computer model that had been previously tested in Portugal under 
the Department of Terrestrial Tran~portat ion~~.  This consultant was supplied information 
compiled by the data base team. The underlying reason for hiring the consultant was his 
previously acquired knowledge about the transportation issues in the Lisbon region while 
working for the Department of Terrestrial Transportation, a highly desirable factor due to 
the need of speeding up the process. 
65 Avtrlicrpio dos Corredores: Conclus~es e Recomenda~Oes, Nova rravessia rodovia'ria sobre o Tejo nu regic?o de 
Li,sbolc. GATTEL, Documento 6,  September 1991. 
- nirecpio Geral dos Transportes Terrestres - Depamnent of Terrestrial Transportation. 
All these groups were supervised and coordinated by the transportation manager who led 
the Planning Team. To keep track of all the activities and complying with the tight due dates 
that were programmed, the Planning Team developed a very detailed methodology at the 
beginning explicitly defining the due dates, tasks and documents to be attained for each phase 
(see GATTEL Phasing). 
This phasing shows a particular concern with separating the different levels of 
intervention, establishing clearly the responsibilities of the technicians and what was to be 
submitted to the decision makers, and therefore to the political setting (see GATTEL 
Methodology). 
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Figure TV. 12 - GA'ITEL Planning Team organization of activities 
A substantial number of the consultants, besides producing specific reports that were 
requested, participated in discussions with the Planning Team, and sometimes with other 
professionals working in the GATTEL, about the information being collected and analyzed, 
namely on geomorphology, physical geography, transportation infrastructures, socio- 
economics and environment. The information considered by the Planning Team to be relevant 
for the study was collected and interpreted in an exhaustive report, summarized in Document 4 
of the GATTEL. Several meetings were held either with just the team members, or with other 
invited experts, about positions, concepts, advantages and disadvantages of the several options 
considered. 
The work started in an uncertain context regarding several key issues, namely the desired 
priority by the central administration between the two objectives stated in the legislation 
(congestion and North-South National crossing) that was never defined, decisions on the 
location of some planned infrastructures for the area (e.g., airport, train crossing of the 
Tagus). This ambiguity is recognized in Document 2 of the GATTEL which states that 
"without orientation guidelines clearly defined"67. 
Ingrained in the legislation that created the GAlTEL68 are several relevant issues that were 
frequently explored in arguments emerging afterwards: 
a) Road capacity / strangling of economic development 
The legislation states that there is a need to substantially increase the road crossing 
capacity of the Tagus, to avoid the "strangled economic development of the region and the 
country" 
b) North - South connection / accessibility to Spain 
The legislation attributes explicit importance to the North South connection and the 
accessibility to Spain stating "due to the importance of the North-South connection and 
the accessibility to the central and Southern part of Spain"69 
c) Congestion / undue costs to user and community 
According to the legislation, the declining of service level is due to congestion 
generating "undue effects for the user and the community in terms of costs of 
t ransp~r ta t ion"~~ 
d) Train crossing at the responsibility of another entity 
Moreover, legislation recognizes that the train crossing of the 25th of April bridge and 
the second train crossing are of the responsibility of the Lisbon Train Interchange Office - 
GNFL71. 
e) Justification of the need of studies 
The legislation refers to the need of "the government to develop the studies necessary to 
make a decision about the second road crossing of the Tagus river in the Lisbon Region 
in the context of the transportation system and the land use planning of the Region and the 
Country." 
67 Metodologia de Avaliapio dos Corredores, Nova travessia rodovidria sobre o Tejo nu regiiio de Lisboa, 
CiATTEL, Documento 2, May 1991. 
68 Decree-Law 14A19 1. 
69 Nova travessia rodovidria sobre o Tejo na regiao de Lisboa, GATTEL, June 1993. 
70 Memorando Sintese: Trabalhos Desenvolvidos, Nova travessia rodovidria sobre o Tejo nu regiao de Lisboa, 
GATTEL, Documento 13, July 1993. 
GNFL - Gabinete do Nd Ferrovikrio de Lisboa - Lisbon Train Interchange Office. 
Legislation problem framing 
The new bridge is seen to provide a greater road capacity and a support for economic 
development. The l e g i ~ l a t i o n ~ ~  established as a goal "to increase substantially the road capacity 
over the Tagus in the Lisbon region", connecting it with effects on development by stating that 
"existing studies reveal the need to, in the short range, increase substantially the crossing 
capacity of the Tagus by road traffic in this region, to avoid negative effects on the economic 
development of the region and even the country, due to the importance of this crossing in the 
North-South connections." The developmental concerns within the whole system of 
transportation and land use planning in the region appear stressed in the legislation when it 
calls "for the decision on a second road crossing of the Tagus river in the Lisbon Region ... in 
the context of a system of transportation and land use planning of the region and the country." 
It is possible that the government, and the Ministry of Public Works in particular, were 
convinced that all the necessary studies were done, specially on alternative locations and 
environmental impacts. The legislation states that there are already studies available, 
particularly about alternative locations and environmental impacts. Curiously, when the 
GATTEL specialists where asked about specific previous studies on the location and 
construction of the new bridge, they did not show to know them. They knew well, however, 
the several studies developed for the region for other purp0ses8~ and used them in building up 
the characterization of the region and as a source of basic data that was updated with new 
information. 
Formal methodology and phasing as stated in the GATTEL methodology 
As stated by the GATTEL84, the official methodology and phasing were as follows: 
1st phase - Baseline conditions, institutional model, coordination with other studies 
This phase is for the development of studies leading to the definition of the possible 
corridors and the selection of the new crossing location, following the description in the 
legislation85: 
(1) "Promoting traffic, geological, geotechnic and environmental studies considered 
necessary for submission of a proposal for the crossing location, including accessibility 
network in both banks, in the context of national and international road and train 
82 Decree-Law 14-N91. 
83 Lisbon Region Transport Infrastructure (ITRL), Lisbon Region Transportation Study (ETRL), Distrito of 
Setubal Development Plan (PIDDS). 
84 Memorando Sintese: Trnbalhos Desenvolvidos, Nova travessia rodovidria sobre o Tejo nu regido de Lisboa, 
GATTEL, Documento 13, July 1993. 
85 Decree-Law 14-N91. 
connections, land use planning, protection of the environment and navigation conditions 
in the Tagus"; 
(2) "Carrying out an analysis of the various institutional models for the construction and 
operation of the enterprise, proposing the most advantageous solution"; 
(3) "Assuring the coordination with the studies under way in the Lisbon Train Interchange 
Office (GNFL) regarding the development of the second train crossing of the Tagus in 
the Lisbon Region." 
2nd phase - Public consultation 
Public consultation started in the 26 th of October, 1991, during a period of 45 days, 
regarding only the Olivais-Montijo option, in the sequel of the decision86 by the Minister 
of Public Works, Transports and Communications, in September 26, 1991, of pursuing 
the works for the option Olivais-Montijo (West corridor, alternative B). The GATTEL 
states87 that this public consultation was done "in accordance with Community Directives 
and national legislation." However, the restriction to just one of the location alternatives 
was challenged by the environmental associations on the grounds that the application of 
the Environmental Impact Assessment legislation would imply public consultation 
regarding the choice between possible location alternatives. 
Previously, in MarchIApril 199 1, the GATTEL had initiated contacts with several entities 
to debate the proposed alternatives. According to the GATTEL88, this involved about 90 
entities that, in one way or another, had information, had participated in studies and, 
directly or indirectly, would be interested in a new crossing over the Tagus river. By 
MayIJune 199 1 the first news on the studies developed by the GA'ITEL regarding location 
alternatives appeared in the media. 
Although, no document was made available identifying the entities that were contacted at 
this stage, it can be inferred from the interviews conducted that they were mainly 
specialists working in the region, municipality technicians and politicians. 
3rd phase - Development of detailed studies on the chosen option 
This phase considers the development of more detailed studies, regarding the choice of the 
best alternative in the selected corridor. 
4th phase - Preparation of the documents for the tendering regarding the construction project, 
call for bidders, and signature of the project and building contract. 
Dispatch 108191, 26th September 1991, Minister of Public Works, Transports and Communications 
(MOPTC). 
87 Mernorando Si'ntese: Trabalhos Desenvolvidos, Nova travessia rodovidria sobre o Tejo na regiao de Lisboa, 
GATTEL, Documento 13, July 1993. 
Metnorando Si'ntese: Trabalhos Desenvolvidos, Nova travessia rodovidria sobre o Tejo nu regiao de Lisboa, 
GATTEL, Documento 13, p.7, July 1993. 
5th phase - Supervision of the project and construction, ending with the completion of the 
construction expected for March 1998. 
Up to the end of the 4th phase, the Advisory Board met very few times (2 to 3 times 
according to the people interviewed), suggesting a reduced influence of this board in the 
process. Considering the number of actors and interests within the metropolitan area, emerging 
during the debates, the Advisory Board seems to be rather restricted, without much room left 
to other entities besides the municipalities. 
Studies developed by the GATTEL 
Between 1990 and 1992, the GATTEL developed a set of documents for supporting the 
decision on the location of the bridge. Two of them are of special relevance, partialy because 
they were widely used by the people involved in the debates (e.g., environmental 
associations): Document 4 - Evaluation of the Corridors - Identification and evaluation of the 
effects (September 91) and Document 6 - Evaluation of the Corridors - Conclusions and 
recommendations (September 9 1). 
This description refers mostly to the process as it is described in the GATTEL 
methodology document. However, the implementation and follow up of the methodology 
revealed to be much more complex and are described in a later section. 
Table IV.3 - Documents developed by the GATTEL 
7 
8 
9 
Impact Evaluation 
Socio-economic Scenarios 
Traffic Analysis 
Jul92 
Jul92 
Table IV.4 - Contents of documents developed by the GATTEL 
For example, one GA'ITEL technician said that the corridor connecting Lisbon 
to the location of the Air Base of Montijo is shown not to be feasible. This 
was later confirmed by another GATTEL technician who added that this 
2 - Methodology of 
Evaluation of the 
Corridors 
May 91 
3 - Characterization of the 
Situation Nov 91 
4 - Evaluation of the 
corridors 
Sep 91 
alternative was suggested to the Minister and received a negative response, as 
the peninsula of Montijo considered a "hard constraint", and should not be 
viewed as a possible anchorage. 
The GATTEL considers for each corridor the public transportation mode (road 
and train) with special care in providing a solution for road traffic, as requested 
by the government. 
The objective of this document is to provide an underlying basis for the 
following phases, namely in terms of a preliminary evaluation of impacts 
associated with each corridor. 
Describes the methodology to be followed in the evaluation of the three 
corridors introduced in Document 1. The characterization and the effects due to 
construction of the alternative corridors are discussed, from the point of view of 
the biophysical system, land use planning and transportation system. 
The analysis and evaluation of the effects, jointly with those induced by the 
construction of the 25th of April Bridge, led the GATTEL Planning Team to 
the selection of a set of criteria that produced a preliminary proposal of an 
evaluation chart. 
The GATTEL Planning Team considered the simultaneous and complementary 
use of several methods of evaluation, to limit the subjectivity in the evaluation 
process, giving the necessary flexibility to account for the different evaluation 
priorities of each actor, entity or social group. 
The high number and diversity of effects and impacts led to splitting the 
analysis of the land use planning in the metropolitan area of Lisbon in two 
components: urban planning and socio-economic system . Aspects of 
technical, economic and financial viability were also considered. 
The methodology of evaluation considers six components for the multicriteria 
analysis: 
- transportation system 
- economic development of the AML 
- land use planning 
- biophysical environment 
- technical viability 
- economic and financial viability. 
However, none of the GATIEL documents made public reports the application 
of the multicriteria analysis. 
Provides an extensive profile of the whole metropolitan area, to be used as a 
support for the following studies. 
Describes and evaluates the effects and impacts associated with each one of the 
corridors. The evaluation is considered within three components: biophysical 
and quality of the environment, land use planning and transportation systems. 
An analysis of the associated risks is carried out. 
(1) biophysical and quality of the environment: Tagus estuary, temtorial 
ecosystems, geological formations and environmental quality factors; 
(2) land use planning: demography, employment, economic structure, 
productive system, land use, dependencieslurban network; 
(3) transportation systems: heavy transportation infrastructures and 
transportation demand between the two banks. 
More documents have been developed in the meantime. However for the issue of the 
5 - Presentation of the 
layouts 
lul 91 
6 - Evaluation of the 
Comdors. Conclusions 
and 
Sep 91 
7 - Impact Evaluation 
8 - Socio-economic 
scenarios Jul92 
9 - Traffic Analysis 
Jul92 
10 - Sketches of the 
alternatives 
1 1 - Eastern corridor. 
Evaluation of alternatives 
Jul92 
13 - Studies Developed 
location the relevant documents are from 1 to 6. 
Presents the specific layouts and connections to the existing road network, 
projected by the GATTEL. A total of four alternative sketches were developed 
and studied, one in each corridor, except in the Montijo corridor for which two 
possibilities were considered - the anchorage in the North bank either in 
Moscavide or Olivais connecting in the South to Alcochete. 
Although the geological characteristics of the Tagus estuary (mud formation up 
to 60 meters) call for a preference for structural solutions in bridge, a tunnel 
alternative was studied in the Eastern corridor, mostly to quantify costs for 
comparison purposes. 
Assembles the recommendations supporting a decision on the location of the 
new crossing. 
This document was handed in, with the remaining four documentsg9, to the 
four ministries directly involved (MPOTC, MPAT, MARN and Ml?). 
The final chapter of recommendations, signed by the Steering Committee, is 
only loosely related to the preceding chapters, attributing the same importance 
to two alternatives that appear in different levels in the document main body 
(Barreiro corridor and Montijo corridor - alternative B). These recommendations 
were seriously challenged by several entities, particularly the environmental 
associations, generating conflict that received extensive coverage in the media 
and led to considerable public debate. 
On the face of the recommendations, the Minister of Public Works, Transports 
and Communications decidedg0 for the a road crossing in the Montijo corridor 
(between Olivais and Montijo - alternative B). Disagreements, namely with the 
Commissioner for Expo 98 who realized that one of the bridge pillars was 
going to fall in the waterfront of the area, led the Minister to shift his decision 
to the other possibility that had been considered for the Montijo corridor 
(alternative A connecting Sacave'm to Montijo-Grilo) which was left out from 
the recommendations of the GATTEL Steering Committee. This decision was 
later on supported by a formal resolution of the Council of Ministersg1, but 
not before being challenged by several ministers and the professional 
community at large. 
Analyzes and evaluates the main impacts of the physical implementation of the 
two alternatives in the Montijo corridor. 
Characterizes the population and employment scenarios for the year 201 1. 
Analyzes and provides projections of traffic supply and demand for 1991 and 
201 1, for the alternatives considered. 
Describes the two alternatives for the Montijo corridor, considering the main 
characteristics and impacts, including several anchorage possibilities in the 
South bank. 
Summarizes the results of the studies presented, emphasizing the main aspects 
of each one. 
Summarizes the series of studies developed by the GATTEL to support the 
89 Document 6 states that Document 3 was being finalized to be handed in shortly. 
90 Dispatch 108191, September 26, 1991, Minister of Public Works, Transports and Communications. 
Decree-Law 220192, October 15, 1992. 
Jun 93 decision on the crossing location. 
The GATTEL Planning Team work methodology 
The GATTEL Planning Team accepted a very tight phasing. When asked why they 
accepted such an enormous task to be developed under short strict deadlines, one of the 
members of the team said that at the outset there was the conviction that their assignment was 
much easier. There were basically two alternatives, the Montijo and the Almada corridors, and 
a conviction within both the Steering Committee and the Planning Team that the Montijo 
corridor provided the best alternative, with the other being implicitly assumed just for the sake 
of comparison, as one of the professionals stated in the interview. It was thought to be a "piece 
of cake" straightforward study between two alternatives, reflecting a generalized consensus on 
the solution at the outset. 
Under this scenario the team saw its mission as a simple assignment of assembling data 
and technical advising the Minister responsible for making the decision, as one of the members 
of the Planning Team put it. 
The work methodology of the GATTEL Planning Team was a key feature in the whole 
process. It was accepted by most of the interviewed as an efficient working methodology for 
the short span of time available to develop the study, and confirmed by the enormous task 
accomplished in such a short period of time. It included innovation in comparison with the 
usual procedures in similar situations. Furthermore, differently from the usual practice in 
works of this type in the area of transportation, which are frequently developed sectorially, the 
GATTEL considered environmental concerns in accordance with EUIEEC requirements, as it 
is clearly stated in the written documentsg2. 
A detailed organizational chart for the Planning Team tasks was prepared by its coordinator 
and followed during the work assignments. As shown in Figure IV. 13, it depicts the decision 
levels, phasing and documents to be issued. 
Besides the organization of a team working simultaneously in several fronts under 
continuous coordination, as described above, it was also necessary to analyze the possible 
methodologies and adapt them to the existing time constraints. Therefore, the methodology 
mostly follows the usual procedure in these cases, but when it gets to the development of 
alternative bridge crossings it introduces a change. 
In fact, instead of identifying specific crossingsg3 the GATTEL Planning Team starts by 
identifying corridorsg4 where possible crossings could be designed. These corridors would 
92 "evaluating environmental risks associated with the crossing as, in agreement with the European Community 
Council Directive of June 27, 1985, related to the evaluation of effects of certain projects in the environment, 
all the phases of the study to develop for the project implementation should be submitted to that type of 
evaluation" (Evaluation of the corridors, GATIEL, Document 4, p. 1.1, September, 1991). 
93 Specific bridge crossings are assumed here as having the same meaning as alternatives (to use the language of 
the GATTEL Planning Team). 
94 Corridors are considered here as pathways, channels, or connection strips within which one or more specific 
crossing alternatives could be located. 
then be studied and compared. Once the best corridors were chosen, the next step would be to 
identify specific possible crossings that were to be further evaluated afterwards. The 
introduction of this innovative procedure in bridge location studies emerged out of the need to 
speed up the process, after studying methodologies followed for the decision on the location of 
similar projects in other countries which would lead to a longer study period. 
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Figure IV. 13 - The GATTEL phasing chart 
It was the conviction of the coordinator of the Planning Team that the corridor analysis 
could speed up the process by considerably reducing the number of bridge crossings to be 
studied in great detail, through the concentration of efforts in the most desirable locations 
initially identified at the corridor level. As the study of each specific crossing alternative is very 
time consuming, a reduction of the possible alternatives to corridors selected in a previous 
stage was expected to reduce the overall time needed. 
Methodology for the development of alternatives and selection of locations 
Conflicts, misunderstandings and ambiguity created during the process resulted from 
unclear understanding of the proposed methodology for the development and selection of 
alternatives. A sound knowledge of the methodology contributes to understand some of the 
ambiguity and conflicts that arose during the process. 
In evaluating the impacts of possible Tagus crossings, the GATTEL Planning Team 
considered a study area that contains the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon (AML). However, for 
definition of the corridors a restricted area was selected, integrating the Tagus estuary in 
Lisbon from the boundary line of the Natural Reserve of the Tagus Estuary to the mouth of the 
Tagus at S. J~~l i i io  da Barra-Trafaria. (see Figure IV.14). 
Location alternatives 
The GATTEL Planning Team narrowed down the feasible crossing connections to three 
possible corridors between the two banks95. They were: 
(1) the West corridor, about 2.6 km long, 1inkingAlgis to Trafaria; 
(2) the central corridor, about 8 Km long, linking Chelus to Barreiro; 
(3) the East corridor, about 8 km long, linking Olivais/Moscavide to Alcochete/Montijo. 
The alternatives are distant from the present bridge, respectively, 4 Km, 8 Km, and 12.5 
Km to 14 Km. 
The corridors were analyzed from the three main points of view% biophysical, land use 
and socio-economic, and transportation. 
The central corridor was predicted to register the smallest biophysical negative impacts 
while the East corridor would register the highest negative impacts, in particular due to its 
proximity to the Natural Reserve of the Tagus Estuary. 
95 Preliminary Identijication of the Corridors to be Studied GATTEL Document 1, April 1991. 
Evaluation of the Corridors, GATTEL Document 4, September 1991. 
Source: Adapted from Michelin@ , 1995 
Figure IY.14 - Restricted and expanded study area. 
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From the point of view of land use and socio-economic system, the central corridor 
appeared to be the best choice on the criteria of addressing a greater variety of interests. It was 
a good alternative to respond to present crossing traffic demand, enhanced "urban 
approximation" of the two banks, favored urban requalification of the Southern bank 
waterfront and functional upgrading of the deprived Eastern part of Lisbon, fitted in the 
strategies of the Regional Land Use Plan for the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon - PROTAML. 
While the East corridor was worst. It was an insufficient response to the present crossing 
traffic demand, induced greater urban sprawl, required extensive reassignment of land uses 
requiring heavy infrastructuring, was incompatible with strategies of the Regional Land Use 
Plan for the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon - PROTAML. 
For the transportation system, the conclusions in the document were: the West corridor 
would best solve the congestion problems felt in the existing bridge without changing the 
present river crossing influence areas; the central corridor would complement the present river 
crossing influence areas while, at the same time, providing for congestion relief in the existing 
bridge and for a good connection with the existing railway system in both banks of the river; 
the East corridor would not contribute for the solution of the congestion problem in the existing 
bridge, it would provide a better connection between the Eastern and Northern parts of Lisbon 
and the Eastern areas of the South bank assuring for increased accessibility to the new Lisbon 
airport in the case of its location at Rio Frio in the South bank while exhibiting potentialities for 
a railway crossing. Therefore, also from the point of view of the transportation system, the 
East corridor seems to be the least advantageous. 
The financial viability of a crossing in three corridors was also considered and led to the 
following conclusions~7: in case of adoption of a private sector toll concession for the new 
bridge, the existing bridge should be included in the concession; for road crossings, the toll 
levels for the three corridors would be within acceptable ranges, with a 14% increase in the 
central corridor and a 22% increase in the East corridor relative to the West corridor). 
In each one of the corridors, the Planning Team analyzed several possibilities for specific 
crossings98 : 
(1) in the West corridor two possibilities were considered in the North bank, but only one 
of them was selected for further study due to the negative features of the other in 
environmental and landscape impacts; 
(2) in the central corridor, three possibilities in the North bank were initially analyzed, one 
of them being a tunnel crossing, but all of them were abandoned due to their urban, 
landscape or patrimonial implications; a fourth possibility was then developed leading to 
97 Evaluation of the Corridors, GATTEL Document 4, September 1991. 
98 Presentation of the Layouts, GATTEL Document 5 ,  July 1991. 
two possible connections in the South bank which were reduced to one due to the 
restrictions imposed by the military air base existing in the Montijo Peninsula and the 
difficulties arising from the urban development planned by the Moita municipality; 
(3) in the East corridor, two crossings were studied: alternatives A and B, connecting 
Sacave'm and Olivais, respectively, to the same point in the South bank; for alternative 
B, a possibility of a tunnel crossing was also considered. 
Summing up: in both the West and central corridors only one crossing was further studied, 
while in the East corridor two crossings were pursued (alternatives A and B); for comparison 
purposes, a tunnel crossing was studied for alternative B in the East corridor, and a mixed road 
and railway crossing was analyzed in the central corridor. 
In September of 1991, the Steering Committee issued a document99 with its 
conclusions/recommendations regarding the crossing location, including the following 
statements: 
- a new bridge crossing should be considered, since the tunnel crossing involves higher 
costs than road crossings and its use has inherent restrictions (pp. 12, 19); 
- the mixed road and railway crossing, studied for the central corridor, would not be 
justified in the short and middle ranges since the railway connection already decided for 
the existing bridge provided an adequate solution, and a new road and railway bridge 
would incur in higher costs (pp. 13,15); 
- the West corridor provides for the least attractive crossing solution, taking into account its 
weaknesses and potentialities100; 
- the central corridor would be the best location, if priority is given to land use 
(development) concerns associated with a new urban link across the river; 
- the East corridor, alternative B, would be the most favorable location, if the priority is 
given to national and inter-regional links, and to the integration in the National Road Plan 
structure. 
The Document 6 of the GAlTEL, signed by the Steering Committee with the conclusions 
summarized above, generated considerable debate within the technical community. The 
conclusions of this document are ambiguous, leaving it open to the Ministry of the Public 
Works, in alternative, to chose the Montijo-B or Barreiro option. This chapter is seen by 
several individuals to be in disagreement with the argumentation of the remaining chapters. 
Moreover, the decision for the alternative B in the Montijo corridor is considered by several 
technicians as the worst option on the basis of the G A m L  technical studies. 
99 Evaluation o f  the Corridors. Conclusions and Recommendations, Document 6 of GATTEL , September 
1991. 
loo "repeats and unfolds the corridor corresponding to the actual crossing without gains in quality" (GA'ITEL 
Doc.6, pp.7). 
Source: Adapted from GATTEL (1 99 1) and h4ichelina (1 995). 
Figure IV.16 - Location of crossing alternatives A and B in the East corridor. 

Source: Adapted fiom GATTEE (1991) and ~ichelin@ (1995). 
Figure IV.16 - Location of crossing alternatives A and B in the East comdor. 

Source: Adapted fiom GATTEL (1991) and ~ i c h e l i n ~  (1995). 
Figure IV.17 - Location of all crossing alternatives 

Location decision 
Following the presentation of the GATTEL recommendations concerning the crossing 
location, the Minister of Public Works, Transports and Communications decidedlO1 to pursue 
the studies for a road crossing in the Montijo corridor (between Olivais and Montijo - 
alternative B). 
This decision faced the opposition of several entities. These included the Commissioner for 
Expo 98, who realized that one of the bridge pillars was going to be in the waterfront of the 
area, and the Junta of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbonlo2 which had a strong preference for 
alternative A if the decision was the Montijo corridor . 
The GATTEL document consideredlo3 alternative A in the Montijo corridor to have a 
greater construction complexity because it had to overcome two navigation channels (Cala das 
Barcas and Cala do Norte), while alternative B had only to overcome the Cala do Norte. In a 
meeting that involved the Lisbon Port and the navigation authorities, in the presence of the 
Minister of the Sea, it was agreed that the Cala do Norte was the major navigation channel with 
the Cala das Barcas being of restricted navigation importance associated to its crossing the 
Natural Reserve of the Tagus Estuary. Knowing this, it was possible to redesign the bridge to 
lower the construction complexity of alternative A. In this way the construction complexity of 
alternative A became similar to alternative Blo4. 
Following these discussions, the Minister of Public Works shifted his former decisionlo5 
to the Montijo corridor alternative A ( S a c a v h  to Montijo-Grilo)lo6, adopting a solution that, 
curiously, had been completely left out of the recommendations of the GATTEL Steering 
Committee in Document 6. In fact, the last section of this document is called recommendation 
and no mention is made to alternative A in this part. The comparison in this final part of the 
document is only made between the Barreiro corridor and the alternative B of the Montijo 
corridor. This decision to choose alternative A was afterwards supported by a formal 
resolution of the Council of Ministerslo7. 
The choice of the Montijo corridor for the crossing was challenged by several ministers 
(including the Minister of Environment and the Minister of Planning) and other politicians, the 
environmentalist associations, and wide sectors of the professional community at large. 
lol Dispatch 108191, September 26, 1991, Minister of Public Works, Transports and Communications. 
lo2 representing the municipalities of the metropolitan area. 
lo3 Memorando Sintese: Trabalhos Desenvolvldos, Nova travessia rodovidria sobre o Tejo nu regiao de Lisboa, 
GATIEL, Document 13, p. 15, July 1993. 
lo4 Menwrando Sintese: Trabalhos Desenvolvidos, Nova travessia rodovidria sobre o Tejo nu regiao de Lisboa, 
GATTEL, Document 13, pp. 15-16, July 1993. 
lo5 Montijo corridor alternative B (Olivais to Montijo-Grilo). 
lo6 Dispatch 39-XIIl92, April 24, 1992, Minister of Public Works, Transports and Communications. 
lo7 Decree-Law 220192, October 15, 1992. 
Misunderstandings on the methodology 
The GATTEL Planning Team defined a methodology of corridor evaluation and selection 
prior to a detailed study of specific crossings in the chosen corridor(s). Only afterwards would 
these alternatives be analyzed, using additional information on their insertion in the urban 
system and the transportation network. What this means is that instead of comparing 
alternatives since the very beginning, the first analysis was done using the corridors. Then, 
after selecting the preferred corridors the alternatives within those corridors were considered, 
including their insertion in the urban and transportation system. 
The issuing of Document 6, containing the recommendations of the Steering Committee, 
shortens the phase of design and comparison among possible bridge crossings, mixing it with 
the corridors selection and generating a substantial confusion between the choices of crossing 
alternatives and corridors. Part of the conflict that developed afterwards may be related to this 
jump over the initially approved methodology. 
For the technical community working closely with the GATTEL, the difficulties in 
understanding the reason for the choice were partially identified with the lack of a multicriteria 
analysis of the several options. No multicriteria analysis is shown in any of the available 
GATTEL documents, leaving room for a substantial ambiguity. Some professionals perceived 
the situation as an attempt from the government to avoid carrying on further technical analyses 
regarding the evaluation of the crossing alternatives. In the words of one of the specialists 
interviewed, "the development of alternatives was not based in any analysis, being therefore 
impossible to technically support any comparison among them." 
At the time of the creation of the GATTEL, the process was set up by the government to 
achieve technical consensus. At the time of the decision, it is not clear how much attention was 
given to the technical advice developed by the GATTEL Planning Team. The technical reports 
produced by the GATTEL revealed a preference for the Barreiro corridor, contradicted in the 
last chapter of the GATTEL Document 6 with the Final Recommendations signed by the 
Steering Committee. In fact, in the document final section, the central corridor and the Montijo- 
B crossing are considered at the same level, being only differentiated by the objective in mind 
- land use versus national North-South connection. Curiously, no reference appears in the 
recommendations to the congestion issue in the existing bridge which seems to have triggered 
the whole process. 
STAKEHOLDERS.: INTERESTS AND ROLES 
The issue of the location of the new bridge over the Tagus river caught the interest of a 
substantial number of individuals and groups including residents, professionals, politicians. In 
this section, the various actors involved in the process, their interests and roles are described. 
Some of these players participated since the beginning of the process during the studies 
being developed to decide on the location of the new bridge, but several of them got involved 
or more strongly involved after the Ministerial decision because they opposed the choice made. 
Government and central administration 
The ministries most directly involved in the process were those of Public Works 
Transports and Communications (MOPTC), Finances (MF), Planning (MPAT) and 
Environment (MARN), all represented in the GATTEL Steering Committee, where the 
representative of the Ministry of Public Works Transports and Communications has the 
presidency. Each one of the representatives assured the coordination with the respective 
ministry. 
When the Minister of Public Works, Transports and Communications ordered the 
G A m L  to pursue the studies for the a road crossing in the Montijo corridor (between Olivais 
and Montijo - alternative B),  among the alternatives that had been proposed and analyzed by 
the GATTEL Planning Team, the ministries of Planning and of Environment showed 
preference for the Barreiro crossing. 
The Ministry of Public Works, Transports and Communications argued for the Montijo 
crossing on the basis of its presumed merits for assuring the national North-South connection. 
The Ministry of Planning considered the Barreiro crossing as an excellent device to rehabilitate 
two declining areas (Barreiro and Chelas) and to avoid opening new fronts of development. 
The Ministry of Environment had a similar stand , further defending that the front of 
development following the Montijo crossing would be too close to a natural area of high 
environmental value, and therefore a threat to ecological sensitive areas. 
The Ministry of Planning went on to develop a document justifying the position kept until 
the resolution of the Council of Ministers deciding on the bridge location. 
The position of the Ministry of the Environment was more ambiguous and suffered 
adjustments along the process. At a certain point, this Ministry shied away from the debate, a 
development that was interpreted by the environmental associations and some other actors as 
an attempt to avoid taking a clear stand on the issue. 
Ministries participated in meetings or authorized the circulation of information necessary 
for the study. Several Ministries not represented in the GATTEL Steering Committee also 
participated in meetings getting involved along the process. Among them were the ministries of 
Internal Affairslo8, of the Sealo9 and of Industryllo. Of these, the most definitive stand was 
108 MAI - Ministe'rio da Adminis tra~b Interna, Ministry of Intema Affairs. 
lo9 MM - Ministe'rio do Mar, Ministry of the Sea. 
l0 M1 - Ministe'rio da Zndustria, Ministry of Industry. 
taken by the Ministry of Industry, in defense of the Barreiro option became the opportunity for 
recovering a declining industrial area in the Southern bank. The Ministry of Internal Affairs 
assumed a role of mediator in the debate leading to the final decision on the location, just 
before the Council of Ministers, promoting several meetings among the involved Ministers and 
attempting to achieve consensus. 
The final decision on the location of the new bridge was taken in the Council of Ministers 
of July 30, 1992. The Montijo corridor (between Sacavt5m and Samouco - alternative A) was 
approved with the opposition of the Ministers of Planning and of Industry. The Minister of 
Environment was absent, being represented by his Secretary of State. 
In general, although opinions of the Ministers appeared in the media at several stages 
during the process, their role grew in importance at the last phase of the decision as their voting 
contribution in the Council of Ministers was approaching. 
Regional administration 
The Coordination Commission of the Lisbon and Tagus Valley Region (CCRLVT), 
directly dependent of the Ministry of Planning, also played a role. This commission is 
responsible for supervising the regional development and was preparing the Land Use Plan for 
the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon (PROTAML) while the studies for the new Tagus bridge 
location were being done. The team working for the Commission on this plan got substantially 
involved in the process and participated in several meetings with the GATTEL. 
The studies for developing the PROTAML were important for the work being developed 
by the GATTEL. As one of the interviewees put it, "besides the information it provided, the 
PROTAML proposed the land use model for the metropolitan area of Lisbon, essential to 
provide the framework for the corridors and to articulate them with the model." As the 
PROTAML was being developed for the Coordination Commission of the Lisbon and Tagus 
Valley Region, directly dependent of the Ministry of Planning, it was one of the supporting 
elements for the position of this Ministry regarding the new bridge location. 
Initiated in May 1989, accomplished in December 1992 and revised at a request of the 
government in mid 1993, the PROTAML is not approved by the central government yet. One 
of the national newspapers reported on the controversy regarding the plan approval referring to 
the words of a Secretary of State of the Ministry of Planninglll: 
In the opinion of that member of government the first version of the PROTAML "did not address 
with the necessary accuracy" and "it did not safeguard duly" two essential aspects for the 
Metropolitan Area of Lisbon: the areas surrounding the Montijo bridge and the preservation of the 
woodlands of the Albufeira lagoon." "I am not relaxed with the rules imposed for the area of the 
bridge and I would like to do everything possible to avoid what happened to the areas surrounding 
the 25th of April Bridge, in urban quality, population life conditions and landscape degradation 
(PUBLICO, March 16,1995). 
Dr. Antdnio Pereira Reis. 
The coordinator of the PROTAML112, contacted by the newspaper, showed surprise for these 
comments, stating that such concerns were never mentioned in the meetings he had with the 
Coordination Commission of the Lisbon and Tagus Valley Region ( P ~ L I C O ,  March 16,1995). 
At a certain point in the process, a restructuring of the public administration gave the 
responsibility of the natural resources management in the region, formerly belonging to the 
Coordination Commission of the Lisbon and Tagus Valley Region, to a new entity: the 
Regional Administration for the Environment and Natural Resourcesll3, dependent of the 
Ministry of the Environment. 
Office for the Tagus River Crossing in Lisbon (GATTEL) 
The GATTEL was created in January 1991, in the context of the Ministry of Public 
Works. Its mission included "executing, coordinating and controlling the activities needed to 
promote the construction and exploration of a second road crossing of the Tagus in the Lisbon 
Region." It was also given the roles of assuring the cooperation of services and entities 
involved in the studies and the construction, and of representing the government in all sessions 
related with the studies and the execution of the work. 
Aware of the complexity of the issue at hand, and the implications for areas such as land 
use and the environment, the GAlTEL Steering Committee decided to form a Planning Team 
for developing the needed studies to "present a proposal of the location of the crossing, 
including the access network in both banks, in the context of the national and international, 
road and train connections, of the land use, the environmental protection ...." 
Environmental associations 
The main environmental associations involved were the League for Nature Protectionll4, 
the Quercus, and the Land Use and Environment Study Groupll5. In a later phase other 
environmental organizations participated occasionally in the process, such as the D. Dinis 
Institutell6. 
In an early stage of the planning process, the GATTEL requested to professionals of the 
League for Nature Protection (LPN) a study identifying ecologically sensitive areas. In this 
way, LPN found out that the location of a future bridge over the Tagus estuary was under 
consideration. Concerned with the preservation of the natural areas in the region, LPN alerted 
l2 Professor Jorge Gaspar. 
l3 DirecpTo Regional do Ambiente e Recursos Naturais, Regional Administration for the Environment and 
Natural Resources. 
l4 LPN - Liga para a Protec~Qo da Natureza, League for Nature Protection. 
l5 GEOTA - Grupo de Estudos de Ordenamento do Territdrio e Ambiente, Land Use and Environment Study 
Group. 
116 IDD - Institute D. Dinis, D. Dinis Institute. 
other environmental associations to the problem. However, they only became clearly 
committed to the issue after a complaint submitted by the LPN to the Portuguese Supreme 
Administrative Court in November 1991117, though more concrete actions were only carried 
out after February 1992. A joint press conference on the issue was given by these Associations 
in March 24, 1992. This was the public starting point of a joint action of the environmental 
associations against the construction of the new bridge in the Montijo corridor. This action 
lasted up to the present day. The bridge is seen by one of our Administrative Public Officials as 
"the issue that brought together the environmental associations", marking a turning point in 
public participation in Portugal and triggering a new phase in the environmental NGOs 
strategy. 
The environmentalists were particularly concerned with the possibility of location of the 
new bridge in the Montijo corridor, since the anchorage point in the Southern bank would be in 
an area of high environmental quality, creating over it additional development pressures. 
Struggling with scarce resources, the environmental associations joined efforts to identify a 
common strategy as a way to increase efficiency of intervention. Several actions were taken 
jointly by the environmentally concerned groups mentioned: they formed a common team, with 
two representatives of each group, responsible for keeping track of the evolution of the process 
and for collecting and processing information to substantiate their positions. The activity of this 
joint team concentrated on specific goals: 
(1) Information diffusion to raise the public awareness - giving press conferences and 
producing a considerable amount of opinion articleslpapers in the media; 
(2) Contacts development - scheduling meetings with key politicians, to clarify positions 
and to inform them of their concerns; 
(3) Collection and processing of information - through the interpretation of data and the 
development of studies to support their arguments technically; 
(4) Street actions - aiming at public mobilization, such as the distribution of a publication in 
the areas used by North-South commuters, a press conference in the existing bridge and 
the distribution of flyers; 
(5) Court actions - initiated with the complaint against the government submitted to the 
Portuguese Administrative Court by the LPN, intending to force the political setting to 
comply with the new environmental rules. 
From the environmental point of view all the corridors have negative impacts. Therefore 
the ecologists aimed at supporting a location with smaller negative effects on the environment 
and with greater potential to solve congestion, considering that this favors a large number of 
people. 
l7  Complaint P 4008192 (Nov 28, 91) . 
Professional community 
Experts were involved in the studies and projects regarding to planning, transportation, 
infrastructures and other areas. Planners, particularly those involved in the development of 
plans for the area, assumed an important role, due to the extensive planning activity taking 
place for the region. 
It is important to understand that professionals began debating issues related to the 
metropolitan area long before the problem of a second road crpssing over the Tagus river was 
put to them. The first comprehensive views for parts of the region appeared in 1987, in 
association with the preparation of the Integrated Operation of Development (OID) of the 
Peninsula of Setlibal. 
After the entrance of Portugal to the EUIEEC in 1986, the classification of the Peninsula of 
Setlibal as a deprived area made this peninsula which contains the Southern municipalities of 
the metropolitan area of Lisbon eligible for special development funds. The municipalities in 
the area got together and developed a joint plan, the Distrito of Setlibal Development Plan 
(PIDDS), to stand as a basis for fund allocation. 
Though restricted to the Southern municipalities of the AML, the PIDDS was the first plan 
of development targeted specifically to this region and putting together several interrelated 
issues. Other more sectorial plans, mainly in the area of transportation, were developed before 
and during this process and they became an important source of information for studies, plans 
and projects developed afterwards, though their proposals were, in the opinion of several 
professionals, frequently forgotten or still to be implemented. Among these plansN8 are the 
Lisbon Region Transport Infrastructure (ITRL) (19801s), the Lisbon Region Transportation 
Study (ETRL) (19701s), the National Road Plan (1985186), the Plan for Modernization of 
Train Services (1988194), the Lisbon Train Interchange Office (GNFL) (1987). 
On the other hand, at the beginning of the development of the Regional Land Use Plan for 
the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon (PROTAML), the municipalities of the Metropolitan Area got 
together for the first time and, under the encouragement of two of their mayors, technicians 
and politicians working at the local level initiated a period of debate and reflection on the future 
of the region. These actions produced a few written documents summarizing the views and 
expectations of technical professionals for the region. One of the more immediate results was 
the creation of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon Board and the growing feeling of identity of the 
region among the professional community and probably the region politicians as well. Informal 
networks were established and the role of the municipalities began to be seen by local 
politicians and practitioners in a wider regional context. It is the understanding and networking 
l8 A more detailed description appears in this chapter in a preceding section entitled "INTENSIVE RECENT 
PLANNING ACTIVITY IN THE AML", under the heading "Transportation plans". 
that were developed by professionals in the course of these activities that will influence their 
stands on the new bridge location issue. 
Most of the professionals that expressed more energetically their position regarding the 
bridge location had, in one way or another, participated in the planning activities under sway 
for the area. Particularly involved in the development of plans for the region, planners were 
mainly concerned with the effects of such an important infrastructure in generating 
development and therefore reshaping the region land use. Information on aspects such as 
population and employment patterns and recent trends affected the way they understood the 
region and led to a reformulation of the dominant concept of intervention, shifting it from an 
expansionist approach to one of improving what is already in place. 
The technical community got rather involved in the new Tagus crossing issue, particularly 
by participating in debates: some conducted and organized by research institutes or political 
parties, others in the media, particularly in the television. One of the first debates that had a 
substantial influence in questioning transportation policies took place in Lisbon in 1990, 
shortly after the new Minister of Public Works Transports and Communications was 
invested119.The publication that came out of this meeting, though ambiguous in its statements, 
contains interventions questioning the role of the Public Works and Transportation Superior 
Council as the dominant entity advising the Minister on infrastructure decisions. This opinion 
is based on the observation that this board is often consulted without being previously supplied 
it with sufficient technical studies and information on which the recommendations can be 
soundly based. 
These debates were retaken when divergent views emerged about the three alternatives for 
the new crossing of the Tagus in the Lisbon region made public in 1991. Among these debates 
one was organized in the Civil Engineering National Laboratory (LNEC) in April 14, 1992, by 
several professional associations (architects'2O, engineersl21, urbanistsl22 and water resources 
professionals123). This debate resulted in a joint communication prepared by the Portuguese 
Association of Environmental Engineers (APEA) and the Research and Intervention Urban 
Nuclei (URBE). 
Throughout the decision process regarding the new Tagus crossing several relevant key 
experts expressed their views on the issue, frequently challenging the chosen option, on the 
grounds of construction factors, environmental impacts or land use development. 
l 9  Organized by the Portuguese Association of Train Transportation in April 5, 1990, for discussing a 
possible train crossing in the existing bridge, it involved close to 1000 participants, mostly transportation 
professionals. 
120 AAP - Associag20 the Arquitectos Portugueses, Portuguese Architects Association; APAP - AssociagFio 
Portuguesa de Arquitectos Paisagistas, Landscape Architects Portuguese Association. 
121 APEA - Associa~20 Portuguesa de Engenheiros do Ambiente, Environmental Engineers Portuguese 
Association. 
122 URBE - Ndcleos Urbanos de Pesquisn e Interven~o,  Research and Intervention Urban Nuclei. 
l23 APRH - Associapio Portuguesa de Recursos Hidricos - Association of Water Resources. 
Municipalities 
All the municipalities of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon became involved. The ones more 
directly concerned with the decision of the location of the crossing were Lisbon, Alcochete, 
Almada, Balereiro, Loures, Moita, Montijo. 
There was not a stable pattern of positions of the municipalities regarding the location of 
the new bridge, either because politicians or technicians working for the same municipality 
expressed distinct views on this issue or because they changed opinions along the process. 
Some aligned since the very begin with the Montijo option and stuck to it. Others initially 
defended Montijo but shifted afterwards, when the Barreiro corridor appeared and they saw 
more potential in it. Still others had some persons working for the municipality preferring one 
option while others selected another; There was no municipal consensus. 
Alcochete and Montijo defended since the very beginning the option of the Montijo 
corridor, historically discussed and never accomplished. With the construction of the 25th of 
April Bridge, the North-South traffic had been shifted away from Montijo which had been 
historically the main boat crossing location in the Southern bank with Lisbon. This 
municipality was eager to recover its position of relative importance within the metropolitan 
area, as confessed by one of the interviewees who stated that if the new bridge would not be in 
the Montijo corridor both Montijo and Alcochete would be permanently thrown to the 
periphery of the metropolitan area. These two municipalities see the construction of the new 
bridge in the Montijo corridor as the long lost opportunity of development of its territory. The 
Mayor of Montijo even stated that the one century old dream was becoming a reality. 
The Barreiro, Seixal and Almada municipalities favored the central corridor, as they were 
aware of its contribution to the relief of commuting congestion in the existing bridge and 
wanted to provide greater accessibility to the capital for their residents depending on the job 
market in the other bank. Moreover, Barreiro, now a declining area, sees in the central corridor 
a way to restructure economically its space. 
The Lisbon municipality assumed for a long period several different positions depending 
on the person making the statements. At the beginning, a strong position in favor of the central 
corridor was assumed, though towards the end the preference officially expressed was for the 
East corrid0r12~, as stated by the Director of the Department of Strategic Planning during a 
public debate with the presence of the President of Portugal. 
At a later stage in the decision process concerning the bridge location, the AML 
municipalities got together to claim their opposition against the option Sacave'm-Montijo 
(option B of the Montijo corridor). 
124 Public Debate with the President, March 7, 1994. 
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Metropolitan Area of Lisbon Board 
The Metropolitan Area of Lisbon Board is a recently created body bringing together the 
municipalities of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon. It is essentially a forum of debate for the 
mayors of the metropolitan area municipalities. 
This entity got together to claim that the municipalities did not want the option Sacavim- 
Montijo (option B of the Montijo corridor) and, in case this corridor were to be chosen, they 
wanted option A. 
Trains of Portugal Company (CP) 
The CP is the firm responsible for the operation of the national train system. Its 
representatives attended the GATTEL meetings frequently. The CP had waited during a long 
time for a train crossing over the Tagus river in the region of Lisbon to complete the train 
connection North-South and raised frequently this concern during the discussions. however, it 
never built its position cautiously and forcefully in favor of a new road and train crossing. 
Maybe it saw for so many times its hopes being dismissed without accomplishment, that the 
possibility of having a connection through the existing bridge, even if not in the most 
appropriate conditions, might have had some influence in this behavior by deciding to hold to 
this possibility in order not to risk losing it all. 
National Highway Authority (JAE) 
The JAE is the entity responsible for planning and managing the national road system. It 
was responsible for the operation and exploration of the 25th of April Bridge. 
Air Force 
The Portuguese Air Force participated in connection with the Montijo Air Base. 
For a while, when the different location alternatives were being discussed, the GATTEL 
Planning Team, at the request of the Air Force, found out that the Montijo air base was a hard 
constraint, meaning that no option could anchor at the peninsula where it is located. 
Professionals working in the GATTEL study confirmed that the Minister of Public Works 
confirmed this. It was never clearly stated what was going to be the future of the base although 
on the basis of rumors that circulated, the military were going to abandon it. It might be that the 
land of the base was already assigned to other functions. 
Lisbon Port Authority (APL) 
The APL was involved due to the possible interference between the future bridge and boat 
navigation in the Tagus estuary and to the needs of providing a connection of the work 
developed with future plans for the Lisbon sea port. 
The importance of this entity is clearly stated in the legislation that creates the GATTEL, 
there it is stated that the studies should take into account the problems of "drainage and 
navigability of the Tagus." 
Particularly interested in the expansion of its activities towards the South bank, and the 
recovering of the North bank sea port areas deactivated to new uses of what the Waterfront 
Land Use Plan (POZOR)125 is an example, the APL leaned essentially to the West corridor 
which was abandoned at early stages of the process. 
The APL was also responsible for defining how high the bridge should be constructed 
above the river level, in order to allow for the circulation of the boats, and what should be the 
minimum distance between the bridge pillars. 
The managing entity of Expo98, the international exhibition scheduled to take place in 
1998 in Lisbon, got involved because the exhibition is to be served by the new bridge and its 
location is subjected to the bridge impacts. 
The Expo98 representatives developed pressure over the GATTEL and the entities 
responsible for the decision to abandon the Montijo alternative B. Though they have not clearly 
stated their preferences, they came against the Montijo alternative B as soon as they understood 
that one of the pillars supporting the bridge was going to fall on the waterfront of the Expo98 
site. They seemed to aggree with the Montijo corridor, as it appeared to facilitate the connection 
of the Expo98 to Spain, one of the essential accesses for the success of the event. 
Natural Reserve of the Tagus Estuary (RNET) 
The entity responsible for the management of the Natural Reserve of the Tagus, presently 
within the National Conservation Institute (ICN)126 which was formerly called National Park 
Service127, was involved due to the impacts of the bridge construction and operation in this 
important natural reserve. 
125 POZOR - Plano de Ordenamento da Zona Ribeirinha, Waterfront Land Use Plan. 
12"c~ - Institute da Conserva~o  da Natureza. 
127 SNPRCN - Servi~o Natural de Parques, Reservas e Conservapio da Natureza, National Park Service. 
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The positions of persons associated with the Natural Reserve of the Tagus were discreet 
due to its role within the Portuguese administration. However, several interviews with the 
technicians of the Natural Reserve brought to the media environmental concerns and called 
attention to the natural values threatened by possible locations of the new bridge. 
One of the interviewees said "the government has strong discipline" 128..."there is no 
individual space for m a n e ~ v e r " ~ ~ ~ .  This lack of individual space for maneuver associated with 
discipline enforcement reflects a highly centralized bureaucratic administration and may have 
substantially influenced the ambiguity in the position of most actors of the public 
administration. 
Montijo a n d  Alcochete Association fo r  Defense of the  Quali ty of Life130 
(AMA) 
The AMA is an organization created to defend the interests of Alcochete and Montijo 
residents in the construction of the new bridge across the Tagus. Set up initially to stand for the 
bridge in the Montijo corridor, this association soon widened its role to intervene in other areas 
related to the quality of life and the environment. 
As stated by one of the members of the association, the location of the bridge in Montijo 
was brought up since the beginning of the century and revived in the fifties and the sixties, 
gathering a substantial number of followers. This debate, that developed while deciding the 
location of the existing bridge, was carried out at the central administration level without any 
intervention from the municipalities. "Once the existing bridge was constructed, the discussion 
was exhausted" until the traffic growth achieved the carrying capacity and "did not provide 
satisfaction to mobility." 
According to one of the municipal officials interviewed, "already in the eighties, the 
municipalities of the Peninsula of Setu'bal felt lack of accessibility" and a certain "isolation, 
namely Alcochete, Palmela, Montijo. " Following studies integrated in the Distrito of Setu'bal 
Development Plan (PIDDS), it is concluded that "a second bridge over the Tagus absolutely 
necessary", as issues related "to employment and the productive system depend on the 
improvement of the accessibility to Lisbon." The same interviewed also stated that "it is the 
PIDDS work, politically reflected and conducted in an integrated perspective, that gives the 
grounds for the development of mechanisms that in 1989-90 gave the first steps for the study 
on the location and funding of the new bridge." 
128 "o Governo e' muito disciplinado ". 
129 "mio hn' espago de nmnobra ". 
130 AMA - Associapio de Montijo e Alcochete para a Defesa da Qualidade ded Vida, Montijo and Alcochete 
Association for Defense of the Quality of Life. 
25th of April Bridge Users Association 
The 25th of April Bridge Users Association emerged out of the protest movement in the 
25th of April Bridge in July 1994. It resulted from merging two user associations that appeared 
simultaneously and independently, one in the Southern bank and the other in the Northern 
bank of the Tagus. 
For years the Southern populations felt neglected and considered it unfair to have to pay 
for for a bridge that had already been paid for131 and which is responsible for long hours of 
traffic lines everyday. As one of the interviewees put it "there was a perception that asking for 
increasing tollfares in the existing bridge was an indignity, considering that it was already 
paid." The legislation supporting the increase of the bridge toll was enacted in June 3, 
1994'32, just before the European Parliament Elections. Considering this a wrong timing, the 
Prime Minister postponed its enforcement for the period after the elections. The feeling of 
injustice grew with the publication of the legal document establishing a 50% increase and the 
public discontent grows in the following 20 days. 
The announcement of the increase of the bridge toll, without further explanation, the 
substantial increase enforced, the uncertain connections with the polemic bridge to be 
constructed in the Montijo corridor together with the possibility of associated future toll 
increases, the perception that the other bridge would not serve the present users of the 25th of 
April Bridge due to the huge distance between them generated the "biggest spontaneous and 
continuous popular protest in memory in Portugal"133. 
The media assumed an important role in providing public information. Two weeks before 
the crucial day the radios informed the public about the toll increase. The attempt to raise the 
cost was postponed till after the European elections. The public began expressing themselves 
through a noisy "h0nking"'3~ which lasted for a week without the government having showed 
any sign of noticing it. The toll increase was limited and the protests went on through 
generalized continuous "honking" and toll payment with large bills and small coins that 
aggravated the already long congestion lines. Still no signs from the government. This lack of 
sensibility or failure to assess the extent of discontent, provided the grounds for more radical 
actions from the indignant commuters. 
Economically, the most affected were the truck drivers that had to commute several times a 
day, who were going to be in the first line of the protests. Crossing the bridge ten to twelve 
times a day, carrying construction materials for a large number of public works, they felt 
particularly hurt by the toll increase. Realizing that the 50% increase was going to overburden 
131 the 25th of April bridge was paid in 1987. 
132 Portaria 351194, June 3. 
133 Visilo, Jun 27, 94. 
134 "buzin~o". 
them to an unbearable limit, they decided to take in their own hands the protesting. In June 24, 
1994, they blocked the South entrance to the 25th of April Bridge, leaving only a lane for 
emergency vehicles. What is most interesting is the acceptance of this situation by the other 
drivers entering town for their work day who promptly (with rare exceptions) accepted the 
inconvenient situation. Once more, the government did not seem to interpret this as a 
generalized discontent that could get out of hand. 
In the meantime all the national television and several radio stations were broadcasting the 
events. With the Prime Minister away in Corfu and unable to handle the situation, the 
government chose to follow an authoritarian role, with no openness to negotiation. 
Positions radicalized, the police intervened and by the end of the day the antagonism had 
reached open confrontation and the country assisted astonished to a situation considered of the 
times previous to the 25th of April revolution. The local population, with a long tradition in the 
workers fights and profiting from a local holidayl35, offered its solidarity, revolted against the 
exercise of authority which brought up the old "traumas and wounds of the Southern bank." 
At the end of the day two associations emerged out of the events: the Association of the 
Users of the 25th of April Bridge in Pragal (Almada) and the Pro-Association of the Users of 
the 25th of April Bridge in Lisbon. In a joint meeting, after realizing that they had the same 
objectives, they decided to merge in one structure: the 25th of April Bridge Users 
A s s ~ c i a t i o n l ~ ~ .  
Assuming no position in relation to the location of the future bridge, their Association 
defined as its main goal the abolition of the toll fare by the cancellation of the legislation 
supporting the toll increase. 
Residents 
The residents more directly affected by the new crossing were mostly from the 
municipalities of Alcochete, Almada, Barreiro, Lisbon, Loures, Moita, Montijo, Seixal 
andVilcl Franca de Xira. 
Lisbon Train Interchange Office (GNFL) 
The GNFL is a committee created to supervise the train crossing to be installed in the 25th 
of April Bridge and to study a future train crossing over the Tagus river. 
TRANSTE JO 
TRANSTEJO is the Tagus boat crossing operator. 
135 holiday in the municipality of Almada 
Associrr~fio lie Utentes cln Ponte 25 de Abril - 25 th of April Bridge Users Association. 
164 
Airports and Air Traffic Company137 (ANA) 
ANA is the public firm responsible for airports and air traffic in Portugal. It has the 
responsibility for studies on the location of the future Lisbon airport. Locations North and 
South of the Tagus have been considered for many years, but a definite decision on the future 
airport location is not available yet. 
Lisbon Subway13* 
The public firm responsible for the design, management and operation of the Lisbon 
subway system presently operates a network restricted to the Lisbon municipality. The location 
of future bridges over the Tagus are a subject of its main concerns and may be related to a 
future extension of the subway system to the Southern municipalities. 
Consortiums for the new bridge construction 
Several firms formed consortiums for the construction and operation of the new bridge. 
These consortiums are multinational and have high stakes in the project. 
137 ANA - Aeroportos e Navega@o Atrea, Airports and Air Traffic Company. 
13* Metropolitano de Lisbon, Lisbon Subway. 

PART 2 
VIEWS OF PROFESSIONALS, POLITICIANS AND 
MEMBERS OF INTEREST GROUPS 
This Part shows how politicians, professionals and interest organizations activists saw the 
issues being raised by the discussion over the location of the new crossing over the Tagus. 
Quotes were drawn out of people's comments, media, and projects, plans and studies. It is 
obvious from the richness of comments that information (ideas, facts, statements, views) all 
played a part in the process of shaping people's opinions and positions. 
Attention of professionals concerned with the location of the bridge shifted from 
congestion to the structuring of the metropolitan area, forcing the confrontation of two models 
of development: one that had lasted for long defending new poles of development for the 
decentralization of the capital, and a new one calling for the "resewing of the urban tissue" by 
directing growth to the already infrastructured open urban spaces and avoiding to create new 
fronts of development. 
The case of the decision on the location of the new crossing over the Tagus estuary is a 
paradigmatic situation of the problem of inadequacy of public decision processes in a society 
shifting from a representative to a participative democracy. This is recognized by one of our 
politicians with international reputation during the interview: 
"This process was an excellent exposure of the inadequacy of a decision process of a representative 
democracy, where the elected body in practice conducts the strings of power and makes major 
decisions on land use or resource management that affect the daily life of people during a long 
period of time" 
The same politician goes on: 
"Not very different from so many other public decision processes ... it became more polemic due to 
the magnitude of the potential impacts generated. 
The political power, unwilling or unable to adjust quickly to the needed changes, operated 
in the same way of 'business as usual' and felt unjustly suffering the required painful test of 
public exposure as something to go through and not as a process leading to the readjustment to 
the public interests. 
"There was a similar attitude" (referring to previous public processes) "from the part of the political 
power, of 'suffering' the process of public debate, but basically not changing opinion" 
This case of the decision on the location of a new crossing over the Tagus estuary came out 
to represent the merging of the very many issues interacting within recent public decisions in 
Portugal. Rich in exposing failures and revealing in ways to cope with the changing society, it 
is an important source of research on complex environments. Its impact on the life of the AML 
residents and the amount of information that circulated as basis of argumentation for different 
positions during an extended time period contributed substantially to its peculiarity and richness 
for study. 
The insistence of the professional community in seeing the location choice as exclusively a 
technical problem forced the several actors to look for data to support their positions. The 
information collected in this way was important but was not enough to explain the case at stake 
and to favor consensus. 
What was at stake was a processual issue of involvement and legitimacy. Involvement, 
because many people felt excluded and unable to intervene in an issue they considered as part 
of their lives as AML residents. Legitimacy, since the local constituency questioned the 
legitimacy of the decision making political setting. 
Several actors felt a need to get involved when the option was not consensual, but they did 
not find adequate mechanisms to participate. Most of the meetings promoted by several 
institutions played a role of forums, but were scattered and had a limited effect in the arenas 
where decisions were taken. These operated separately, leaving most of the players, if not the 
totality, out. 
The central player in this process was the GA-ITEL, the entity created by the government to 
develop the studies leading to the decision of a second crossing in the Lisbon region. Within 
this entity it was the GATTEL Planning Team that was responsible for the technical advice on 
the location. This multidisciplinary group brought innovation to the process, as a consequence 
of assembling a substantial amount of expertise, adopting interactive modes of work and 
following a private sector way of operation under tight due dates. 
Besides GATTEL, a group of players with greater involvement in the process were the 
Environmental Associations. These NGOs, engaged since early stages, kept a permanent role 
along this public decision and intervened actively throughout the process. This effort was for 
these associations a learning process, in organizational and interactive terms. They generated 
and forced the Public administration to make available greater amounts of data. While doing 
this they revised their operation procedures. 
A large part of this research focuses on these two groups: the GATTEL and the 
Environmental Associations. The stories of these two actors are particularly rich in what 
concerns to the of use of information and in the establishing of interactive processes. The 
emerging of two new interest associations as a result of the development of the case is also 
discussed. 
Given the complexity of the process being studied and the large variety of intervenients 
involved in different moments of this public process, the other actors were mostly individuals 
involved in plans or projects for the area (past or present), members of interest associations, 
municipal officials (either professionals or politicians) and some key public figures. 
The following text tells the story of the public decision of the second crossing of the Tagus 
in Lisbon. It reflects the interpretation of the facts, constructed mostly through the views 
expressed by the interviewees. The historical background was built from several plans, 
projects or documents produced for this region. Meeting memos and technical statements were 
used when it became necessary to validate facts. News were also helpful, because since this is 
still an on going process there is not much published material available except for the media. 
ONE CENTURY OLD HISTORY 
The history of the crossings on the Tagus estuary is a one century long lasting sequence of 
events as stated by some of the interviewees: 
"The crossing in Montijo is an old story and came out again when the discussion of a new 
alternative crossing was raised again." (Environmental NGO member) 
"The discussion over the construction of the new bridge goes as far as the construction of the 25th 
of April Bridge. Already at that time several hypotheses of crossing were discussed. These 
discussions came up in the Proceedings of the Corporative A ~ s e m b l y ' ~ ~ ,  and were held in the 
Corporative Chamber. They already thought that the bridge should be constructed in Montijo and 
not in Almada for the same reasons (e.g. the connection with Spain). They ended up with the 
location of the existing bridge due to it being the narrower crossing and therefore much less 
expensive." (municipal official in favor of the Montijo crossing 1 NGO member) 
The story of the bridge location may be seen as the mixing and overlapping of several short 
stories, some of which dating from one century ago. It was built on several events happening 
each time the government, some specialist or agency thought it was time to construct a crossing 
to the South in the Lisbon region. Raised and abandoned several times due to numerous 
139 Assembleia Corporativa, Corporative Assembly. 
factors, the issue of a crossing challenged the creativity of the specialists bringing up proposals 
that shaped the minds of the professionals working in the area. But the story of the crossing in 
the Tagus estuary meant more than just plans or projects. It was a story of aspirations of the 
region residents, of evolution of urban and regional options, of gained and lost opportunities 
and of continuous concern. In sum, it was the story of a changing society and of its adaptation 
to changing patterns. 
For more than 100 years, discussions over possible locations of crossing of the Tagus 
estuary took place, bringing along studies and proposals developed by several specialists, 
focusing within two main channels: Montijo and Almada, the shortest pathways to the 
Southern bank. 
Once in a while, the need for a crossing was brought up and given the utmost importance 
to die afterwards due to a variety of circumstances, the most important being the lack of 
financial resources for such a substancial endeavor. These episodes left behind a legacy of 
projects and proposals developed along the years to overcome the estuary barrier. 
Professionals working in the metropolitan area reported to be familiar with some of these 
proposals. 
STICKING TO TWO PATHWAYS 
Several connections emerged maintaining the same corridors - Almada and Montijo. 
Technological constraints forced specialists to pursue the shortest path. These pathways 
privileged the proposals emerging until the middle of this century, influencing future 
generations of specialists and framing their minds. One of the interviewees stated: 
"These things made lots of people in the 50s and the 60s to defend that the bridge should be here 
(Montijo). During this period the municipalities were not involved in the process and the debates 
were processed all within the central administration." (municipal official in favor of the Montijo 
crossing 1 NGO member) 
Therefore, it is more than natural that the bustling around a possible future connection, linking 
the capital to the South, raised again the expectations of Alcochete and Montijo residents when 
the first opportunity for the construction of a bridge emerged in the middle of this century. 
In 1966 the Almada corridor received the construction of the 25th of April Bridge, fulfilling 
the needed connection in the West of the estuary. The populations of Montijo and Alcochete 
saw this as an opportunity lost by them. 
It is evident that the present technical community generally accepted the idea of a second 
crossing in Montijo. This was confirmed by the plans and projects proposals of crossings 
existing for the area and restated by the interviewees. Those discussing a second crossing 
always assumed a connection in Montijo, considering the other pathway already implemented. 
Professionals considered Montijo the historical location and some used that as part of the 
argument to defend that location: 
"Very early, before the discussion was initiated, there were reports from the beginning of the 
century that defended the bridge in this area." (municipal official in favor of the Montijo crossing 
(NGO member) 
"By the end of last century, Eng. Miguel Pais had discussed the need for a crossing that came to be 
in Beato-Montijo in 1920. Public positions were held and a bridge for vehicles and train was 
spoken, connecting Montijo to Olivais, Sacave'm, Beato (oriental connection). The municipalities 
that today belong to the metropolitan area of Lisbon wanted the crossing." (GATTEL member) 
A municipal planner working in the metropolitan region states this view, actually shared by 
several of the interviewed specialists : 
"When the issue was raised once again by the government, eager to establish a second crossing due 
to the congestion in the existing bridge, the only possible other alternative was Montijo." 
In sum, Montijo became along the years the other possible connection, a fact taken for granted 
in the mind of most people. This strongly influenced the way professionals looked at the issue 
once it came out again. 
That Montijo was the most considered connection is confirmed by several plans developed 
for the area. Among them are the Master Plan for Lisbon (1948)140, which considers the new 
bridge connecting POGO do Bispo (Lisbon) with Montijo, linking to one of the circular 
throughways. The main roads proposed in the Plan of 1948 were reassumed in the 1959 
Master Plan of Urbanization for Lisbon141 with some modifications. Among the changes is a 
new location for the bridge over the Tagus, which is proposed to connect Alciintara to Almada. 
Moreover, a throughway connecting Alciintara through Campolide to Buraca and two 
highways, - one to the North and the other to the South, as a continuation of the bridge were 
also suggested (Silva, 1994). 
The great increase of traffic verified in the fifties and the operation of the Tagus bridge in 
1966, forced the Municipality of Lisbon to consider the revision of the 1959 Plan. A 
Commission was created for that purpose. It identified three main issues to be addressed: 
radiocentrism, deviation between the expected and real population, delays in certain 
infrastructures and collective equipment. This Plan - 1966167 Master Plan of Urbanization 
for Lisbon - already includes studies developed by other entities, such as the Lisbon Train 
Interchange Office (GNFL) of Lisbon and the Lisbon Subway (Metropolitano de Lisboa)l4* 
(Silva, 1994). 
140 Plano Director da Cidade de Lisboa - PDCL - 1948, also called Groer Plan: This plan refers to a 3rd circular 
which would include the AV. dos Estados Unidos da Ame'rica, partially constructed, connecting the forest park of 
Monsanto with the future bridge to be built in Grilo. This link was totally constructed until AV. Gago 
Coutinho. The Plan for Chelas adopted it, as well as the following Urban Plans (pp.192, Carlos Nunes da 
Silva, Politica Urbana em Lisboa, 1926-1974, Livros Horizonte, 1994). 
141 Plano Director de Urbanizagio de Lisboa - PDUL 1959. 
142 The construction of the underground until Alvalade was undenvay at the time. 
These Plans restrain the crossings to the two pathways, identify problems that last until our 
d a y ~ 1 4 ~  and included studies develop by other entities working in the area, encompassing 
development concerns that spill over the limits of the municipality. 
THE FIRST TAGUS ESTUARY CROSSING 
Need of a bridge 
By the end of the fifties the government identified the lack of a bridge to the South as an 
economic constraint for the region. One of the main documents of governmental policy 
statesl44: 
. . .  
e excemon of the crossing iLlsbon. the problems of the connections between North and 
South by the transposition of the Tagus were solved with the construction of the Marshal Carmona 
Bridge in Vila Franca de Xira." (pp.1) 
"The increase of traffic between the two banks of the Tagus in Lisbon, did not suffer the 
competition of the new bridge in Vila Franca de Xira, demonstrating that the two traffics were not 
interdependent." (pp. l) 
"The government, interpreting once more the public opinion, aggravated by the sharp evolution of 
the traffic of the post war period, certified that it was absolutely necessary to establish the 
connection to the Southern bank of Lisbon, in the short range." (pp.1) 
The same report refers to the need to fit the connection in the regional organization of 
Lisbon, 
"The connection, adequately framed in the regional organization of Lisbon, should exclusively 
constitute a communication device, but never be a tool of development of the urban extension of 
the capital to the Southern bank." (pp. 15) 
It even states that using the bridge for development would imply, in the long range, the 
construction of other bridges that would be a burden or the economy. 
"In effect, the advantages of the connection could be overcome through the pressure of population 
requirements, creating inconveniences in the desirable regional structuring of Lisbon and on the 
local economy; successive works of art would then be necessary which would never solve 
satisfactorily the problem, with the new link bing rendered an unproductive instrument by the 
circumstances to be, heavily weighting on the general economy of the country." (pp.15) 
The inconvenience of various links across the estuary is raised again by a traffic 
specialist145 in a technical comment of February 1992 when the second crossing over the 
Tagus in the Lisbon region was debated: 
"We should not transform the urban centers of the Southern bank (namely Almnda and Barreiro) 
into new urban neighborhoods of Lisbon, but should reinforce their specialization and self strength 
143 radiocentrism, deviation between the expected and real population, delays in certain infrastructures and 
collective equipments. 
1 4 4 ~ ~ ~ ,  JAE (1957) Elementos par0 o Estudo do Plano de Fomento 1959-1964. LigapZo de Lisboa d Margem 
Sul do Tejo. Vol I .  Lisboa, January 1957: Minist6rio da Obras Piiblicas (MOP) e Junta Autonoma das Estradas 
(JAE). 
145 Prof. Jose Manuel Viegas. 
... These agglomerates have favorable conditions for that. The (large) width of the river (and 
therefore the costs of each crossing) discourage (any link between banks). To understand better the 
consequences of this vision, let us use as reference big foreign cities crossed by rivers, such as 
London, Paris, Montreal and Budapest. Though varying strongly in total population, these towns 
have spacings between bridges crossing their rivers that are not very different from one town to the 
other, always around a few hundred meters."146 
He followed on stating that the option for an urban integration of both banks implies the 
construction of several bridges and therefore an intolerable cost, as well as an unfulfilled need 
of bridges in each moment: 
"The widths of the rivers in those towns allow the systematic construction of new bridges, and 
therefore the effective urban integration of the two banks. In the case of Lisbon, the cost of each 
new crossing is so high, that, if we opt for an urban integration of both banks, we will always be 
with a deficit of at least one bridge relatively to what would be necessary in each moment."147 
Montijo is postponed 
It was with dismay that, people from Montijo and Alcochete saw their dream fall apart 
when, after several studies, in 1958 the government chose the Almada corridor. It is obvious 
that, between the two, the shortest pathway was in Almada. This may have encouraged the 
government on its decision. But the Montijo crossing was not to be abandoned. In fact, the 
same Document considers that the Beato-Montijo crossing should be kept in mind, justifying it 
on the basis .of its importance to the train connection. 
"Though the solution Beato-Montijo is not studied at this moment, as it is sated in this report, that 
crossing, which is so important for the train connection proposed in the train plan148, should not be 
abandoned." (pp.21) 
REFLECTING ON A SECOND CROSSING: Two accepted 
pathways 
Plans, projects and studies for the Lisbon region 
Several plans, projects and studies developed for the Lisbon region or parts of its territory 
came up with information related to the location of a second bridge over the Tagus estuary. 
Each time funds were available for investment, the issue of a second Tagus crossing in Lisbon 
was debated. 
Below, I describe some statements in these plans that molded, over the years, the views of 
the professionals:I intend to show that there was much information on the issue, circulating 
146 CISED, February 1992. 
147 CISED, February 1992. 
l48 Plano Ferrovifirio (1927) proposes the connection Beato-Montijo. 
among professionals previously to the creation of the GATTEL, that influenced them and 
played a part in the debates for the decision on the second crossing over the Tagus estuary. 
Foreseeing the consequences of expansion encouraged by the accessibility provided by the 
25th of April Bridge which was under way, the Ministry of Public Works developed the PDRL 
- Master Plan for the Lisbon Region (1964)149. Professionals expected this plan to provide the 
development guidelines for the Lisbon region. It never got the approval of the central 
government after it requested a revision. It was caught by the 25th of April of 1974 military 
coup when the preliminary studies were being developed. One of the proposed guidelines 
contained in the PDRL document expresses the need to 
"guarantee the urban independence of Setu'bal through an important development of this center to 
prevent that the 25th of April Bridge compromise that independency". 
No reference is made to a possible second bridge in the region, with either road or train 
crossing. 150 
In 1966, the 25th of April Bridge starts operating and in the following year, the PDCL - 
Master Plan for the citv of Lisbon (1967) was initiated. Approved by the government in 1977, 
this Plan represented the last attempt until 1982 to redirect Lisbon development and refers to the 
"increase of utilization of the Bridge over the Tagus." 
The Plan also proposes an integrated road system. Just as a work hypothesis, a crossing in 
Beato-Montijo is referred, though suggesting that further studies were needed. It was also 
stated that the location of a second crossing was dependent from the road andor train functions 
which it would have attributedl51. 
In the PDCL, Lisbon was divided into Units of Land Use152 (UNOR). The alternative of 
the bridge over the Tagus in Montijo falls in the UNOR 39153 which covers an industrial area 
- Beato-Marvila-Olivais-Chelas. This Land Use Unit was the object of a detailed studiedl54, 
accomplished in 1973, from which serious doubts about the viability of using this connection 
for a second crossing155 seem to have resulted. The study considers a future bridge in Beato- 
Montijo as a working hypothesis. It favored, however, the crossing not in the continuation of 
the AV. dos Estados Unidos da Ame'rica, but rather in the continuation of the second circular 
149 Ministkrio das Obras P"b1icas (MOP) Plano Director da RegGo de Lisboa (1964). 
150 A Travessia do Tejo numa Perspectiva de Politica de Desenvolvimento Urbano e Regional, Parecer 
NEURl82, Ministkrio das Finangas e do Plano, Secretaria de Estado do Plaeamento, Instituto de Analise da 
Conjuntura e Estudo de Planeamento. 
151 idern. 
52 UNOR - Unidades de Ordenamento. 
lS3 Estudo Urbanistico da Unidade de OrdenamentoLJrban Study of the Land Use Unity. Beato-Marila-Olivais- 
Chelas (UNOR39). 
lS4 C h a r a  Municipal de Lisboa (1973) Interprojecto."UNOR-39. An6lise politica de interven@o" Lisboa. 
155 A Trnvessia do Tejo Numa Perspectiva de Politica de Desenvolvimento Urbano e Regional, Parecer 
NEUR/82, Ministkrio das Finan~as e do Plano, Secretaria de Estado do Planeamento, Instituto de AnAlise da 
Conjuntura e estudo de Planeamento (pp. 1 14). 
(AV. Marechal Gomes da Costa) in Olivais-Cabo R ~ i v 0 . l ~ ~ .  By 1982 no further study of this 
proposal existed. The needed bridge in the UNOR 39 is justified by: 
- support to the local, regional and international connections, at the time assured by the 
existing bridge but expected to attain the saturation in 1985; 
- fast connections between Lisbon and the new airport, in order to comply with the 
international standards for such connections: 40 minutes; 
- fast connections between Lisbon and the sea port and the industrial expansion area in 
Montijo, foreseen in the General Plan of Development of the Ports of Lisbon and 
Setcibal.157. 
The National Develowment Plans (111 Plano de Fomento 1968- 1973, IV Plano de Fomento 
1974-1979, and after the 25th of April of 1974 revolution, the Middle for 1977-80 
and the Maior Plannin~ Owtions for 1981-84) discussed the asymmetries of the region, the 
need to correct them and the wanted investment policies. 
The policy orientations of the 111 Plano de Fomento (1968-1973) were followed by the IV 
Plano de Fomento (1974-1979). The 25th of April of 1974 revolution prevented this last plan 
to be implemented. What is important to retain from this is the appearance of a new concern for 
framig the sectorial actions in a perspective of regional planning. This concern is also present in 
the 1977-80 and 1981- 1984 Plans, developed after the revolution. 
The IV Plano de F ~ m e n t o l ~ ~  specifically mentions a second crossing West of the existing 
bridge, connecting Algis (Lisbon) to the Trafaria (Almada). This option had, at that time, a 
strong support of the Lisbon Port Authority159 willing to expand the Port activity in this area 
and therefore seeking greater accessibility. This pathway was seldom considered, either 
because it was seen as an additional pressure for an environmentally important area or because 
it was seen as a duplication of the existing bridge. 
The Plan for the Lisbon Sea Port (Plano Geral de Desenvolvimento dos Portos de Lisboa e 
SetLbal) requested by the General Administration of the Lisbon Sea Port in 1971. anticipates the 
creation of two expanded areas in the Southern bank: one in the area of Trafaria-Bugio and the 
other bigger in the area of Montijo-Alcochete. To make this last expansion viable, the plan 
considers the construction of the bridge Beato-Montijo which would directly connect this 
Lisbon Sea Port area and the new airport of Lisbon to the Northern bank. Due to the need to 
idem (pp.114). 
157 idem (pp.114-115). 
158 A Travessia do Tejo Numa Perspectiva de Politica de Desenvolvirnento Urbano e Regional, Parecer 
NEURf82, Ministkrio das Finan~as e do Plano, Secretaria de Estado do Plaeamento, Instituto de Anilise da 
Conjuntura e Estudo de Planeamento. (pp.3) 
159 APL - Administrapio do Porto de Lisboa, Lisbon Port Authority. 
transfer the Montijo Air Base to make land available for industrial expansion and to build a 
new bridge, this is considered a second priority160. 
"One of the most important problems which is still to be solved is the urban organization of the 
Peninsula of Setcibal. The Lisbon expansion is moving in that direction compromising the 
important touristic potentialities still existing in the area. This expansion is associated with the 
uncontrolled connection between the two banks of the Tagus. The increase of fluxes will accentuate 
mostly after the major poles generating traffic, such as the new airport, the specialized terminals of 
the Lisbon Sea Port, the new industrial plants and the growth of the existing dormitory 
function."161 
The Study of Transports for the Lisbon Region (ETRL), initiated in July 1973 and 
organized in four distinct periods, specifically mentioned the crossings of the Tagus in the third 
and fourth phasesl62. 
"During the third period, which was developed between mid 1976 and the end of 1977, the works 
concentrated in ... pursuing several sectorial studies, particularly in continuation of similar studies 
of the previous period (downtown, Benfica, Tagus crossing)." (ETRL, pp.56) 
"In the fourth period from the beginning of 1978, the works focused essentially on the elaboration, 
development and evaluation of alternative actions at the short and middle ranges, aiming at restoring 
or complementing several elements essential to the transportation system of the Lisbon region; 
these actions respect mostly to the transportation modes connected to rails (railway, underground, 
tramways), to the transportation of Tagus crossings and still to the urban and suburban 
transportation in buses." (ETRL, pp.56) 
An interviewed professional recalled his involvement in this study: 
"I already participated in a project of great dimension, the ETRL. It was more for transportation 
management. Already at the time of the ETRL, there was a big multidisciplinarity, a good dialogue 
among professions. Technicians from the Lausanne school came. In the 70's and 80's the ETRL 
was not applied." (transportation manager) 
In the Lisbon Train Interchan~e Office (GNFL) report there are some important statements 
related to the existing bridge, but no reference is made, to a second crossing.163 The 1982 
report states that a train crossing on the 25th of April Bridge has been planned for long, refers 
to the limitations of its structure due to the maximum weight capacity of the platform, and 
considers the construction of an exclusively road bridge as a serious m i ~ t a k e . 1 ~ ~  
"The construction of the bridge over the Tagus exclusively for road traffic is a serious mistake under 
the point of view of transport coordination. The previous Minister of the Economy, Pro5 Ferreira 
Dias, recognized this when he called it 'the least interesting' of the endeavors of the National Plan of 
1959-1964, according to pure economic criteria. It is been made a strong effort the country has to 
pay directly or indirectly whose result will be to favor the road traffic at the expenses of the train 
transportation, exactly in a sector where this had all the conditions for economic preferen~e."'~~. 
A Travessia do Tejo Nunm Perspectiva de Politica de Desenvolvimento Urbano e Regional, Parecer 
NEURl82, Ministerio das Finan~as e do Plano, Secretaria de Estado do Planeamento, Instituto de AnAlise da 
Conjuntura e Estudo de Planeamento. 
idem. 
DG'ITIITEP (1980) ~s'tudo de Transportes da Regido de Lisboa - ETRL. Relat6rio Sintese Vol 1. Maio. 
163 idern. 
l* idem. 
165 Eng. Francisco Lino Neto, 0 Carninho de Ferro no Panorama dos Transportes Terrestres. Lisboa, 1965 in 
A Travessia do Tejo Numa Perspectiva de Politica de Desenvolvimento Urbano e Regional, Parecer NEURl82, 
MinistCrio das Finan~as e do Plano, Secretaria de Estado do Plaeamento, Instituo de Anaise da Conjuntura e 
Estudo de Planeamento. 
Each time a big facility in the South bank (airport, sea port expansion) was discussed, the 
issue of the location of a new bridge emerged. During the debates for a second crossing before 
and during the GATTEL operation, the future location of the airport of Lisbon received 
particular attention and often conditioned the view of the players. 
The idea of the construction of the New Airport of Lisbon was referred in the Master Plan 
for the Lisbon Region (1964) and a specific entity was created in 1969 to develop studies for 
its location. In the Preliminary Study of the Planning for the New Airport of Lisbon, requested 
in 198 1, the locations considered were in decreasing order of priority: Rio Frio, Porto Alto and 
Ota (the first two South and the third North of the Tagus). The study also recommends care in 
saving the ecological wealth of the Natural Reserve of the Tagus and refers the importance of 
locating this infrastructure in accordance with a policy of regional development and land 
use166. 
Two plans were specifically developed to study the location of the new airport of Lisbon - 
one accomplished in 1972167 and the other in 198 1 168. Both these studies favor the location in 
Rio Frio. However, the 1982 Document on the Crossings of the Tagus advises caution in this 
decision. Among other reasons it refers that there is no knowledge about "other European 
airport which was completely dismantled". But it also considers other type of constraints, 
including the impacts on natural environment and the difficulties in closing two military 
facilities: the Montijo Air Base and the Alcochete Shooting Field 
The study refers that the location of the new airport in Rio Frio or Porto Alto could have 
impacts in the newly created (1976)l69 Natural Reserve of the Tagus. Difficulties in moving 
the Montijo Air Base and closing the Alcochete Shooting Field are also part of the reasoning. 
Following this argumentation, the document suggests a further study of a possible location in 
Otu referring several advantages such as: 
"- it is only 3 km away from the highway to the North 
- needs less road infrastructures than Rio Frio and Porto Alto 
- it has a train connection 
- implies only the cancellation of one military facility 
- has better support in the surrounding communities."170 
Nowadays, the location of the future airport is still unclear, though some professionals 
think that there are indications that it will be constructed in the Southern bank. These include 
lfi6 A Travessia do Tejo Numa Perspectiva de Politica de Desenvolvimento Urbano e Regional, Parecer 
NElJR182, Ministerio das Finan~as e do Plano, Secretaria de Estado do Planeamento, Instituo de Angise da 
Conjuntura e Estudo de Planeamento. 
lfi7 GNAL - Gabinete do Novo Aeroporto de Lisboa (1972) Estudo da Localiza~iio do Novo Aeroporto de 
Lisboa. Lisboa. 
TAMS - Profabril Estudo Prelirninar de Planeamento do Novo Aeroporto de Lisboa. Lisboa, 1981. 
Decree Law 565176, July 19. 
170 A Travessia do Tejo Numa Perspectiva de Politica de Desenvolvimento Urbano e Regional, Parecer 
NEURl82, Ministerio das Finansas e do Plano, Secretaria de Estado do Planeamento, Instituto de Andlise da 
Conjuntura e Estudo de Planeamento (pp.147). 
the decision on the new crossing in the Montijo corridor and the abandon of the Montijo Air 
Base by the Air Force. 
More recently, in the beginning of the go's, the PROTAML considers that the need for a 
new airport is not urgent. As stated by one of the interviewees who was a member of the 
PROTAML team: 
"We were the first to say that the solution for the airport was not urgent. It is a decision for 2005 
or 2015 because the (air) traffic is not going to grow in the (formerly) expected proportion. 
Moreover, the evolution in the utilization of airports allows us today to operate them in smaller 
spaces. The saturation (of the existing Lisbon airport) is only attained after 2005. Therefore, we can 
make the decision later ... either Ota or Rio Frio have conditions for a good airport ... we in the 
PROTAML bended to the Ota because it gathers better accessibility opportunities." (transportation 
planner) 
One of the interviewees stated in 1994: 
"The Air Force has to leave the Montijo base by 1996 ... In 1985 there was a proposal for the 
airport to be an expansion of the commercial airport." (municipal technician) 
The ambiguity on the future location of the airport from the part of the government created 
a lot of uncertainty in the participants discussing the best crossing alternative of the Tagus 
because it represented an important information missing in the process. 
In 1982, a technical report on the Crossing of the Tagus in a Perspective of Urban and 
Regional Development requested by the Secretary of State of Planning (operating under the 
Minister of Finance and the Plan) analyzed a second crossing of the Tagus in a perspective of a 
policy of urban and regional development. 
Though, with reduced circulation since it was an internal government document, this report 
identifies the main problems, checks references connected to the crossing in existing plans and 
projects, and concludes with a technical advice. The report is important because it describes the 
views of the several plans and projects for the area. It also allows to understand the main issues 
considered relevant by a team of land use and transportation planners. The technical advice 
provided in the document reflects the position of the team that prepared it, mostly urban and 
transportation planners, or better the position of a group of professionals working in the 
Lisbon region. The report analyzes several plans and projects for the region drawing out 
aspects connected to land use and transportation that might be important to build information 
for a second crossing in the Lisbon region. 
In June 24, 1982, the report concludes: 
"The big decisions are still to be taken, namely about the restriction of growth, degree of 
tertiarization and industrialization, direction of expansion, functions for each bank of the river, 
location and phasing of the more urgent infrastructures." (pp.49) 
"The problem of the crossing of the Tagus is, among others, a rupture point of the system. It 
appears as a result of increased crossing needs between the two banks. In accordance with the trends 
of land use verified in the Southern banks, and existing projects which foresee the location of 
facilities that are strongly generators of traffic, such as the new airport in Rio Frio and the new 
terminals of the Lisbon Sea Port. Therefore these needs tend to grow in an uncontrollable way." 
(pp.50) 
The report goes on suggesting the need for "the development of a structuring idea for the 
AML: 
"It is necessary to create an adequate structure suitable to the AML planning that, in connection 
with the institutional entities, allow for the development of a plan, its implementation and 
prospective study, and for a permanent follow up." (pp.51,52) 
It also suggests a development plan for the Lisbon region before taking any decision on the 
crossing. Meanwhile, the improvement of the boat crossing capacity as a short and middle 
range solution is proposed: 
"Having in mind more direct solutions aiming to reinforce the crossing means at the short and 
middle ranges, it is suggested to use quantitative methods for evaluating the advantages and 
inconveniences of the several alternatives. These should not compromise the solutions at the long 
range. Increasing the number of boats and taking most advantage of the existing documents could 
contribute to that. On the other hand, the location of big poles of traffic generation should not be 
induced, while the guiding lines for the AML development are still to be defined." (p.52) 
Among the plans developed for the area is the Distrito of Setu'bal Development Plan 
(PIDDS)171, seen by the municipal technicians and politicians as a document developed with 
the participation of the Southern municipalities to be a "working tool for the AML". 
"It should be said that, in the Southern bank the municipalities of the Distrito of Setu'bal developed 
the PIDDS because they felt the need of a document developed with their participation. This plan 
became an important working tool for the AML." (pp.2)172 
In the report of the first phase of the PIDDS (1987), a possible new crossing is indicated in 
the map of page 75, showing already an intention and acknowledgment of the Montijo 
connection by the part of the team of the professionals doing the plan. 
The need for increasing the accessibility to the North bank is also mentioned in the several 
reports issued under the Integrated Operation of Development (OID)l73 (1987, 1989, 1990; 
1989- 1993): 
- one of the proposed projects under these funds refers to the study of the location of the 
new road and train crossing of the Tagus, concerned with the saturation of the existing 
bridge, ( ~ p . 2 1 0 ) ~ ~ ~  
- the OID Report of 1989 states that "it is still left to be solved a key issue for the region, 
for which there are no bases for a decision: the new road and train crossing of the 
Tagus" (pp.63, OID of the Peninsula of Setu'bal, PNIC-FEDER, Ag. 1989) 
- in March 1990, the European Union "approves the integrated approach to the Peninsula 
of Setubal as being an integrated operation of development which can benefit of 
European Social Funds. " 175 
171 PIDDS - Plano Integrado de Desenvolvimento Integrado do Distrito de Setubal, Distrito of Setubal 
Development Plan. 
172 Document on the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon 1991. 
173 OID - O p e r a ~ b  Integrada de Desenvolvimento, Integrated Operation of Development. 
174 Estudo Preparatdrio da Operapio Integrada de Desenvolvimento da Peninsula de Setubal - 2nd phase, 
CEDRU 1987. 
175 Operapio Integrada de Desenvolvimento da Peninsula de Setubal, 1989-1993. 
The view on the transportation sees the Peninsula transportation network as the privileged 
connection of the capital to the South: 
"Therefore, besides the transportation system of the Peninsula being to a large extent organized to 
respond to the commuting demand to Lisbon, it was also organized as the platform of the 
connection of the capital to the South." (pp. 29) 
In this report, concerning actions to be implemented between 1989- 1993, saturation of the 
existing bridge over the Tagus is listed as a transportation problem (pp.44) affecting 
commuting and being an economic bottleneck for "the operation of the sea ports and the 
development of the productive activities of the Peninsula relative to the Lisbon market" (pp. 
121). 
The commitment towards the improvement of accessibilities appears in the chapter on 
Strategies and Development (pp.46,58) and Measures 11176 and 111177 cover the transportation 
infrastructures for train178 and road179 connections (pp. 127 and pp.131). Measure I1 includes 
the widening of the platform in the existing bridge and the improvement of the connection to 
the North bank. No explicit reference is made in this phase to the possible investment in the 
construction of a new crossing (pp.63) as it is clear when the relationships with other national 
plans are referred: 
"These proposals are related with the National Road Plan. It remains to be solved the key issue for 
the region, for which it does not exist, for the moment, enough basis (for a decision): the location 
of the new train and road crossing of the Tagus. Also, the decision of the location of the New 
International Airport of Lisbon, to be evaluated in a wider context, will affect the Peninsula of 
Setu'bal, due to the strong implications at the level of development." (pp.63) 
This report shows that by 1990, the second crossing of the Tagus was still a remote idea 
for some key professionals involved in relevant regional plans. They were concerned with dual 
mode crossings - train and road - and with the location of this infrastructure and the airport 
which was not decided by then. This fact is important because this report was developed 
having in consideration the plans for the region under way and it shows that the team did not 
acknowledge any decisions on a second crossing of the Tagus. 
The OID study states that the commuting trends between the North and South banks are 
expected to be maintained because a consolidation of the economic base of the Peninsula of 
Setcibal was foreseen. The need to balance the functions in the North and the South of the 
Lisbon region means that the Peninsula has greater capacity to supply many of its needs on 
services and, therefore, to diversify its economic base (pp.67). 
176 Infrastructure of Train Transportation. 
177 Infrastructure of Road Transportation - National and Regional Network. 
178 In accordance with the Trains of Portugal (CP) Middle Range Plan - Plano de Mkdio Prazo da CP (1988- 
1994), including the train crossing in the 25th of April Bridge. 
179 In accordance with the Plano Rodovin'rio National, Road National Plan under way, including the widening 
of the 25th of April Bridge platfonn. 
From this survey of technical advice in existing plans and projects it is possible to conclude 
that: 
(1) whenever there is a reference to a second crossing that link is identified in the Montijo 
corridor, with the exception of the IV Plano de Fomento that refers a crossing to the 
West of the existing bridge; 
(2) part of the transportation specialists considered an exclusively road bridge without the 
train mode to be a waste of resources ; 
(3) a permanent concern of the specialists is the need to frame the future development in 
the Southern bank by appropriate plans; 
(4) the undecided locations for big infrastructures in the Lisbon region, such as the new 
airport, the Lisbon Sea Port expansion, and the future train connections to the South. 
Forums of municipal technicians and politicians 
During the eighties a few forums emerged in the Metropolitan Area joining municipal 
officials and politicians in discussing issues of the future development of the area. One of them 
gathered representatives from seven municipalities of the Northern AML to discuss the 
accessibilities and the road network. As one of the participants said, 
"several meetings were held with some results, mainly in the merging of points of analysis, views, 
contacts, mutual acquaintances, which allowed substantial progress ... they allowed to assess in a 
more shared way a set of problems." (pp.2)lg0 
Later on, towards the end of the decade, another forum of reflection gathered all the 
municipalities of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon to discuss the Region Land Use Plan. The 
participants were municipal politicians and technicians working in planning1*' who produced 
several documents182 summarizing the key aspects of the issues under discussion. This forum 
was created as a reaction to the central government, to carry out the Land Use Plan for the 
Metropolitan Area of Lisbon coordinated by the Regional Commission. Opening one seminar 
organized in the context of this forum, the president of the Municipality of Vila Franca de Xira 
identified the 
"need for dialogue to assess the shared problems and tune a strategy of options which will 
effectively allow a consonance between the several decision levels." (pp.l)lg3 
He stressed the fact that it has not been easy to "progress in the concretization of the 
intermunicipal potential for forming associations" and went on to state that the municipalities 
lgO Document of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon July 1989. "0 PROT como Plano - Programa da AML" 
proceedings of the seminar of July 4, 1989, Document of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon, July 1989. 
involving about 12 municipalities and 100 individuals. 
Document on the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon, 1991. 
lg3~ocument of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon July 1989. "0 PROT como Plano - Programa da AML" 
proceedings of the seminar of July 4, 1989, Document of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon, July 1989. 
behave differently than in some other times in the past because they jointly got together to 
debate issues and to find joint solutions. In fact he stated: 
"The merit of the initiative is totally ours because we were able to dialogue." (pp.2)lg4 
He congratulated the attendants of the session because they had several meetings attended by 
representatives of all the seventeen municipalities of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon" a fact 
considered "particularly significant" (pp. 2), calling the on going initiative the "Pro-Association 
of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon". The opportunity of gathering the technicians was seen in 
favorable terms by another participant: 
"This is the first time we technicians had a chance to meet. Never before had the technicians met in 
the metropolitan area of Lisbon." (pp. 13)lsS 
The seminar was the result of work developed by a team of technicians from the 
municipalities of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon invested with the responsibility of setting up 
a meeting to analyze intermunicipal problems of the metropolitan area, and to carry out a 
preliminary analysis of crucial issues for the municipalities intervention in the Metropolitan 
Land Use Plan. 
Municipal technicians and politicians participating in this seminar were seeking a way of 
operation different from that of the central administration, calling for more participative 
procedures. 
"To the way of acting of the central administration, usually centralized, from the cabinet, 
authoritarian, imposing decisions, we want to answer which a dialogue mode, participated, very 
open, collecting several opinions from debates on disagreements, and retaining the options that 
better serve the population and the reality of the country." (pp.3) 
A municipal technician intervening in the session called the attention to the need of defining 
common concepts of urbanism, a common language suitable for comparisons. 
"When we move to a supramunicipal level these problems have to be considered, we have to 
understand each other in the spoken language, we have to be able to exchange data to assess the type 
of change and evolution trends as they are happening." (pp. 5) 
The advantages of these meetings were seen as 
"an opportunity to meet and to reflect together. They have a unique positive value to add individual 
expertises, putting together the little each one knows to solve a problem." (pp. 14). 
Some results were also communicated in the meeting: 
"Therefore, these issues were debated among us and we reached the conclusion that it was possible 
to find certain consensual projects." (pp. 18) 
In one documentl86, the view that the municipal officials had about the metropolitan area is 
summarized: 
"A metropolitan area that until this date (was) passive and congested, monocentric." (pp.4) 
idem. 
idem (pp.13). 
l86 Document on the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon, 1991. 
and that they were aiming 
"to a territory more policentric and balanced, as in the quality of life supplied by its so unequal 
parts, and, therefore, canceling opportunities of social cohesion as in the differentiation of attractive 
vocations." (pp.4-5) 
In these meetings the new crossing of the Tagus is identified as a need to solve congestion 
and once more Montijo is the only possibility mentioned. This was stated in interviews of the 
professionals who participated in the meetings. 
The minutes of the meeting are not so clear, though some of the statements refer to the need 
to study a second crossing 
"It is urgent.to start thinking on the study of the location of the new crossing of the Tagus and the 
restructuring of the North-South train and road connections, I am not saying in terms of projects, 
but in terms of studies. Studies should be carried out on the location of the second crossing and on 
the specific functions it will have."(pp.50) 
and to the uncertainty regarding the location of big infrastructures suggesting the definition of a 
timetable to clarify these issues. 
"There is another issue ... and that is the issue of the context uncertainty ... there are some things 
that .we hear talk for several years. Lisbon Airport, new bridges, railway lines, underground 
expansion, Lisbon Port with connections to Bugio-Trafaria, major circulation rings all ideas 10,20 
years old and these issues go on and on without being clarified. Therefore, I think that one of our 
functions is to force the existence of a phasing for the definition of issues of this kind; a phasing 
has to exist. In my way of seeing, it is not a result of our lack of capacity for opting and defining. 
No, it is a more clear expression of the absence of policy." (pp.71-72) 
In the summary of key issues for the concept of development of the Metropolitan Area of 
Lisbon, point 7 refers to the amelioration of the unbalances between center and periphery, 
departing from the assumption of "a greater (capacity) train and road crossing of the Tagus", 
mentioning as one of the concerns the location of the new airport: 
"assuming that the location in Rio Frio will contribute to the gain of a new weight of the Southern 
metropolitan area and of rebalancing the urban network of the AML." (pp. 11) 
This statement goes on to advise that the accessibilities proposed should not be dependent on 
the location of the new airport, but should be seen in a more general setting of land use. 
A previous point calls the attention of the municipalities to the need to program the 
infrastructures and facilities of superior hierarchy with the non-municipal entities: 
"if investments on major national and regional transportation infrastructures and facilities are not 
programmed with the nonmunicipal entities responsible for their development, the municipalities 
are bound to waste of resources." (pp.4) 
The need to restructure the road and train North-South connections and to study the 
location of the new crossing of the Tagus is identified as urgent by one of the participants in the 
report produced in 1989 (pp.50)187 and it was raised again in the 1991 report (pp.10)188. 
lg7 Notes on the joint reflection of the Municipalities of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon, July 1989. 
l88 Notes on the joint reflection of the Municipalities of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon, March l991 
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Forum of train specialists 
Another important forum of specialists involved mostly transportation experts. In 1990 the 
Portuguese Association for the Development of the Train Transportation (ADFER)189 
organized a Conference to discuss the train crossing over the Tagus river. As stated in the 
written document issued from this Conference, what was under debate was the possibility of 
the train to cross the 25th of April Bridge as a way "to develop the South of the country and 
improve the traffic in Lisbon". 
One of the members of the GATTEL states that a plan developed within Lisbon 
municipality considers only the East alternative: 
"Initially there were only two alternativeslgO. Only in the sequence of applying the defined 
methodology did we get to the three alternatives ... For example the GARLIS of the 
Municipality of Lisbon only considers the East alternative, never the West or the central ... Only 
in the sequence of the methodology are the alternatives identified. We identified all the 
possibilities and after that we characterized them on aspects related to physical viability, costs, 
environment, traffic." (GA'ITEL member) 
Electoral manifest for the Lisbon municipality 
An electoral manifest issued in 1989 by the coalition today ruling the Municipality of 
Lisbon refers once more to the need of a second crossing of the Tagus, listing among the 
priority problems of regional and metropolitan level: 
"to make compatible and program the local intermunicipal network, the regional road network and 
the second bridge over the Tagus; to improve the circular metropolitan connections among 
municipalities, reducing the negative effects of uncoordinated recent decisions as the Cascais 
highway." (pp.2l)l9l 
However, the electoral manifest does not refer to any specific location for a future bridge. 
DECIDING ON THE CROSSING LOCATION 
The need of a second bridge over the Tagus estuary appeared in several plans and projects, 
as mentioned above. Most of them considered its location in Montijo, a situation that 
compromised and reinforced this location in the mind of the professionals working in the 
region. The idea was so generally accepted and was talked about for such a long time that most 
professionals took for granted that the new bridge would be in Montijo. 
ADFER - Associapio Portuguesa para o Desenvolvimento do Transporte Ferrovidrio - Portuguese 
Association for the Development of the Train Transportation. 
190 in the East corridor. 
lol Lisboa, Capital Atlintica da Europa, Electoral Document 1989. 
The growing congestion of the 25th of April Bridge brought urgency to the construction of 
a new bridge. The problem was so serious that more recent documents, issued in the go's, 
suggested remedies for temporary relief of congestion of the existing bridge, such as "the 
,widening of its platform" and its reinforcing to accomodate a train crossing in the lower level. 
However, they also pointed out that this would not solve the congestion unless a "new bridge 
upstream the river " is constructed, as stated in OID reports and other studies. 
Decisions on major transportation infrastructures, airport location and sea port 
reorganization and expansion are crucial for the bridge location process, since these structures 
raise specific accessibility requirements. However, information about such decisions was 
frequently unavailable or ambiguous. These studies were carried out by a relatively restricted 
team and were not subjected to wide dissemination, but they enhanced, particularly in the 
media, the publicly available information. 
The debates that took place before and after the decision on the bridge location generated 
the "intellectual capital" that made this location process unique. The urban and transportation 
plans under way for the region created a space for discussion and reflection on the future of the 
metropolitan area. Along with information, they also created a lot of complexity and 
uncertainty. Several agents involved in the plans encouraged the interaction among public 
agencies, professionals, municipal politicians and technicians, an interaction that grew during 
the development of the process. 
More recent concerns also brought new concepts to the debate. Among them sustainability 
and diversity, strongly imprinted with environmental concerns. This shift privileged the land 
already served by infrastructures, avoiding the opening of new fronts of development. Such a 
line of thought is rather suitable for Lisbon whose population is declining. However, its 
acceptance required from the part of the decision makers a previous awareness of this changing 
reality. 
When the GATTEL was created in 1991, the two possible corridors with public exposure 
and framing the minds of the specialists were in Alge's-Almada, already fulfilled with the 25th 
of April Bridge, and in Montijo. Nothing made people guess that other possible connections 
would emerge. The two alternatives had been accepted as the only ones for so long that people 
had the impression that all possible alternatives had already been explored. 
At that time, besides the existing 25th of April Bridge in Lisbon, the other connections 
across the Tagus designed with the North-South traffic in mind were assumed as given facts: 
the Vila Franca de Xira Bridge operating since 1948, and the planned new bridge for 
Carregado, proposed in the National Road Plan. This is acknowledged by the GATIXL in one 
of its documents: 
"With influence in the behavior of the system are other infrastructures already existing (such as the 
bridge of Vila Franca de Xira) or planned (namely the bridge in Carregado and the metro station in 
Cais Sodre')." (pp.7, GATTEL, Document 6) 
It is within the above described context that, with the agreement of the Council of Ministers 
(May 1989), the Land Use Regional Plan for the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon192 (PROTAML) 
started in 1990 under the Regional Coordination Commission and the Ministry of Planning and 
coordinated by a well known geography University Professor. In October 1991 the second 
PROTAML report (strategic phase) was concluded. 
The development of the PROTAML and the creation of the GATTEL, emerged in a period 
of extensive plan development activity: most municipalities were preparing their Municipal 
Master Plans, the perspective of a Regional Plan gathered municipal politicians and technicians 
together for the first time, and the Southern Municipalities had put together a joint plan for the 
allocation of funds under the OID. It was a period of intense activity and debate on issues 
concerning the Metropolitan Area, what is in some way confirmed by the creation of a 
Metropolitan Entity long f ~ r s a k e n l ~ ~ .  
By mid 1991 the GATTEL made public three possible locations, one of which had never 
been exposed before and would become highly controversial. 
Ambiguous hierarchy of objectives 
There is a general agreement that the main problem under consideration was congestion, 
but there was great ambiguity in the hierarchy of objectives. One of the interviewees even 
stated that "nobody remembered to ask the Minister at the beginning, what he wanted" if it was 
to solve congestion or the North-South connection. 
In the legislation that created the GATTEL the objectives are not stated clearly, though the 
introduction of that document refers, between the lines, to two issues to be addressed by the 
location of the new road crossing of the Tagus estuary: 
- congestion in the Lisbon region 
"The traffic between the two banks of the Tagus in the region of Lisbon has been growing 
incessantly." (first line of the legislation) 
- the North-South link 
"Existing studies reveal the need to substantially increase in the short range the crossing capacity of 
the Tagus by road traffic to avoid strangling the economic development, not only of the region but 
also of the country, given the importance of this crossing in the connections North-South and with 
the border." @L 14N91). 
This is further confirmed by the methodology established for the GATTEL since the very 
beginning. The objectives are stated once more indirectly: 
"The Decree Law that creates the GATTEL refers, to the incessant growing of traffic between the 
two banks, and to the declining road connection service. Moreover, it refers to the need to increase, 
in the short range, the road crossing capacity of the Tagus, to avoid strangling the development 
192 Resolution of the Council of Ministers 21/89, May 15 (PROTAML). 
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stranglement not only of the region but also of the country, given the importance of this crossing 
for the North-South and border connections" (pp.4, GATIEL, Document 2). 
Since there was no straightforward statement of the objectives, most of the specialists were 
left to their own definition of the problem. Most of them considered congestion to be the 
problem to be solved assuming that the North-South connection would be assured by the 
Curregado bridge proposed by the National Road Plan: 
"It was necessary to solve congestion in the 25th of April Bridge." (GATTEL consultant) 
"The problem the bridge should solve is congestion." (transportation planner) 
"the problem is essentially the problem of interconnection of the commuting traffic between the 
two banks, as for satellite towns." (PROTAML team member) 
Congestion 
Congestion and the need to assure greater accessibility between North and South banks 
was a permanent concern. One of the remedies proposed was the widening of the platform of 
the existing bridge and the construction of a train connection. These solutions are presented in 
the studies developed under the OID : 
"The saturation problem in the 25th of April bridge will be partially solved, in the middle range by 
widening the platform of the existing bridge. On the other hand, the flux of passengers can improve 
substantially with a train connection in the lower platform of the bridge. However, as it was 
analyzed in the report of the first phase, not only the problem of the train connection for goods 
exist, as the road traffic will again attain the saturation pretty soon. A new bridge upstream of the 
existing bridge is a development factor for the Peninsula of Setcibal, as well as for the South of the 
country. Naturally, the structuring of the system of transportation of the Peninsula and the AML 
are further related to this issue." (pp. 210, Preparatory Study of the OID, 2nd phase, CEDRU 
Set.87). 
At this point there were no references in the document concerning the agency responsible to 
make the study, or the way it was going to be funded, leaving these categories blanked with an 
ambiguous "to be defined". The OID study goes on stating the dependency of the Southern 
bank from the capital and raises the issue of intra-regional connection deficiencies as affecting 
negatively the economic activities of the Peninsula. 
"The proximity to Lisbon and the inter-relations established explain the dependency of the South 
Bank from the capital. The transportation system of the Peninsula is mostly organized to respond to 
the demands of commuting to Lisbon." 
"In the present situation the (road) network privileged the crossing function of Lisbon to the South 
and the access of the North bank to the West and South beaches. On the other hand, the intra- 
regional connections were necessary to support the negatively affected economic activities of the 
Peninsula." (pp. 29, Study of the OID, 1st phase, MPAT 1990). 
In sum, lack of transportation infrastructure (pp.42), high dependency from Lisbon (pp.44), 
saturation of the existing bridge (pp.44), rupture in the Barreiro terminal, EN10, EN307 
(pp.44), difficulties of access to leisure areas (pp.44), deficient intermunicipal connections 
(pp.44), are some of the key issues identified in the OID study. 
According to the report, the proposals of infrastructures and communications are 
coordinated with other plans. Curiously, the study states 
"These proposals (of infrastructures and communications) are articulated with the National Road 
Plan, leaving unresolved a crucial issue for the region and for what no adequate basis exist: the 
location of the new road and train crossing of the Tagus. Also, the decision concerning the New 
International Aqor t  of Lisbon, which has to be analyzed in an expanded context, and which will 
always affect the Peninsula of Setu'bal due to the strong implications that it will have at this 
development level." (pp.63, Study of the OID, MPAT 1990). 
The key objective stated for the Peninsula of Setw'bal is to seek the balance of functions 
between the North and South banks and the reduction of unemployment to 10%. Furthermore, 
the bottleneck created by the saturation of the bridge is considered to be negative to the 
productive activities of the Great Lisbon. 
"The commuting values are expected to be maintained ... the objective is to reduce unemployment 
to 10% of the active population with the creation of 38,000 new jobs ... the tendency is to 
establish a greater balance of functions in the region." (Great Lisbon) (pp.67, Study of the OID, 
MPAT 1990). 
Identifying conseuuences: 
"The saturation of the 25th of April Bridge creates problems particularly serious to the 
transportation of goods and it blocks the functioning of the sea port and the development of the 
productive activities in the Lisbon expanded market." (pp. 121, Study of the OID, MPAT 1990). 
Several actions related to these issues are proposed as a complement to improve accessibility. 
Improvement of accessibilities: 
- the train connection (duulication of the connection Pinhal Novo - Poceirao. new train line Pinhal 
Novo - Alrnada, train'crossing of the Tagus in the existing bridge) (pp. 128, Study of the OID, 
MPAT 1990). 
- the road infrastructure, the improvement of the road connections to the North and Center of the 
country, namely through the IP1, by widening the platform of the bridge over the Tagus; 
- the development of a ring distributing traffic flux along the waterfront municipalities; (pp. 131, 
Study of the OID, MPAT 1990). 
And it goes on stating: 
"(These measures) reorganize and integrate the economic urban tissue, making it simultaneously 
accessible to the regional (mostly located in the North of the Tagus) and the international markets." 
(pp. 133, Study of the OID, MPAT 1990). 
The need for a new crossing is referred in the PIDDS (a plan developed for the Distrito of 
Sethbal under the Association of Municipalities), in the Electoral Manifesto for the 
municipality of Lisbon of 1989, in the documents developed during the period of reflection of 
the municipalities of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon (initiated when it became known that a 
Land Use Plan was going to be developed for the area), and in the first PROTAML document 
on transportation. Therefore, a new crossing was up front in the mind of the professionals. 
Initial alternatives 
Interviewees were at the beginning mentally framed for the Almada and the Montijo 
pathways. The later was the dominant option. The proposed bridge for Carregado was 
assumed to be the response to the need of a North-South regiondnational connection. 
This frame of mind is obvious in the specialists hired to work in the GATTEL. In the 
interviews they reported the way they saw the problem at the preliminary phase: 
"Initially it was agreed the corridor would be Montijo. It came from before. The other alternative 
was the corridor parallel to the present bridge in Trafaria." (GA'ITEL member) 
"Initially we accepted such due dates because we thought it was peaceful. There were two 
possibilities - Algks and Montijo - and Montijo was peaceful. The fact that we considered the 
situation pacific with two alternatives, led us to accept the imposed due dates. It seemed a 
relatively easy problem we never thought it was going to become so complex. Nobody 
anticipated what came afterwards. Initially there even was a meeting when things are stated as 
follows: the solution is Montijo and therefore it is necessary to find technical data to justify it 
and that did not shocked me, I myself was convinced of that." ( G A m L  member) 
The two generally accepted alternatives among the technicians at the beginning were the 
governmentally chosen option of Montijo and the West pathway. This last one was considered 
the "academic alternative for the sake of comparison" as a technician put it, because there was 
an implicit agreement that Montijo was the solution. The West option was not welcome by the 
municipality of Almada due to difficulties of insertion in the road network and its possible 
negative environmental impacts. It was also seen by several traffic engineers as a duplication of 
the existing bridge and most urban planners considered that it was going to reinforce the 
unbalanced development of the metropolitan area, causing more expansion towards the Atlantic 
littoral. 
THE GATTEL 
The GATTEL was innovative in its set up as well as in its operation, when compared with 
existing public agencies and governmentally mandated study groups. Its Planning Team 
developed a process that also proved to be innovative. First the GATTEL Planning Team 
established the phasing to be submitted to the GA'ITEL Steering Committee. Departing from a 
traditional model of operation, the team made the link between the rational instrumental model 
and a more flexible procedure mode. This shows concern for making compatible two different 
settings and it is described below. This phasing, of the GATTEL project, included the tasks 
and responsibility of the participants, documents to be issued, due dates, and identified two 
decision levels: technical and political (see below phasing of GPT). 
Besides, the GATTEL organized a work methodology to study the location and design of 
the crossings that was inspired in similar studies done elsewhere in Europe, but was adapted to 
comply with the time limitations imposed (see below innovative methodology). 
Phasing of the GATTEL project 
The phasing developed by the GATTEL Planning Team (GPT) was submitted to, and 
approved by, the Steering Committee. The phasing was pretty much followed, step by step, 
during one year. This proposed phasing was organized in a chart, that clearly registered two 
distinct levels: the decision level and the technical level. This drew a sharp line between the 
political and the technical responsibilities (see Figure IV.13). The chart with the phasing was a 
typical form of the rational model, describing the objectives to be accomplished in each phase, 
the tasks to attain them and the products (reports) to be issued. Furthermore, the GPT assumed 
the role of providing technical advice, leaving the decision role to the higher levels of the 
hierarchy - the GATTEL Steering Committee and the Ministry. In fact, this is as much 
interesting as both the way the chart was set up separating the decision from the technical level 
and the procedure followed up by the phasing show the team acceptance of the usual traditional 
procedures of these settings. They were playing by the rules. Technicians working in the GPT 
saw themselves as providers of technical advice, leaving to the political setting the decision 
making function. They saw their role as exclusively technical. They considered the final 
decision to be the responsibility of the G A m L  Steering Committee and the Minister. 
Innovative methodology 
Methodologically, as proposed by the GPT and approved by the GATTEL Steering 
Committee, the idea was to start with an exploratory phase, with identification and 
prioritization of the alternative corridors for the crossing. The GPT was assigned to do the 
prioritization of the corridors, considering the possible effects that a bridge location in each 
could have on the biophysical and environmental contexts, the land use development, and the 
transportation system. Only after this, would the team add technical and economic viability 
factors. The second phase focused in the actual design of the linked structures, inside a selected 
corridor by the government as priority for the location of the new road crossing of the Tagus. 
Finally, a third phase was to contain the development of the building contract. The phasing of 
the GPT was internally presented to the Steering Committee and approved. The first phase was 
tightly followed. 
The idea of the GPT was first to identify and select a corridor, and only afterwards to 
develop the specific bridge crossings inside the selected corridor. The objective of this 
procedure to shorten the overall time needed to carry out the necessary studies for supporting 
the decision on the location. Therefore, the initial phase dealt exclusively with broad issues, 
leaving the aspects related to specific design of accesses, road links and urban integration to a 
later stage. Furthermore, a corridor was considered feasible by the team if it allowed at least 
one possible alternative within it. 
In this first phase, from reports were issued: Document 1 - Identification of the corridors; 
Document 2 - Methodology of the evaluation of the corridors; Document 3 - Profile of the 
study area; Document 4 - Evaluation of the corridors under study. It was not programmed the 
production of any external report in the in the first phase. In the case that it would be 
impossible or undesirable to select only one priority corridor, the idea would be to consider 
two corridors and to carry on the studies on both of them. Another possibility was to exclude 
the corridor considered with less priority and compare the remaining ones, or even to develop 
bridge crossing possibilities inside the two corridors and make comparisons among them. 
Even with all the exchange of ideas that was going on in the metropolitan area, previously 
and during the studies of the GATTEL, the crossing brought up during these processes was 
always Montijo, the historical alternative. It is within this setting, that an unexpected solution 
was developed. During the studies the once innocuous straightforward decision between two 
obvious one choice alternatives was transformed into a controversial decision process, between 
an unexpected additional option and the previously obvious solution. 
It is stated in the legislation that there already existed studies for the location of the new 
bridge and that there was a need for developing further studies essential to the decision on the 
second road crossing in the Lisbon region. It is possible that the government, and the Ministry 
of Public Works in particular, were convinced that all the necessary studies were done, 
specially on alternative locations and environmental impacts. The legislation states that there are 
already studies available particularly about alternative locations and environmental impacts. 
Maybe the Minister thought that what was necessary was to put the existing studies together. 
Furthermore, it is possible that the funds were only provided to accelerate the process of 
preparing the information, given the urgency the issue of the crossing gained. From this point 
of view, the central idea of the Minister could be to structure the information tactically, with the 
aim of legitimizing an already taken position. 
Curiously, when I asked GATTEL individuals about specific previous studies on the 
location and construction of the new bridge, they did not seem to know them. They knew well, 
however, the several studies developed for the region for several other reasons (ITRL, ETRL, 
PIDDS). They were used to build up the characterization of the region and provided the basic 
data, afterwards up dated with the more recent information that was being collected. The last 
study I came across offered technical advice on the Tagus crossings dated from 1982. 
Meanwhile, considerable change occurred in the Lisbon region. It is likely that because of this 
the government thought it would be urgent to rethink the issue. 
The GATTEL Planning Team process 
According to the phasing developed by the GATTEL Planning Team (GPT), the decision 
level is responsible for the approval of standards, for their evaluation, for the approval of 
documents, and for the selection of the corridors to be studied. The Planning Team is 
responsible for the definition of criteria, the methodology of evaluation, the hierarchy of the 
corridors, and the production of documents at a technical level. 
The process coordinated by the GPT was organized around three groups - the data base 
team, the consultants, the Dutch consultant - coordinated by the Planning Team. As soon as 
these group began operating, the working procedures were maintained informal. The GPT 
members worked within their fields of expertise -- urban planning, environment, 
transportation - bringing to the table, on a regular basis, the general debate of the issues under 
consideration. Whenever a hired consultant was working in a subject, and the GPT felt the 
need to clarify information, the expert was also invited to the debate. This also happened, when 
several ways of seeing the same problem arose. Wanting to gain a deeper understanding of 
some specific issue, the GPT frequently invited other professionals of the area of expertise 
under consideration, besides the consultants. It was during these debates that most of the 
information was exposed, digested, transformed and gained meaning. 
These debates began to be "so interesting", as someone put it, that very often the Steering 
Committee members joined in the debates. Besides having involved top professionals with 
deep knowledge on the area, the team was able to keep in mind the target. It was this target that 
operated as the framework of the process. These debates played and important role in the use 
of the technical information, exposing it and enhancing its use through the argumentation 
developed. Reports, comments and data developed by the consultants were brought to the table 
and debated by the group. 
Some GATTEL members felt, for example, that the professionals worlung in land use for 
the PROTAML were not giving them tools and criteria for analyzing the bridge location in the 
metropolitan area. Part of this resulted from the fact that the PROTAML was still in the 
preliminary stage, as some of the interviewees explained. Therefore, until a certain point, the 
GPT developed its own land use criteria, that was to become later adopted by the PROTAML 
team, as reported by the interviewees. 
As a professional interviewed stated "the PROTAML team was specifically directed to land 
use" and therefore it was "the adequate entity to provide a reference in this area". The GATIEL 
Planning Team felt the need for land use guidelines. This "forced them to develop their own 
land use framework", as one of the professionals involved in the studies stated. Therefore, the 
lack of land use tools was considered a gap in the information. This difficulty was later 
overcome during the development of the studies, as a result of coordinated collaboration of 
professionals from both teams. 
The need to collect updated information in a period when the General Census of the 
population was still under way, made them recur to informal networking to fill in the gaps of 
available published data. Professionals working in public agencies, frequently municipalities, 
were contacted by the GPT and asked for the needed data. As an incentive, and a form of good 
will, this exchange was done with the promise of some added valued. For example, the GPT 
promised to return the data structured and processed to the agency of origin. Some of the 
interviewed technicians mentioned this, suggesting that it would have taken ages to do the same 
work indoors, due to the agency shortage of resources (as one municipal technician said). 
With a flux of information established in and out of the GATTEL, informal networking 
went on in a continuous basis. These informal contacts contributed to putting together up dated 
information. They contributed to build trust and to test metropolitan actors opinions on issues 
arising within the process, and for these players to get informed about the work going on at the 
GATTEL. This was a good device to build acquaintance and trust within the agencies of the 
metropolitan area, particularly in the municipalities. It also worked as a way to overcome 
interaction needs in preliminary stages of the process. As a GATTEL member said, "for 
example after a formal meeting during a conversation, a new subject would be brought up to 
test how they felt about it". This allowed for the checking of the general opinion on the subject 
and the issues it involved. 
"To evaluate the corridors, the following municipalities were contacted: Alcochete, Montuo, 
Barreiro, Almada, Lisboa and Loures. This allowed for an additional collection of information and 
provided some reflection to evaluate the corridors. " (GATIEL member) 
"Deeper contacts were developed with Almada and Loures regarding the alternative connections." 
(GAlTEL member) 
"Alcochete and Montijo created the Association for the new bridge." (GAlTEL member) 
Some key players were left out of the process, among these were some ministers and the 
civil society at large. However, some key local politicians and members of the technical 
community of the metropolitan area were involved. Informal networking for the gathering of 
information frequently involved local technicians, allowing for the collection of some inputs 
along the way. In this way the process of the location of a second crossing started being more 
familiar, at least within the professional community. Some public agencies sat in the GAlTEL 
Advisory Board which, however, had a limited expression. Nevertheless, there was no formal 
wide involvement of citizens, except for a public hearing on the Montijo alternative. This 
alternative was strongly opposed at this hearing. 
Informal networking was extremely positive in enhancing the use of the technical 
information. While bringing up new issues, the GPT could gather further understanding on 
them. The professionals exposed to the issues were forced to reflect on them. Frequently, they 
also had to revise information to take a stand on an issue. This happened with the decision 
between options A and B in the Montijo corridor. The boat traffic was an important factor in 
this decision because it determined the height of the bridge. To justify the importance of 
considering the boat traffic, one of the interviewees stated that it was a vital issue because, as it 
was stated in a publication on a bridge in Normandy, it was a source of accidents: 
"Since 1960 that with the boat traffic there is one bridge that falls every year." 
(GATIEL member) 
The same person went on clarifying that the boat traffic in the two channels that the bridge 
had to overcome was a crucial matter for the decision between options A and B in the Montijo 
corridor. 
"Option A in Montijo had to pass over two channels, the North channel and the Barcas - boats 
channel. Option B only had to overcome one. Therefore, option A was more expensive than 
option B. In a meeting that we had with the Ministry of the Sea, we were discussing this 
problem when we found out that the Barcas channel (the one further away from the bank) was 
only used by boats for sand and fuel transportation to the Carregado Power Plant, passing 
afterwards under the Vila Franca de Xira bridge." (GAlTEL member) 
"Therefore, while the North channel needed a 400 meters high clearance, the Barcas channel only 
needed 120 meters, due to the type of boats using it. So, the construction costs could be lower 
than if two bridges of 400 meters were needed, as it was thought initially. This made the choice 
to fall on option A and to abandon the initially considered option B this was." (GATTEL 
member) 
The fact that these boats were able to pass under the Vila Franca de Xira Bridge revealed 
that the hight they were considering to overcome this channel was excessive. In accordance 
with the interviewees, this was the result of a meeting that sat at the same table individuals from 
the GATTEL and from the Lisbon Port Authority to analyze the boat traffic on the Tagus in the 
areas where the two options of Montijo touch the North Bank. This meeting resulted in a 
revision of the preferred alternative, and the work concentrated on the alternative A. 
Expo 98 was a key player in the choice of option A. As soon as the Ministry of Public 
Works, Transportation and Communications announced publicly the choice of alternative B in 
the Montijo corridor, the Expo 98 Commissioner expressed his concern about this choice in the 
newspapers. He was worried by the fact that one of the pillars of the future bridge was going 
to fall in the Olivais dock. As the Expo 98 team designed the project taking the most advantage 
of this piece of the waterfront, the possibility of the bridge falling on top of it caused great 
distress. The GATTEL maintained contacts with the Expo 98, and in its Document 13 stated 
that the alternative A of the Montijo corridor "under the point of view of the exhibition is the 
one that provides the best access"l94. But not everyone agreed on this. According to some 
technicians, the Barreiro and Montijo corridors provide the same access to the Expo 98. One of 
the G A m L  members stated: 
"Though important, the location of the Expo 98 was not known. Initially, the possibility that it 
would be in Canada was still under discussion . This alternative (Barreiro) gives the Expo 98 the 
accessibility that any other corridor would give." (GATTEL member, May 94) 
It is not until September 1991 that the GATTEL study about the three alternatives is 
completed and handed in to the Minister. As soon as these alternatives were made public, a 
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growing debate in the media (television, newspapers, periodicals) and meetings emerged, 
involving a substantial amount of entities and generating considerable controversy. A complex, 
multi-objective, no unique answer problem was at stake. 
Peculiarities of the GATTEL 
The GATTEL provided an interesting institutional setting. Given, financial and 
administrative autonomy by legislation, the group set up an operation similar to a private 
consulting firm. This resulted from the profile of the Steering Committee Chairman, seen by 
several actors as "a man from the private sector". Moreover, the GATTEL structure and mode 
of operation resulted from a document written by this Chairman to the Minister of Public 
Works when he was invited to assume that role. This Document states the main principles to be 
followed. 
Answering my question on why they decided to adopt for this organizational structure, a 
GATTEL member stated: 
"The idea behind it is the conviction that through a bureau directly dependent from the Minister a 
greater dynamic would be brought to this complex process, enhancing the possibility of success." 
When I asked why they considered the collaboration of the several ministries, the answer was: 
"That resulted from the specificity of the work. This work has to do with several ministries and it 
was understood, since the very beginning, that there should be representatives of the ministries. We 
identified the relevant ministries for the work." (GATIEL member) 
and afterwards, describing how the work was done: 
"The Steering Committee had informal meetings at least once a week. These meetings had 
proceedings and a report was sent every two weeks to the Minister, and later on also to the Secretary 
of State195, at the request of the Minister. This besides the direct access we had to the Minister." 
Within the GATTEL, a Planning Team was created for developing the possible alternatives 
of crossings over the estuary. This team, formed by technical consultants hired through 
informal networking, covered areas such as transportation management, environment, urban 
problems. The proposals developed by the GATTEL Planning Team raised a number of issues 
that underwent a long debate. Among them stood the recognition of the limitations of the radial 
transportation model operating for long in Lisbon, and the possible solution of overlaying on it 
a grid model. Very important was also the attention given to the possibilities the future bridge 
opened as a potential tool for restructuring the metropolitan urban space. In association with 
these questions, the location of the future Tagus bridge in Lisbon acquired a new relevancy in 
the debates that proceeded, even after the governmental decision in 1992 of constructing the 
new bridge in the Montijo corridor. 
l95 of the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications. 
Even more interesting was the way of operation of the GATTEL Planning Team. They 
worked with tight deadlines for specific outcomes, under a previously defined phasing 
methodology approved by the Steering Committee. This GATTEL Planning Team was made 
up of four professionals who did consulting work in the region. The team had therefore a deep 
knowledge of the area, but more important, they knew where the needed data was, and had 
large experience in working with this type of studies. Besides, three of them had previously a 
good experience of working together. 
One member describes the team 
"The GATTEL technical group was created by the GATTEL Steering Committee. It had a 
Chairman and aides, and was organized in several components: design, environment, land use, and 
traffic. " (GAlTEL member) 
"X brought with him Y (connected to the land use) and Z (in transportation, who is his aide). Both 
had worked with X in a private firm." (GATTEL member) 
"Some members of the team had worked together before in a private consulting firm - X, Z and 
Y. They were invited by T. W, the responsible for the environment, was invited by the Steering 
Committee member of the environment." (GATTEL member) 
"The permanent GATTEL team is very reduced in size, but it includes people with a wide 
experience and knowledge of the Lisbon Metropolitan Area. They also have a good network of 
contacts, allowing for a good selection of consultants and giving access to a large quantity of 
information. The role of the GATTEL technicians was to coordinate and direct the hired 
consultants. " (GATEL member) 
This arrangements had the advantage of putting together a well knit team, with a wide 
knowledge of the area and able to direct the studies to the crucial aspects. Although some of the 
Documents produced by this group had considerable diffusion, the quite elaborate job carried 
on by them was mostly unknown to common citizens. Part of this results from the belief that 
this type of decisions should be conducted by indoor professionals (who assume the 
compromise of not talking about the work being developed) and committed technicians, and the 
conviction that the results should have restricted access. 
The amount of knowledge that emerged out of this process was only possible because the 
coordinator, together with the whole GPT was able to assemble the information coming from 
the different sources, inter-relating it, and giving it meaning. This would not have been 
possible without the ability to resort to various sources of information, the deep knowledge 
already existing about the area, a good network developed during previous studies, and the 
effectiveness of a newly created network. Two other aspects seem to have played a role: the 
resources made available by the GATTEL structure and the legitimacy of this governmental 
organization which allowed the accessibility to a wider pool of information. 
The coordinator of the <;PT assumed here a crucial role, supported by a highly motivated 
team. They had between their fingers the responsibility of providing the rationale for a crucial 
decision about a major infrastructure that would shape the future of the Metropolitan Area of 
Lisbon. 
THE UNEXPECTED ALTERNATIVE 
The members of the GPT, in reviewing the data and discussing the issues, began to 
conclude the two initially considered alternatives, including the one that everyone agreed on 
initially, were unsatisfactory. In a way, that was a surprise to all, including themselves. They 
came out with a third alternative, which had not being exposed to the outside when the 
GATTEL made public the unexpected solution, it caught everybody by surprise. 
After understanding the rationale of this option and of getting used to the idea, a growing 
number of professionals adopted it, some of them enthusiastically. Even those who insisted in 
sticking to the East corridor, the one that initially gathered a wide consensus, said during the 
interviews that both bridges were needed and the choice was just a question of priority. 
Initially, in accordance with the original problem definition, the search was for a solution 
for the traffic congestion. As the studies developed and the unexpected alternative emerged, the 
discussion was shifted to the desirable future of the metropolitan area. The Southern 
municipalities were forced to revise their options, and mostly they lined up according to their 
geographical location. 
At the time of the decision, the municipalities were developing their master plans. Since the 
other possible connection had always been Montijo, most of them considered only this option 
making it rather difficult to reframe the whole plan without considerable changes. This situation 
was particularly dramatic for the Southern municipalities which would be under extended 
restructuring with the creation of new accessibilities. On the other hand, the West Southern 
municipalities more affected by congestion were eager to improve their accessibility to Lisbon. 
The consequence was that the municipalities to the West - Almada, Seixal , Barreiro -- 
favored the central corridor while those to the East - Montijo, Alcochete - strongly defended 
the Montijo corridor. Moita, bended more or less equally for the two locations. 
It is at this point that several factors, other than accessibilities and infrastructures, came into 
play. The AML ecological importance, the socio economic profile of its municipalities, and the 
relevancy and constraints of the region mobility provided the context of argumentation 
supporting the different alternatives. The unexpected central corridor option, came to be 
considered the most suitable by the GATTEL Planning team as stated in their reports, but it 
was considered in a similar stand as the Eastern corridor in the Conclusions signed by the 
Steering Committee. 
The central corridor connects Lisbon to one of the most populated areas in the South. 
News in the media, and professionals, testified that this option had higher potential for 
capturing the traffic presently overcrowding the existing bridge. Therefore it would more 
efficiently address the congestion issue. According to them this comes from information 
contained in an origin-destination study developed by the GATTEL which was never made 
public. 
Some professionals also considered the central corridor an economic opportunity for two 
depressed areas in the two banks - Chelas and Barreiro. Besides, it also avoided damaging 
the amenities in the periphery of Lisbon and prevented the opening of a new front of 
development, taking advantage of already infrastructured spaces. It became an attractive 
solution for the environmentally concerned individuals. The advantages mentioned were not 
considered goals at the time, but they were seen as strong advantages of this solution. 
"In the meantime there was the decision about the Expo 98. The bridge was decided in the town 
ring, and the Expo 98 in the limits of the town. Instead of restructuring Olivais they were going to 
restructure Chelas. Between Sept. 91 to Jan. 92 Lisbon bended to the PROTAML (proposed central 
corridor)." (transportation planner) 
The whole debate on the location of the new bridge centered around the new option and the 
solution previously thought to be correct. This last one was strongly opposed by environmental 
groups. They argued that an area with high natural value would be irreversibly damaged. This 
option located further East, in the outskirts of Lisbon, connects an urban industrial area in the 
North, with a rural region in the South bringing over it new development pressures. In spite of 
this, the two Southern municipalities of Montijo and Alcochete were eager to house the bridge 
convincd of its importance "to improve the quality of life of their residents". 
Individuals of the technical community interviewed considered that none of the activity and 
participation related to the discussion of the central corridor influenced or even played a role in 
the final decision, clssifying this decision has have been essentially political. One even stated 
that 
"it was never seen in this country such a great detachment between the political decision and the 
technical advice." (municipal technician) 
Suprise with the unexpected alternative 
The unexpected alternative, which became known as the central corridor, came up as a 
surprise and shock for most of the professionals working in the area. It challenged the 
specialists frame of mind. 
One of the municipal technicians said that when he was confronted with the central corridor 
option, he was caught by surprise, and asked for time to think things over. A few days later he 
had reviewed the information in the municipal plan and put together information to make this 
new option feasible. This was actually confirmed by one of the members of the GATTEL 
Planning Team. Surprise is evident in the statement made by the specialists involved when they 
were exposed to this new alternative. 
"No one had seen what was under our eyes ... After that it became evident that this (new 
alternative) was the solution. It is amazing that nobody had seen it. In fact, it is so obvious and 
better relative to the others. It is incomprehensible how it took so long to find out." (municipal 
technician and transportation planner). 
"When the three alternatives were communicated, by a delegation of the GATIEL technicians, the 
Municipal Plan was already under way, and I was surprised. Our big concern was at the level of 
impacts and how it was compatible with the objectives of the municipality." (municipal 
technician) 
One professional even associated the emergence of this new option as generating shock: 
"The internal reaction to the Barreiro (option) generated crisis and debate ... the main issue was the 
scare of a possible massive entrance (of vehicles) in Barreiro and the central area of Lisbon. This 
option meant a massive entrance of cars in an area consolidated by the tertiary." (GATIEL member) 
The new alternative was generated because professionals responsible for studying the new 
crossing were unsatisfied with the initial options - Montijo and Algks - and saw a greater 
opportunity in this new alternative. 
"In terms of transportation Montijo would not solve, congestion. To solve congestion it was 
necessary one (bridge) side by side with the present one. The vital issue was the land use." 
(GATEL member) 
When the choice of the Minister was known to be in the Montijo corridor, one of the 
interviewees stated with grief : 
"The opportunity to connect the North train line to the Southern train line was lost with this 
decision." 
Generation of alternatives 
But what led the GATTEL team to generate the new alternative that had never been publicly 
exposed before? One of the specialists of the area attributed it to the expertise of one of the team 
members on the transportation system of the area and explained in great detail the way the 
unexpected alternative was generated. 
"When the GATTEL was created, its technicians, of whom I am an acquaintance and a friend, 
started to have meetings with the municipalities more (directly) involved in the process. For them 
it was clear that there existed three alternatives, due to a logic of connection of the existing or 
expected infrastructures. This is, we had a circular (CRIL) in the (North of the) AML that ends in 
two points (at the river bank). In any of them it was possible to fit a crossing. For example, if 
there is a highway (in the North) that ends in the river, the (natural) development is a bridge 
connecting it to the South. Therefore, I would have a bridge in Alge's and another in Moscavide. 
This is clear. 
On the other hand the technician responsible for transportation in the Municipal Plan of Lisbon 
understood that there was the possibility of another alternative - the central - because of the 
functioning logic of the town. You have the North-South axis in the East side. The equivalent in 
the West side is in the continuation of the AV. de Chelas and the second circular. Therefore, if the 
first one is connected to the South by the 25th of April Bridge, this one can also be connected to 
the South to an already existing axis on the other side: the speedway of Barreiro. 
The third (alternative) appeared like this." (municipal technician and transportation planner). 
The environmental component was included in the process and considered as a constraint 
factor. Therefore, at the request of the GPT, one of the studies carried out by an external 
consultant produced a map with all the possible environmental constraints in the region of 
Lisbon. Afterwards, a map with the road network in both banks (existing and planned) was 
drawn, giving the spatial dimension of the road traffic within the area. These two maps were 
put together, probably for the first time by an entity looking at the metropolitan area as a whole 
and willing to generate all the possible connections between both banks in a through way. This 
procedure reproduced the two already debated corridors (East and West) and brought up a new 
one - the central corridor connecting to Barreiro. This last one had never been exposed to the 
public. It received two types of antagonist reactions: unconditional acceptance and strong 
opposing reaction. It is the Barreiro corridor, that gradually came to obtain the consensus of a 
wider technical community and generated a lot of controversy. 
Planning specialists usually explain all the outcomes as a contribution of data and 
methodology. When it comes to the generation of alternatives there is not much insight on how 
they got to them. Even when questioning about it, the most common answer is "based on 
information and the methodology we got to the three alternatives" and there is no further 
explanation. However, if we talk to them for a while and ask them about how things were 
started and organized, and they have the opportunity to chat about their daily work, they 
frequently give us clues about how they got to the proposed options. This shows that either the 
specialists have not rationalized the steps to get there, or they think they are so obvious that no 
explanation is needed. It was not until further conversation that one of the GATTEL members 
explained: 
"In the m phase the corridors were identified. This was done by putting the road network and the 
environmental constraints maps together. Therefore the method for evaluation took into account the 
biophysical constrains and the viability of the existing road network. This procedure allowed for the 
identification of the three corridors, though some of them had strong limitations. All this is 
described in Document 2." (GATTEL member) 
The knowledge about the procedures for generation of alternatives still has limited coverage 
in the literature. Usually, the texts mention the phase of alternatives development as just "then 
alternatives are generated", offering little guidance to establish the appropriate methodology for 
it. 
THE NEED TO REFRAME THE PROBLEM 
Changing the views 
The unexpected alternative, which caught everybody by surprise, also dethroned Montijo 
as the first choice for the pathway. It changed the way people looked at the problem. Some of 
the specialists embraced the new solution enthusiastically. Here are some of the statements 
collected during the interviews: 
"With the appearance of this alternative (Barreiro) it became clear that Montijo could not be the 
solution, because it generates urban sprawl without solving the problem of transportation, 
dependent of connecting Almada, Seixal and Barreiro." (urban planner) 
"Montijo does not solve any problem (North-South connection or traffic congestion). It has the 
advantage of being the best link to Spain. Barreiro solves the North South train connection, 
provides better public transportation, solves the urban road connection and has a strong social 
impact because it has the potential to recover the declining Barreiro area." (Environmental NGO 
member) 
"From there (the appearance of the Barreiro option) it became clear that this was the solution. It 
was amazing that none had ever noticed (this crossing possibility). In fact, it is obvious that it is 
so much better than the others that it is not understandable why it took us so long to find it." 
(municipal technician and transportation planner). 
"I arrived at the conclusion that the central corridor was the best for us, through the available 
information. In fact we were able to get to it through the astonishing numbers given: 70% of the 
present traffic of the existing bridge was generated in Almada and Seixal, and it was estimated that 
only 10% was going to be shifted to Montijo. It would facilitate the accessibility of the AML 
(persons and goods) related to the industrial requirement of the Southern bank, and the possibility 
of transporting the goods to the North bank for the harbor or the airport. The difficult in the 
circulation on the existing bridge would also benefit from some improvement. It would assure 
better fluxes of persons and goods within the AML. From an urban point of view, the connection 
to Barreiro, would create an opportunity of recovering a declining urban area, already dense, 
developing a new centrality." (municipal technician) 
However, some of the participants saw otherwise. One of the interviewees pointed out that the 
Barreiro option provided for the most complex insertion in the existing urban and 
transportation infrastructures: 
"The insertion of the central corridor is the one with the highest complexity." (GATTEL member) 
Train crossing increases complexity 
The possibility of a train connection also influenced the positions on the alternatives and the 
way their complexities were viewed. 
"Some want to make the connection in the central corridor since they say the cost is reduced, the 
width is shorter and the construction is technically easier. That would be so if it were only the road 
mode. However it will have to be a train connection as well as, making the costs really high. It 
also has technical complexities in stability because of the characteristics of the river and the larger 
width to support the train connection. There are economic and technical issues too. Here (Montijo) 
the bridge is less complex than in the central corridor." (municipal official in favor of Montijo / 
NGO member) 
The train connection in the 25th of April Bridge was also identified as a factor which influenced 
the criteria: 
"The criteria changed when the trains were approved for the (existing) bridge." (environmental 
consultant) 
Explaining how they organized the process to develop the possible alternatives one of the 
GPT member commented: 
"For the first document we tried to see where the crossings (could) be anchored, taking into account 
the following items: 
(1) train crossing 
(2) the three peninsulas in the South bank 
(3) if the corridor allowed at least for a crossing." (GATI'EL member) 
During a longer conversation, on my insistence on the exact procedure followed a 
transportation specialist explained the specific development of the alternatives: 
"When the GAlTEL was created its specialists that were studying this initiated meetings with the 
municipalities more involved in the crossing problem. For them it was already clear that there was 
the possibility of three alternatives due to a matter of logic of (inter)connection of the existing or 
planned infrastructures. This is, I have here the CRIL (circular) of the AML that ends up in two 
points. In any of them it is possible to fit a crossing. For example, if we have a highway that ends 
up in the river, the (expected) development is a bridge that connects more to the South, therefore I 
would have the bridge in Algks and another Woscavide, these are obvious." (municipal technician 
and transportation planner). 
Another GATTEL member explained the process of generating alternatives stating that the 
"people used to looking at maps characterized the different elements": 
"People used to looking at maps characterized the different elements. We made traffic inquiries, 
analyzed physical viability, costs, projections, etc." (GATTEL member) 
"The corridors were identified considering the biophysical restrictions and the road network. This 
resulted in three alternatives." (GATI'EL member) 
"There were three corridors already analyzed and with at least one viable crossing; this is, channel 
areas and needed connections." (GATTEL consultant). 
Debating the corridors 
The debate gravitated around the three corridors: East (Algis-Trafaria), central (Chelas- 
Barreiro) and the West (Montijo).  Early in the process the first of these options was 
abandoned, centering most of the debate around the other two alternatives. 
The Montijo option was defended because it allowed the creation of a circular system 
around the higher density urban areas in both banks. 
"The East (Montijo) solution is the one that allows the creation of a circular system, as it happens 
in all European capitals crossed by a river. In our case it has been more complicated because of the 
width of the estuary. The idea is to avoid the heavy traffic in town." (GAlTEL member) 
In the view of an interviewee, the other option - Barreiro - required not one but three 
bridges. 
"The Barreiro (pathway) crosses an area of high port activity in the North bank and a boat parking 
area in the South bank (Mar da Palha). This requires not one bridge, but three bridges to overcome 
the first stretch and increased hight because of the parking and traffic of boats close to the banks. 
Moreover, due to its location it had to be a mixed bridge because it allowed train crossing and an 
only train bridge would never be made. Therefore, we ended up opting for Montijo, alternative A. 
The tunnel hypothesis was put aside because it was very expensive." (GATTEL member) 
Another point in question was related to the bridge anchoring in areas of high concentration of 
occupation. 
"Montijo is a mixed corridor: urban and regional. Barreiro is an urban corridor with the train, and 
not regional. It presents problems because it anchors in areas of excessive concentration and also 
with problems in the Northern bank." (municipal technician). 
The West option lost support from the professionals. However some expressed their 
preference for it: 
"M was between the central and the West corridor, considering that this last one was the least 
problematic." (GATTEL member) 
Document 6 of the GATTEL refers to the consequences of the West corridor in environmental 
terms, 
"It has effects over areas of high ecological value, namely with legal protection status, and over 
environmental quality factors, particularly noise." (pp.5, GATTEL, Document 6 )  
And in transportation terms: 
. . 
or m l d s  the L- cro- without gaining in quality, because it extends the 
pathway of the most significative demand area." (pp.8, GATTEL, Document 6 )  
Furthermore, 
"it is the corridor that enhances more development of the littoral, accentuating the existing socio- 
economic asymmetry in the AML, and reproducing the present spatial structuring." (pp.4, 
GATTEL, Document 6 )  
The West option, had the preference of the Lisbon Port Authority due to a planned 
expansion of its activity to this area (Trafaria). This alternative was soon abandoned, with the 
debate focusing mostly in the two other possibilities (East and Central). In fact, the GATI'EL, 
in its final recommendations, suggests to leave the West corridor to the third priority (pp. 19, 
GATTEL, Document 6). 
Table IV.5 - The most used arguments on each option 
- technical and therefore financial 
ntral corridor) 
- solves the AML bottleneck - more pollution when moving 
contaminated soils in the river 
- lower environmental impacts 
- potential to be a rehabilitation - higher noise pollution 
- higher boat collision risk 
SACA V ~ M  - MONTZJO 
- balances the AML 
- advantages for the economy 
- responds to national and 
interregional functions 
- easier road network insertion 
- lower cost 
- does not solve the 25th of April 
Bridge congestion 
- has negative effects on the 
environment 
- generates urban development in 
the remaining rural areas of the 
AML 
Learning with the unexpected alternative 
The stir around the unexpected alternative raised some doubts about the purpose to create 
an inter-ministerial team like that of the GATTEL. In fact, it is not clear if the creation of an 
inter-ministerial team was an effort to enhance collaboration among expertise areas considered 
crucial for the decision or just a political legitimation of the studies and decisions. Most of the 
professionals interviewed considered that the involvement of the various ministries was just a 
way to achieve greater and wider political legitimacy, but not a sound will of effective 
collaboration. Some of them even considered that it was "cosmetics" for the EECtEU. 
The unexpected alternative quickly caught sympathizers within environmentalists and urban 
planners. The environmentalists, very concerned with the consequences of the bridge in the 
Montijo corridor due to the high natural value of the nearby area, saw this alternative as a better 
opportunity. The group of urban planners that were concerned with the connection of an urban 
area to a rural area, and the problems associated with opening a new development front, saw 
this possibility of linking two urban areas as the solution. They saw this as an opportunity to 
avoid the error of three decades ago when Lisbon was connected to Almada by the 25th of 
April Bridge. 
The attention of professionals concerned with the location of the bridge, shifted from 
congestion to the structuring of the metropolitan area, forcing the confrontation of two models 
of development: one that had lasted for long defending new poles of development for 
decentralization of the capital, and the new one calling for the "resewing of the urban tissue", 
directing growth to the already infrastructured open urban spaces and unwilling to create new 
fronts of development. Planners defending this option were against the opening of new fronts 
of development. They argued that demands for land development were slowing down due to 
declining demographic trends. They were also convinced that there was plenty of open land 
within the already developed land available to be used, and that municipalities could save 
expenses in infrastructure development over time. 
Some professionals defended solutions following the logic of the poles of development, so 
popular in the 60's, while others were against that. In fact, according to one of the 
interviewees, this type of intervention "depends on the strong will and the enormous 
investment capacity of the public administration" stating afterwards that nowadays in Portugal 
we do not have neither one nor the other. 
Some urban planners went even further saying that the Montijo corridor is associated with 
the old model of development, defending that self-sufficient new poles of development were 
necessary to decentralize the town. However, some in this group considered that Lisbon has 
changed since the last census and the issues were different. Another concern that was 
expressed regards to the lack of governmental commitment and resources needed for creating 
new poles of development. Most of them still had the image of what happened with the 
construction of the existing bridge. They feared that connecting an urban area (Lisbon) to a 
rural peripheral municipality (Montijo) would encourage uncontrolled development in the 
South. 
Today Lisbon is no more the tiny capital of the end of the century, the Southern 
municipalities had gone through substantial growth encouraged by the conquered accessibility 
of the 25th of April Bridge. Technology has progressed considerably allowing for increased 
number of alternatives. A wide transportation network is already operating serving the 
residents of the whole metropolitan area. Environmental concerns added one additional factor 
to an already very complex issue. 
The problem of the North-South train connection, train passengers have still to go through 
the inconvenience of the best crossing linking the train lines in both banks of the river. So far, 
a specifically created bureau (GNFL) is responsible for assuring the train crossing in the 25th 
of April Bridge and, in the long range to propose a second train connection across the Tagus in 
the Lisbon Region. A good many metropolitan actors opposed the train crossing in the existing 
bridge, suggesting as more adequate a metro or tramway crossing. Several professionals 
working in the area also think that the train connection between the North and South lines 
should be constructed elsewhere. 
Questioning the decision 
For more than three years, solutions for the best location of the bridge, have been debated 
without obvious alignments within political parties, municipalities, professionals, or even the 
government. For the first time in Portugal a decision of the Ministry of Public Works was 
publicly challenged by other ministries (Ministry of Planning and Ministry of the 
Environment). Also for the first time, a complaint was filed by an environmental association to 
the Portuguese administrative courts. 
During the year of 1992, the debate in the media (radio, television, newspapers, journals) 
intensified. A few documents had not been publicly exposed before (e.g. comments of 
Ministry of Planning and Higher Council of of Public Works and Transportation and 
Communications196). Disagreement arose inside the government itself, the controversy 
increased, and with it the variety of interpretations of the available information. 
Most of the interviewees said that "it was a political decision", implying that factors other 
than the technical advice had far more weight. A transportation planner states that "never was 
the gap between a technical study and a political decision so wide". Once more surfaced the 
usual complaint of the technicians that the processed information was not used for the final 
decision came out. 
196 CSOET - Conselho Superior de Obras Pu'blicas e Transportes, High Council for Public Works and 
Transports. 
There was a generalized opinion among professionals, and even the public in general, that 
the decision was not based on technical advice. Some explained this by the lack of legally 
defined criteria that policy makers had to follow to make and justify decisions. 
There are no criteria reauired bv law 
"The way to get to the decision is not clear. There is a great degree of arbitrariness and lack of 
responsibility. The decision maker decides and does not have to provide full justifation. The 
Portuguese law does not force the establishment of criteria." (GATTEL consultant) 
Another one confirmed that he could not find anywhere justification for the decision made by 
the government. 
Justification of the government choice for Montiio cannot be found 
"I could not find anywhere the justification for the choice of Montijo." (Environmental NGO 
member) 
Still another saw it as a conflict opposing the political and the technical arenas, and stated: 
The minister won the war 
"The Minister of Public Works had won the war by February-March 1992, according with the 
information circulating inside the government." (PROTAML team member) 
The following statement reinforces the idea, shared by several professionals, of the 
powerfulness of the Ministry of Public Works, and therefore of his autonomy to make the 
decision autocratically. They see this as having negative effects on planning efforts. 
"Since it (Public Works) is an area that already has millions at hand, (the ministry) applies an 
immediatist and practical approach ... that smashes any attempt of planning. It is necessary to give 
structure to the decisions." (PROTAML team member) , 
Some municipalities felt that they were not involved in the decision. One municipal official 
attributed the decision to the GATTEL entity and the government. He stated: 
Government and GATTEL decided all 
"They have decided all. The decision was conducted uniquely and exclusively by the government. 
Not even by the National Assembly. Only now with the first phase of construction ready and in 
accordance with the law the EIA, is the subject presented for public consultation. Any citizen can 
provide an opinion for 60 days. The non technical summary is already available." (municipal 
official in favor of Montijo / NGO member) 
Most professionals saw this process as biased and were convinced that the decision was 
already made beforehand. 
Biased process 
"The representative of planning was a member of the staff of the Ministry of Public Works and the 
representative of the environment was an aide of the Ministry of Public Works. The two ministries 
(planning and environment) that could raise objections were under the tutelage of the Ministry of 
Public Works." (municipal technician and transportation planner) 
The decision was already taken 
"This emerged as decision not as a process." (Environmental NGO member) 
"The bridge was previously decided." (GATTEL consultant) 
Other interviewees were convinced that although the issue is very interesting, there is nothing 
to be found out because the decision was 
Political in the bad sense 
"(The decision was) political in the bad sense, without any justification whatsoever. It was 
something like: that is how it should be, and that is how it is going to be. The guess is that the 
Minister of Public Works convinced the Prime Minister, and although the Minister of Planning 
and the Minister of the Environment initially claimed to be against it they were politically 
pressured to keep quiet." (Specialist of transportation) 
"It seems a bet of a wicked witch: I want (the bridge) to be there." 
(Environmental NGO member) 
The situation generated mistrust and the conviction that the location of the new bridge was 
decided before, or by unknown ways. There was a generalized conviction that the decisions 
were done on the backstage. 
Backstarre decision 
"The mistakes of the environmental organizations were: good faith in the informed argumentation, 
lack of un&rstanding of the concerns of the common citizens. Most of the decisions are made in 
the backstage without diffusion." (environmental NGO member) 
External factor 
"We have to accept that there is a strange factor that shows up in the process of finding out the 
reasons for the choice ... you do this, this is what we want. Long before the government decision, 
the Ministry of Public Works had a hand in the process. There is something coming from outside. 
I talked with a member of the parliament that told me that these things are not decided in Lisbon 
but in Brussels." (environmental NGO member) 
"The ministries of Planning and Environment never wanted this solution .... the Minister of the 
Environment is not (a person) to have ideas, the Prime Minister also ... therefore this idea came 
fro~n outside, at the request of someone." (environmental NGO member) 
Focusing in the solution 
"We had nothing to stand on for our criticism. We had to find a pathway within the realities." 
(environmental NGO member) 
Others considered that the real motive for the decision was property speculation: 
"Real reason behind the decision: to benefit the developers speculation. It does not solve the 
problems of connection by train to the Southern bank, the interregional connection North-South, 
etc." (environmental NGO member) 
Others, still, mentioning the results of a meeting said: 
Technical information does not influence politicians 
"I got more precise information on the location. Information does not have great influence on the 
decisions of the politicians. It only changes their mind if they recognize an error. They only make 
the meetings to convince us (technicians), and usually the municipality does not have influence in 
the decision. " (Municipal Technician) 
There is a generalized idea among professionals that technical advice is often ignored, and 
that most decisions are made exclusively on political grounds. They attribut the decision on the 
new bridge location to the power of the decision makers, to the influence of external pressures, 
to the inexistence of a requirement that decision makers justify their choices. 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSOCIATIONS INVOLVEMENT 
Based on the existing studies, including those produced by the GATTEL, the 
environmentalists considered that the Western corridor would increase the pressure over the 
Arriba F6ssil da Costa da Caparica, a protected area. This option allows for the expansion of 
the Lisbon Sea Port in this area, a wish expressed by the APL and an additional pressure over 
the protected area. Noise was also indicated by environmentalists as a future impact in case this 
option is implemented. 
If the option was in the central corridor, construction could cause the resuspension of 
heavy metals produced by the Barreiro and Seixal industries and now deposited in the river 
bed. Additional consequences in noise and air quality were also identified as possible impacts 
of this choice. 
Finally, the Eastern corridor is by far the one considered by ecologists to have the worst 
effect on the environment. This is confirmed by the studies of the GATTEL. 
"The East corridor, in any of its alternatives, is the one presenting greater environmental risks in 
particular in the Alcochete channel and in the area of the small river-island, mainly in the 
construction phase effects over the Tagus estuary over areas of high ecological value will also be 
expected." (GATTEL Document 4, pp.3.30) 
As one of the environmentalists notes: 
"The eastern corridor is the least desirable solution, due to its proximity of the estuarine area and 
the fact that it connects to an area of special protection, created because of its considerable value to 
birds." 
Ecological importance of the Tagus estuary 
Next to the Natural Reserve of the Tagus Estuary and crossing the Special Protection Area 
(SPA), the Montijo solution is perceived as having substantial direct environmental impacts 
(associated to the construction) and indirect environmental impacts (because it is believed to 
induce further development in an environmentally sensitive area) The Tagus estuary is 
considered by national and European specialists as an area of high ecological quality. 
Besides the Natural Reserve of the Tagus Estuary (RNET), classified under national 
legislation and the Special Protection Area (SPA)1g7 EU directive, the area deserved other 
environmental qualifications. However, most of the argumentation that became public focuses 
mostly in these two classifications: the RNET and the SPA. Actually in practical terms the 
SPA, with about 40,000 ha, includes totally the RNET within its limits. 
The Natural Reserve of the Tagus Estuary 
Created in 1976, the Natural Reserve of the Tagus Estuary (RNET) was one of the first 
five protected areas created in Portugal. This area is managed by the National Conservation 
Institute (ICN)lg8 through a local delegation. 
1 9 7 ~ ~  Directive 791409. 
198 ICN - Instituto de Conserva~tio da Natureza - National Conservation Institute. 
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The Tagus Special Protection Area 
In 1979, under he Bern convention, the EECIEU issued the Directive 791409 for the 
protection of wild birds and their habitats. In 1986, when Portugal became a member of the 
EECIEU it had to comply with this Directive. In 1988, at EU request, the ICN listed twenty 
areas of Special Protection Area (SPA) under this directive. In the meantime, in 1991, the 
Portuguese legislation stated that a SPA was required to be approved in the national legislation 
by a Decree Law199. This led an environmental leader to state that 
"An EU Directive has more legal strength because it is a law at the European level; and, in this 
case, it is stronger than the (national) Decree Law that creates the Natural Reserve of the Tagus. 
Therefore, the delimitation made by a governmental service for the SPA of the Tagus estuary is 
much more important than the boarders of the Natural Reserve."200 
Among the areas listed, figures the Tagus SPA which was only recently recognized by national 
legislation - DL 280194. 
In the national legislation, the DL 280194 established the Tagus SPA, but failed to 
recognize the previously established boarders. The Environmental NGOs that were following 
the process tightly noticed the differences and complained to the EU. This was afterwards 
corrected in the legislation and the Minister of the Environment notified the EU Commissioner 
for the Environment suggesting to leave some room for further discussion of the boundaries. 
In the answer, the Commissioner reminded that only in exceptional situations would such an 
adjustment be accepted. 
The Ramsar convention - wetlands directive 
The Ramsar convention intended to prevent the destruction of wetlands. When the 
Portuguese government signed the Ramsar convention201, one of the wetlands listed of 
international importance was the RNET202. AS stated by an environmental public manager, this 
assumes particular importance since the Ramsar convention is signed among states (by the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs) as any agreement between nations. Therefore, it has a higher 
status than most signed environmental conventions which only require the presence of 
governmental environmental agencies representatives. What is important to retain from this is 
that, besides being recognized in national terms as a Natural Reserve, the RNET is classified 
under the Rarnsar convention as a wetland of international importance. 
It is the threat of construction of the bridge on the East corridor that triggered the 
mobilization of the Environmental NGOs. Aware of the potential impacts on the environment, 
they collected information, conducted studies and exchanged ideas with whomever could 
influence the process. 
199 Liberne, Jan/Fev 92, n037, "A nova ponte sobre o Tejo", pp. 6. 
2oo idem. 
201 Signed by the Portuguese government in September 22, 1980 and issued in Decree 101180, Oct. 9. 
202 The other is the Natural Reserve of Ria Formosa, now a Natural Park. 
Particularly sensible to the environmental effects of the Eastern corridor, the ecologists 
assumed a key role, due to the numerous actions they moved to inform and alert the citizens to 
the negative impacts of this solution. This made one of them state "the public image of the 
bridge ended up associated with the environmentalists because the resistance to the 
construction in the East corridor was led by us (environmentalists); we were the main 
opponents". The same ecologist stated that "the environmental aspect assumed excessive 
importance in the game" making people connect the issue mostly to "the birds of the Tagus", 
forgetting other important socio-economic and social aspects. 
The LPN: the first Environmental NGO in the process 
At this time, the League for Nature Protection (LPN)203 saw itself as a "meeting space" for 
"non decision makers", as one of its leaders stated in the interview. He explained that 
"the LPN intends to be a meeting space for specialists and be part of the decision processes, 
although we are non decision makers ... The LPN operates as a space of communication. Not as a 
space of decision. Therefore it was not a structure that conducted the processes, but, obviously, 
there were persons who tried that certain decisions be taken". 
The explanation goes on: "rarely have our members been decision makers in these processes 
and when that happened it was not in the context of the LPN", meaning that it was on their 
own and not as LPN members or representatives. 
In the case of the new bridge, as soon as the first studies began being developed, "persons 
in the central administration (working in the GATTEL, or in the administration with 
connections with the GATTEL) made us aware of what was being studied" confirmed one of 
the LPN members. He classified the future bridge as "a structure with great impact in the land 
use that was going to affect the development of the region". 
Invited by the GATTEL to do a "study characterizing the region", the LPN accepted the 
task, convinced that it was going to be a technically sound project with the environmental 
component integrated since the very beginning. 
The explanation advanced by the LPN for being selected to do the study was: 
"probably it was recognized that the LPN was able to organize that information, or better since the 
GATTEL wanted to assemble the information quickly" and that would be difficult if "they had to 
follow the usual time consuming institutional processes. Plus, there was a specific interest in 
involving the environmental associations in the process. These are the objectives not explicitly 
considered, but for me they are obvious." (LPN member) 
Disagreement over the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Referring to the LPN study, one of its members recalled: 
"What was initially suggested was that the LPN develop an Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA), or a pre-study for an EIA." 
203 LPN - Liga para a P r o t e c ~ o  da Natureza, League for Nature Protection. 
One of the LPN leaders considered this possibility as rather tricky, preferring that the study be 
not an EIA. Feeling strongly about this, he stated 
"I had to be very f i  to write in the document that it was not an EIA." 
He also added: 
"If it were today I would probably have fighted for not doing the study at all. I think it took 
authority from the LPN." 
"It was necessary to fight to avoid the final result to say just what the client wanted to be said; we 
suffered pressures from all sides, even from inside the team that produced the report." 
The study developed by the LPN during the beginning of 1991 intended "to provide a 
reference for an EIA", stated the coordinator of the LPN team. Something like an 
environmental characterization, "leaving out the land use aspects." As one of the members of 
the LPN team that prepared the report described, 
"the information available for the Tagus estuary was organized, natural resources identified and an 
initial analysis of potential impacts was developed." 
A preliminary version of this report, developed by the LPN and handed in by May 1991, is 
followed up by a discussion with the team that produced it, at the request of the GPT. As 
stated by one of the LPN team members interviewed 
"It was not a formal presentation but a general discussion about the location preferred by the 
technicians. " 
The LPN team was strongly in favor of not giving an opinion of the preferred site location, but 
to provide the G A m L  with information of the negative and positive effects of each one of the 
possible locations. 
During this process some of the LPN members were called by the GATTEL Steering 
Committee members to "discuss the final position of the association." After handing in the final 
version of the report in August 199 1, by the beginning of SeptemberIOctober, the members of 
the LPN executive board understood that "the process was escaping from our hands", as one 
of the interviewed LPN member stated. He added: 
"I never had great illusions on the LPN participation. I always believed that it was going to be a 
mascarade, but after a certain point it became completely obvious to everybody that it was going to 
be just that. We were told by inside sources that the decision of the Minister of Public Works 
would be contrary to the suggestion of the LPN. Immediately after, there was a public 
announcement of the decision for the Montijo corridor. It is at this point, that the other 
associations became involved, due to their concern with the direction the events were taking and 
alerted by the LPN which was aware that the process was escaping from their hands." 
"At this point, the publicly available information was scarce", said one of the leaders of a 
NGO, "Document 6 of the GA'ITEL, was the only one available and everything else, even 
when available for consultation, was very restricted" (e.g., xeroxing the documents was not 
allowed) or obtained with great difficulty by the back door." Even in this case great part of the 
information was only got after the decision. When the final decision began leaning to the 
Eastern corridor, the environmental groups got considerably concerned due to the potential 
threat it represented to the important natural values of this area, and they developed efforts to 
change it. They are convinced that, under the environmental point of view, it was the most 
undesirable solution of all the three alternatives considered. 
The Environmental NGOs and the media 
One of the major efforts developed by the environmental associations was the development 
of contacts with the media: "all the journalists and Portuguese opinion makers interested in the 
environment and several editors", as stated by a leader of one of the Portuguese environmental 
associations. These contacts were occasionally extended to some foreign media. 
During the end of 1991 and the first half of 1992, the media became particularly productive 
in issuing opinion articles about the location of the new bridge. .Part of this is already a 
consequence of joint actions carried out by the environmental associations. They resorted to 
press conferences and contacts with journalists to make public their positions and concerns. 
Environmental NGOs appeal to the courts 
Strong disagreement with the way the government carried out the process led the 
environmental associations to appeal to the courts, seeking enforcement of the law. These 
actions included complaints, judicial action, and development of contacts aiming to explain 
their views. Initially, these legal actions recurred to the National Court System, but soon 
turned to European instances, when they realized that their efforts to be heard were failing. 
The first of these actions occurred at the end of 1992. The LPN submitted a request to the 
Supreme Administrative Court (STA)204 to cancel the governmental decision to construct the 
new bridge in Montijo on the basis of non compliance with the Portuguese and European Law 
on Environmental Impact Assessment and Nature Conservation (409/79/EEC) and the Ramsar 
and Bern Conventions. This was the first complaint ever made by an association to the 
Portuguese Supreme Administrative Court - STA (Lisbon). The STA made public the decision 
on this law suit in March 17,1995, one week before the contract was signed with the 
consortium that was going to build the bridge. The complaint was dismissed over the meaning 
of "significant impacts." Unhappy with the result the LPN, with the support of the other 
environmental associations (GEOTA, Quercus, IDD), appealed to a higher entity in the 
Portuguese Court system: the Plenary of the Supreme Administrative Court205. By October 
1995 this entity had not ruled on the case yet. 
Two years passed before another judicial action was carried out. This time it was the turn 
of another environmental association - GEOTA - to seek court action. At the end of 1994, 
204 STA - Supremo Tribunal Administrative, Supreme Administrative Court. 
205 PlenArio do Supremo Tribunal Adminitrativo, Plenary of the Supreme Administrative Court. 
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GEOTA placed two complaints in the Portuguese Courts: one for unfulfillment of the public 
consultation rules, and the other for lack of approval of the EIA. This environmental 
association was making a stand for two rights: one was the right of accessibility to 
information, and the other was over of the right phase to conduct the public hearing. 
European law requires the diffusion of information to the interested public, but the 
ambiguity of our legislation leaves considerable room for interpretation. According to EU 
legislation206 there is a requirement for the diffusion of information to the interested public and 
a demand that the opinions collected be afterwards integrated in the decision. The interested 
public is defined in the legislation2o7 as the citizens and representative organizations of the 
"target region" for the endeavors considered and the "districts where it is located or that could 
be impacted." The legislation is ambiguous about the procedures of dissemination of the public 
consultation, about the supplying of documents to the interested entities, and on how to handle 
the responses or opinions. The public audits are considered optional, and the law does not 
define who has the competence to decide on its accomplishment. The duration is of 40 to 60 
working days in the Decree Law (DL) and of 20 to 30 days in the Regulamentary Decree (DR). 
According to the DL all the studies are public, and according to the DR the consultation is 
"developed due to a diffusion of a non technical summary." The Evaluation Commission is 
supposed to prepare a report about the consultation in a period of 5 days after the end of the 
public consultation (Joanaz de Me10 et al, 94). The entrance of the country to the EU brought 
with it the requirement of Public Participation. Therefore, the Directive 851337lEEC was 
transferred to the national Decree Law 186190 and specified in the Regulamentary Decree 
3 8/40. 
The public involvement in public decisions is a new development in Portugal. Required by 
EU Law since its entrance to the European Community, forced by the growing environmental 
awareness and by a more participative civil society, public participation has muddled through 
the Portuguese public decision processes. 
The second issue had to do with a debate about the phase when the public hearing should 
be conducted. According to Document 13 of the GATTEL, the second of the five phases to be 
carried out involves Public Consultation: 
"Public consultation is expected to be developed during this phase on the selected option and in 
accordance with Community Directives and national legislation." ( ~ p . 6 ) ~ ~ ~  
It is obvious from what is stated that public consultation is to be conducted specifically on the 
"selected option", mentioning that it will be "in accordance with Community Directives and 
206 Directive 851337lCEE article 6. 
207 DL 186190 article 4; DR 38190 article 4. 
208 Nova uavessia rodovi6ria sobre o Tejo na regigo de Lisboa, Works Developed - Synthesis, GATTEL, 
Dcournent 13, June 93). 
national legislation." This, because the objective of the first phase is the development of studies 
to identify possible corridors and to select the location of the new crossing, as stated on 
document 13 of the GATTEL: 
"The elaboration of necessary studies to the identification of possible corridors and selection of the 
location of the new crossing." (pp.6) 
In sum, public consultation was considered, according to,the GATTEL Document 13, only 
for the alternative chosen internally in the first phase. This is the one of the most controversial 
issues that oppose the environmental associations and the GATTEL. 
The environmental associations state that, in accordance with the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) legislation, the public consultation should have been carried out during the 
period of decision on the alternatives, while the government interpreted the legislation in a 
different way, considering that it should be conducted once one alternative was chosen. 
Therefore, it is important to describe here what are the national requirements established for 
Public Consultation and what is the usual procedure. 
After appealing to the hierarchy without success, namely to the Minister of the 
Environment, GEOTA submitted two judicial actions, in October and in November of 1994, 
respectively to the Administrative Court of Lisbon and to the Supreme Administrative Court. 
The former, on a disagreement about the procedure used in the Public Consultation of the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and the latter to cancel the dispatch of the Ministry of 
the Environment and the Ministry of Public Works, which approved the EIA. By the end of 
1994, beginning of 1995, the suspension of the dispatch requested by GEOTA was denied. 
At the end of 1992, another complaint was filed to the Courts connected to the bridge 
issue. This time the disagreement was over the transfer of the Special Protection Area (SPA) 
classification to Portuguese legislation and the setting up of the limits of a SPA for the Tagus 
estuary. This SPA includes the Natural Reserve of the Tagus estuary and an additional 
expanded area. Proposed by the Portuguese government to the EU in 1988, its integration in 
the national legislation was expected to be done up to 1990, but this did not happen. 
It is not until 1994 that the SPA becomes part of the Portuguese law. This happened only 
after efforts of two of the Portuguese environmental associations (LPN and GEOTA) alerted 
the EU to the failure from the part of the Portuguese government in accomplishing what was 
already agreed. Enacted in legislation in 19942", the SPA appeared with different borders than 
those previously proposed. This generated a new exchange of letters between the Portuguese 
government and the EU that ended up with the Ministry of the Environment promising to 
restore the borders, but keeping open the possibility to rediscuss the issue. In 1995 the original 
209 Decree Law 280194, Nov 5. 
accepted limits of the SPA are finally correctly established in the Portuguese law. The 
Commissioner for the Environment congratulated the Minister of the Environment for the 
correction of the SPA limits in the Portuguese legislation, and reminded that changes in the 
limits are only allowed in exceptional cases. 
During 1992-94210 GEOTA was the most visible NGO connected with the bridge issue. 
Most of its work was developed in analyzing documents and in generating public intervention, 
exposing the issue. They analyzed information and produced with it several written documents 
(flyers, publications, opinion articles). Members of GEOTA wrote several articles on the 
bridge and developed contacts with journalists. The LPN, which initiated key environmental 
actions, was, for a while, struggling with internal difficulties and had to slow down. An 
environmental association recently created got also involved in these actions - the Institute D. 
Dinis (IDD). 
It is also during this period (1992-1994) that four Environmental NGOs (GEOTA, IDD, 
LPN, Quercus) published the Historical Environmental Errors, the new Bridge over the Tagus 
in Lisbon211, prepared jointly and submitted to public exposure in May 1994. This was a joint 
endeavor of these associations, signed with two other associations -Amigos da Terra and 
Idea. This publication compiles a variety of information, mostly in the areas of land use and the 
environment, discussing the three possible location of the new crossing over the Tagus river 
and recommending the environmental groups preference for an exclusively train connection in 
the central corridor. This represents a key event in the process of joint work involving these 
associations. 
This publication was distributed to the media, the National Assembly and to the public in 
genera1212. A delegation of the NGOs asked to be received by the Minister of Public Works, to 
offer him this publication and express their position. The Minister refused to receive them and 
they presented a complaint to the Provedor deJusti~a (interview June 94). 
In November of 1994 the GEOTA and the LPN reinforced their joint work after the two 
leaders had a trip to Brussels, in representation of the four NGOs (GEOTA, LPN, Quercus, 
IDD). It is after this date that the LPN develops a sound work with the European Commission 
related to the issue of the bridge, persistently informing about the events going on and alerting 
to the environmental conflicts created. A drastic change of strategy is revealed by this new way 
of handling the issues. Instead of trying to address all the issues that were emerging, the LPN 
decision board decided to focus in a few key environmental issues and stick to them 
persistently, avoiding to abandon them due to the numerous solicitations emerging. 
- - 
210 from beginning of 1992 to October 1994. 
21 Dossier l, Erros Histdricos do Ambiente, A Nova Ponte sobre o Tejo em Lisboa. 
212 Distribution to the Public on May 31st, 94. 
In NovemberIDecember 1994 two formal complaints are filed again to the EU. One was 
signed by GEOTA in the 29th of November, accusing the Portuguese government of not 
complying to the Directive 791409EEC on the conservation of wild birds and the 92143EEC 
on the conservation of wild habitats. This complaint also mentions the insufficiency of the EIS, 
particularly in the assessment of the environmental impacts of the induced urban development 
which was considered an unacceptable consequence of the bridge, on the edge of the SPA and 
without prior evaluation of the consequences. The other formal complaint was signed in the 
2nd of December by LPN, Quercus and IDD, complaining that the SPA allows uses 
inappropriate to its protection status, and that the Portuguese government is allowing the 
construction of a new town without EIS, disregarding the law. . 
It was the first time that the Portuguese government was challenged by an environmental 
NGO in the Supreme Administrative Court. The resolution of the courts was mostly 
unfavorable to the environmental associations. This situation led them to look for higher 
ranked entities in an effort to have their views taken into consideration. Therefore, in July 1995 
the four environmental associations requested to the European Court, in Luxembourg, the 
cancellation of the funding of the project that was provided by the European Commission. 
The letter of the law is quite dubious about the matter at hand. The NGOs invoked the 
principle of the law as interpretation guide, while the government invoked the public interest 
and the urgency of the matter to have it carried out. So far, the courts have favored the position 
of the government. 
This opposition process led by the associations is still going on. Though the building 
contract was signed for the construction of the Montijo option in the view of the associations 
several gains came out of the process: 
(1) "the compensation measures were a direct consequence of the complaint submitted, 
because they were imposed by the EU. It is a pitty that this did not happen without the 
complaint. "; 
(2) "greater respect by the government for the environmental associations and for the 
patrimonial aspects", having now in some cases tried to solve informally some 
perceived possible conflicts; 
(3) "a learning process of how the EU works" and "how to reach the right people." 
Public mobilization by environmental NGOs 
In 1994 the mobilization of the Southern residents for "h0nking"~13 actions, during one 
hour two days in a row, before the signing of the building contract for the new bridge, had two 
213 This action consisted in each vehicle keep pressing the horn while crossing the toll booths. 
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different interpretations. The media considered it a failure, while environmentalists considered 
that it had enough expression, though less than the previous one. In their views it was 
"sufficient to demonstrate that if there is a new increase of the tolls there will be a reaction", 
but "insufficient to mobilize to other modes of action", as stated by an environmental leader. 
The fact is that the context built along the process of this case prepared the grounds for the 
position assumed by the commuters using the existing bridge when they revolted against the 
increase of the bridge toll. One of the environmentalists noted that "after the blockage the 
journalists who showed up during the following events did not have knowledge of the dossiers 
- information." After some informal talk, he said he had found out that "internally, coverage 
of the bridge events was given to the ones not familiar with the issue", avoiding to involve 
those that were already knowledgeable about it. 
In August 30, in a program of a national radio214, one of the environmental leaders was 
warned that he could not ask questions to the Ministry of the Public Works, also present in the 
same program. In fact, the Minister only accepted to show in the program under the condition 
that he could be questioned only by the journalists and not by the environmental associations. 
This was interpreted by the ecologists as an additional sign of the refusal to dialogue. 
Development of contacts with the Portuguese State hierarchy and the EU 
Part of the actions taken by the environmental NGOs was the development of contacts, 
nationally or internationally, to alert to the problems emerging out of the option of constructing 
the new bridge in the corridor next to an area of Special Protection, important at the European 
level, and identified to have greater impact in the environment. 
Contacts with the Portuguese State hierarchv 
Nationally, the environmental associations developed contacts with three high individuals 
in the Portuguese State hierarchy: the President of Portugal, the Procurador Geral da Reptiblica 
(PGR) and the Provedor de Jtisti~a (PJ) .  Environmentalists also met with the main political 
parties: the leaders of the Socialist, the Social-Democrat, and the Popular Parties and members 
of the Executive Board of the Communist Party. They also met with several European 
Parliament and National Assembly deputies and with several General Directors. 
The President of Portugal met several times with the environmental associations. They 
expressed to the President their concerns about governmental decisions having negative 
impacts in the environment, particularly the new bridge planned for the Tagus estuary. During 
these talks environmentalists presented their positions and argument. As part of these contacts 
214 TSF. 
an interest association defending the quality of life of the Montijo and Alcochete residents. 
They claimed a seat in the GATTEL Advisory Board. 
"The AMA, the Montrjo and Alcochete Association for Defense of the Quality of Life, came from 
a Commission Pro-Bridge Alcochete -Montrjo. The AMA was legally formalized in the same day 
the govenunent announced that the bridge was going to be built between Moscavide and Alcochete. 
The AMA was an informal group of residents of these two municipalities that expected to closely 
accompany the construction of the new bridge and to assure an integrated and harmonious economic 
development." (municipal official/ NGO member) 
The 25th of April Bridge Users Association 
The 25th of April Bridge Users Association emerged from the events on the bridge in July 
1994, to defend the interests of the users of the existing bridge against the toll bridge increases 
decided by the government. One of the interviewees, member of this association, defined their 
objectives: 
"The Association does not take a stand about the location of the bridge. The Association was 
created to demand the abolition of the toll fare and to extinguish the legislation of its increases." 
(member of a N O  Association) 
This association was the result of merging two associations that were created simultaneously in 
each of the river banks. In fact, the decision to inverse the toll fare in the existing bridge with 
the objective of collecting funds to participate in the construction of the new bridge generated 
disagreement among the present users. Users of the existing bridge expressed their 
disagreement when the bridge fare was increased by 50%. The users engaged in protests 
beginning with the "honking" at the booths that led the way to a complete blockage when he 
hope of dialogue with the government was lost. 
After the increase of the toll fare one of the users, who got later involved in the 25th of April 
Bridge Users Association, complained "the government does not give any answer despite the 
pressure of the municipalities." (environmental NGO member) 
As one interviewee explained this was a demonstration of anger, irritation 
"There was a demonstration of spontaneous bad will, irritation." 
Though the issues are much more complex, one of the reasons that contributed to this 
situation was a general feeling of detachment of the bridge users from the government 
decision. The perception that the future bridge would not solve the existing congestion 
contributed to the general feeling that the present bridge users were going to pay for a bridge 
that would not serve them. Moreover, the 25th of April Bridge users considered unfair that this 
one be the only bridge in the country with toll fares. 
The users, in fact, accounted the government responsible for the situation. One of them 
stated that "they (referring to the government) did the mistake, so they should solve it", 
implying that the public administration should bear the costs. This statement has ingrained the 
concept of "they" an indication of detachment from the decision makers (reported by one 
interviewee in May 95). 
The legitimacy of the 25th of April Bridge Users Association was only recognized by the 
Minister of Public Works after the blockage occurred and several other actions were carried out 
(such as the slow pace crossing). 
"After that we (25th Bridge Users Association) received phone calls from the Minister of Public 
Works for a meeting in 27th of October. This meeting lasted 3h 301x1. .... The minister considered 
that the Association had become a representative group." (member of a NGO Association) 
Then he also explained that the association can become an ideal partner: 
"The association can have an important role and should be an ideal partner ... It is very difficult to 
dialogue with the municipalities, but (the association) should never be a substitute of the 
municipalities." (member of a NGO Association) 
Referring to the 25th of April Bridge Users Association, one of the interviewees spotted 
attempts of manipulation from the part of the government: 
"The Social Democratic Party tried to control it (the blockage), it made the Bridge Users 
Commission and tried to manipulate (the situation), but was not successful." (politician) 
Analyzing this association characteristics one of the interviewees states: 
"It is a temporary association of persons who do not have any social connection, cultural, of way 
of life, or interests, but who have a common issue and about that issue explode. They will split 
apart afterwards." (politician) 
This type of association was analyzed at the time by a sociologist, who established a 
difference between the social contract or organized strikes and this more spontaneous and 
punctual event which explodes and disappears afterwards, leaving behind no organization. 
"It is not the social contract, the organized strikes. No, there is here a spontaneous and punctual 
(event) which explodes, and appears and disappears like a flash without leaving any sign of 
organization." (politician) 
Similarity is established by the same interviewee with the protagonism in the media, suggesting 
that the behavior is the same as that of the media. 
"Only that moment. They have their 5 minutes of glory in front of the camera. Screaming, 
throwing stones ... but the mechanism is autofeeder. It is a disruptive mechanism in social terms 
... because it increases the level of aggression ... and of bad spontaneity. It is negative, destructive 
... this process is uniquely disruptive. It is a simplifying process." (politician) 
Moreover, reductionism to one solution is seen as a potential inductor of violence 
"Everything that is simplifying leads to violence. Because it reduces the problems to a unique 
cause. And the solutions to a punctual and unique solution. And that is poverty and a river of 
violence. That one suffers aggression because he has short hair, the other because of his." 
(politician) 
What this means is that the fact of reducing and simplifying issues to one single solution (a 
dichotomy) leaves out a whole range of options and participants, and makes it difficult to 
enhance understanding of the issues under consideration. Comparing the location of the bridge 
with the process of the blockage the same interviewee differentiates: 
"While the other, the first process ... was a process of enrichment of the social tissue, of the level 
of demand and unsatisfaction, but of unsatisfaction that led the people to demand another type of 
approach to the issue. " (politician) 
NEED OF CITIZENS INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC DECISIONS 
One of the interviewees considered the process for the location of the new bridge over the 
Tagus as a good revealer of the inadequacy of the decision process. In his words: 
"This process was a good systematic revealer of the inadequacy of the merely representative decision 
process." (politician) 
It may be argued that it was a political decision that ignored the technical information 
produced. However, it created along the process an intellectual capital that gained the respect of 
the government and forced the bureaucratic administration to revise its operation modes. 
It is possibly too early to identify all the changes brought by this process, but there is no 
doubt that the environmental associations have changed, that the first signs of citizen groups 
participation are there, that the right of access to available information became a demand, that 
the Public Administration begins to understand the importance of assuring participation, and, 
hopefully, that politicians understood that elections are only one of the citizens rights because 
they also can express themselves through dialogue and should be heard. 
Never before participation, dialogue and transparency have been so clearly stated in the 
political agendas. This may represent the climbing of a notch in Portuguese politics, as one of 
the Portuguese politicians stated 
"The appearance of the private televisions, which was more or less simultaneous with the end of 
the process of the bridge, is going to provide a forum for expression of these concerns. (It is also 
going) to increase the pressure on the political parties for all the public processes (POZOR, CRIL, 
dinnossaur imprints. It is the same story. All of them are required to have a more open attitude 
relative to the role of the state, transparency and participation, and in considering the options 
technically. Under this point of view, let us say we won something ... It made us climb one notch, 
as the Americans say. The demand on the level of the media, on the level of the protagonists, the 
politicians, the social or economic (agents) increased." (politician) 

PART 3 
THE ROLE OF INFORMATION 
ARGUMENTS SUPPORTED AND CHALLENGED BY 
INFORMATION 
During the debates information circulated back and forth and frequently acquired specific 
meaning to the participants involved. This section discusses key arguments which were 
brought into discussion and how they were handled and shaped during the process. The 
arguments overviewed below resulted essentially from the use and discussion of information in 
debates and illustrate the development of new beliefs shared by some of the actors. This shows 
how information achieved powerful meaning and how it influenced the mind of the 
participants. 
Information that circulated before and during the decision process structured the minds of 
the specialists and often was transformed into meaningful images, which emerged influencing 
the way people saw the issues. Along the process images were used, created, reformulated and 
even challenged. This was perceived by one of the professionals active in the debate, who 
stated that decisions are influenced by images: 
"The decision is influenced by images that individuals or groups have, by the participants 
environmental perception, and by administrative structure and political will. Without power it is 
not possible to reach a decision." (transportation planner) 
In fact, information which gained powerful meaning triggered action and supported it 
afterwards. It is information that acquired meaning and was largely debated that is presented 
below describing what that meant for the framing of the participants ideas. 
Defining the problem 
Professionals defined the problem in varied ways and some reformulated it when the 
Barreiro option appeared. When I asked the interviewees what was the issue to be solved they 
gave me different answers. Some, while framing the problem, described the definition in 
legislation, congestion and the North-South connection: 
"X mentioned a Decree law that came out in January 1991, creating the GATIEL, describing the 
assumptions, the traffic congestion in the bridge and the need to find a solution to the connection 
North-South. The need to take into consideration the projects for the area and the limitations at the 
levels of land use and the environment level." (GATTEL member) 
"The legislation only refers to the need of a road bridge ... In the Decree Law creating the GATTEL 
there is a reference to the need to solve an urban problem and the need for an interregional 
crossing." (environmental NGO member) 
"A solution was sought for the congestion problem and a response to the regional and national 
connections. " (GATTEL member) 
For others, and these encompassed most of the professionals inquired, the issue was to solve 
congestion: 
"I remember that somewhere along the line the Minister of Public Works stated that the objective 
was to solve congestion in the existing bridge. The fundamental issue seemed to be to solve the 
congestion. The consultants were not asked for listing the problems to establish priority criteria." 
(GATIEL consultant) 
"It was necessary to solve the congestion in the 25th of April Bridge." (GATTEL consultant) 
"The problem the bridge should solve is congestion" (transportation planner) 
"The problem is essentially the problem of interconnection of the commuting traffic between the 
two banks, as for satellite towns." (PROTAML team member) 
The perception that congestion was the problem at stake was because professionals saw 
congestion as a long lasting issue tending to become worse: 
"I always defended that this bridge should be an urban and suburban bridge, i.e., for urban and 
suburban traffic, to decongest the 25th of April Bridge, because even if public transportation 
improves, the amount of individual transportation in the crossing of the Tagus will last for a long 
time yet, while there are no drastic restrictions the use of individual transportation in the town of 
Lisbon. We have now in the Southern bank 280 to 300 vehicles per 1,000 inhabitants, it may even 
attain 500 in some places. In central Europe it is already around 500 per 1,000 inhabitants. It is 
expected that Portugal will come closer to these values. In fact, in 1970 the value was 70 vehicles 
for 1,000 inhabitants and today it is 280. This rate cannot be kept. Actually, it slowed down from 
last year to this year. Anyway, individual car ownership will be growing. It is a problem of 
congestion. Even reducing to one half the car utilization rate, since it is expected that in a period of 
10 to 15 years the number of cars double, the present situation is going to repeat - 14 lan lines in 
the morning - and more than one hour to overcome 2 km." (transportation planner and municipal 
consultant) 
Lisbon is seen as a town with serious mobility constraints. Professionals feel a strong need 
to ameliorate traffic congestion. The whole issue of the bridge grew in urgency with the traffic 
congestion in the existing bridge. Most of the interviewees stated that the new bridge was to 
solve congestion. 
Lisbon is hell 
"Lisbon is hell and people get used to that hell which is awful." (Environmental NGO member) 
While defining the problem as congestion professionals were assuming that the North- 
South national crossing would be assured in Carregado, as expressed in the interviews. This is 
obvious in the statement of one of the interviewees dismissing even the possibility for some of 
the other options: 
"The new national crossing is by road mode. The PROTAML assumed the proposal of the National 
Road Plan of 1985186 developed by National Road Authority (JAE), though we make suggestions 
on the phasing. (Initially) we did not expect the (national) crossing in Lisbon but in Carregado." 
(PROTAML team member) 
"Carregado would be a perfect national crossing, the other is going to be questioned ... It would be 
not possible. The national crossing was solved by Carregado." (PROTAML team member) 
The assumption by some specialists that the national North-South connection was assured 
by the proposal defined for Carregado in the National Road Plan, gained greater strength when 
they found out, from a traffic study done within the GAlTEL, that the national traffic crossing 
the 25th of April Bridge was 4% (as stated in the traffic study never exposed publicly except 
for some of the findings that were disclosed mainly in the media). This value was considered 
by the specialists as minimal to justify that connection as the higher priority objective. For a 
group of the specialists involved, solving the congestion of the existing bridge assumed a 
higher priority. 
"The creation of the GATTEL is made under the wrong assumption of making a new bridge 
crossing ... The North South connection is in Carregado ... The North-South (national) traffic is 
about 4% in the 25th of April Bridge ... the problem that the GATTEL should be given to 
address is how to improve the situation: solve the congestion in the present bridge and avoid 
dumping cars into Lisbon." (environmental NGO member) 
"The problem that the bridge should solve is congestion ... The North-South traffic is minimal 
(about 4%) and therefore it has no meaning." (GA'ITEL member) 
"For that it is proposed for the last 15 years the crossing in Carregado, an easier connection 
between the North and the South of the country. From Marateca, if we go always straight, we get 
to Carregado, an excellent connection of North-South traffic, besides it is there that the traffic is. 
Only 4% of that traffic crosses the 25th of April Bridge. Plus, 40% of the traffic in this bridge is 
originated in the Almada municipality, with the traffic from the Seixal municipality it adds up to 
75 % . " (transportation planner and municipal consultant) 
This evidence influenced people's views and a need to reframe the problem was felt. One 
professional, justifying the issues at stake, explained: 
"The issue is if I want to increase the capacity where it already exists or if I am going to take 
advantage from the need to increase the capacity to diversify points of development, favoring in 
terms of diversity and centrality other areas, not the ones where accessibility already exists." 
(transportation planner and municipal consultant) 
It is the appearance of the unexpected alternative which brought new possibilities back to 
the table, as an unfinished debate about the wished model of development for the Lisbon 
metropolitan area. Moreover, it is the 4% traffic share of national North-South traffic in the 
25th of April Bridge and the integration of the urban component that bring to the debate further 
factors, one of them the train crossing: 
"In the view of the GEOTA the urban problem is more urgent than the regional. Actually only 4% 
of the North-South traffic uses the 25th of April Bridge. That puts an urgency in the crossing of a 
train in the actual bridge." (environmental NGO member) 
"We are forgetting the essential: or connect the North and the South by train, as well as (to make) 
the connection to the trans-European network with (already) assumed promises." (environmental 
NGO member) 
Professionals saw the train crossing as a way to avoid cars in Lisbon. The possibility of 
just a train crossing was enthusiastically argued by some specialists eager to avoid the entrance 
of more cars in Lisbon, one of the causes of existing congestion. 
"On the other hand the train is less expensive (for the users) and does not bring cars to Lisbon, 
creating an alternative." (environmental NGO member) 
"We bet that in transportation terms priority should be given to the train mode, because the modal 
partition has to favor the train public transportation. In a context of high road offer the train supply 
mode should be created." (PROTAML team member) 
During the debate, the 4% of North-South traffic crossing the existing bridge is going to 
play a crucial role in the justification for the location of the new bridge. Solving the congestion 
in the existing bridge assumes higher priority and consequently leads to defending the Barreiro 
option. 
"According to the traffic data of the GATTEL the solution points to Barreiro." (PROTAML team 
member) 
Professionals tried to explain why the Minister of Public Works did not incorporate this 
new information in the decision. Some saw it as a problem to be addressed and felt the need to 
hierarchize the two objectives stated in the legislation. They thought the Minister should be 
asked to define the priority. 
"Nobody remembered to ask the Minister at the initial stage what he wanted." (GATTEL 
consultant) 
Others felt the incompatibility to handle both objectives by the same single solution, and 
considered the Minister option as not solving any of them: 
"The North-South connection in simultaneous with the solving of congestion is a wish of the 
Minister (of Public Works). If I have here congestion and there the North-South connection than I 
make a bridge in the middle and solve both. Only these things are not solved exactly on the base of 
geometry. After making the traffic studies the conclusion reached was that the bridge in Montijo 
does not solve neither the urban nor the national crossing." (transportation planner and municipal 
consultant) 
Some felt confused with what was at stake and began questioning if the problem to be 
addressed was congestion, as one interviewee stated: 
"After a certain point it was not clear to me that the problem to be solved was congestion." 
(GATTEL consultant) 
Others questioned the need for a bridge 
"Changing points: the big change of opinion is when they reached the point of questioning the 
need for a new bridge. This situation was reached very late but before the Resolution of the Council 
of Ministers." (environmental NGO member) 
Though traffic congestion was frequently used as a powerful image, the adopted alternative 
(the one chosen by the Minister) is peripheral to the urban area. Therefore, it is not considered 
by some of the professionals as the best solution for diverting traffic from the existing bridge. 
To justify it professionals put this alternative in the light of the preferred model of development 
for the metropolitan area. 
Urban planners vs. traffic encineerg 
"This was the vision of the urbanists. The defense of the Montijo (crossing) was never in terms of 
traffic, but always of an ideal of development which considered the establishment a new Almada in 
the other extreme of the Peninsula of Setu'bal. It was the model of a triangle - Almada, Setu'bal ... 
with the other vertex missing, which has to be in the East, and that is Montijo. It is this logic that 
shows up in the PIDDS, developed by the coordinator and with the support of people connected to 
the communist party. Therefore, in accordance with the urbanism of the East, voluntarist, based on 
the poles of development." (municipal technician and transportation planner). 
Connecting urban to rural areas 
One of the most important concerns among professionals was the consequences of 
connecting an urban area to the rural countryside. They saw it as a contribution for future 
chaotic development and urban sprawl. 
One environmentalist explained that we should not damage the 800 years of rural balance: 
"In our reality it is very important to be aware that we have an 800 years old rural space - which 
achieved the balance of experience." (Environmental NGO member) 
The fact that the Southern bank was a mixture of urban and rural lands is considered by 
professionals to be important: 
"In the Southern bank there is a waterfront arch between Montijo and Almada - an urban continua 
- oscillating between semi rural fields and the full urban areas." (transportation planner) 
Due to the rural characteristics of Alcochete and Montijo, a South resident with his roots in 
Alcochete, saw a bridge in Montijo as a potential for future changes: 
Mon$o bridge affects rurdnatural features 
"I am sensitive to the environment. My father's family is from Alcochete. For me a bridge in 
Montijo will never be the most advisable due to the environmental impacts. The development is 
going to alter the characteristics of the area. Alcochete and Montijo do not have so serious social 
problems as Barreiro, where there are high levels of unemployment, since the disappearance of the 
work posts of Quimigal - about 15,000 work posts for a local population of 30,000." ( N W  
member) 
He implied that the local population was not aware of the possible future development effects 
due to the bridge construction. 
"The population (of Alcochete and Barreiro) is traditionally originated from Ribatejo. They love the 
land, the countryside and the bulls." (NGO member) 
He considered himself as isolated among his peers, who saw the bridge as an opportunity: 
Turning position into a personal matter 
"When I run into people (from Alcochete and Montijo) they say "if you take us the bridge (in 
Montijo) I will never speak to you again." (NGO member) 
Bridge as an opportunity 
Some of the interviewees statements show that the populations living in more rural areas of 
the AML are eager to have the bridge close by. This means the abandonment of their 
metropolitan area peripheral status. They see increased accessibility as a way to become part of 
the AML. This is evident in the following statements: 
Montijo bridge as a promotion 
"Montijo sees the bridge on its grounds as a promotion." (GATTEL consultant) 
Bridge as an opportunity 
"If that (the central alternative) were accompanied with an improvement of accessibility to all this 
(Montijo) area and the capital. But, as you know, it does not happen if we do not grab the 
opportunity and at this moment the opportunity is the bridge (in Montijo)." (municipal technician) 
The bridge was seen as a means of progress by some, and was contested by others. The 
issue becomes controversial. 
Growth seen as progress 
The willingness to have progress is here contested by one of the interviewees, who refers 
to a false idea of progress: 
False idea of progress - 
"The other important issue is the "false idea of progress" brought along - a growth without 
limitation, the interest in producing products, the destruction of cultural diversification. The urban 
expansion is carried on because the rural value is destructed in the behalf of the monoculture. There 
is an interesting thing. The progress is badly interpreted. There is a symbology of the progress and 
it is that what the populations have in their heads ... high rise buildings with 7 to 8 floors in rural 
areas. Progress is associated with roads, big highways, big dimensions." (environmental NGO 
member) 
While others saw growth as a positive effect: 
Bridge as a factor of population growth 
"Alcochete is going to be affected negatively ... Montijo is going to duplicate the population." 
(municipal technician) 
One bank or two banks town 
The diverging points of view that were illustrated result from larger amounts of 
information circulating and a larger number of options on the table brought the need to 
reformulate the problem. Some professionals explained that before the decision people should 
have agreed on what type of town they wanted. This was to be known as a "one bank" or a 
"two banks" town. 
Urban planners looked at the region as an urban area in need of an integrated solution. The 
crucial decision was focused between a "one bank" or a "two banks" metropolitan area. Many 
considered the latter as the right option and defended the central alternative, implying that the 
area had to work as a whole through the creation of a continuous reticular space between the 
two banks, merging areas of considerable development. Additionally, the South connection in 
the declining region of Barreiro would contribute to the possible recovery of this area and the 
impact of development could be considered negligible. 
So, urban planners concerned with the modus operandi of the urban area considered that 
the crucial decision was between a "one bank metropolis" or a "two banks metropolis." 
"To make a decision on the location of the bridge it is essential to discuss and reach a consensus on 
a key issue: if the town is going to be a two banks town, and therefore the strategies should aim to 
the improvement of interaction between the two banks, through tunnels, bridges etc., or if each one 
of the banks should develop more or less independently, assuming distinct and different functions." 
(transportation planner) 
Two generations of planners -- two models of development 
The two urban models of development defended reflect the views of two generations of 
planners: one generation bases the decentralization of the urban space on the creation of 
controlled poles of development, and the new generation embraces the new concepts of 
sustainable development, taking into consideration the areas already infrastructured and in 
search for development. 
"There were discussions, but I think that the positions became extreme very early in the process, 
because they represent completely different logics. The persons with a perspective of urban and 
regional planning divided into two positions, according to the generation they belong to." 
(municipal technician and transportation planner) 
"The older people, formed in the planning style of the 601s, think that the bridge in Montijo is a 
great opportunity to create a new town there and decompress the Metropolitan Area. It is the 
philosophy of St. Andre' relative to Sines, of the old plans of the Housing Development Fund219, 
to create towns to decompress, the theory of poles of development." (municipal technician and 
transportation planner) 
Impossibility of accomplishing two simultaneous mega projects 
One professional explained that the construction of a new town required a strong 
centralized power, and the resources to carry out a new town project. He also stated that he did 
not think we had either of these conditions. Explaining why he did not believe that there was 
the possibility to make another town in the South as a pole of development to decompress 
Lisbon, he referred to the difficulty in financing two huge projects simultaneously: a big town 
for decompression of the Metropolitan Area in the South and the Expo 98. 
"On the other side, let's not forget that at that time the Expo 98 became part of the agendas, and no 
matter what would happen it was also going to be a strong investment. It is not possible to 
imagine that it two Expos can be made at the same time. In practice it was a little bit of this that 
was going on." (municipal technician and transportation planner) 
Closing the ring 
It is the one bank town model that is supported by traffic engineers eager to close the ring 
(one of the circulars of Lisbon). It is important to stress here the institutional "personality" of 
219 FFH. Fundo de Fomento da Habitago. 
the JAE2Z0 that somehow represents the traffic engineers views cherished by the Public Works 
Minister. Looking at their traditional operation, we find that their main objective is the shortest, 
less costly connection between two points (urban areas) and preferably with no ramifications 
along the way. Their preferred solution pointed to a connection North-South in Carregado, 
well away from Lisbon. Along the process, Montijo was the favored option for the Tagus 
estuary crossing. 
The National Highway Authority (JAE) is an important stakeholder in decisions that 
concern transportation. This is obvious in the statements of several specialists interviewed: 
JAE Paradigm 
"The Highway Authority (JAE) is a state inside the state and therefore does not want to talk with 
anyone else. This is the military spirit that characterizes the Highway Authority, managed by 
people from the army ranks (Corps of Engineers) until very recently." (municipal technician and 
transportation planner) 
"The central corridor had many things besides a plain road structure, therefore it is the worse thing 
to ask the Highway Authority." (municipal technician and transportation planner) 
"For the JAE it (Montijo) was obvious because it was in the initial proposal. They did not want to 
know about studies and evaluations." (GAITEL consultant) 
"the JAE lacks decision power, nobody (inside it) wants to define himself." (GATTEL consultant) 
On similar grounds stood the option advanced by a consultant responsible for advising the 
Minister who claimed that a throughway to serve a metropolitan area has to be as peripheral as 
possible, and thus defended the East alternative. 
In summary: two views appeared in conflict, one preferring a thoroughfare - the urban 
planner choice associated with looking at the region as an urban functional space and 
considering its crossing as a way of reinforcing the metropolitan area and striving to give it 
more cohesion as a whole -, the other preferring a circular flow - the traffic engineers and 
JAE stand having in mind favoring traffic tangential to the urban area and defending a 
connection as peripheral as possible. These are two solutions associated with distinct 
conceptual frameworks of the involved actors. 
Close the ring 
"The traffic engineers rationale was to close the ring." (transportation planner) 
The closing of the ring was associated with the view of an expanding city. However, recent 
data showed that this trend is being slowed down. 
Static vs dynamic model 
Recent data on the changing trends in population, employment and traffic (Census of the 
Population, 1991) provide evidence of a decline of central urban areas and a displacement of 
residents to the neighboring municipalities, leading to the consideration of a central connection 
220 TAE - Junta Autdnoma das Estradas - National Highway Authority. 
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as an instrument of revitalization of the urban space, instead of a reinforcement of the 
expansion at the boundaries of the urban core. 
It is obvious from the above arguments that a considerable debate supported the 
discussions on the location of the new bridge. This appears as a complex issue allowing for 
different alternatives according to the objectives and points of view of the actors involved. It is 
the incorporation of a dynamic image of Lisbon that brings once more an additional evidence in 
changing trends which influenced changes in opinion of the participants. 
After making some general points: 
- "Lisbon has an (urban) unqualified East area." (GATTEL member) 
- "The Lisbon municipal plan indicates as possible areas of development the East area." (GATTEL 
member) 
- "Lisbon inverted its demographic trends and lost population, so that it is necessary to attract 
population. " (GATTEL member) 
one of the specialists concluded: 
"Considering this the central corridor was the one that allowed for rebalancing the area." ( G A m L  
member) 
Another one viewed the situation as follows: 
"The periphery of Lisbon has been desertifying for offices. Separated from the interland, a circular 
sub urban area developed and (urban) chaos has been spreading." (Environmental NGO member) 
"Knowing that population has been decreasing and many people in the AML are aged, the eagerness 
for further development seems inappropriate." (NGO member) 
Geometry 
Professionals looking into the town land uses and transportation links are usually very 
concerned with the geometry. Where are people located, where are the more densely populated 
areas'! Where are the transportation links? They are interested in the spatial geometry and often 
use it as a supporting argument for their explanations. In fact, geometry played a role in this 
case while discussing the type of location decisions: 
"The connection North-South simultaneously with the solution of congestion is an utopia of the 
Minister (of Public Works). He thought if I have here congestion and there the North-South 
crossing, I make a bridge in the middle and solve two problems. Only, these things are not solved 
exactly on the base of geometry." (transportation planner and municipal consultant) 
"Land use has also a great amount of mathematics and geometry. This territory is uncentered 
physically and socially. I think that this should be reversed and some others think it should be 
reinforced." (GA7TEL member) 
"Some see the problems almost geometrically. For example, a well recognized planner divided the 
AML in two distinct areas, vertically divided by Seiml, to defend that any bridge had to be located 
towards the East to serve the local existing population because there was the higher percentage of 
the population." (GATTEL member) 
Need to contain development 
The need to contain development and avoid sprawl is a permanent concern brought by the 
growing acceptance of sustainability concepts. Environmentalists and environmental 
concerned planners, willing to preserve natural resources, condemned the eagerness to create 
new fronts of development. One interviewee complained about the indiscriminate opening of 
new fronts everywhere: 
Current Planning on the basis of opening new fronts 
"At this moment, planning is done opening development fronts. Chiado, Expo 98, Waterfront. The 
Waterfront aims to expand the town towards the Tagus, not connected to it. The only thing they 
can think about is producing housing and offices ... enough to lodge 5 to 6 million inhabitants." 
(environmental NGO member) 
Avoid new fronts 
"Montijo is out of all this. With the highway to Cascais and the highway to Loures, new fronts of 
development are open for a period already declining (demographically). With so many fronts 
(already) open, the opening of new fronts is undesirable. In the Peninsula (of Setubal) we have 
already highly unqualified space. Therefore it is necessary to qualify what we already have." (urban 
planner) 
False idea of urban congestion 
One of the ideas brought to the table during the debate was that containing development can 
be done by intensifying the use of land or by the possibility of occupying empty spaces within 
the urban tissue. A professional, member the team of the PROTAML, explained: 
Reknitting the urban tissue 
"The Land Use model reached by the PROTAML team was one to avoid the continuous and 
disorderly expansion of the territory and to reconcentrate the occupied land, reknit the tissue and 
restructure the occupied land. There is no need for expansion. It is necessary to use the already 
occupied space" (PROTAML team member) 
Unoccupied backvards 
"This goes against our urban planners who consider that the whole space is very congested. They 
confuse lack of organization with high rate of occupation, which in real terms does not exist. Inside 
Lisbon the backyards are unoccupied. These are areas to order and occupy." (PROTAML team 
member) 
The idea was to spoil what is already spoiled. Reknitting the urban tissue assumed great 
relevancy. One of the specialists interviewed described how the informed professional 
community got to the idea that there was room within the urban space for further occupation 
and how for a while they lived on false assumptions of needed space for development. 
"On the other side (Southern bank) professionals, due to several reasons, either because they worked 
in the PROTAML or in the Municipal Plans where these problems came forward, knew well 
several municipalities of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon, had made some easy computations of 
what is already comprqmised to urban use and figured out that it is enough to the double of the 
present population. Therefore, there is no need to open new fronts (of development). What is needed 
is to channel all the investment to consolidate what is now occupied and to improve environmental 
quality of those areas. Otherwise, we are going to have numerous holes not filled up. We are going 
to have unfinished streets, unbuilt plots. Let's occupy to the maximum what exists today, resew 
the urban tissue ... instead of opting for a megalomania that needs enormous powers to move." 
(municipal technician and transportation planner). 
Resewing the urban t i s su  
"The land use model that our team (PROTAML) developed was to avoid the continuous disordered 
urban expansion, and to make a reconcentration of occupation of the land, resew the urban tissue, 
and reorganize the already occupied space. There is no need of expansion. It is necessary to use the 
space already developed. It goes against the urbanists ideas, because they consider that everwng is 
highly congested. They confuse disorganized development with high level of occupation, which 
does not exist in real terms. Inside Lisbon the backyards are disordered areas, areas to be organized 
and occupied." (PROTAML team member) 
These ideas were extremely appealing to the environmentalists who were eager to preserve 
the natural resources. 
High environmental value of the AML 
In fact, the environmentalists ended up being sympathizers with the urban planners 
solutions, but motivated by different concerns. The East solution was in environmental terms 
the one considered to have greater environmental adverse effects, both in the short and long 
ranges. In fact, that connection would be linked to a rural area through a space of high 
environmental value, classified at the EU level, besides it was close to the existing Natural 
Reserve of the Tagus Estuary. These facts, plus the potential for future urban development 
pressuring highly sensitive areas, made for the position of environmental concerned 
individuals against the adoption of the East connection. The following statements reflect the 
environmental rationale assumed during this process. 
Natural Reserve of the Tagus is of European Importance 
"The Natural Reserve of the Tagus Estuary is one of the 10 most important European wetlands." 
(environmental NGO member) 
International Environmental Law ignored 
"The construction of the new bridge is against two international conventions: the Genebra 
convention ... and the Rarnsar convention which protects the wetlands." (environmental NGO 
member) 
Landscape is one of the richest in Europe 
"In landscape terms, it is one of the richest areas of Europe and people get used to live with it, to 
have the Flamingos very close and the campinos and salt marsh." (NGO member and Southern 
resident) 
Structuring role of the transportation infrastructures 
An important underlying concept in the debate, particularly when issues of increased 
accessibility were raised with the creation of the Barreiro option, was the powerful structuring 
effects of the transportation network. The structuring effect of transportation infrastructures is 
well present in the references made about the organization of the territory. However, only one 
interviewee specifically mentioned it clearly establishing the link: 
"It is the accessibility that shapes spatially the land use. The land use management of the urban 
planners fails ... It is the heavy infrastructure network based in the market that makes the land use: 
the C m ,  for example, has a considerable effect in the land use." (GATTEL member) 
Though only one person made clearly the connection of the transportation and the land uses 
most of the comments have this ingrained as an assumption in the proposed explanation. 
Bridge as a tool of recovery 
It is because of this structuring effect due to increases of accessibility that Barreiro begins 
to be seen as a tool for recovery. The option in Barreiro emerged out as a new innovative 
possibility which gained adepts along the process. One of the strongest images created was this 
possible bridge seen as a tool for recovery due to its contribution to increase accessibility to the 
area, as it can be drawn from several statements of the interviewees. 
"Barreiro is a municipality that has seen the production of its heavy industry decline ... It has a 
very important commercial center. For example, it has two Benneton shops. This center, if 
connected to the core of Lisbon, could operate as an extension of the Lisbon downtown commercial 
center. Recently, it (Barreiro) is more and more a suburb of Lisbon." (transportation planner) 
"The bridge is seen as a tool of recovery" (environmental NGO member) 
"Barreiro is dying. The central corridor would allow for the urban recovery, of an area in strong 
depression and with gradually less potential to attract interests. Not providing accessibility to it 
(Barreiro) is only going to make the situation worse." (urban planner) 
Questioned why the bridge in Barreiro would generate urban requalification, the same 
specialist provided a further explanation, saying that it was 
"not the infrastructure but the accessibility that it generated." (GATTEL member) 
"The problem that the bridge should address is the revitalization of the declining areas, since 
Barreiro already has adequate infrastructures." (environmental NGO member) 
While creating accessibility to the area, the central functions of Barreiro could become a 
continua of the same functions in the central city of Lisbon. 
Potential of Barreiro to become a central area 
This was defended by one local technician who stated: 
"In the urban hierarchy, in the South bank, the Barreiro can with Almada assume an important role 
of central area." (municipal technician) 
"All the strategy of the PDM is developed in that direction, reinforcing the centrality that it 
(Barreiro) already has, in the urban hierarchy established to the South bank. The (Barreiro) bridge 
reinforces the Barreiro centrality. That centrality would be reinforced in the context of the remaining 
municipalities of the South bank ... polarizing the area, and Moita and Seixal." (municipal 
technician). 
These specialists showed a strong notion of opportunity, taking advantage of the present 
profile of the area and their knowledge of the region and its trends. In this view, Barreiro could 
become a neighborhood of Lisbon. One specialist stated the advantages of this option: 
"It would relate the train connection with the associated socio-economic group. It would bring to 
the center of Lisbon an area which is already urban and it would make possible its rehabilitation in 
urban terms, making Barreiro a neighborhood of Lisbon." (environmental NGO member) 
"The bridge in Barreiro could make this town become closer to the center of Lisbon through 
increased (the central pathway) accessibility." (environmental NGO member) 
Lack of transversal connections 
Professionals understood the difficulties of transversal mobility along each one of the two 
banks due to different factors. Difficulties at the level of transversal transportation connections 
either the deep valleys perpendicular to the river banks in the North bank, or the numerous 
peninsulas and bays in the South, provided a powerful image for the specialists working in the 
region. 
Phvsiographic restriction* 
"This area is like a hand; in the Southern bank there are a kind of three fingers (peninsulas)." 
(GATTEL member) 
Professionals are still concerned with these difficulties and new ways have been proposed 
to overcome it. Among the proposals are the waterfront arch in the South. The location of the 
bridge was also seen in that light. 
Moving from a spinal to a radiocentric grid structure 
The connection to the existing transportation infrastructures and the gridline, radiocentric 
and spinal transportation structures molded the minds of the specialists dealing with 
transportation issues in the region. After referring to the information on transportation in the 
Master Plan of Lisbon and the new proposal to reorganize the transportation system one 
technician explained: 
"Therefore, the goal is to pass from a structure in spine to a gridline radiocentric structure." 
(municipal technician and transportation planner). 
This became important for arguing in favor of the Barreiro option. This was the solution 
that better fitted this option because it represented a deconcentration of the transportation axes 
of Lisbon which has been designed as a spine structure with collateral arteries hanging on it. 
The new proposal favored an expansion of activities to the sides to be enhanced by overlaying 
a grid of transportation lines facilitating the transversal mobility. 
Lack of articulation 
Some people considered that most of the public decisions were made within a specific 
sector with little or no link to other related issues. What they say is that there frequently is a 
tendency to look into these interconnected issues under an exclusively transportation or 
urbanist approach and neglecting the interdependencies of the decisions of one sector with the 
others. 
Sectored View 
"Transportation and circulation was the only concern. Well observed, but being only a sectorial 
view of the reality." (environmental NGO member) 
"Planning is done with sectorial visions without any knowledge about other people's sectors. For 
example transportation planning and circulation being handled without any knowledge about the 
agriculture sector, urbanism being developed without any knowledge about other sectors. There was 
a sectorial vision." (environmental NGO member) 
One interviewee explained that as a lack of a culture of coordination. 
No coordination culture 
"I already participated in a project of big dimensions: the ETRL, (it was) more towards the 
management of transportation, not so much the interfaces. We do not have a culture of 
coordination. Already in the ETRL, at the planning level of the 60's and 70's there was a high 
multidisciplinarity, a dialogue between different professions. Technicians fmm the Lausanne school 
came. In the 70's and 80's the ETRL was not implemented ... The process of political coordination 
itself stayed so bad that this tool was not viable." (PROTAML team member) 
Defending the location at Montijo 
Supporters of the Montijo solution, also used information as a basis for their 
position. Here are some examples: 
The Barreiro bridge seen as an extension of the 25th of April Bridge 
"The Barreiro corridor is not a new crossing. It is an extension of the existing bridge. What Lisbon 
needs is not more traffic, but that the traffic gets more distributed and does not pass through the 
center." (municipal official in favor of Montijo 1 NGO member) 
Minimizing the ~ o ~ u l a t i o n  growth impact 
"The Barreiro corridor, being a solution for decongestion in the immediate future, is going (in the 
far future) to increase congestion and accentuate the asymmetry, maintaining the present situation. 
An investment of this dimension has the potential for structuring the area. In theory there is the 
risk to spoil everything, but it is not exactly like this. The population gets distributed slowly, 
besides there are planning elements. The expected 12 to 14 thousand inhabitants increase is nothing 
compared with the 180 thousand (inhabitants) of Almada and Barreiro." (municipal official in favor 
of Montijo / NGO member) 
What matters is quality not quantity 
"The problem is not to have too many people, too many houses, but to have lots of people and 
houses without infrastructures. In the 60s it was important to make lots of buildings. Today it is 
different. The error then made allowed us today to have experience and concrete examples. The 
problem is not to have lots of high rising buildings, but to insert them well." (municipal official 
in favor of Montijo 1 NGO member) 
In summary, the information generated within the discussion of the new estuary crossing 
location gained a powerfull meaning, particularly whithin the technical community. This is well 
reflected in the way people expressed their views on the subject. 
The key information that contributed to the recommendation of the new crossing location 
includes: 
- updated data showing decreasing demographic trends convinced professionals of the 
declining demand on land development; 
- evidence of the origin-destination traffic study showing low levels of traffic capture in the 
Montijo option that reinforced the idea that congestion was not going to be solved by this 
option; 
- new environmental concerns that led to the reformulation of urban development models 
towards more sustainable cities, contradicting solutions of town saturation based on 
opening new fronts of development; 
- view of the central corridor option as a recovery tool of two declining areas, Chelas in the 
North and Barreiro in the South, providing a simultaneous solution to two serious urban 
problems. 
The technical community, although initially suprised, accepted the evidence offered in 
support of the central corridor. There was a general acceptance of the new option. The 
participation in various debates, organized by professional associations, research institutes and 
even the GATTEL, gave to a wider technical community the opportunity of exploring this new 
option and led the new meaning inside this group. 
However, a problem arose when the new proposed solution was not accepted by (part of) 
the central administration, a body working under clearly defined bureaucratic rules and 
handling changes with difficulty. Such an organization cannot easily alter its own way of 
seeing a problem, particularly when the new proposed alternative had never been considered 
before and, therefore, did not become part of the political agendas. Though the technical advice 
favored the newly created option, something prevented this administration to adopt the 
proposed solution. 
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND MISSING INFORMATION 
Although a lot of information was used and discussed during the process, several players 
identified information which was not used or was only partially used. 
"There were things that were not approached." (politician) 
"There is technical information that was not integrated." (municipal technician and transportation 
planner) 
One respondent considered that the knowledge available for the Northern bank was greater 
than for the Southern bank, stating: 
Less information available for the South bank 
"I always felt that there was much more information on the North than on the South, much more 
plans, much more knowledge of reality. Most of the people involved lived in the North side and 
there was new information on the North bank. The information about the North was more digested 
by people. " (Southern municipal technician) 
One of the interviewees identified information rarely considered in environmental debates: 
Air and noise uolution in an urban vs a rural area 
"In local terms the emissions in Barreiro would have increased if the bridge were located there, and 
would be three times higher than in Montijo, according to the traffic calculations. The North 
insertion in Sacavkm also presented problems (passing over two schools and at the second and third 
level of buildings)." (environmental NGO member) 
There were several pieces of information that participants identified as missing 
"The three corridors emerged without discussion at the level of the urban issues. Only raised the 
issues related to land use were raised." (GATTEL member) 
"The intermunicipal issue (more than one entity) was not approached, particularly in what concerns 
the intermunicipal interaction. It was not given the importance it deserved." (Southern municipal 
technician) 
However, some of this information was used, though not in the view of most people 
because it did not show in the reports or for the final decision of the Minister. One of the 
interviewees identified information which in his view was not used, but was discussed in 
meetings, he stated: 
Information not considered, but sometimes discussed in meetings 
"(1) it is impossible to reverse development in terms of the work market, as it is usual to live in 
the South and work in the North; the hypothesis of the municipalities to develop to the South is 
unreal because they do not provide accessibility needed to work; 
(2) it is impossible to look at Lisbon as Paris, a town of two banks with a system of bridges; 
(3) there is an interesting argument advanced by a transportation specialist in LNEC that considers 
an estimate of fluxes across the river equal to the present fluxes in Lisbon and finds out that for 
that there is a need of one bridge every 500 meters (along the river)." 
(GATEL consultant) 
Some information was seen by the specialists as not used or only partially used. Part of 
this information turned into key issues at conflict stages, and was used differently by the 
different players willing to substantiate their positions. This was the case of the effects 
generated by the construction of the 25th of April Bridge: 
Ignoring the impact of the 25th of April B r i d s  
"The impact evaluation of the 25th of April Bridge (was not considered). Among us nobody learns 
with the past, we depart always from zero." (GATIEL consultant) 
"The dossier of the old bridge was completly put on the grey zone." (politician) 
The above comments came up when referring to the issue of the train crossing of the 25th of 
April Bridge and once more have implicit the idea that specialists did not use information that 
already existed. 
A set of interviewees also identified lack of access to information, particularly at the public 
debate level. This was the case of the economic dossiers related to construction costs, one of 
the pieces of information that gained great visibility in the debate. 
Inadwuate information on construction cos& 
"Things that did not enter ... I think that in the pubic debate what is relevant and did not enter into 
consideration were the economic dossiers. This is still a hole today. I (myself) had never access to 
the economic dossiers. Since I do not have access to the economic dossiers, (I assume) the access to 
economic information failed. About the remaining subjects, better or worse we are getting 
information. " (politician) 
"The information on the costs of the bridge was insufficient ... I think they have underevaluated 
(the cost of the Montijo option) and overevaluated the East alternative cost (i.e., the central 
corridor)." 
"The costs ... They were manipulated in a way that was not serious. It was said that the cost of the 
Montijo option was 120 millions while the other (central corridor) would be 180 to 190 millions. 
The firm that won (the construction of the Montijo bridge) makes it for 200 millions. Although it 
is acceptable that the price is different, because with the pre-project it is possible to correct the 
price, what is less acceptable is that the increase is of practically 60%. That leads me to believe 
that the cost of Montijo was minimized ... but worse than that is to compare two uncomparable 
things. The cost of a road bridge in Montijo with that of a train-road bridge in Barreiro, in equal 
terms. Besides, the accesses were not considered." (municipal technician and transportation planner) 
Specialists referred frequently to the final traffic study that was never publicly exposed, 
when they were justifying their positions. This was another piece of information that achieved 
substantial visibility during the controversy, as it can be seen by statements of interviewees: 
Unavailability of the traffic fluxes studv 
"The final traffic study, considering the demand elasticities relative to the various ticket costs, in 
public transportation or in the bridges, was not considered, published, or diffused, because what the 
traffic study says is that this bridge cannot capture any (significant) traffic to the 25th of April 
Bridge. It can capture 20% of the traffic. However, there are certain values that came out on the 
news." (municipal technician and transportation planner). 
"The input-output matrices never became public." (PROTAML team member) 
"The information concerning the studies on fluxes of origin-destination traffic were made, but have 
been well kept." (urban planner) 
"In what refers to the input-output study surveying (the traffic movement of) present users of the 
bridge, it was obvious (from the results) that the idea would be for the consolidation of the existing 
land use and not in opening new fronts ... The municipalities in the South are small and have a 
weak structure." (GATTEL consultant) 
"the input-output matrices did never become public." (PROTAML team member) 
"I never saw any traffic study." (politician) 
"There is a study going on, sponsored by the World Bank, inquiring about the traffic North-South 
in a national perspective." (transportation specialist) 
"According to some inquiries about the traffic in Porto Alto it was found that only 10% of that 
traffic was related to the North-South connection. Most of the remaining traffic always had to do 
with the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon (AML)." (transportation specialist) 
The economic and traffic aspects assumed a crucial role in the process. However other type 
of information was identified by the interviewees as relevant, but not used, or only slightly 
approached. 
Lack of the new exdoration costs for the 25th of April Bridge 
"The exploration of the 25th of April bridge and the costs of including in the same platform the 
train to Algarve, the train of goods and the suburban metro. How is it possible to explore in the 
same line the three things. " (politician) 
"The less debated dossier was the future of the 25th of April Bridge. This is also the most urgent 
and the most useful to the population of all (the dossiers) that exist today, and was the least 
debated. " (politician) 
Lack of the 25th of A ~ r i l  Bridge structural reinforcement costs 
"How much is going to cost the reinforcement of the 25th of April Bridge and how much is 
possible to explore it? Intuitively, I think it is not possible (to explore it with profit). It is not 
possible because it has different logics. 
First, it is a crazy cost, because the cost to reinforce the bridge for the train with wagons is very 
high. 
If the train has to brake, the movement is transfered to the whole bridge. Therefore, the bridge has 
to be reinforced to resist to it and that is not being done. The bridge was calculated for automobiles, 
which do not brake all at the same time, and for surface metro (light train). 
The government decided not only to construct the Montijo (bridge), but also to put on the 25th of 
April Bridge the three (types) of trains. . . . At this moment there is a serious problem. . . . That is 
not technically possible and is not economically feasible. A tendering was opened for the 
constmction of the (train) crossing in the 25th of April Bridge and the tendering had no applicants. 
Now they are going around. They do not have any solution. Solutions can always be found (but) it 
is going to cost a fortune." (politician) 
Lack of priorities definition 
"What is more important? The bridge in Montijo? ... What is the priority of the priorities? Is it the 
bridge in Montijo or the crossing, forseen since Salazar, of the suburban surface train in the 25th of 
April Bridge? It is the suburban crossing of the 25th of April Bridge. That does not depend of the 
bridge in Montijo, or Barreiro , or Carregado, or anywhere else. It could be done since the first 
European Community Support Framework in connection with the metro network of Lisbon ... and 
it is not going to be in operation when the bridge in Montijo begins operating." (politician) 
"The urgency is the rapid transportation in the existing bridge." (environmental NGO member) 
Lack of information on the Drocess 
"At this moment I begin to doubt ... I am not sure if Ferreira do Amaral (Minister of Public 
Works) is not retarding the dossier of the 25th of April Bridge on purpose ... and for what? ... with 
the hope that one of the two is not going to be made? ... or the long distance train? ... But only the 
surface metro, as I said, was what should be done in the 25th of April Bridge. ... In the meantime 
someone is going to make in Barreiro, or Carregado, or in Vila Franca de Xira another train bridge 
... I begin thinking that the foggy lack of information is suspicious ... The lack of definition of 
due dates ... about the train in the 25th of April Bridge ... which is the dossier that could advance 
independently of the decision of the train crossing of Montijo. It could have started. It has nothing 
to do one thing with the other. He (the Minister of Public Works) wanted to discuss them (the two 
issues) in the same Council of Ministers ... He wanted to put together the road crossing, the 
surface metro, and the solution of the problem that comes since Fontes Pereira de Me10 from the 
XIX century, the train connection North-South." (politician) 

PART 4 
LESSONS OF THE CASE 
WHAT THE NEW ALTERNATIVE BROUGHT UP 
The unexpected alternative was developed during a period of intense restructuring policies 
for the metropolitan area catching everyone by surprise, even its later followers. 
It had the effect to shake the people's frame of mind, which for long years was set up to 
accomodate the Montijo option as the natural follower of the 25th of April Bridge. Besides, 
most of these professionals were already working in plans, most of them already compromised 
with this alternative, making change even more difficult. 
However, despite all these difficulties the unexpected alternative gained adepts who saw in 
it potential for new not previously perceived opportunities. These were brought up by an 
argumentation supported by concepts giving meaning to the strong links between transportation 
and land use. This was called by one technician of the GATTEL Planning Team "tools for land 
use and transportation evaluation." 
It is the exploitation of the tight connection between transportation and land use that 
contributes to the development of new shared meaning. This process developed in the forums 
created within the GATTEL and also in the ones involving wider audiences - the politicians 
and technicians working for public agencies, namely municipality technicians and consultants. 
Shared meaning became so powerful that, to some of the actors, it reshaped the way they 
thought and reframed the problem, generating new alternatives (e.g., environmental 
associations suggested the construction of only a train bridge in the central corridor). 
DIFFERENT MODES OF OPERATION 
Usually, "technical studies", are given to a team of professionals with specific field 
expertise to carry them on indoors. The whole process is developed under secrecy, mainly 
because the location of big infrastructures can generate considerable controversy and 
speculation, and governments generally want to avoid them. It is also true that these groups are 
most frequently dependent of one agency (e.g., a ministry). 
For example, transportation plans, though attracting the attention of the agents operating in 
the metropolitan area, were mostly developed indoors, restricted to a team of transportation 
experts. Though these plans did not particularly influence the specialists from other areas of 
expertise, they framed the views and minds of the transportation planners, who showed 
familiarity and knowledge about these plans. 
Moreover, the usual procedure of these groups is that their members carry on their work in 
their specific areas of expertise and at the end they glue the various contributions together with 
little or no attention to their articulation, besides some short summary conclusions, once more 
developed with their backs turned to each other. 
Frequently, we end up with documents rich in gathered data, with little articulation and 
almost no interpretation of the data in meaningful ways that would be useful to the subject 
under consideration. However, they may sometimes serve the purpose of politically 
legitimizing a previously stated policy. 
Definition of the problem and final decision are in the hands of the politicians. The experts 
only have to carry out the studies requested by the political setting within well defined strict 
boundaries and complying to established due dates. 
This prevents these studies from having enough meaning, that can only be achieved by 
articulating the different pieces. One way to do this is through sitting all the team members at 
the same table and carrying on wide debate. This allows people to bring up their views, which 
are frequently shaped by their fields of expertise, and accounts for the possibility of merging 
the coiltributions of the various actors in a meaningful way. 
The GATTEL Planning Team established a dynamic process that is quite unusual to these 
groups. Usually they operate under more rigid and bureaucratic rules. In fact, these types of 
governmentally mandated groups: 
(1) are usually created to address a clear one solution task (e.g., design of a bridge) and 
not a "wicked problem" such as the location of a bridge; 
(2) frequently involve one or very few consultants or a team drawn from and under the 
responsibility of only one public agency (e.g., as for the airport location), with strong 
loyalty ties to that agency; differently from an inter-ministerial plutidisciplinary team 
involving the contribution of a large number of professionals and public officials who 
share their expertise during the process; 
(3) most frequently the rules and procedures are clearly stated and accepted by the client 
and the consultant, in this case there were several aspects of operation that remained 
ambiguous since the beginning and along the process (the objectives, the procedures, 
the level of responsibility); 
(4) usually the expertise is restricted to a very specific type (e.g., hard science in a 
geology study) not easily translated for wider technical communities; in this case the 
issue under consideration interested, and was challenged by, a great number of 
professionals (urban planners, transportation managers, environmentalists) and it 
dealt with issues that professionals from differentiated backgrounds could 
understand. 
Unfortunately, group processes, as these are called, are a more time consuming effort. 
Usually the studies are directed to solve problems that should have been solved a long time 
ago. The usually tight schedules that these studies have to obey also prevent the adoption of 
such a course of action. 
The other thing is that the problem is sometimes operational and straightforward, and it is 
not a "wicked problem"221 that may require space for redefinition. 
Location of a big infrastruture, particularly in a widely urbanized area, cannot be properly 
considered a one solution straighforward problem. The number of interests involved, the 
possible alternative locations, and even the possible considerations of "package deals" make it 
quite a complex issue. 
The other unusual aspect of the GATTEL Planning Team was the very high amount of 
information gathered and structured during the process. Also, the debates and brainstorming 
sessions that were organized led to the development of a meaningful language that became 
powerful because it allowed for the articulation of concepts coming from different fields of 
expertise. 
As one of the team members put it, the process involved a lot of experts from many 
different areas. 
"There was a pluridisciplinary team since the beginning and the issues were assessed against the 
various fields at the same time. As far as I know this is not very common ... I think that this had 
much to do with the people that were involved in the process." 
The team members considered brainstorming very important. One of them said that "there 
were very special minds (brains) discussing", adding that the debates became so interesting that 
the Steering Committee members sometimes participated. 
221 Rittel and Weber. 
The debates centered around "what we thought was good or bad and what we could do - 
this was to make us think." The GATTEL Planning Team debated "planning concepts that 
could be very different, but could be logically understood." 
The GA?TEL Planning Team: 
( l )  established a participatory process within a bureaucratic setting, 
(2) was able to successfully coordinate the different groups operating, and 
(3) created meaning through the articulation of concepts emerging out of different 
sectors. 
The GATTEL was very innovative in several ways: 
(1) the fact that it was a inter-ministerial group 
(2) the financial and administrative autonomy, more in the way of a "private enterprise 
endeavor " 
(3) the Planning Team, the methodology, the process (simultaneous contacts, informal 
network, debates involving outsiders, knowledge of the region, previous experience 
of work, knowledge of data sources), the articulation (meaning of data in the 
reports, development of new adapted images, bridge as economic tool for economic 
recovery), the technical acceptance (by a wide number of professionals, what they 
said about the studies, respect for different opinions). 
INTERACTIVE PROCESSES AND NETWORKING 
Important enough is the information used by the GATTEL Planning Team. When the 
GATTEL was created several studies were developed or were under way. The municipalities 
were developing their municipal plans. They were going through a joint reflection about the 
wanted future for the metropolitan area, and the PROTAML was under way. Transportation 
plans, such as the National Road Plan and the Train System Plan, were also setting structuring 
policies for the area. Any of these activities implied the collection and structuring of data 
relevant to the studies the team had on its hands. 
An identification of the plans and public agencies producing information was the initial 
phase of a wide development of contacts (reaching to as many as 60 entities, as stated in a 
GATTEL report) with public agencies and consultants. The purpose of gathering the most 
updated information was twofold: to collect data covering the identified topics (land use, 
environment) and to involve consultants to give expert advice in areas crucial to the decision 
(e.g., ecology, geology). 
Frequently, these contacts with professionals working in several agencies began by being 
informal and tentative. Some of them got formalized, whenever the need justified it. The 
collection of information was set up as a two way flux, meaning that information provided by 
an agency was structured and returned to the source with value added for this agency use. 
Besides the advantage of creating trust, this procedure was beneficial to both sides in very 
political terms. 
One key source of information was still working on the data making difficult its 
accessibility - the Census of the Population of 1991. Some of the information was acquired in 
preliminary form and compared with other information for cross evaluation. Often, information 
that was not directly available was collected from surrogate sources, and worked to suit the 
needs. 
The information gathered in this way was debated by the group or with other participants, 
consultants and other GATTEL members. These debates had the advantage of building up 
meaning for the information and of articulating the knowlege of different fields. 
The information fluxes that were established, particularly with some consultants and 
municipal technicians and politicians, created informal forums that influenced the establishment 
of trust and credibility. These entities developed a key role in the process, being frequently 
responsible for the public use of information that might otherwise stay indoors within a 
restricted group. In this process of turning public issues that frequently stay indoors, the media 
was crucial to provide a space for debate. 
The breaking of the consensus among the political and technical entities, with the 
unexpected alternative, increased the level of controversy. Positions were radicalized once the 
Ministry of Public Works preference was made public. 
One of the groups showing greater opposition were the environmentalists. The need they 
felt to carry out studies and to defend their stand, encouraged them to work together in defining 
actions (e.g., meetings with public figures, media conferences, media statements), developing 
studies and exchanging information. Later on, a more expanded group including other 
environmental associations produced a joint publication on the location of the new bridge, 
giving their views on the issues and offering some proposals. Most of the information they 
used in all these activities was obtained in governmental studies (produced by public agencies). 
The GATTEL studies, particularly Documents 4 and 6, supported most of the environmental 
association analyses. Appreciations of the studies developed by the GATTEL Planning Team 
appear in the environmental associations joint publication222 though reference is made to the 
lack of some information they considered vital. 
222 Dossier Erros Histdricos de Ambiente - A Nova Ponte Sobre o Tejo enz Lisbon , GEOTA, IDD, LPN, 
Quercus. 1994. 
LACK OF TIME AND ROOM FOR REFRAMING THE PROBLEM 
There were "difficulties in redefining the problem", as one of the interviewees stated. 
Initially the problem was set in legislation as being the need of a national and regional North- 
South connection and the solution of congestion in the 25th of April Bridge. When none of the 
alternatives gave a good answer to both problems a third alternative emerged, assuming 
congestion as the main priority and relegating the North-South connection to a second plan. At 
this point there was a need to redefine the problem. But the rigid bureaucracy was unable to 
readapt to change with the high speed needed for complying with the tight due dates that were 
set. 
Plus, the redefinition of the problem is always difficult in a rational model setting more 
prone to an already accepted one solution problem. Furthermore, it is not an easy task for a 
bureaucratic structure to accept such change lightly. Moreover, the acceptance of change needs 
time, something that did not exist at this point. 
When the unexpected alternative emerged, highly recognised experts operating for long in 
the area confessed that they had never thought of it. They had also operated in the area for a 
long time and were frequently involved in teams making projects, plans or studies for the area, 
accepting as a given fact a future bridge in Montijo. 
Once the unexpected alternative was developed, and the connection between the bridge and 
the future image of Lisbon became powerful, people felt the need to reframe the problem. 
However, the process that had been set up, did not consider that possibility. 
The tight deadlines, made this even more difficult due to the need to assure an increased 
amount of time to carry on the task. 
The controversy grew inside and outside the government. The Ministry of Public Works 
pressured by the governmental agenda and, still adopting the top-down model of the 50's 
decided for the easiest choice, accepting the previous solution and saying that "bridges are not 
to stay in drawers." 
Since mechanisms for participation are limited in Portugal, it was not until a 50% toll 
increase in the existing bridge to pay for the bridge to be constructed in Montijo was enforced 
that the location issue of the new bridge was unburied again. How much is connected to the 
location, how much is connected to the imposed cost, or the equity of the situation (since "there 
is no other toll bridge in the country") is still to be uncovered. 
However, this conflict that began with peaceful "honking" next to the booths and grew to a 
one day blockage of the bridge, already costed the tax payers a 300 thousand contos media 
campaign, a revision on the bridge fares, popularity, and a special tow-truck that the 
Portuguese Highway Authority had to buy in order to prepare for the possibility of a second 
blockage. 
The return from summer vacation, with the new tolls being charged, brought again the 
expression of discontent through "honking", payment by check, payment with high bills or 
small coins, "car panes" in the booths, and forgotten wallets. Everything seemed to be a 
pretext to show public unacceptance of the government decision. 
This is a lesson to be learned by all of us. It is time to understant that if participation is a 
commitement of the government, some processes have to be designed differently to avoid 
unecessary costs generated by the groups that feel unheard. Plus, it is proved in the literature 
and there is evidence here, that group processes have led to more innovative solutions and 
greater consensus, besides educating the participants. 
GROUP PROCESSES 
What happened in between that changed the course of events? Maybe the critical point was 
the setting up of group processes. 
Possibly due to the extremely tight due dates and the dimension of the task they had in their 
hands, the methodology adopted by the GATTEL Planning Team had to be sped up in two 
ways. The methodology, itself resulting from a careful analysis of other cases (Svern, 
Normandy bridges) introduced an innovation shortening one of the project phases in order to 
make possible the execution of the task in the established schedule: instead of exhaustively 
analyzing all the possible alternatives, the initial phase would only consider possible corridors, 
like channels across the river, without analyzing detailed bridge locations. Each of these 
corridors had to have at least one feasible alternative. Secondly, data were sought 
simultaneously in several fronts. For this, several groups were created, as explained in the 
GATTEL documents, to collect needed information, while external consultants were hired to 
develop studies in several areas considered crucial. Frequently, these consultants sat with the 
GATTEL Planning Team and other GATTEL members arguing and debating about the 
information that was being collected and the issues that were being considered. 
The environmental associations were also creating a small scale group process when they 
gathered together to develop joint actions and to share ideas, at the same time as they were 
optimizing resources. This led to markedly different strategies and forms of operation that 
enhanced their credibility among professionals and politicians. They also initiated judicial 
forms of action and learned to operate in the wider settings of international environmental 
NGOs and EU institutions. 
LATE INVOLVEMENT OF STAKEHOLDERS 
Most of the involvement was done at the public agencies or consultant level, leaving little 
or no room for general items and interest group organizations. These were just allowed to 
follow up the process through the media. 
Starting in January 1991, the GATTEL developed the first report in April 1991 of that 
year. In FebruaryIMarch 1991 the decision of the Ministry of Public Works to construct the 
bridge in Montijo was publicly announced in the press. This choice was to be legitimized by 
the Council of Ministers only on July 1992. Between these two dates a flow of events took 
place filling in the news with opinions, positions and debates. 
Once the building contract was prepared, the GATTEL openned a tendering for the 
construction (January 1993) and the winner was selected. After this, an Environmental Impact 
Study was developed and submitted to public consultation. In the 24th of March of 1995, the 
contract was signed with the consortium that won the construction contract and the bridge 
construction starts. 
After the decision on the bridge conflict arised because of the chosen location, the 
evaluation of the EIS, and the Public Consultation procedure on the location. In the 
construction phase, conflict arose again, but this time under the accusation that the mitigation 
measures proposed in the EIS were not applied. 
The media had an important role. The media coverage brought to public forums issues that 
frequently stay indoors, increasing the potential for public participation. However, some of the 
interviewees considered that part of the information brought up by the media was highly 
inaccurate. 
Besides the high potential of the bridge to spatially reshape a whole metropolitan area, what 
makes this case so interesting is the public controversy generated over the solutions proposed 
and the amount of available information debated, changed and articulated during the whole 
process, by a large and wide group of participants. 
Though congestion and the North-South connection were stated in legislation as the issues 
to be addressed by the GATTEL, several other issues emerged, namely environmental 
protection, the future urban development model for the metropolitan area of Lisbon, the cost, 
technical problems of bridge construction, improvement of quality of life, infrastructured land, 
train conllection, location of the new airport. 
This whole debate led, among other things, to innovative processes of informal 
organization to deal with the issue. This is important as Portugal is in an early stage of the 
participation process and therefore it is in a period of designing adequate forms of institutions 
to calry out these tasks. 
The environmentalists considered the location of the bridge a crucial issue. In their words, 
"the construction in the East corridor will irreversibly damage the environment". Aware of their 
resource limitations and of the importance of such a decision, three environmental associations 
organized a joint team to carry out studies and collect information, and agreed on taking 
articulated action against the unwanted option. 
Later on, a joint effort of environmental associations, but this time expanded to include 
other ecological groups, produced a written document on the effects of the bridge that they sent 
to several National Assembly politicians and distributed to the population in a community 
outreaching action. 
SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS 
This case reveals the difficulties of opening public decisions to wider constituencies. 
Difficulties in integrating the views of a wider constituency in the decision have often led to 
limitations in carrying out decisions, additional costs in solving conflicts, or even the 
impossibility of implementing the projects. Conflicts can develop because part of the actors are 
not heard or the necessary political acceptance is not assured. They may cause project 
implementation delays or even lead to the impossibility of accomplishing the project. 
Conflicts such as the ones occurring in June 1994 in the 25th of April Bridge are an 
example of what can happen when there are difficulties in integrating the views of a wider 
constituency. People were demanding greater legitimacy and better justification of decisions as 
well as their involvement in the decision process. 
Overall, the process generated a lot of information and explored new ways of operation. 
Here is a summary of key relevant elements. 
Interactive processes -- development of forums 
Debates held in meetings of local technicians and politicians, before and after the GATTEL 
creation, contributed to a pool of shared knowledge among a wide group of professionals. The 
richness of this pool of knowledge played an important role in the way the process developed. 
The meetings held in the GATTEL, and later on in some municipalities, constitute the 
creation of new forums for debate, initiating a participative process unusual in this context, 
though mostly restricted to the technical sphere. Unfortunately, this initiative died too soon and 
had only limited implementation. It contributed, however, to create shared knowledge, though 
it did not effectively develop consensus. 
The environmental associations also developed forums for debates among them, sometimes 
expanded to a wider technical and political community. 
Shared knowledge 
The meetings had an educational effect on the participants, mostly from the technical 
community, developed shared meanings that would later on influence the credibility of the 
GATTEL Planning Team, as stated by the interviewees, and developed new ways of seeing the 
problem. 
Learning processes 
Participants in the meetings went through a "learning process". The debated issues 
generated more knowledge and new understanding, and framed a consensual image for the 
town among the technical community. 
The environmental associations revised their way of operation and got together to share 
scarce resources and to divide tasks. As one governmental specialist stated, "it was the bridge 
that united the environmental associations". For the first t d e  the government was challenged in 
the National Administrative Court and complaints were filed in European Union instances. 
The environmental NGOs learned how to move in the wider context of the European Union 
and how to become more strategically efficient. A trust network developed among them and 
with some of their international counterparts. They carried actions set up in joint discussions . 
Informal networking 
The meetings held with the wider technical community, and the ones held with the 
municipal politicians and technicans, established trust among participants that favored informal 
contacts keeping up a continuous feedback whenever necessary. A similar processes occured 
with the environmental associations. 
Value added information 
Informal networking provided relevant up dated data, frequently exchanged with the 
promise of some value added to it (e.g., that raw data received would be returned back already 
structured and analyzed). 
Innovation in the methodology -- shortening the process 
The development of a methodology fitting exceptionally tight due dates was considered a 
challenge by the GA'ITEL Planning Team. After this team analyzed the methodologies adopted 
in similar processes elsewhere it reached the conclusion that a new idea was necessary to 
shorten the study period. The methodology developed considers the study and selection of 
corridors, as pathways across the Tagus, before studying specific crossing alternatives. The 
definition of specific alternatives was to be done afterwards, only in the selected corridor(s), 
allowing for a significant reduction in the number of alternative crossings to be studied in detail 
and, consequently, to a reduction in the time necessary for the study. 
Recognition gained by technicians and environmentalists 
The high intellectual level attained by the debates organized by the GATTEL Planning 
Team received the recognition of the Steering Committee elements who often sat in their 
meetings. This might be one of the reasons why nothing written in the technical reports was 
substantially changed before consulting with the members of the GPT, as confirmed in the 
interviews. The douments issued by the GATTEL Planning team were recognized of high 
quality by the professional community, some of whose members acknowledge using them as 
sources of information. 
The environmental associations also gained credibility among politicians. They began to me 
more often consulted whenever a controversial environmental issue was at stake. 
Meaningful technical reports 
The substantial capacity of the GATTEL Planning Team to synthesize main aspects and to 
integrate the different sectors contributed to enhance the meaning of the technical reports. The 
most striking feature of these reports is that they were not merely descriptive, as frequently 
happens in this type of studies. They were interpretive, reporting on the implications of the 
different information analyzed. The several topics of the reports were articulated and made 
sense. 
Articulating the political bureaucracy with the more interactive process 
Until a certain point, the GATTEL Planning Team was successful in defining a working 
process that integrated a bureaucratic system with a more participative one. This was done by 
allowing the two processes to coexist independently, keeping them open to each other, and 
allowing for the opportunity to establish the link between both when the participants so wish. 
Something like keeping the door always open for cross participation between the two settings. 
Though the methodology adopted was based in the logic of the rational instrumental model, 
defining specifically which areas belong to the decision level and which ones to the technical 
level, the process led by the GPT operated pretty much as a group process, stimulating a wider 
involvement. 
In fact, the debates carried out by the GPT on a continuous basis were always open to 
other GATTEL members who frequently joined them. This does not necessarily mean that they 
shared the same views, but that they had the opportunity to be exposed to the debates. This 
practice might have also contributed to enhance the credibility of the GPT in the eyes of the 
higher level hierarchy. 
This represented an important contribution to enhance the compatibility of operation of two 
types of entities (a bureaucratic and a more interactive one), but a further effort is still required 
to integrate in the process other organizations, such as interest associations, to assure the 
integration of the views of a wider constituency. The distinct rules and procedures of these 
institutions makes it rather difficult to render compatible their working together. A gap of 
communication between the two is present due to the difficulties of mutual understanding and 
their distinct modes of operation. A good example of this is the whole process developed by 
the environmental NGOs which complained of difficulties in integrating their views in the more 
bureaucratic public administration settings. 
New information, new solutions 
New information was produced in working papers, newspaper articles, joint publications 
of the NGOs. Part of it was available to public access. Information was challenged, used, 
transformed and new approaches were proposed (e.g., the only train bridge connection in the 
central corridor suggested by the environmental associations). 
New organizations 
Interest organizations (Montijo and Alcochete Association for Defense of the Quality of 
Life (AMA), 25th of April Bridge Users Association) emerged, due directly or indirectly to the 
issue under consideration. Some of them assumed expanded roles afterwards. 
Learning with the case 
I described several positive effects of the studied case, because I believe that the successes 
of the case teach us lessons for the future. Most people consider that this case was not different 
from other public decisions. I argue against it. I think this case was unique and constitutes an 
example of the paradigm shift from the representative towards the participative democracy in 
Portugal. As one of the interviewees stated, "this process was a good systematic revealer of the 
inadequacy of the merely representative decision process." It may be argued that the final 
decision on the location was political and ignored the technical information produced. 
However, the process created an intellectual capital that gained the respect of the government 
and forced the bureaucratic administration to revise its modes of operation. 
Vertical links missing 
Horizontal communication links were most successfully established, but vertical links were 
missing ( G A T E L  - government; environmental associations - GATTEL Steering Committee - 
central government, municipalities - GATTEL). Furthermore, weak links among the ministries 
may have resulted from the perceived hierarchy existing in our public system. 
Lack of a consensual problem definition 
The ambiguity in the way the problem was defined and the never established hierarchy of 
the objectives left substantial room for each actors to define the issue according to their interests 
and views. 
This process involved mostly professionals, leaving out the common citizens, who felt 
neglected and ignored by the government. Professionals, though interacting actively, felt that 
their technical advice was ignored by the central administration. Maybe this can partially 
explain the events on the 25th of April Bridge. As an interviewee put it, the basic thought was: 
"They did it, they should pay for it", referring to the government. Citizens and wider 
constituencies felt disconnected of the decision of the Minister of Public Works and the 
government. They considered that a lot of knowledge created during the process was either 
ignored or only partially used. 

CHAPTER V 
FINDINGS 
THE MEANING OF INFORMATION 
The public and even close observers of policy making often think that if information is not 
used in a decision it is not used at all. In this case, most people thought that information was 
not used because the Minister of Public Works did not consider it in the decision. Due to that, 
they called the decision "merely political". 
Based on this research, I concluded that this is a misleading and partial assessment. I think 
there was plenty of information, and that information was used, reframed, and restructured. It 
might be that the Minister did not use it for his decision. This does not mean that information 
was not used by many participants, nor that it was not influential. 
I consider that information is used when it makes a difference. When people look at it, talk 
about it, think in particular ways because of it. It makes a difference in the way they perceive 
an issue. It is in this process that information may influence people's views. It may lead people 
to reformulate their perspectives, or it may bring new ideas. It is while doing these things that 
they use information. It is in this process that information influences them as they learn. Data 
per se is not influential. To become influential it has to fit a purpose, it has to explain 
something and to be connected to some idea so that people can understand it. That is why it is 
important for the participants to put information in the light of a problem. This is what can 
happen in group discussions. While doing so people begin understanding information, and 
changes in the way they see the problem may occur. 
Frequently changes in people's views happen in a subtle way. People sit down, think 
about the problem, talk about it, relate the issues, get nuances and suddenly some idea fits in. 
This new idea resulted from reflecting and maturing the information in the context of the issue. 
It is a sophisticated process that moves along by itself. It is not something you can put the 
finger on. This process was identified in the literature as the "enlightenment" (Janovitz 1970, 
Weiss 1977), meaning that information influences without being actively used (directly 
translated into a decision). It is the most effective way that information gets used in policy. 
"Information influences plans and public actions by becoming embedded in the thought, our 
practices, and institutions of a community. Thus, when information is most influential, it is also 
most invisible." (Innes, 1995) 
There is plenty of evidence in this case that information was widely used. The GATTEL 
Planning team used it while discussing the issue, reframing the problem or coming up with a 
new crossing alternative. Environmental associations referred to it when working together 
trying to avoid irreversible environmental damage in the estuary. The team working in the Land 
Use Plan for the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon used it when defining the policies for the region. 
Municipalities dealt with it while developing their municipal plans. Professional groups used it 
to construct their arguments when they got together to discuss the issue of the bridge. Political 
parties analyzed it in search for a position on the bridge issue. 
The GATTEL Planning Team (GPT) was the main group using information to address the 
specific issue of the crossing in the early stages of the process. Their task was to study the 
location of the new crossing over the Tagus estuary. The core of the GPT, without knowing its 
consequences, created a group process. That made the team members use information in a way 
very different from the usual in similar cases. This team sat regularly together, compared notes, 
discussed information being collected, identified further data needs, brainstormed about 
possible crossing alternatives on the light of information (e.g., the maps with the North and 
South road network) and identified the advantages and disadvantages of each option, drawing 
out of their knowledge of the region and out of available data. While doing so they used 
information. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE GATTEL PLANNING TEAM (GTP) 
The GPT was organized as an interactive process supported by data generated by a set up 
structure designed by its coordinator. The GPT was constituted by a core team and several 
subgroups. These subgroups worked directly under the supervision of the coordinator of the 
GPT (see Chapter IV). They were responsible for specific tasks mostly related to the 
collection, analysis and interpretation of data. Therefore, their function was mostly to prepare 
information to be used by the core GPT. Four individuals integrated the core group of the 
GATTEL Planning Team. This group included two professionals in transportation (the 
coordinator and a member working in close connection with him), an urban planner and an 
environmental engineer. While the first three already knew each other and had worked together 
before, the last one was brought into the process by the representative of the Ministry of the 
Environment in the Steering Committee. 
This is important because the three members already acquainted had previously developed a 
common understanding of some issues under debate in the region. When they started they 
already had a common language and they shared understandings of the way the town operated. 
For example, they shared the view that transportation and allocation of land uses depend 
strongly on each other. This meant that by the time they started this job, they had already 
overcome the first stage of a group process, the phase of building trust. Meaning, that they 
shared social and intellectual capital. 
THE SET UP OF INTERACTIVE PROCESSES 
Two features of this group are important here. One is the fact that the group started with 
experience of working together and with some common understandings. The other is that the 
amount of time for getting started could be less than a group with unacquainted members. The 
usual first stage of group processes took place before they began. This is an important reason 
information was used. The team departed from a more advanced stage than most groups and its 
members had already discussed a part of the information before. There are good chances that 
these two reasons had a great contribution to an effective use of information and facilitated the 
establishment of the group process since the very beginning. This core group of the GPT was a 
key player in the whole process of this case study. 
The members of this team relied on their knowledge, on the information produced by the 
subgroups of the GPT, and on the work of consultants hired to respond to specific "holes" in 
the data -- the important information missing. They also used data from previous 
transportation and planning studies done for the region by various entities. Team members 
reported that networking was also a good way to collect information. The team members saw it 
as a mode to have access to up to date information, particularly to data that was not public yet. 
This is important, as at that time several public agencies were collecting information which was 
not yet prepared in public form (e.g., the municipal plans going on in the region, the National 
Institute of Statistics at the time collecting information for the National Census on Population 
and Housing). It was mostly through networking that the GPT was able to get a lot of new 
information. When they were asked why would someone be willing to give them such 
information, the answer was that much of it was done on the basis of trust. But there was more 
to it. 
In fact, the team got often data in raw form, worked it, oganized it and structured it (e.g., 
by aggregating data counts in tables). Afterwards, they gave this treated information back to the 
agency that had supplied it. It is this value-added information that made a difference. Some of 
the agencies supplying raw information recognized that they did not have the personal or 
financial resources to deal with the collected data in time to be useful for to GATTEL team. 
These entities reported satisfaction to receive this data back in a more elaborated form. They 
were also happy to have this data handled in a shorter period of time than if they had to do it. It 
is this value-added to information that made a difference. 
This assistance to data providers also helped to build trust and credibility of the GATTEL 
Planning team among professionals. More, the expanded networking generated with this 
mechanism of collecting information also encouraged interaction with a wider number of 
professionals working in other agencies. These professionals, when interviewed, reported a 
good professional interaction with the members of the GPT. 
During my initial contacts, and even in interviews afterwards, all the members of the GPT 
core showed a good working relationship with each other, a strong commitment towards the 
study developed (e.g., a sense of proud for having produced a good study in such a short 
time), and a sense of connection towards the other members of the group. This is what 
happens when a group process establishes a positive interactive process and people listen to 
one another and jointly solve a problem. While talking to them I found interesting that their 
enthusiasm for the project overcame the long intensive working hours required by the urgency 
of the study. What counted for them was the quality of the study produced. This shows a 
strong commitment to the project, feature often generated in group processes but less frequent 
in more solitary analysis or standard bureaucratic procedures. 
It is the ties established between the team members, their common understandings and their 
commitment, supported by a positive interaction, that contributes to explaining the quality of 
the documents produced by this team. The networking established with the wider professional 
community also contributed to the credibility achieved by the team. In fact, people interviewed 
confirmed that the GPT documents were widely accepted as accurate and fair. Even 
professionals with different views on the issue had a good impression about the work outcome 
of the GPT. For example, one of the coordinators of a previous plan, who considered Montijo 
as the priority choice1, also accepted that in the longer range a bridge in the Barreiro would be 
important. 
Even documents that received little public exposure represented high quality work. For 
example, the characterization (Document 3 of GATTEL) of the metropolitan area, one of the 
documents with least public exposure, is an exhaustive excellent description of the region 
profile, historical and recent trends, besides interpreting the urban and transportation 
It was the only connection presented in the plan he led. 
development in a interconnected way. Usually, documents characterizing an area are mostly 
descriptive, giving a few or no clues to how each analyzed factor influences the other. They 
frequently present good descriptive work of each component, but put little or no emphasis in 
the interconnections between them. In fact, from my professional knowledge on existing 
studies, plans and projects, I concluded that this is a study of quality, which has more than a 
merely descriptive objective, incorporating the interpretive aspects. It goes further than the 
'business as usual' in the analysis of data. In the words of one interviewee: 
"Document 3 is an important document with all the ideas of characterization of the AML. It is a 
great document for anyone willing to do something in the AML ... It used other studies and 
articulated them. This document is important in the study of the AML in terms of characterization 
of the territory . . . It gave support to Document 4" (urban planner) 
I think that what made the difference here was the on going interactive process that favored a 
more elaborated approach to information. This meant that the team could present more nuances 
and to develop a sophisticated characterization. 
I think that the characterization study is one more proof that the level of understanding on 
the issues could only be achieved because the team worked in an interactive way putting 
information together, discussing the issues, and collectively making sense out of the data in 
relation to wider issues and their context. It is true that most of the members of the team were 
very knowledgeable of the region when they started working for GATTEL, but what the study 
shows is not only a good description of each component but a logical interconnection between 
the several factors making sense out of them. 
The core of the GPT met on a regular basis to debate the information assembled in the light 
of the problem. One participant refers to these meetings: 
"I felt strongly in these discussions the logic of the arguments for the X corridor. .... The 
brainstormings were very important. There were very special minds (brains) discussing. This made 
the Steering Committee members sit in some of these meetings." ( G A W  member) 
While getting together and debating the data they generated more knowledge. That made a 
difference in the way they saw the problems. All the team members considered that these 
meetings were very interesting and they showed real enthusiasm about the work going on in 
these instances. 
Other GATTEL members, not part of the GPT core team (e.g., people of the Steering 
Committee or other professionals such as infrastructure specialists also part of the GATTEL), 
joined the debates in these meetings and contributed to the discussions. As a member put it "the 
discussions in these meetings were so interesting that frequently the other members of 
GATTEL came and became part of the debate". Furthermore, several consultants hired to do 
some specific studies for GATTEL (e.g. the team developing an environmental study for the 
Lisbon region), also got frequently involved and contributed with additional knowledge for 
these debates. This was an important exercise because it provided the opportunity to brainstorm 
on all possible alternatives, and identified the goods and bads of each one of them. While doing 
this the team integrated the ideas of a wider range of people than just the group. As explained 
by one of the members of the GATTEL Planning Team, each option was submitted to a 
thorough scrutiny. According to his explanation, this meant that the team identified and listed 
the good points and the bad points (as "devil's advocate") of each option. Here are some 
accounts of participants: 
"I felt strongly the logic of the arguments of X (in favor of the) W corridor. It characterized a type 
of land use that I doubt will happen. (I think that) a greater (urban) concentration would be 
generated in that area and the remaining of the Peninsula (of Setlibal) would be away from 
development. The C solution decompressed all this and allowed for the requalification of those axes 
always forgotten." (GATTEL member) 
"We tried to see what the three corridors would generate in land use models for the Peninsula of 
Setu'bal. We evaluated the impacts over the consolidated system." (urban planner) 
These sessions took place during the process. Participants used information to support the 
points being made, they discussed it, reformulated it, and invoked it. 
INFORMATION PUT IN THE LIGHT OF THE PROBLEM 
At the beginning, before the GPT was set up, most people, including the team members, 
consensually accepted that Montijo was the choice. When hired, the GPT accepted the tight due 
dates. Instead of the usual six to eight years required for studying the location, in similar 
processes elsewhere, they agreed to complete the study in one year. The explanation offered by 
one of the members of the GPT was that "it was a piece of cake". The team members saw their 
work as a choice between two alternatives, one of which was the "duplication of the existing 
bridge", in the process just for "the sake of comparison" or as a "merely academicw2 option. 
The other was the historical alternative, generally agreed upon by the technical community as 
the right solution at that time. At this stage there was a general agreement and no conflict about 
it. 
The GPT initiated the study with the conviction that their task was to find the best crossing 
alternative. In the team view the goal of improving congestion was the one with highest 
priority. When asked about the North-South connection, the other objective stated in the 
legislation, most professionals responded that it was addressed by the future bridge proposed 
for Carregado up stream the Tagus, in the National Road Plan. Therefore, the team focused 
essentially in solving the congestion issue. 
Most of the team views were strongly built on previous information on the crossings, some 
of them already one century old. The team members knew about the plans, the projects and the 
debates on the issue of the crossing, and shared some agreed upon conceptions of the problem 
with the professional community. All the written documents I went through and all the people 
interviewed said that initially they thought the bridge could be in Montijo. Municipal plans 
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being developed for the area at that time often took this assumption into account. Moreover, 
written documents issued from recent debates carried on with the participation of the 
metropolitan municipal politicians and technicians to discuss the future of the metropolitan area 
as a contribution to the land use plan for the region, also shared this view. 
During my analysis of the documents and my talks with the people, the two relevant 
alternatives under discussion before the GPT started were the ones on the table at the beginning 
of the process. The general agreement among the professional community then favored the 
construction in the East corridor (Montijo). The more recent documents analyzed stuck to the 
above mentioned two alternatives, giving priority to the East solution. What this shows is a 
shared acceptance of a bridge construction in the East corridor (Montijo) among most of the 
professional community. 
GENERATION OF ALTERNATIVES 
Searching for alternatives, the GPT brainstormed to identify all the possibilities for 
crossing the Tagus estuary. When asked how they had done that, one of the interviewees 
explained that they looked at the maps showing the transportation networks of the North and 
South banks and established all the main possible connections between the two networks. 
Therefore, what they did was to use information (the maps) to generate the possible links 
between these two networks. A member of the GATTEL, when interviewed, identified these 
professionals as 
"people used to looking at maps." 
What this shows is that the possibility to read visual information - maps - was part of the 
team skills. It also shows that the way to generate the alternatives was by putting together 
existing information in the light of the problem. In this case, the team drew the possible main 
connections between the two networks shown in the maps. The development of all possible 
crossings was a result of people looking at information - the maps - and using their views 
and knowledge to suggest the possible connections. 
Part of the alternatives identified this way were similar to the ones raised in previous 
documents (studies for the existing bridge, municipal plans, written technical advice, 
transportation projects). The team carried out a tight scrutiny of the alternatives to identify 
possible positive and negative effects associated with each one, and listed them. Information 
generated this way became part of the report they produced comparing options. This report 
became widely known by politicians and professionals working in the region. A lot of this 
information was used later on by the GATTEL members, by professionals working in the area 
and by politicians, while arguing and defending their views on the issue. The GATTEL 
documents did not consider all the alternatives generated during these brainstorming sessions, 
just the ones feasible for construction. 
In fact, after the brainstorming sessions to identify alternatives and strong and weak points, 
some of the considered crossings were eliminated because the team found them impossible to 
construct due to several reasons. For example, in the case of the crossing linking the 
downtown plaza (Terreiro do P a ~ o )  with the South, one team member identified disruption of 
the Baixa Pombaline as the explanation for abandoning alternative. The team thought that the 
idea to disrupt an important downtown historical area would be unacceptable. Once more 
information influenced their decision to abandon this option. 
INNOVATIVE FEATURES 
The GPT new procedure for selecting the location of alternatives 
The need to increase process efficiency to comply to the tight due dates imposed, made the 
GPT coordinator search for information. By putting information together, he was able to come 
up with a creative solution. The methodology developed by the coordinator, in search of 
reducing the length of the procedure for the initial part of the selection and comparison of 
alternatives, shows creativity and was identified by some interviewees as innovative. The 
proposed mode of operation resulted from putting together information on similar cases of 
locational decisions and framing the issue to respond to the need in shrinking the procedure 
time length. Therefore, the coordinator of the GPT, conscious of the need to comply to the 
tight due dates, analyzed the methodology of several similar projects carried out elsewhere. 
While doing so he developed a way to reduce the amount of time initially needed to identify and 
compare the alternatives. 
His idea was to begin by assembling the alternatives in corridors and to study only 
afterwards the impacts on land use, environment, transportation resulting from construction of 
an alternative in one of these corridors, instead of considering a more detailed analysis for each 
of the alternatives at the outset. It differed from the usual procedure because instead of 
analyzing each identified alternative per se, what would require more time due to their number, 
it follows initially a more comprehensive approach at the corridor level. A detailed analysis of 
each alternative is only carried out after selecting the preferred corridors, and just for the 
alternatives in the selected corridor. 
With this in mind, the alternatives were assembled into corridors. As defined in the new 
procedure, a corridor could only be considered if it contained at least one feasible crossing 
Name given to the downtown of Lisbon, after Marqu2s de Pornbal the Prime Minister at that time who ordered 
the reconstruction of the downtown area after the Lisbon earthquake in 1755. 
alternative for construction. This rule almost eliminated the central corridor - the one 
containing the new unexpected alternative -- due to concerns with the feasibility of land 
insertion of this alternative. This was because it seemed difficult to insert a bridge in an area of 
dense urban occupation in the North bank. Therefore, a team member and a bridge construction 
specialist ("a man of the bridges" as stated by one interviewee) went on a field exploration. 
After considering the possibilities in loco, they concluded that the construction was possible. 
One of the interviewees said: 
"We almost abandoned Barreiro (option). For a while we could not establish a design that satisfied 
us. It was only at the end, in a visit to the place (where the bridge would be anchored), that we 
solved successfully the design." (GATEL member) 
I 
Furthermore, this alternative also allowed for the installation of a train crossing connecting the 
Northern and Southern train networks, a solution long sought by transportation professionals. 
What this example shows is that a mix of indoor and outdoor field work to gather 
information is frequently needed to analyze the options, without which important knowledge 
may be lacking. Such qualitative study is frequently not referred in the reports issued 
afterwards, as happened in this case. Though people fail to mention this type of data (may be 
because it is not considered scientific information), it very often plays a relevant role in 
bringing knowledge to the process. This is obvious an example of such a case. 
Some specialists argue that if the expert hired is good he is able to assure that all the data 
needed will be collected and analyzed. This may be true to one solution type of problems, but 
may fail in more complex, multidisciplinary issues. In these cases professionals can hardly 
exhaustively cover all the needed data. Frequently, more data becomes needed when some new 
solution is proposed, in order to analyze its possibilities. Moreover, sometimes the lack of 
information is more a lack of knowledge of the real world than of some scientific information. 
Since, little or no importance is given to this type of data, it is frequently omitted from the 
reports, even when used. In the present case, this shows that even a team with substantial data 
and a much knowledge about the metropolitan area still lacked some information. They had to 
gather it directly from reality, and as a direct response to a need felt due to a new alternative 
developed during the process and not thought before. In fact, what happened was that this new 
alternative, developed indoors, required further information to confirm the feasibility of its 
construction. This shows that by using information new options could be generated. When this 
happens additional data can be necessary to assert their implementation. This happened because 
information was missing and because a new alternative made people realize they needed more 
information. 
The reason I described in more detail the procedure of generation of alternatives resulted 
from my conviction that the literature offers little understanding on the processes of option 
development, frequently summarizing this stage as "then the alternatives were generated". 
Usually, the literature does not specify how people got down to the alternatives or how they 
operated to identify the options. This also happened with people during my interviews. When 
they were asked how they got to the alternatives, they showed surprise with the question and 
simply said that they looked at the data and identified the alternatives. It took me several days, 
and long conversations with different participants on the meetings, until one of them explained 
that they looked at the maps and connected the North and South road networks, describing the 
process in more detail. 
This case is a clear example of people reporting having used information but with 
difficulties in identifying how they used it, or how it influenced the results of the process. It is 
this process of generation of alternatives, by looking at the visual information, and putting 
together knowledge through debate, that allowed the GPT to develop a new alternative, that 
had not been previously conceived, or much less considered. 
The new alternative caught everybody by surprise. Part of the explanation why it was 
developed is that when a group integrates information from different sources and from different 
sectors within a problem frame, there are good chances an idea for a new solution appears. The 
composition of the team shows that the approach followed was multidisciplinary involving 
three main components: land use, transportation and environment. Therefore, information 
generated in different fields came into the debate. When the team members met and discussed 
the information in the light of the problem, this originated a different way to see the issue, 
made them review their views and while doing it, they came up with a new alternative. For 
example, when they came up with the Barreiro option by connecting the two road networks 
(North and South) that made sense. They were searching for all possible connections and here 
it was one that nobody had seen before. Because, probably, nobody had the mission to identify 
all possible alternatives. They were concerned with other issues within the metropolitan area 
and, therefore, were taking for granted information that already existed on possible crossings. 
The new option in Barreiro had not emerged before because this was the first time that a 
group of professionals was given the job to collectively find the best crossing alternative of the 
estuary, though a lot of information used in this case had also been used previously. 
Professionals of the region used part of the information before, when they worked for other 
type of studies. For doing this, forums were organized. In the eighties two forums assumed 
importance for our case. One, gathering representatives of seven Northern municipalities of the 
AML to discuss the accessibilities and the road network, was described by one participant: 
"Several meetings were held with some results, mainly in the merging of points of analyses, 
views, contacts, mutual acquaintances, which allowed substantial progress ... they allowed to 
assess in a more shared way a set of problems." ( ~ p . 2 ) ~  
The other was a series of collective debates carried out to decide on the future development of 
the metropolitan area, by the initiative of two mayors and involving local politicians and 
technicians. In the oppening address, the Mayor of one of the municipalities said: 
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"need for dialogue to assess the shared problems and tune a strategy of options which will 
effectively allow a consonance between the several decision levels." ( ~ p . 1 ) ~  
These individuals got together to discuss the main issues of the metropolis, as a contribution to 
the coming Land Use Plan for the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon. Their purpose was to decide 
what future image for the metropolitan area they wanted, not to discuss a new crossing over the 
Tagus. Their problem definition was to agree on the future image for the metropolis and not to 
find the best crossing alternative. Information was used to address their objective. The analysis 
of the written documents issued from these meetings and the talks I had with several of the 
participants showed that the bridge crossings considered in the discussions were those already 
exposed. More, though the crossing of the Tagus was talked over, this issue was subsidiary 
and seen by the specialists as with no immediate urgency. They did not generate a new 
crossing alternative, but presumably have technically influenced the crossing alternative with 
the ideas generated in the debate. They probably prepared the grounds for the future 
development. 
More than anything else, it is the setting up of a group (the GATTEL) to study the new 
crossing alternative for the Tagus that made professionals use information in the context of a 
new problem definition - the best bridge location. These professionals used information in the 
light of this new problem definition. While doing that they saw what nobody had seen before, 
as stated by one of the interviewees: 
"It is incomprehensible how it took so long to find out." 
adding, 
"No one had seen what was under our eyes." 
Maybe it was under their eyes, but the truth is that all the forums emerging in the Metropolitan 
Area at that time had other issues in the agenda and this was just a subsidiary element, taken for 
granted in the form of the previous discussed alternatives. Therefore, information was used, 
but for other purposes, not to find the best crossing alternative. 
Several people confirmed that the GATTEL was the first example of an agency (or group) 
that was specifically created with the objective of defining the best crossing across the Tagus 
(or so the team thought). Some interviewees identified this as the reason that provided the 
opportunity to create a new crossing alternative. What they meant was that it was the first time 
data was seen in the light of a new crossing of the estuary. 
What happens in such a group can be understood by analogy to the story of the elephant 
and the four blind men. There were four blind men and an elephant. The blind men were asked 
to describe the elephant. The first blind men leans against the elephant body and describes it as 
a wall. The other grabs one of the legs of the elephant and thinks it is a tree. The third one 
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touching the elephant td identifies it as a brush. The fourth touches the elephant trunk and says 
it is just like a snake. What this means is that each one of them had an understanding of a part 
of the elephant, but failed to have the overall picture. To draw the comprehensive picture they 
must put all the information together. This story illustrates that the independent interpretation of 
the parts by individuals, even if absolutely accurate, may fail to give the overall picture. 
Integration of the environmental component 
The integration of the environmental component as a basic dimension of the problem 
increased the number of factors playing a role in this process, and meant it was more likely 
they would reframe the issue. In previous transportation studies environmental concerns were 
at best subsidiary. The introduction of the environmental component is seen as an innovation 
by several interviewees (e.g., GATTEL and environmental association members). It was the 
first time the government included a representative of the Ministry of Environment in such a 
process. For a long time before, locational decisions of big infrastructures were the exclusive 
responsibility of the Ministry of Public Works. In a business as usual procedure, it was 
common that a team of this Ministry would strictly operate within its limits. Most information 
would stay unknown to the technical community and the public in general. 
In this case, the environmental component was a concern of the government since the 
creation of the GATTEL. The GATTEL Steering Committee included, from the beginning, a 
representative of the Ministry of Environment. These are the reasons, suggested by the 
interviewees why the Government wanted to include the environmental component into the 
process: 
(l) a will to carry out, or to make it look, a more credible process due to the new 
environmental concerns of the population andlor the new requirements imposed by the 
EECIEU (since an application for EU funds would have to be made), 
(2) the general conviction of politicians and professionals at the start of the GATTEL, that 
the process was non. conflictual due to the several years the issue existed and the initial 
agreement of the professional community in the initial phases of the process, 
(3) the advice from the initial group, part of them future elements of the Steering 
Committee of the GATTEL who were responsible to establish the structure of the 
GATTEL and were eager to develop a sound work, 
(4) the mythical meaning of a bridge to the population in general and to the image of a 
politician, as revealed by the names given to the existing bridge: first Salazar Bridge6, 
and later on 25th of April Bridge7. 
After the political strong man of the authoritarian regime at the time. 
After the date of the military coup that in 1974 overthrew the old regime. 
Environmental issues were assumed to be essential to the decision. Anyway, the 
acceptance that the inclusion of environmental considerations in the decision was decisive 
meant an additional concern beyond what used to be considered before. As a result, the issue 
of the bridge location is shifted from only finding the best solution in transportation (with 
mobility playing a central role) and land use terms (with concerns for land development), to 
include the need to consider the effects on the environment. 
Compared with previous similar studies, in this case a substantial amount of environmental 
data existed and was integrated in the process, influencing the participants views. The 
environmental study requested by the GATTEL from a leading environmental association 
contributed, in the early stages of the process, to the environmentalists' conviction that the 
bridge decision was going to be a "model case". The environmental study, and the interaction 
of the GPT with the environmental consultant of that team, supported the analysis of the 
environmental impacts expected for each corridor. This shows that a substantial amount of 
environmental data existed and was integrated in the process, influencing the views of the 
participants. One of the main consequences of the consideration of environmental information 
by the professionals was to make participants be aware that the Montijo option anchored in the 
Southern bank next to an area of high ecological value. A second effect of this information was 
that it was not just the short range direct impact of the bridge construction that was negative to 
the environment, but also the future impacts resulting from creating new accessibilities. In 
sum, what this shows is that the introduction of the environmental component made a major 
difference. First, it challenged the long accepted Montijo option. Second, it made participants 
more aware of long term consequences on the environment in a broad sense. 
The GATTEL private sector mode of operation 
People I interviewed thought that the origin of the GATTEL President in the private sector 
was an important factor in malung the process work efficiently. He was also a man who had 
the confidence of the Minister of Public Works. These two features played a role in his 
management practice. He brought to the GATTEL the form of operation of a private entity. 
This was confirmed by several people working in or hired by the G A T E L .  Professionals saw 
the private mode of operation as more efficient than the usual public functioning. The effects of 
the private mode of operation are obvious in several parts of the process. For example, in the 
tight compliance to the due dates, which bureaucracy usually handles with more flexibility. The 
GPT complied to the due dates initially imposed and issued the outcomes accordingly to the 
phasing chart previously established, even after some unexpected developments along the 
process. 
The process organized with the creation of the GATTEL represented a change in the way 
public processes are set up. The team assembled independent professionals who were not 
directly dependent from the Ministry of Public Works - the GATIEL Planning Team. Such a 
group worked differently from 'business as usual' and offered the GPT considerable space for 
autonomy, favoring creativity. Group processes become creative when they have sufficient 
independence to carry on debates on information. When they are solving problems and 
everyone can talk and learn. While doing so, the groups create their own dynamics and the 
participants debate data in the light of the problem. The result can be a new solution integrating 
information on different subjects. It is the interaction generated among the participants of these 
meetings, based on trust and shared meanings, that establishes the context for the generation of 
innovative options. Since the GPT created a group process this became possible, though it is 
doubtful that the GATTEL realized it at the outset or explicitly intended to achieve it. 
CONSEQUENCES OF NEW INFORMATION GENERATED 
All these discussions and conclusions were a direct result of looking at information in 
the light of the problem and understanding data in response to the several interests of the 
metropolitan area. It was the use of information that generated the new alternative. It is also due 
to the use of information that the chosen option fit better the problem from the perspectives of 
several players (e.g., environmentalists, urban planners). It is, once more, information that 
influences the reframing of the problem and shifts the debate to new grounds - the desired 
model of development for the metropolitan area. 
The unexpected alternative quickly got supporters among environmentalists and urban 
planners. The former saw this new solution as an opportunity to avoid the irreversible 
environmental damage foreseen in the Montijo option. The latter, saw it as an opportunity to 
link two urban areas, instead of an urban area in the North to a rural area in the South. This 
came as an opportunity to avoid the error of three decades ago when the existing bridge was 
constructed, generating a new front of development. This new solution suited well 
environmentalists and a new generation of urban planners who show growing concern with 
sustainability. 
The attention of professionals concerned with the location of the new bridge shifted from 
congestion to the restructuring of the metropolitan area, and forced the confrontation of two 
models of development. One that for long defends new poles of development to decentralize 
the town, and a new one that calls for the "reknitting of the urban tissue" by directing growth to 
the already infrastructured vacant urban spaces, rather than creating new fronts of 
development. 
The position of urban planners was strongly supported by recent evidence that demand for 
land development was slowing down due to declining demographic trends. Moreover, there 
was a general conviction among specialists working in municipal plans that there was plenty of 
infrastructured unoccupied land available. 
Therefore, the new alternative fit better the model of development of the metropolitan area 
and responded positively to the on going debate among local politicians and professionals 
working in the area. This debate started before the GATTEL was created, when municipal 
politicians and technicians got together to discuss the future of the metropolitan area. The idea, 
then, was to contribute views to the land use plan under way. 
It is the unexpected alternative developed by the GAITEL during the process that generated 
a lot of conflict and forced a great amount of people to reformulate the problem and to change 
their views. After the new option appeared, professionals concentrated in comparing the 
Montijo and Barreiro solutions, and the West alternative was dropped out. While analyzing 
these two crossing possibilities the team became convinced of the advantages of the new 
option. Among the four main reasons advanced in favor of the Barreiro option, only 
congestion was originally given: 
- it solves conpestion best 
Because the central option is the best connection between the residences of the 
commuters using the existing bridge and their place of work, it would serve better the 
users of the existing bridge and, therefore, it was the best solution to divert traffic. 
- it was located well away from sensitive natural areas 
Since this alternative was more towards the West it was located further away from an 
important natural area, responding better to environmental concerns. Plus, the fact that it 
connects two urban areas was also appealing to the environmentalists. They opposed 
strongly the connection between densely populated areas in the North bank and rural 
areas in the South, because they saw it as an encouragement for urban development in 
agricultural fields. 
- it connected two declining urban areas and could operate as a "tool of recovery" 
This was a powerful argument in the process. It was particularly suitable to the urban 
planners concerned with the declining of some areas in town. This option increased 
accessibility and, therefore, professionals saw it as a good device to cure the ongoing 
difficulties felt in those areas. 
- it allowed for the North-South connection by train line 
This was thought by several participants as a good reason to select the central corridor. 
The connection of the Northern and Southern train networks is not a new issue. Several 
professionals, particularly transportation specialists, raised it often, as an important piece 
needed to complete the national train network. 
INFORMATION INFLUENCED CHANGES OF POSITIONS 
The use of information during the process influenced the way people saw the problem and 
was responsible for the changes in people's views. Interviewees identified several 
professionals who initially rejected the Barreiro option, but became enthusiastic defenders of 
the new option afterwards. They rejected it first until they learned how it would work. Though 
this new alternative caught a lot of people by surprise and many participants initially rejected it, 
gradually it gained support as players looked at the information, analyzed it, reflected on it, and 
talked to other participants about it. Then, understanding was developed as players used 
information in the discussions over different options. For each option they put together 
knowledge of several components and they came out with articulated explanations and 
meaning. For example, the image of the potential increase of accessibility through the central 
bridge as a tool of recovery of declining urban areas is a result of putting several factors 
together: 
(1) that a bridge increases accessibility, 
(2 )  that areas with increased accessibility undergo development, 
(3) that, in declining areas, development is likely to invert the process of decline. 
Among the professionals recognizing that the new alternative came up as a shock is one of 
the GPT members. This member acknowledged that the image that came to mind hearing about 
the new option was 
"a battalion of cars entering Lisbon and clogging the city". 
This, because the interviewee saw the connection as a traffic generator since it linked a 
populated Southern urban area to Lisbon. The views of this GPT member were based in 
another underlying assumption that contributed to the position assumed - the perception that 
all cars would be discharged in only one exit. As the discussion continued the team member 
realized that the link was supposed to work as a distributor, a thoroughfare with several exits to 
distribute the cars along it. As a result, the initial objection disappeared. 
The coordinator of the GPT made a difference. He was regarded as very effective and 
persuasive. A large part of this persuasiveness resulted from the use of information. The 
combination of his personal skills with a good capacity to make sense of interrelated factors by 
putting information together contributed to build the understanding of players concerned with 
the location of the new bridge. When I asked one of the team members what contributed to the 
change of views of the people inside and outside the GATTEL, one member said 
"it was the power of persuasion of the coordinator of the GPT." 
While presenting the different options, the coordinator of the GPT used data to make his point, 
showing how different components related to each other and what that meant in terms of 
consequences for each one of them. I had the opportunity to talk to the coordinator several 
times. I was impressed by the capacity he had to describe the issues and to explain interrelated 
complex factors very clearly making them easily understandable. He showed a good ability to 
explain the information in a meaningful way. 
Moreover, the coordinator worked as an information manager. What I mean by this is that 
he was able to make sense out of the interrelation of factors, of knowledge coming out from 
different specialties, bringing together information and synthesizing it in a meaningful 
dynamical structure. Though group processes can play an important role if they involve a good 
interactive process, it is also essential that someone works directly with the information 
generated by the group, to assure that the information debated, the new ideas generated, and 
the concerns expressed are kept in the process and meaningfully recorded for future use. 
Someone is needed to do the backstage bookeeping work on information between the 
meetings, such as reorganizing the notes, structuring the main ideas, and defining the future 
agenda (e.g., list all the goods and bads of each alternative). Because this information has to be 
recorded, structured, and brought up again to redirect discussion, someone has to be sure to 
keep in the good ideas, to make clear the interrelation between factors debated, and to maintain 
continuity. 
Plus, the coordinator had an extensive knowledge of the metropolitan area. This 
knowledge was important for setting up the process, knowing where to look for the relevant 
information, and stimulating a more interconnected view of the region dynamics. Some of this 
knowledge was shared with the other team members with whom he had already worked. Part 
of his background knowledge came from his previous involvement in a team restructuring of 
the transportation in the Lisbon region, when he worked for the Department of Terrestrial 
Transportation8. While working there, he participated in a team that developed an extensive 
work with the collaboration of specialists from Lausanne, Switzerland. One of the subprojects 
was about multimodal crossing of the Tagus and provided him with the opportunity to reflect 
on the transportation issues of the metropolitan area in connection with possible Tagus 
crossings. 
Though it is in part the use of information that makes a difference in this process, that 
could not happen without group processes and a good coordination. This is particularly true in 
this case given the tight due dates that required greater efficiency. Information appears in many 
forms (facts, data, stories, arguments) and is brought to the process by many people 
(professionals, members of interest associations, politicians). This pool of knowledge does not 
have any influence on people's views if it does not emerge into the open discussion and does 
not get argued over. The group processes, however, allow that discussion to happen. It is the 
fact of making available a space to discuss information in the light of the problem that 
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encouraged people to exchange views and to listen to the others. This case showed a good 
openness. It is this openness that made people feel it was legitimate to raise these issues. While 
doing that they integrated information generated by different sources. This is only possible 
through the opportunity of interaction provided by group processes that have certain 
characteristics. To be successful these groups are constituted by a group of peers who respect 
each other, have a lot of expertise among them and are not told what they can or cannot talk 
about. It is these groups, not any other, that can set up such a process. In such group 
processes there are good possibilities that some creativity appears. That was what happened 
here, why the GPT generated the new alternative. The group created met the Habermas criteria 
of rational communication (Habermas, 1973, 1983) and the characterists that social 
psychologists considered essential to assure the success of these groups (Dryzeck, 1990; 
Argyris, 1982, 1993; Bateson, 1996). 
The GATTEL group revealed creativity in the way it handled the issues. This happens 
when a group has a good interactive process and debates information in a context of autonomy. 
Groups under certain conditions are known to be creative. In fact, they break down 
assumptions. Having a group with diverse experiences assembled and operating under an 
interactive process, it was likely that its members would not do things according to standard 
practice and would develop through paths not tried before. 
When the GATTEL exposed publicly the unexpected alternative, opinions about the best 
alternative diverged' within the technical community, the political parties, the interest groups, 
the municipalities, 
"unity of the municipalities ended up when the central corridor (Barreiro) appeared." 
(transportation planner) 
The new option was very different from the already accepted Montijo crossing. The previously 
existing consensus was broken. Politicians and professionals interested in the new crossing 
who had not been involved had different ideas. Some did not know what to think about the 
new alternative. Others opposed it. For example, politicians of Montijo opposed the new 
option because it would take away a long sought opportunity for assuming a more direct 
connection to the capital. The traffic engineers willing to "close the ring" did not get convinced, 
because the new solution did not fit their problem definition. 
Still others, namely the professionals working in the development of the municipal plans, 
initially reacted against the idea of a new alternative. One of the reasons was because their plans 
only considered the Montijo alternative and this new crossing required substantial changes in 
these plans (e.g., Barreiro municipal plan, the municipality with the South anchorage of the 
new option). More, these changes required a revision of the initial technical advice given to the 
local politicians. Participants of accomplished plans also opposed it, because to accept the 
Barreiro link meant a substantial revision of the views proposed in their plans (e.g., Integrated 
Plan for the Distrito of Setzibal, Land Use Plan for the Lisbon Metropolitan Area). However, 
despite all this inconvenience, some of these players soon saw in the new proposal greater 
potential to solve some long standing problems (e.g., recovery of declining areas, containment 
of urban sprawl, keeping away from natural areas). 
The case of the Barreiro municipality is a good example of change. Opposing initially this 
alternative, the team of the municipal plan soon understood that this was a unique opportunity 
to recover the municipality's decline. In a short span of time the team revised the information to 
develop a proposal for a possible insertion of this alternative in the road network. This 
happened because they analyzed information, reflected on what this new option could mean 
and discussed this with their peers. 
"The coordinator of the Municipal Plan of Barreiro when confronted with the possibility did not 
agree. He ended up agreeing that the connection with Barreiro had advantages, though he was 
reluctant at the beginning. If this is the conidor selected the town of Barreiro will become a 
suburban area of Lisbon. This may be the solution for the declining area" (transportation planner) 
Also, the coordinator of the Land Use Plan for the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon was not 
enthusiastic about the new alternative at the beginning. His position was that no more bridges 
should be constructed between the two banks. Later on, he changed his views. In the opinion 
of one interviewee, it was the opportunity to rehabilitate the declining area of Barreiro that 
made a difference. 
"Even before the PDM was approved, in the first meetings held between the GATTEL and the 
PROTAML team, the leader of this team was against any more connections between the North and 
South banks. This changed during the debates. By the end, he ended up admitting that the central 
connection was the solution." (transportation planner) 
The confusion generated among the technical community by the exposure of the new 
alternative was obvious. The newly generated information required change of a long lasting 
consensus in such a short time and created a lot of disorientation among the politicians and 
professionals who had not enough time and opportunity to revise their views. This is evident 
by the contradictory news that appeared in the media during 1991. While some said that the 
new bridge was going to be in the Montijo corridor others stated that the bridge would be in the 
Barreiro corridor, as shown by the following newspaper headlines: 
"New bridge over the Tagus links Montijo to Beato" - Se-0, March 16 
"Barreiro may take away the new bridge from Montijo" - Expresso, June 29 
"New Bridge will connect Montijo-Alcochete to Lisbon" - D i a o  de Noticias, June 30 
"New Tagus Bridge will be between Chelas and Barreiro" - Expresso, August 17. 
This also reflects a lack of consensus among the public about the best place for the 
location. More, the amount of news on the crossings coming out during this period shows that 
the future location of the bridge generated a lot of attention. The diverging views in these news 
illustrate the level of controversy of the issue and its degree of complexity. 
OPPOSITION ENHANCES THE USE AND GENERATES NEW 
INFORMATION 
Public agencies 
In September 1991, the Minister of Public Works announces to a newspaper (Ptiblico) that 
the new bridge is going to connect Olivais (North Bank) to Montijo, accomplishing one of the 
alternatives in the Montijo corridor. This announcement, and a later decision of Minister of 
Public Works to shift the preferred option to the other alternative in the Montijo corridor, 
anchoring in the North bank at Moscavide (instead of Olivais), generated a lot of controversy. 
While generating conflict it also brought into the open a lot of information. Environmentalists, 
transportation specialists, urban planners and several professionals working in the region used 
information while arguing about their values and positions. 
Despite all the information that the GATTEL Planning Team analyzed and structured, 
Document 6 was issued in September 1991 with a final section with recommendations that is 
seen by professionals as contradicting the technical advice of the rest of the document and 
diverging from the expertise offered by the GATTEL Planning Team. This incoherence 
generated a lot of debate among the technical community. It was identified by several 
professionals who closely followed this process as the reason to consider that the decision was 
political. The credibility of the process leading to the decision was challenged. Those opposing 
the Montijo alternative became more outspoken and assumed more radical positions. Many 
people pointed out to the inconsistency of the final recommendations with the remaining 
technical advice claiming that, after all this process was similar to other public decisions where 
technical advice is sought by decision makers to be ignored afterwards. More, one professional 
stated that 
"never was the gap between a technical study and a political decision so wide." 
The recommendations of Document 69 of GATTEL do not mention the issue of congestion 
or even refer which one of the corridors was most likely to better address it. Congestion was 
completely forgotten at this stage. Despite being an objective stated up front in the legislation 
for solution at the time of the creation of the GATTEL. Though congestion was implicit in the 
whole process and many professionals considered it the main reason for a second crossing, it 
was omitted from the recommendations. Most of the interviewed professionals saw congestion 
as the main reason to trigger the construction of a second bridge. 
Another puzzling suggestion in the GATTEL document recommendations is related to the 
alternative in Montijo corridor. The recommendations in this document suggested the selection 
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of the alternative B of the Montijo corridor, the least technically preferred in this corridor. 
Reports with conclusions and recommendations that do not match the findings happen often in 
bureaucratic settings. This unmatching between the report findings and the recommendations 
means that the GATTEL Planning Team creative process led to a situation unforeseen by the 
bureaucratic status quo (the government) and forced it to regain the control by setting up the 
door and returning to the 'business as usual' procedure of bureaucratic settings. Closing up 
the doors limited the exposure of information, but a substantial amount of it had already been 
publicly exposed. It is exposure of information to a wider constituency that made a difference. 
It triggered several actions carried out afterwards (organized debates, press conferences, 
political contacts, letters of complaint, public mobilization). 
The interest a new bridge in the Lisbon area generated among professionals, the amount of 
information already circulating within the professional community due to the developed 
networking, and the openness of the process made a difference. It is information that played an 
important role while being used in the several events that took place during the conflict. 
The issuing of the Conclusions and Recommendations by the GATTEL was followed by 
the Minister's public announcement that the GA'ITEL would pursue studies on the alternative 
B of the Montijo corridor. He did not follow the technical advice given in the GATTEL reports 
that led to so much speculation. People advanced reasons for why the Minister did opt for a 
distinct solution. I do not have any way to find out the truth behind them and it might well be 
that the reasons people proposed are not even close to the truth. Maybe the Minister never read 
the documents. Maybe he just looked into the final recommendations. It might just be that the 
new solution did not fit his agenda. 
The Minister's decision generated opposition from some public agencies. The first strong 
reaction came from the Expo 98 as soon as it became public that the GATTEL would follow 
studies on the alternative B of the Montijo corridor, connecting Olivais to Montijo. This entity 
governmentally mandated to organize the World Exhibition to be held in Lisbon in 1998) saw 
its project strongly compromised by this decision. The Expo 98 criticized the North anchorage 
of this option because it fell on the place reserved for the exhibition. Two pillars were to be 
built in the dock of Olivaisl0. By November, the Expo 98 was able to push further away the 
two mentioned pillars but was still unhappy with having a bridge on top of its land. As they 
stated, "from the worse the least: if the bridge cannot disappear at least (we) should push it 
away" ll. This shows that the the Expo 98 put together two pieces of information, one on the 
location of the new bridge and its supporting pillars, and the other its own plans for the 
exhibition. While doing that Expo 98 understood that the new solution did not serve its 
interests and negotiated compromise: pushing away of the pillars. 
Expresso, Nov 23, 1991. 
l Expresso, Nov 23, 1991. 
This decision of the Minister of Public Works for the Montijo corridor also found 
opposition within the government. In particular, the Ministry of Planning that supported the 
Land Use Plan being developed for the metropolitan area, the municipalities of the metropolitan 
region united against the initial position of the Ministry of Public Works (option B in Montijo), 
and the Ministry of the Environment showed concern about having a bridge next to a protected 
area. 
Information was used by the various Ministers to defend their positions. The Minister of 
Public Works argued in favor of the Montijo crossing due to its merits for assuring the North- 
South connection. The Minister of Planning considered the Barreiro option as an excellent 
device to rehabilitate two urban declining areas and to avoid new fronts of development. Also 
concerned with the potential that the Montijo crossing had for encouraging development, the 
Minister of the Environment revealed his opposition because this connection in the South was 
too close to a natural area of high environmental value representing a long term threat. 
Information was structured in the Land Use plan to fit the team problem definition. The 
team members saw that accepting the Minister's selection meant a complete revision of the plan 
including its underlying assumptions, meaning a reframing of the problem. As one 
professional stated, the decision to construct in the Montijo corridor perverted the concept of 
the Land Use Plan of the Metropolitan Area. The team of this plan, initially opposed to the 
Barreiro option, soon understood that this was the crossing that best served the model of 
development they defended, the containment of urban sprawl. Moreover, the potential that this 
option offered to help recover two declining urban areas (Chelas in the North, and Barreiro in 
the South) made it much more appealing in terms of urban planning. After developing this 
understanding, the team of the Land Use Plan became strong supporter of the Barreiro 
solution. When the Minister made the decision they reacted strongly. The decision did not fit 
their model of development. The Minister of Planning, who realized the advantages of this 
crossing for planning purposes, backed up the position of the professionals of the Land Use 
Plan team . 
Environmentalists 
Environmentalists used information extensively while developing actions to alert the 
government, the European Union, the professional community, and the public to the negative 
environmental impacts of the Montijo solution. No other group assumed so much relevancy in 
opposition actions. They strongly opposed the Montijo option because it linked urban land to 
an area of important ecological value and they developed several actions to revert the decision. 
These actions enhanced the use of information by a wider audience. They also substantially 
influenced the environmental associations structure and way of operation. Three environmental 
organizations - LPN, GEOTA and Quercus - took the leadership of the process. While 
doing so they joined efforts taking advantage of joint resources, they learned to work with 
EUIEEC instances, they developed substantial networking inside and outside the country and, 
while doing this, restructured their own mode of operation, their views and their strategies. 
The consequences of the environmental associations involvement in the bridge location issue 
was so powerful that a public official considered "it was the bridge that united the 
environmental associations". 
The persistent and extensive campaign led by the environmentalists established in minds of 
people a strong connection between the issue of the new bridge location and environmental 
concerns. One of the involved environmentalists stated: "the public image of the bridge ended 
up associated with the environmentalists because the opposition to the construction in the East 
corridor was led by us", "the environmental aspect assumed excessive importance in the game" 
making people associate the issue of the bridge location with the "birds of the Tagus". In his 
view this was somewhat negative because the public in general forgot other important socio- 
economic and social aspects. It might be so, but the extensive use of information on the 
environmental component, or better its public exposure, had the advantage of contributing to 
turn the environment into an active issue in the governmental agendas. 
The integration of the environmental component by the GPT and the interaction established 
convinced the environmentalists that this was going to be a model case where environmental 
data played an important part in the decision. However, that did not happen. Integration of 
environmental data since the preliminary stages influenced the process in other ways. Initially 
convinced that this was going to be a model case, environmentalists took a while to 
understand, during the process, that though the GPT identified the effects on the environment, 
the information was going to weight little in the Minister final decision. The introduction of 
environmental data since the very beginning allowed to integrated it with data from other 
components and to become part of the whole. That proved to be important. First, the good 
articulation of the different components made the information meaningful. Plus, the meaning 
acquired by information was crucial in the actions taken by the environmental associations 
when proving their points of view and alerting people to the damages to the environment. The 
introduction of this data in the reports added visibility to the environmental component and 
credibility to the reports, because it became recognized as part of the process. It was included 
in a report produced by a governmentally mandated group and integrated the new 
environmental concerns of professionals and the public, besides fitting the requirements 
established by the EUJEEC. It is possible that consideration of the environmental component 
will became part of the terms of discourse in policy arenas and empower environmental 
proponents as happened in other countries (e.g., environmental impact reporting in four 
proposals for major mixed use development in California)12. 
One environmental association - the LPN13 - got involved early in the process. The 
GATTEL requested to the LPN a study on environmental matters. The most direct explanation 
for this is the urgency the GATTEL had in obtaining environmental information. The LPN 
members became aware of the process for the bridge location, as soon as the GATTEL 
developed the first studies. One of the interviewees explained that "persons in the central 
administration made us aware of what was being studied". When I asked why they were 
chosen, one environmentalist said that it was because the LPN was the oldest environmental 
association and had gained "technical credibility" over the years. Members of the LPN were 
often consulted by several agencies for their technical expertise. Another interviewee gave a 
more practical explanation: "probably it was recognized that the LPN was able to organize that 
information, or better since the GATI'EL wanted to assemble the information quickly" and that 
would be difficult if "they had to follow the usual time consuming institutional processes". 
This refers to the standard bureaucratic procedure to request to a public entity to fulfil1 the 
needs of environmental data. Usually, the requests are formally made and wait to be dispatched 
by public officials of several ranks in the hierarchy, to be finally initiated. There is still another 
possible explanation for this association to be invited: it is the association that presents stronger 
features of environmental conservation, the type of expertise the GATI'EL most wanted. 
The three reasons played a part. The LPN was seen by professionals as the environmental 
association with a more institutional posture. Several of its members work in the public 
administration. So they are better equipped to play by the rules. This probably revealed at the 
time to be a more promising profile to deal with the bureaucracy. The urgency of the study and 
the tight due dates required the support of a more flexible organization with already sound 
knowledge in the area of the environment to carry out the task. Moreover, the expertise in 
conservation matters also played a role. 
A team of the LPN members provided the environmental information in a written report 
and discussed it with the GPT, favoring an early integration of the environmental data in the 
process. Contacted by the GATTEL to develop an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), a 
group of technicians of the LPN ended up accepting to do an environmental reference study, 
but refused the EIA, as explained by one interviewee. They were suspicious of the way that 
study could be handled afterwards. This is evident by the concern the team showed to made 
explicit in the written report that it was not an EIA. The study was developed to identify the 
environmentally sensitive areas in the region. As explained by one of the members of this 
l2 Innes, Judith "The power of data requirements" Summer 1988, APA Journal; Innes, J. The Role of 
Information in Communicative Planninn.paper presented in the Annual Conference of the Association of 
European Schools of Planning, Glasgow, Scotland, Aug. 16-19, 1995 (pp. 7). 
l3 LPN - Liga ProtecRo da Natureza. 
organization, the study was not an impact study, just a preliminary environmental work. Once 
accomplished, the LPN handed it to the GATTEL and several of its participants sat with the 
GATTEL Planning team to discuss the environmental aspects. When I asked one of the team 
members if the information they developed was used he replied "yes, because it appeared in the 
GATTEL documents". What this shows is that there was a concern to collect and introduce 
environmental data. The interaction among the team members developing the study and the 
GPT favored the integration of this information with the other components. 
It is this study, and the follow up discussion in May of 1991 at the request of the GPT after 
reading the environmental report, that contributed to the GATTEL documents substantial 
information on the environment. As stated by one of the participants, this meeting "was not a 
formal presentation but a general discussion about the technicians preferred location". This 
observation shows that the meetings set up by the GPT adopted looser procedures than the 
usual formal presentations expected in bureaucratic settings. It was during this meeting that the 
LPN team took a 'technical stand' to avoid revealing its position about their preferred location, 
focusing only in "providing information on negative and positive impacts" of each alternative. 
At this time, the LPN was what one of its members called an association of "non decision 
makers", a group marked with a strong conviction of maintaining a neutral technical posture. 
One that is professionally ethical and credible. Later on, the LPN members were called by the 
GATTEL Steering Committee to "discuss the final positions of the association". In these 
meetings they felt it was legitimate to discuss their positions, as opposed to expressing 
interests. 
What made a difference was the opportunity to discuss environmental information. In fact, 
the report handed by the LPN team followed a 'business as usual' approach. The team met, 
distributed the tasks, and each specialist developed his own area of expertise. They assembled 
the information in a written report. The time to discuss the ideas of the report was limited as 
stated by the person who explained to me the development of the report procedure. This was 
the 'business as usual' form of operation. 
The LPN team behaved as neutral technicians in the technical context, but when they 
moved to the more political context (the GATTEL Steering Committee) they felt legitimate to 
take positions. In this new context they felt they moved upwards in the hierarchy, entering the 
decision level. This distinction between the technical level (professional) and the decision level 
(political), is a marked feature of the bureaucracy. That is also clearly shown in the phasing 
chart (see Fig.IV.13) developed by the GPT. The gap between these two settings was 
identified in the literature (Caplan, 1979; Weiss, 1976) and is a source of frequent 
misunderstandings. Group processes tend to blur the boundaries between these two worlds, 
allowing links to be built between both. 
The request of the GATTEL for an early involvement in the process gave the impression to 
the LPN that this was going to be a model case, where for the first time environmental 
information was going to be considered. This was one of the reasons why the environmental 
activists only became involved much later. Anyway, some of the LPN members disagreed and 
showed suspicion. This is revealed in the fact the LPN members did not want to make an EIA, 
though there was also another more technical explanation. The professionals of the LPN, 
particularly the biologists, considered impossible to make a sound study in such a short period, 
since monitoring life cycles requires usually more than one year. For some time everything 
seemed to be going in the right direction in the view of the environmentalist. By the beginning 
of SeptemberIOctober 1991 the members of the LPN board realized the situation was getting 
out of control. According to one interviewee: 
"the process was escaping from our hands." 
The same interviewee added 
"I never had great illusions on the LPN participation. I always believed that it was going to be a 
mascarade, but after a certain point it became completely obvious to everybody that it was going to 
be just that." 
By end of 1991 there were rumors in the press of the preference of the Minister of Public 
Works for the Montijo corridor and afterwards appeared the public announcement that the 
choice was contrary to the LPN position. 
The technical information14 available at this point was scarce. In particular, the GATTEL 
documents were not widely distributed. This is confirmed by an environmentalist who said 
"At this point, the publicly available information was scarce, Document 6 of the GATTEL was the 
only available and everything else, even when available for consultation, was very restricted (e.g., 
xeroxing the documents was not allowed) or obtained with great difficulty by the back door." 
The environmentalists complained that they could only get most of the information after the 
decision and due to a lot of efforts and persistency from their part. This seemed contradictory 
to the openness of the process led by the GPT, but it is not so. Several GATTEL documents 
circulated among the municipalities and among a group of professionals more directly involved 
in developing studies for the GATTEL. However, since only one environmental association 
just hardly participated in the process, the environmentalists did not generally have access to 
these sources. Later on, the environmental associations put together a substantial amount of 
information and distributed it widely. This exposure of information contributed to the increase 
of openness of the phase that followed the decision, already at a time when the GPT had 
stopped operating. The environmental associations assumed a crucial role in the dissemination 
of this information. 
The actions taken by the environmentalists enhanced the use of information. Convinced 
that under the environmental point of view Montijo was the most undesirable solution of the 
l4 Refers to formal technical information --- reports. 
three considered, environmentalists took action trying to reverse the decision. They worked 
with the media (preparing opinion articles and supplying information on the environmental 
issues), they recurred to the national courts (for the first time a complaint was filed to the 
Supreme Administrative Court against the Portuguese government by an environmental 
association), they complained to an international court (European Court), they lobbied (contacts 
with high rank politicians to express their concerns), they developed joint efforts (got together 
and produced a joint publication on the bridge, gave joint press conferences), they coordinated 
efforts (identified and distributed tasks among them to take the most advantage of their short 
resources), they consulted each other (when taking a stand), organized debates (with the 
President of Portugal and professionals), visited the future bridge site with several entities to 
call public attention to the issue, and organized mobilization actions (one hour 'honking' during 
two days against the signing of the building contract, street flyers). During these actions they 
worked closely'with members of the government, with the professional community, with 
members of the European Union, with activists of international environmental NGOs, with 
elements of other interest associations, with the journalists and with the public in general. In 
sum, they projected their image to wider audiences. This had its consequences. It established a 
vast networking that proved to be very useful to the environmentalists activities. 
Information was used and reframed, and more elaborated knowledge was created. The 
persistence of the environmental association in this case, the outreach to a wider community 
and the articulated actions contributed to a disseminating of information of an unusual scale. 
The consequences of all this activity assumed proportions unforeseen at the beginning of the 
process. 
Information was used in the meetings with high rank politicians (the President of Portugal, 
several ministers, leaders of the political parties). These meetings followed similar patterns. 
Environmental association members provided information, expressed their concerns (e.g., 
about irregularities of the process) and requested intervention. Environmentalists also used any 
opportunity to bring up the case of the bridge when meeting about other environmental issues. 
According to the interviewees, not much visible change came out of the political development 
of contacts. However, they had a more subtle influence. The contacts with politicians helped to 
build the credibility environmentalists gained afterwards, a "greater respect by the 
government". In fact, after the bridge issue, some governmental officials consulted the 
environmental associations on several environmentally controversial issues prior to make a 
decision (e.g., location of hazard waste incinerators). 
Environmentalists disseminated a lot of information by giving press conferences and 
producing a considerable amount of opinion articles and papers in the media. When preparing 
the opinion articles for newspapers or supplying information to journalists about the issue of 
the bridge, the environmentalists extensively used information. As one of them confirmed, a lot 
of that information came from the GATTEL documents, though they had to force the 
government to make available part of this information by appealing to the legislation that 
assures public access to documents. Environmentalists saw the contacts with journalists as 
very positive. It was a good vehicle to expose publicly the information. The environmental 
NGOs established, along the process, a network with the media that was useful for other 
environmental issues. One of the environmentalists interviewed stated that one positive 
outcome of this process was that journalists had the opportunity to establish privileged access 
to professionals of the environment. This, he said, influenced the quality and accuracy of 
environmental information coming out in the media. 
The environmental associations were one of the main groups that contributed to the public 
exposure of technical information that frequently stays indoors. This influenced a wider 
constituency and reached the general public. The exposure to this information partially explains 
the strong public involvement in the bridge blockage when the toll fare issue appeared. By 
discussing the information appearing in the media or obtained from the public administration or 
through interest associations, the bridge users developed the idea that the future bridge did not 
serve them. Therefore, they were not willing to pay for a service they did not get. The use of 
information also explains the creation of the 25 th of April Bridge Users Association, because 
data was important to back up the positions of people. Since the users were organized around 
an issue - the toll fare increase - without information they did not have a stand. 
The environmentalists relied heavily on the use of information to support their actions. 
Since they operate on limited resources they had to made the most of it. Recognizing their 
limited human and financial resources, the environmental associations decided to join efforts. 
Among other things, they created a team operated as a group process to assemble, structure and 
debate the information on the new crossing, to develop proposals, and to produce a publication 
for diffusion. This group met, put information together and developed new crossing options 
(e.g., it proposed an only train crossing in the Barreiro corridor). It is this information that is 
later assembled in a joint publication and distributed to the media and the public. This joint 
venture influenced the environmental associations' way of operating. Their strategy was 
altered. It became usual for them to consult among each other when a new environmental issue 
came up. 
Nowadays, the environmental associations rely on informal consultation among them to 
adjust strategies or to raise awareness on issues brought to the table. This is only possible 
because they learned to work together during the bridge process and, while doing it, they built 
trust. On the basis of this trust, they often informally shared tasks to take the most advantage of 
their few resources. Moreover, they also became more effective in the selection of issues. As 
one leader explained, "now we changed the strategy": instead of grabbing all the environmental 
issues under way and have dispersed interventions that could not be effectively pursued for a 
long period of time, they are more selective in the issues they got involved and when they pick 
up one they take it until the end. They also learned a lot about their rights and about the 
legislation that provides support to their actions (namely the access to information). 
Information was assembled, structured and made explicit in the various complaints filed by 
the environmental associations to the Portuguese and European courts. In times of controversy 
and when there are residual conflicts that are not resolved in the existing forums and arenas, 
people may recur to the courts. In this case, it happened. For the first time in history, an 
environmental association filed a complaint to the Portuguese Administrative Court against the 
government, intending to force the political setting to comply with the new environmental 
rules. Several other complaints followed this one to the Portuguese and the European courts 
(e.g., disagreement about the right phase to conduct the EIA, infringement of legislation). For 
each complaint the environmental associations assembled information to support their views 
and, while doing that, they revised it and produced new one (e.g., the analysis of data on boat 
activity to check if the material from the river dredged was being deposited in the agreed place). 
But what is important here is that information was used because of the need to structure it to 
support the complaints. Some of this had further consequences. The case of the bridge location 
over the Tagus was ultimately thrown to the headlines of the environmentalists concerns about 
the intervention of European funds in constructions with negative effects on the natural 
systems. 
This is the case of the complaint dealing with the non compliance of the Portuguese 
Government with the Special Protection Area boundaries. It resulted in compensatory 
measures. As an environmentalist stated 
"the compensation measures were a direct consequence of the complaint submitted, because they 
were imposed by the EU. It is a pitty that this did not happen without the complaint." 
At a wider level is the case of the information supplied by the environmentalists to the Wild 
World Fund which became part of a report of this organization. The Tagus new bridge case 
was selected as one of the reference case studies in a recent assessment "of the implications for 
biodiversity, both positive and negative, of the European Union Structural Funds in the period 
up to 1999 and beyond"l5. The report states: 
"Recent decisions in the cases of 20 motorways in Germany and the Tagus bridge in Portugal gave 
cause for serious concern about the willingness of the EU Commission and Member States to 
uphold EU environmental law firmly throughout the EU."16 
Moreover, a report of the Wild World Fund criticizes the European Cohesion Fund allocation, 
using the Tagus bridge case as a reference, adding an annex with a list of violations to its 
Impact Study. As one of the environmental leaders stated, 
"the bridge case begins emerging (internationally) as an example of wrong application of European 
funds." 
l5 Birdlife International. The Structural Funds and Biodiversity Conservation. Sept 1995. 
l6 idern, pp5 of Summary and Recommendations. 
It was the information that supported the environmentalists complaints that threw the 
bridge case to the EU documents headlines. A working group recently created within the 
Budget Control Committee (BCC) of the European Cohesion Fund analyzed the application of 
the funds in the several countries (Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland). In a recent meeting of 
the BCC the reporter attacked the EU Commission and the governments of several countries 
because the funds were being wrongly applied. This report, still in internal circulation, has to 
follow the usual channels through the Plenary and the European Commission and will only 
afterwards become public. What this shows is that information made a difference. It is the 
existence of a substantial amount of information and its wide exposure to support the 
complaints that makes it to be used by the EU to question the appropriateness of fund 
application. 
The environmentalists learned to operate in new settings and to use information as a way to 
be listened to. While interacting with the European setting (EU agencies and European Courts) 
the environmentalists learned how to operate in European instances. More, they also 
established networks with international associations members, which revealed to be useful for 
consulting later on. Keeping these peers informed made a difference. 
All the conflict on the new bridge location and the projection of information beyond the 
country boundaries had consequences initially unforeseen. At the European level the question 
of the Cohesion Funds application in the construction works harming the environment is 
drawing increased attention. The European Commissioner for the Environment has visited 
Lisbon since then and held talks with high rank politicians expressing her concerns. The bridge 
case created a precedent that will influence the national government in fully interpreting the 
environmental component in future processes on issues of location of big infrastructures. 
CONVERGENCE OF PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The convergence of professionals, politicians and interest organizations to a common 
model of development for the Lisbon Metropolitan Area provided the conditions to articulate 
the several group processes emerging in the issue of the new bridge location. More, the 
intensive networking produced among the professional community while they were exchanging 
information contributed to the exchange of ideas and an adjustment of the views of the people 
interested in the new crossing location. Several groups organized shorter or longer group 
processes. However, these processes worked in contained forums without an overall 
coordination. These forums (e.g., GPT, environmental associations), mostly involving 
professionals, required information to operate. Moreover, players of these forums started to 
know, through either the media or informal contacts, that there were other groups trying to 
assemble information to defend positions. This was the departure point for intensive 
networking to exchange information. While doing it the players discussed ideas, data and 
positions. This interaction had a strong influence in shaping the evolution of this process. 
Since the GATTEL integrated information from different components and the Barreiro option 
was a creation coming out of that integration, fitting better the agreed model of development for 
the region, these groups converged in the same direction. 
SIMPLE IMAGES LOADED WITH COMPLEXITY 
This high level of understanding of the interrelated factors made possible the translation of 
complex issues into very simple ideas. While debating the location of the new crossing over the 
Tagus, professionals used information. They analyzed data through their views, put 
information in the light of the problem and reframed the issue to better respond to their 
expectations. Information which was worked on that way gained powerful meaning and its 
understanding became part of the intellectual capital shared by a growing number of 
participants in the overall debate. Because they understood the information, they translated it 
into short and illuminated imagery statements. These statements reflected a substantial amount 
of knowledge (e.g., history, views, expectations, models). They became appealing ideas 
extensively used during the debate. These ideas, translating complex issues into a simple 
form, resulted from discussions going on among specialists. Such constructed arguments 
acquired powerful meaning as a result of discussions. More, it was the level of understanding 
attained by the integration of interrelated factors that enabled participants to produce such 
powerful images (e.g., connecting urban space to rural land, bridge as an opportunity, bridge 
as a tool of recovery, progress, one bank vs two banks town, closing the traffic ring, new 
poles of development vs sustainable development of infrastructured areas, reknitting the urban 
issue). These images became important devices for triggering action and for supporting it 
afterwards. As one of interviewees put it: 
"The decision is influenced by images that individuals or groups have, by the participants 
environmental perception, and by administrative structure and political will. Without power it is 
not possible to reach a decision." (transportation planner) 
A selection of the arguments and images that gained greatest expression in the debates 
among the participants is given below with a short description of the main underlying 
assumptions drawn during the debates on the new crossing. What I want to highlight here is 
that there is a whole logic behind the debate carried on among professionals when discussing 
the location of the new crossing over the Tagus, and that logic is supported by the views of the 
different type of participants, by the knowledge going around and by the need to reframe the 
problem. 
Connecting urban space to rural lands 
One of the deepest concerns among professionals was that a connection between an urban 
and rural area would produce serious urban sprawl. The professionals saw as undesirable the 
additional development pressure created by making a rural territory easily accessible with a 
potential for chaotic growth. For a long time, specialists discussed the connections between the 
North urban bank and the rural South. These discussions became more intense after the 
construction of the 25th of April Bridge when people observed the real effects of the new 
bridge to the Peninsula of Setu'bal. These effects deserved several studies and became a 
permanent concern among specialists. These concerns were usually expressed by planners who 
did not want uncontrolled development and urban sprawl due to new accessibility, and by 
environmentalists who believed that the increased accesibility would cause irreversible damage 
on more natural systems. Several statements illustrated this. An environmentalist willing to 
preserve the rural balance achieved in the course of 800 years, commented: 
"In our reality it is very important to be aware that we have an 800 years old rural space - which 
achieved the balance of experience." (Environmental NGO member) 
A transportation planner who was identifying the best location for the bridge South anchorage 
stated: 
"In the Southern bank there is a waterfront arch between Montijo and A l m d  - an urban continua 
- oscillating between semi rural fields and the full urban areas." (transportation planner) 
An urban planner who learned from previous experience explained: 
"Having studied the impact of the 25th of April Bridge (I think) by extrapolation that Montijo is 
going to have a very similar behavior. A very negative impact, bad to the Metropolitan Area. With 
the bridge over the Tagus there was a Southern growth due to an increase in accessibility. Big 
fronts of development oppened during the construction of the bridge. With the new connection axis 
the areas open to development were densified" (urban planner) 
An urban planner dismissing the Montijo option because of its potential for urban sprawl said: 
"With the appearance of this alternative (Barreiro) it became clear that Montijo could not be the 
solution, because it generates urban sprawl" (urban planner) 
A NGO member concerned with possible changes induced by a new bridge in Montijo stated: 
"I am sensitive to the environment. My father's family is from Alcochete. For me a bridge in 
Montijo will never be the most advisable due to the environmental impacts. The development is 
going to alter the characteristics of the area." (NGO member) 
This was not the view of people from the municipalities of Alcochete and Montijo who had 
seen the opportunity of a direct connection to the capital vanishing when the 25 th of April 
Bridge was constructed twenty years ago. The new possibility of having a bridge in Montijo 
was a long awaited opportunity that they were unwilling to miss. 
Bridge as an opportunity 
The new bridge as an opportunity was another powerful idea advanced during the process. 
The more peripheral Southern municipalities, eager to achieve a greater integration in the 
metropolitan area, saw the new bridge as an opportunity to achieve development, to escape 
their peripheral status and to become better connected to the capital. This is particularly 
important in the case of the municipalities of Montijo and Alcochete which had lost the chance 
to be connected to the capital when the government decided to locate the first bridge away from 
their territory. They have been waiting since then for a second opportunity and now it was 
there: 
"All the people that live in this region (South bank) feel the urgent need of a new crossing." 
(municipal official) 
"Montijo sees the bridge on its grounds as a W." (urban planner) 
"as you know, it does not happen if we do not grab the opportunity and at this moment the 
o~~ortunitv is the bridge (in Montijo)." (municipal technician) 
Behind the notion of opportunity was the concept of progress seen differently by the 
various participants. 
Economic progress 
Progress was a contested idea. Municipal technicians and politicians working in the more 
rural municipalities of the metropolitan area saw growth as progress. 
"A new bridge over the Tagus river is absolutely essential for the economic development. We think 
that with the new bridge we get integrated in the AML, our resources can be available for the AML 
to be used. It is now difficult to go to Lisbon to study and work, industries have difficulties in 
locating in our municipality." (municipal official) 
"The construction of the bridge in Montijo creates the possibility to develop the tertiary, today 
with a 20 % (share). Before, (the economy) was essentially based in the primary and secondary 
(sectors)." (municipal technician) 
Environmentalists contested this notion calling it a "false idea of progress": 
"The other important issue is the "false idea of progress" brought along -- a growth without 
limitation, the interest in producing products, the destruction of cultural diversification. The urban 
expansion is carried on because the m a l  value is destructed in the behalf of the monoculture. There 
is an interesting thing. The progress is badly interpreted. There is a symbology of the progress and 
it is that what the populations have in their heads ... high rise buildings with 7 to 8 floors in rural 
areas. Progress is associated with roads, big highways, big dimensions." (environmental NGO 
member) 
However, this was not so simple. Discussions initiated already about the Land Use Plan 
for the Metropolitan Area brought to the table the need for a decision between the option of a 
one bank or a two banks town and the evolution of outcomes on those grounds. 
One bank vs two banks town 
The issue of a one bank vs. a two banks town gained also strong expression in the 
professional debates. The option for a one bank town implied no more bridges connecting both 
banks. This was the initial position of the coordinator of the Land Use Plan of the Metropolitan 
Area, who was unwilling to have more bridges across the Tagus estuary. One of the 
interviewees stated: 
"Initially, the PROTAML did not accept the bridge in Montijo." (municipal technician) 
The option of a two banks town opened the discussion on the best alternative. It was seen 
as an integrator of the whole metropolis. Urban planners thought the metropolitan area needed 
an integrated solution, in the light of the model of development wanted for the region. 
Considering the two banks town as the right choice, they thought the Barreiro option was the 
priority since it fitted better the model by making both banks operating as a whole. It also 
brought the opportunity for establishing a continuous urban space going from one bank to the 
other. 
"To make a decision on the location of the bridge it is essential to discuss and reach a consensus on 
a key issue: if the town is going to be a two banks town, and therefore the strategies should aim to 
the improvement of interaction between the two banks, through tunnels, bridges etc., or if each one 
of the banks should develop more or less independently, assuming distinct and different functions." 
(transportation planner) 
The structuring of the debates around this idea gained substantial supporters and was 
mentioned by people interviewed. Behind this are the assumptions of the model of 
development for the metropolitan area, further discussed below. In fact, the decision between 
the bridge in Montijo or Barreiro shifts the whole discussion to two models of development 
defended by different generations of planners. 
Two generations of planners -- two models of development (poles of 
development vs sustainable development of infrastructured space) 
The two urban models of development defended reflect the views of two generations of 
planners -- one seeking the decentralization of the urban space through the creation of 
controlled poles of development, and another embracing the new concepts of sustainable 
development in the already infrastructured areas. 
"There were discussions, but I think that the positions became extreme very early in the process, 
because they represent completely different logics. The persons with a perspective of urban and 
regional planning divided into two positions, according to the generation they belong to." 
(municipal technician and transportation planner) 
"The older people, formed in the planning style of the 60's, think that the bridge in Montijo is a 
great opportunity to create a new town there and decompress the Metropolitan Area. It is the 
philosophy of St. Andre' relative to Sines, of the old plans of the Housing Development Fund17, to 
create towns to decompress, the theory of poles of development." (municipal technician and 
transportation planner) 
"To admit that the solution is this or that has assumptions essential to its accomplishment." 
(municipal technician and transportation planner) 
Therefore, some planners argued that to decongest the town it was necessary to create new 
poles of development away from the existing centers to absorb growth and operate with self 
sufficiency. Other planners, concerned with sustainability and containment of growth, and 
seeking to avoid new fronts, defended the occupation of the still unoccupied spaces within the 
urban area: the reknitting of the urban tissue. 
17 FFH, Fundo de Fomento da Habita~go. 
Closing the traffic ring 
The traffic engineers supported the first group of planners. Their views were framed by the 
mission of supplying good national traffic mobility. They wanted to close the ring around the 
urban area. For them the issue was the construction of a speedway to assure car mobility. They 
wanted to make sure to have a good flow. Looking at their tradition of operation their main 
objective is the shortest, least costly connection between two points (urban areas) and 
preferably with no ways out along the way. Therefore, they favored traffic kept on the edges of 
the urban area. They wanted a connection as peripheral as possible, which would also allow 
for the closure of a Lisbon circular involving both banks of the Tagus. 
"The traffic engineers rationale was to close the ring." (transportation planner) 
Rekniting the urban tissue 
The second type of planners concerned with sustainability had a different stand. The 
reknitting of the urban tissue is strongly connected to the idea of "false congestion". Some 
interviewees are convinced that part of the urban planners think that the urban space in the 
metropolitan area is totally filled up and does not have empty spaces for further development. 
These interviewees claim that the urban space is not fully occupied and that it allows for the 
filling in of some empty spaces and for a greater densification, taking advantage of the 
infrastructures already available. 
"This goes against our urban planners who consider that the whole space is very congested. They 
confuse lack of organization with high rate of occupation, which in real terms does not exist. Inside 
Lisbon the backyards are unoccupied. These are areas to order and occupy." (PROTAML team 
member) 
As planners became concerned with containing development and redirecting it to already 
infrastructured areas, they analyzed in greater detail the urban spaces and found that there were 
unoccupied spaces in that urban tissue that could be filled in. A key concern to avoid new 
fronts of development put them in close agreement with the environmentalists. 
"Montijo is out of all this. With the highway to Cascais and the highway to Loures, new fronts of 
development are open for a period already declining (demographically). With so many fronts 
(already) open, the opening of new fronts is undesirable. In the Peninsula (of Setu'bal) we have 
already highly unqualified space. Therefore it is necessary to qualify what we already have." (urban 
planner) 
"The Land Use model reached by the PROTAML team was one to avoid the continuous and 
disorderly expansion of the territory and to reconcentrate the occupied land, reknit the tissue and 
restructure the occupied land. There is no need for expansion. It is necessary to use the already 
occupied space" (PROTAML team member) 
The Barreiro option fitted this second model. It could bring important changes, fulfilling 
some planners' expectations. One was the recovering of two declining areas (Chelas in the 
North and Barreiro in the South). The other was the creation of a central function continuum 
involving both banks. 
Bridge as a tool of recovery 
This idea gained considerable supporters and had a strong influence in changing the views 
of several professionals. The bridge in Barreiro was seen as a possible tool of recovery for 
seriously declining areas, due to the increase in accessibility it provided. 
"The bridge is seen as a tool of recovery." (environmental NGO member) 0 
"Barreiro is dying. The central corridor would allow for the urban recovery, of an area in strong 
depression and with gradually less potential to attract interests. Not providing accessibility to it 
(Barreiro) is only going to make the situation worse." (urban planner) 
"The problem that the bridge should address is the revitalization of the declining areas, since 
Barreiro already has adequate infrastructures." (environmental NGO member) 
Barreiro as part of a central area 
Since the urban planners knew that Barreiro had some central area characteristics, they saw 
in the Barreiro crossing a possibility to connect two central areas. In this way, the central area 
could be extended from Lisbon downtown to the South bank in Barreiro, making a continuous 
encompassing both banks of the Tagus. The possibility to recover Barreiro by connecting it to 
the central area in Lisbon reinforces the idea of recovery expressed above. 
"In the urban hierarchy, in the South bank, the Barreiro can with Almada assume an important role 
of central area." (municipal technician) 
"Barreiro is a municipality that has seen the production of its heavy industry decline ... It has a 
very important commercial center. For example, it has two Benneton shops. This center, if 
connected to the core of Lisbon, could operate as an extension of the Lisbon downtown commercial 
center. Recently, it (Barreiro) is more and more a suburb of Lisbon." (transportation planner) 
Furthermore, it is also this option that is appealing to environmentalists because it keeps 
away the bridge from the sensitive natural areas. 
Need for new institutions 
During the decision process of the new location of the bridge, institutions introduced new 
ways of operating (e.g., the GATTEL Planning Team) and others (e.g., environmental 
associations) reformulated their previous operation ways. This shows that even existing 
institutions are searching for new more flexible ways to operate. This need was partially 
imposed by the complexity of the problem at stake that required the integration of a multitude of 
factors and actors. More, the EU requirements (introducing the environmental component, 
access to information and assured participation), being transferred to the Portuguese 
legislation, contributed to the implementation of the new rules in Portuguese settings. This is 
particularly important in a country with a bureaucratic system that does not have mechanisms 
for interaction with the common citizen. 
When there are no mechanisms for people to intervene in the process and these people feel 
they are not being heard, they get mobilized, they create social pressure, they search for 
empowerment and develop their own institutions to fill in the gap. 
 h here was a group out of the process. We are still learning how to institutionalize participation. 
The processes are carried out more by habits and tradition than through institutionalization." 
(environmental NGO member) 
The controversy generated by the debate over the issue on the location of the crossing of 
the Tagus revealed a need for interaction with the public administration felt by some groups left 
out of the process. Two institutions were created, at different times and due to distinct reasons 
for assuming such interaction. The Montijo and Alcochete Association for Defense of the 
Quality of Life (AMA) supported the location of the bridge in Montijo. Their members wanted 
to sit in the GATTEL Advisory Committee and knew that to play by the rules they had to be 
recognized as a social partner, i.e., be legalized. Later on this association expanded its 
functions and assumed a wider role: the assurance of the quality of life of Montijo and 
Allcochete residents. The 25th April Bridge Users Association resulted from merging two 
associations (one in each river bank) created in the day of the bridge blockage to fight the toll 
fare increase. These interest associations were formed by people that would not have a chance 
to be heard otherwise. Even though they were legalized as interest group organizations, and, 
therefore, recognized as social partners, the chance to dialogue with the government was 
limited. Still today, the bureaucracies mostly consider as dialoguing partners the public entities 
(see the composition of the GATTEL Advisory Board that includes only entities from the 
public administration)lg. 
The great number of people involved in the 25th of April Bridge blockage resulted from the 
use of information by the public in general. It was the knowledge people built during the whole 
debate about the location of the new bridge, mostly conveyed by the media, that made them 
realize that they were going to pay for a service (the new bridge in Montijo) that they were not 
going to use. It was the self confidence that information gave to these people and the 
awareness that the new bridge was not going to solve their problem, that provided them with a 
common stand for action. They felt they had the legitimacy to assert their rights. Revolted by 
the injustice that information had shown and frustrated for not being heard, they carried out the 
blockage. It was an extreme situation because environmental activists had organized several 
actions before to call governmental attention and received no reaction. As stated by one of the 
Southern residents, "the fights were to force the Government to talk with us". 
What seemed to be at stake was the power to demand a hearing. The feeling that their 
interests were not being taken into account, a perception of injustice. Moreover, the media 
l X  Dispatches of the Ministry of Public Works (MOPTC) in 1991 and 1994 (47lMOPTCl91 and 49-XIIl94). 
played an important role in diffusing information to a larger audience. People protesting did not 
have institutions to rely on, and the central administration was deaf to them. If we do not want 
this to be repeated we have to rethink our institutions. The present institutions are not 
responding to the needs of our citizens. 
One of the members of the 25th of April Bridge Users Association, describing these 
actions, explained that the members of the association set working teams. One of the main 
tasks in their agenda was the development of contacts to talk with the government. Their 
objective was to present their case directly to governmental officials. They also sought to 
construct an image of the association in the media through a press conference and interviews 
given by the association leaders, and to become legally recognized "because they had to get 
organized", as the same member explained. But the most interesting feature of this new 
association is its internal organization, which shows creativity, flexibility and a flat hierarchy 
avoiding reliance on a single leader. Internally, they decided to rotate leadership assuring 
everybody equal power, what one of its members called "assuring equity of intervention" 
through recognition of their work as members, "not in terms of image but of recognition". By 
rotating the leadership they wanted to avoid having a too powerful leader. This also assured the 
flexibility and continuity of the organization, because it did not depend on only one person. 
Besides, the procedure provided several members with the skills to assume leadership 
whenever necessary. 
I mentioned here the case of two associations developed to fill in a gap perceived by the 
citizens as a direct consequence of their understanding of the situation, due to information that 
circulated. New institutions may emerge when existing mechanisms, like the public 
administration, are unsatisfactory to the growing public need to get more directly involved in 
public decisions. People put greater pressure on governments when decisions affecting them 
are at stake. They want to be heard and to be able to influence the outcome. In this case, if 
information had not circulated before, the influence on the public adminiqtrtion could not be 
sought, or the public reaction would have taken a much longer time. At the blockage, people 
shared already a common stand and were ready to act on it. 
The two associations appeared because people felt a need to be heard. Once operating, 
these associations used information they got from the public agencies, from the media and from 
other associations. This information was assembled by their members and circulated among 
them. It was used to support the members views inside and outside the organization. While 
doing this they debated the information and used it to support their arguments. They also began 
publishing flyers and newsletters to circulate the information and their views. 
Learning to defend the rights 
Information favored the creation of more interactive processes. Data provided clarity to a 
complex ambiguous situation and helped the participants. This gave them self confidence and 
an eagerness to intervene. As one environmentalist said: 
"The Portuguese public is not used to being influential in the decision, they do not feel they have 
rights ... They still have a certain fatalism, therefore when the government makes a decision they 
consider it irreversible." 
The experience with the issue of the location of the bridge has changed the way the Portuguese 
citizens perceive their role in the public processes. There is room for change in the way these 
processes are set up and to integrate some new ideas. The creation of new associations and the 
restructuring of associations that already existed partially show this. 
Despite the general feeling of powerlessness among professionals who consider that 
decisions are merely political, things will never operate in the same way. There is a growing 
awareness among individuals of their rights and a greater energy in expressing them. The 
administration respects more the views of technicians and activists than when the GATTEL 
started. Government and participants also understand better the way these processes operate 
and there clearly is a growing informal exchange of information among professionals, 
activists, public officials and media personnel. Part of it resulted from the expanded 
networking created during the location of the bridge process. 

CHAPTER V1 
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In sum, this case shows that information used in interactive settings created powerful 
meaning. This resulted from a mixture of innovative features. Part of them came from the 
GATTEL contribution, namely the private imprint brought to the GATIEL by its president, the 
way of operation of the GATTEL Planning Team, the new methodology for the assessment of 
the best location for the new bridge, and the introdution of the environmental component at 
early stages of the process. 
All this favored the development of a context rich in information use and created the 
grounds for the generation of an unexpected option seen with great potential by the 
participants. The opportunity to put information together in the light of the problem under 
consideration (the best location for the future bridge) made a difference. The new solution 
brokes a long standing consensus and brought to the process substantial controversy after a 
divergent choice by the Minister of Public Works. 
It was the use of information and the meaning acquired by that information, particularly 
within the technical community, translated in illuminated imagery statements that influenced the 
changes in the players views and widened the debate. New actors coming to the process used, 
reformulated and generated new information. While doing this they reviewed their way of 
operation, and strategies, and widened their working settings. It is information and the need of 
greater involvement felt by excluded citizens that influenced the emergence of new institutions. 
The numerous forums created by stakeholders during the long controversy, though without 
any formal horizontal coordination converged in its results due to a shared model of 
development for the metropolitan area of Lisbon. 
INFORMATION TRIGGERS ACTION 
The use of information triggers action. While providing support for arguments it 
supplies the necessary ingredients for people to make a stand with self assurance. Once this 
happens people feel part of the process and may initiate action to redirect it. They frequently 
have to revise ways of operation or to reformulate strategies. Much of this is done in interaction 
with other people. It is this interaction that makes a difference. It assures the subsequent 
exchange of information and ideas that makes the process richer, frequently contributing to 
increasing its complexity by bringing a large number of interests and factors (e.g., 
environment, urban component) into consideration. 
I argue that information was used in this case, not in the restricted logic of supporting the 
final decision, but in a more general way constituting a basis for action. Actually, information 
was used by politicians, professionals, members of environmental associations, and people in 
general when getting involved in action: 
- to support new proposals 
- to motivate people to get organized because with a better knowledge of the issue they 
could take a stand 
- to generate new knowledge 
- to see the issue differently (e.g., the unexpected alternative) 
- to provoke debate 
- to challenge a decision 
- to reframe the problem / to generate new ways of seeing the problem 
- to generate new alternatives (just a train bridge in the central corridor, two parallel train 
and road bridges) 
- to construct innovative joint processes (environmental joint working group, commuters 
interest group that resulted from merging two simultaneously created associations with 
the same objective, the Alcochete and Montijo Association for Defense of the Quality of 
Life (AMA), joint press conferences, articulated actions) 
- to file judicial complaints (Portuguese administrative courts, EU instances). 
The dissidents desire to propose new alternatives as a result of their disagreement over 
solutions, particularly the environmentalists, made people look for supporting data in existing 
studies, frequently recurring to the GATTEL documents. The radicalization of positions and 
the awareness of resources scarcity contributed to the emergence of joint efforts (joint studying 
group and publication) and led to the creation of new entities (e.g., AMA). 
INTERACTIVE PROCESSES 
This study shows that information was used by influencing people's views. Most of the 
changes could not have happened without the interaction, through group processes or 
networking. Though the process considered here was complex and no coordination existed 
among the different group processes operating during the debate, the fact that participants 
developed a shared convergent idea - the model of development for the metropolitan area - 
and participated in a strong network partially compensated the lack of coordination. The shared 
idea for the AML and the strong networking among participants channeled the work of 
professional community members in the same direction. 
The decision process for the location of the new bridge over the Tagus was a learning 
process for many people. Government, professionals, activists and journalists learned that 
there is a changing society, more outspoken and with an increased power of organization, that 
wants to be heard. Moreover, they also realized there are complex problems that may seem to 
have a single clear cut solution at the beginning and may need reformulation afterwards. This 
suggests the need to assure the conditions for such problem reframing to happen. 
When considering these types of complex issues one must allow professionals with 
different expertise to meet and debate the information, to collect it, to have room to develop 
meaning and, if necessary, to reframe the issue. I do not mean that all problems need group 
processes to achieve agreement. There are problems that might have more clear cut solutions. 
But in 'wicked' problems it is important to understand that initially defined solutions may be 
revised after putting the information in the light of a new problem frame. These are problems of 
difficult definition. Therefore, the emphasis has to be directed to a consensual framing of the 
problem. 
In a changing world of politics, the use of information needs to be seen in a different 
perspective. It becomes powerful in a new society where environmental issues and a growing 
technology use set the grounds to overcome national boundaries. What made this case so 
influential was 
"the power of the flows (in the networks) rather than the flows of power "l 
We are entering the information society. In this new world empowerment is not so much built 
on the traditional forms of legitimacy but on the efficiency of the flow of information 
established in developing networks. 
Further studies are needed to study these new settings favoring the emergence of new more 
flexible institutions and the better understanding of how they can be positively interrelated with 
the existing bureaucracy and of what is the role information plays in the process. 
Interactive processes, either group processes or networking, when meeting certain 
conditions, have the ability to be creative and generate change. They constitute a key resource 
to address complex problems with no unique answer and involving numerous interests, 
because these processes allow for the integration of information from different sectors and 
varied sources, in the light of a specific issue. If these groups are allowed to operate with 
autonomy, to include the key stakeholders and to use information, they may bring creative 
solutions to the problems at stake and become an important support for the policy maker. The 
policy maker, however, will have to be more adaptive as these groups are likely to challenge 
accepted knowledge. Knowing more how they operate and about the factors that make them 
successful is important for setting these groups and for taking advantage of their operation. 
There has been a lot of study about interactive processes, but since each situation is so 
specific there is limited theorizing about it. This dissertation represents a contribution for theory 
building about the use of information by groups, but more cases have to be studied and 
compared to make broader generalizations. An important part to explore is how bureaucracies 
can be articulated with newly created institutions, since they work with rules very different 
from those of interactive processes. What type of procedures can lead bureaucracies to absorb 
the outputs of these more flexible institutions? Merging the outputs of both operations for a 
common good will bring better solutions. 
The established bureaucracies often regard the interactive group processes with suspicion. 
One of the reasons is that bureaucracies are unwilling to share their power with others. 
However, some cases already proved otherwise. The Mayor of Seattle, who had established a 
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sound interactive planning process, was reelected though his party did not receive the 
confidence of the voters in the second term. A similar case happened in ~vora, where the 
Mayor who had initiated an interactive planning process with the local stakeholders, gathered 
substantial public support, despite his 'party's declining votes. These cases show that the 
confidence built up with the involvement of wider constituencies had more political benefits 
than the drawbacks of sharing power. These are cases that should be studied to provide better 
insights into the way to operate in the future in a world where power has become fragmented 
and more interests inevitably become part of public decision processes. 
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Appendix I 
Interview Guideline 

Nivel de envolvimento/ Papel 
Historial do processo 
Envolvido 
Funcaes 
Estrutura o gimatava . . r 
Funcionament~ 
Freauencia das reuniaes 
Elementos envolvidos nas reuni6es: ttknicos do GATI'EL. do exterior. CMs ... 
Havia lirracaes com o PROTALM. ou CCR em rreral? 
OS resultados e r a .  discutidos nas reuniBes? 
Oralmente? Distribuidos antes em forma escrita? 
Com a ajuda de elementos visuais? (slides, mapas, grAficos, etc.) 
Havia relat6rios regulares? Distribuidos a todos OS envolvidos? 
Existe algum material escrito do processo, al6m dos relat6rios piiblicos do GATTEL? 
(Doc 1 - Identificaggo Preliminar dos Corredores a Estudar - Abril9 1 
Doc 4 - Avaliaggo dos corredores - identificagiio e avaliqiio de efeitos Sept 91 
Doc 5 - Apresentaggo dos traqados - Julho 91 
Doc 6 - Avaliag2o dos corredores - ConclusBes e recomendagks (l0 fase) Sept 91) 
Processo 
Tinha tido alguma experiikcia de envolvimento neste tip0 decisaes piiblicad localizqiio? 
E a primeira vez que est6 envolvido num caso destes? 
Ou em casos afins? 
Acha que este processo foi diferente dos outros em que esteve envolvido? 
Porque? Em que aspectos especificos? 
Como compara este processo com outros do seu conhecimento e envolvimento? 
Como 6 que este se diferencia da sua experigncia anterior? 
Como B que se diferencia da forma usual de funcionamento? 
ReuniGeg 
Quando C que foi envolvido no processo? Especificamente quando C que comegou a ter 
reuniGes? 
Com a equipa gcnica? Com OS elementos da comissiio instaladora? 
Qual era a frequencia? 
Elementos presentes nas reunities: representante de todos ministros sempre presentes (duma 
foram geral), ou alguns mais em permanencia que outros, ou convocados de acordo com o 
t6pico 
ORGANIGRAMA DE COMPETI~NCIAS 
As reunities foram titeis durante o processo? 
Poraue diz isso? 
Quais eram OS assuntos irnportantes discutidos e debatidos? 
Factos? Opinities? 
Acha que me pode dar um exemplo? 
Aspectos tecnicos ... 
reuniaesl informaciia 
Houve casos em que informa~iio que lhe niio parecia importante (crucial) foi considerada e 
usada? Como? Exemplo concreto. 
Porque 6 que achava que nil0 era relevante? 
Argumentou na ocasiiio? Usou factos? Quais? 
Pensa que OS outros elementos presentes o compreenderam? 
Quais tergo sido OS argumentos mais eficazes? 
Trabalho de prupo 
Esteve de alguma forma envolvido com o trabalho de grupo? 
Apenas com um element0 especffico? 
0 que pensa do trabalho de grupo? 
(em comparagiio com outros grupos ecnicos em que tenha trabalhado) 
Leu OS relat6rios? 
Pensa que existe algum aspect0 crucial que niio foi contemplado? 
estao do Drocesso de gnqm 
Virios subgrupos? 
Qual era a fuqHo especifica do grupo tknico? 
Como era o funcionamento? 
Actores chave 
As ag$ncias relevantes foram envolvidas no processo? 
Como era esse envolvimento? (revisgo de relatbrios, pareceres, reuniaes ?) 
Foi alguma delas deixada fora do processo? 
PorquC? 
0 que o faz pensar que era um interveniente importante? 
Fez diferenqa n2o ter esse interveniente envolvido? 
Objectivm 
Qual foi a miss20 inicial que lhe atribuiram? Isso mudou? 
PorquC? 
Existiram mais que um objectivo? Qual deles h e  parece mais importante? 
Problema 
Qual C o problema que a ponte vai resolver? 
Duma perspectiva tCcnica como C que VC o problema? (solu~iio de traego, desenvolvimento, 
ligaqiio N-S, congestgo) 
Porque C que isso C urn problema? 
OS outros v i m  o problema da mesma forma? 
0 problema foi discutido durante o processo? Especifique. 
0 grupo pensou longamente sobre o problema? Argumentaram como? 
Consegue-se resolver m.ais de um problema com uma 6nica alternativa? Como? 
Quando comeqou a trabalhar no processo o grupo estava jB a tratar um problema especifico? 
Qual? Como? 
Ideia pre-existente 
Houve pessoas que me disseram que a localizaqiio no Montijo era uma ideia muito forte e que 
grande parte veio com essa ideia para o processo? Acha que isto C verdade? PorquC? 
Ouiniii~ 
Entrou no processo jB com uma opiniiio acerca da localiza@io? 
Posso saber qual? 
Mudou de opiniiio durante o processo? Porque? 
Houve factos e argumentos que o fizeram mudar de opiniiio? 
Gw2Q 
No inicio o grupo tinha uma opiniiio especifica? Como 6 que evoluiu ao longo do processo? 
0 que fez o grupo alterar a opiniiio, ou manter a opiniiio? 
Individual 
Houve alguem que tenha vindo para o processo com uma opiniiio especifica e tenha alterado a 
opiniiio ao longo do processo? Quem ? Como? Quando? Porque 6 que acha que isso aconteceu? 
Informaciio 
Pensa que houve informa~iio importante que foi deixada fora do processo? Qual? Especifique. 
Porque? 
Ar~umentaciio 
Tentou argumentar acerca de algum aspect0 que considerasse muito importante? Pode-me dar 
um exemplo. 
Conseguiu que OS outros o percebessem e aceitassem a sua perspectiva? Convenceu-OS? 
Pensa que conseguiu faz6-10s perceber o seu ponto? 
Isso seguia uma direc~iio que eles niio queriam? 
Era um assunto controverso, quais foram or argumentos usados? 
Factos usados? Exemplos? 
6 
SituacGes inesperadas 
Lembra-se de alguns aspectos novos que emergiram durante o processo? 
Porque pensa que eram importantes? 
SueestGes 
Como 6 que um processo destes poderia ser melhorado de futuro? 
Appendix I1 
Cronology of Events 





Parecer n" 215lPI "Nova travessia do 
1992.05.22 
1992.05.22 
C a r r e g a d o  s t u d i e s  o n l y  
concluded In 7 to 8 months 
CB asks for CSOP ducument 
bridge cannot be constructed in the central corridor" he based his opinion in a 
document of the CSOP, but ignored the written comment developed by his 
cabinet dated from Feb 10,92" (Expresso 92.05.09) 
(Seman6rio92.05.22) 
(Sema&io 92,05,22) 





Appendix I11 
News 













